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A bstract
This study is concerned with the making of regulatory policy for pharmaceuticals in the 
European Union. It proposes that an ad hoc development of Community competencies 
which does not amount to coherent strategy, far less a single medicines market, has 
resulted in a regulatory framework which favours the interests of industry. This is important 
on two fronts. First, it appears to run counter to contemporary research into EU regulation, 
which finds that consumer interests prevail over those of producers generally. Second, this 
pro-industry leaning seems not to be in keeping with member states’ regulatory 
frameworks at home, which developed primarily as a means of protecting consumers’ 
health (patients) following the Thalidomide tragedy. In providing support for this 
contention, rather than adopting an economic frame of analysis to assess -  quantitatively -  
how the industry benefits, the study instead proposes a political perspective to understand 
how policy decisions have been taken.
Specifically, the study examines how supranational policy for pharmaceuticals is made with 
the context of a clash between the European Community’s free movement of goods 
principles and, via the principle of subsidiarity, the right of the member states to decide 
their national healthcare priorities. The agenda and roles of the European Commission, 
the member states, consumer interests, and the industry as the sector’s four primary 
stakeholders are scrutinised within this context. The analysis concentrates on policy level 
interactions, examining how the political considerations at stake over medicines have 
affected policy outcomes in specific instances. It is shown that the incomplete 
development of competencies is not just a result of the policy clash, but also because 
different policy impetuses (and stakeholders) have spurred different aspects of the 
framework. This involves the development of a multi-faceted theoretical lens in order to 
capture the complexities of making pharmaceutical policy at EU level.
This lens is based on the understanding that EU pharmaceutical policy is made within 
policy networks consisting of the four stakeholders. To gain a better grasp of the dynamics 
at play, these networks are tied to a regulatory policy-making framework known as the 
‘politics of policy’. It is a view which identifies different modes of regulatory politicking on 
the basis of the perceived costs and benefits the proposed intervention would bring to 
affected interests. Linked with wider European integration and policy-making theories, 
including neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance, this allows 
for a more complete perspective on how policy is made for the sector. Via its broader 
approach, therefore, the study provides insight into the complexities of making 
supranational policy for medicines, especially with regard to the need to balance conflicting 
interests within the harmonisation process.
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Chapter  1 
No Single European  M arket in Pharmaceuticals
Introduction
In the context of modem medicines regulation the late 1950s and early 1960s was a 
watershed. Under tragic circumstances the drug Thalidomide focused attention on the 
potential harm inadequately regulated medicinal products could cause. Originally released 
by Chemie Grunenthal on the West German market in 1957, and prescribed as a sleeping 
aid in the treatment of morning sickness for pregnant women, Thalidomide (Contergan in 
West Germany) was hailed as a ‘break-through’. But the subsequent birth of tens of 
thousands of babies with congenital anomalies, as well as the affliction of many pregnant 
women with peripheral neuritis -  a severely degenerative nerve disorder which can result 
in irreversible damage -  saw the drug’s removal from most of the major markets in 19611. 
And though the damage had been done, policy-makers set about reviewing the nature of 
drug registration and regulation. The result, beginning in West Germany2, was a wave of 
new medicine laws in many countries regarding the safety evaluation of therapeutic drugs.
Having long-recognised the potential toxicity of medicinal preparations, many western 
countries had various regulations in place before the tragedy. These were primarily 
administrative, however, pertaining mainly to drug quality, advertising and promotion i.e. 
what claims manufacturers could make about their products. Until the early 1960s most 
had no independent safety and efficacy testing protocol for new drugs whatsoever. The 
Nordic countries and the United States were exceptions, though the latter was the only 
major western market to not approve Thalidomide.
Since the late 1950s, pharmaceutical manufacturers in the US were obliged to provide 
reliable and accurate information in their packaging inserts -  particularly regarding any 
adverse effects -  such that doctors and health professionals could make informed 
decisions on the drug’s use. This was not yet the case in Europe where patients did not 
pay for their medicines and pressure for proof of efficacy was therefore not as strong. 
Moreover, the US also had a federal regulatory office for pharmaceuticals, the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), which in 1958 had been empowered by the US Congress to 
license manufacturers subject to their meeting certain safety standards. The Thalidomide 
disaster forced European policy-makers to look across the Atlantic to these elements of the
At its peak Thalidomide was estimated to have been available in 46 countries and sold under 50 
different tradenames (TVAC 2000).
2 In 1961 the German medicines law, the Gesetz uberden Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln (or 
Arzneimittelgesetz), was first established.
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American regulatory framework. For it was on the basis of such safety and efficacy 
legislation that Frances Kelsey, medical officer at the FDA in charge of new drug 
applications, had delayed granting Thalidomide US market authorisation.
With the development of clinical pharmacology during the 1960s and 1970s as a result of 
the disaster, safety and efficacy became widespread authorisation criteria in Europe 
(Dukes 1985). Aware of the need to regain public confidence, most European countries 
also introduced stricter liability standards, though the US example of an independent body 
to deal with medicine applications took a little longer to become a standard model in 
Europe. The United Kingdom, for example, created the Committee on Safety of Drugs in 
1963, to which companies were required to submit their data for assessment, but there 
was little government control until the 1968 Medicines Act (Orzack at el 1992) -  since 1989 
the Medicines Control Agency decides on all market applications. In Germany, the 1961 
drug law was accompanied by the compulsory registration of all new medicines with the 
Bundesgesundheitsamt (Federal Ministry of Health) but it was only in 1967 that proof of 
effectiveness became an approval criteria; which was then strengthened to include 
approval based on clinical trial evidence in 1971. It is nevertheless as a direct 
consequence of the Thalidomide tragedy, therefore, that pharmaceuticals are today 
perhaps the most highly regulated of all consumer goods.
1 Pharmaceutical Policy and the Supranational Context
In Europe, the Thalidomide disaster also made it clear that a broader level of control was 
required, especially as negotiations over a six-country economic co-operation and cross- 
border trade regime had been concluded a year earlier3. Thus, in 1965, and towards 
establishing public health protection guidelines for medicines, the European Community 
(EC) agreed Directive 65/65/EEC on common authorisation requirements for new drugs. 
Guidelines for the pharmaceutical sector were likely to have been a long-term inevitability 
under the common market banner, but the disaster kick-started the process. Since this 
first piece of legislation the Community has been actively involved in the regulation of 
medicines4, and there have been numerous further regulations covering issues from 
guidelines on price transparency and good manufacturing practice, through to the 
licensing, advertising and labelling of therapeutic drugs.
Most recently and perhaps most significantly, since 26 January 1995 there has been an 
independent European Union (EU) institution for the regulation of pharmaceuticals. The
Plans for the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom) were agreed in the 1956 Spaak Report.
4 For this study the terms pharmaceuticals, medicines, medicinal products and (therapeutic) drugs are
employed interchangeably.
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European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA)5 oversees a 
(Community) market approval process for new drugs based on the safety and efficacy 
criteria laid down in 1965. But more than that, according to the European Commission 
press statement released at the time, the agency’s establishment was "... an important part 
of the overall strategy of the creation for a single market for pharmaceuticals.” (CEC IP 
1995) The EMEA brought with it a more streamlined market approval process, lessening 
the time needed for new medicines to reach the market. This would facilitate their ‘free 
movement’ within the Single European Market (SEM), and represents a function which 
goes beyond the more limited information-dissemination role of most other EU agencies. 
The empowerment of the medicines agency in this way, indeed its very creation, reflects 
equally the growing regulatory role of the EU (H6ritier et al 1996, Wallace & Young 2000), 
as it does the specific needs of the pharmaceutical sector in Europe.
The regulatory history this Community involvement in pharmaceuticals represents is one 
which is considerably longer than for other industrial sectors, and it relates to both the 
product and market. Yet, despite being one of the most highly regulated sectors at 
European level -  and almost eight years having passed since the inauguration of the 
EMEA amid much fanfare -  there is still [no single markejjor pharmaceuticals in Europe. v
The reasons for this are numerous and interwoven. They relate to certain unique 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical market and the nature of the EU’s competencies 
which result. Nevertheless, there is a broad-ranging regulatory framework for medicines in 
place -  in which the EMEA is a major element -  and the lack of a single market has not 
precluded the Community from acquiring considerable regulatory powers. It is the purpose 
of this study to examine this framework, to consider its development and shape, and to 
address several important issues not dealt with in the existing literature about how 
pharmaceutical policy has been made in the EU.
1-1 Unique issues
It is first necessary to set out some of the issues relevant to any examination of 
pharmaceutical policy in the EU. The foremost of these is the widely-acknowledged point 
that the pharmaceutical market is ‘peculiar’ in comparison to other industrial sectors in 
developed countries6. Although the reasons for this are examined later, it should at the 
outset be noted that medicines involve ‘life and death’ matter unlike any other industrial 
product. In addition, the market dynamic involves the patient (consumer) being reliant on a 
prescribing doctor for most of the medicines he or she consumes, with the state (or health
5
The EMEA is more widely known as the European Medicines Evaluation Agency.
6 For instance Schweitzer (1997), Mossialos & Abel-Smith (1997) or McIntyre (1999).
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insurance funds) as the largest purchaser. Not just because of health issues then, but as 
medicines are directly tied to social security and healthcare budgets -  with the exception of 
defence, no industry is financed to such a degree through public expenditure -  
governments have an unduly large say in the market. These are just three of the features 
which serve to distinguish pharmaceuticals from traditional products and markets.
The policy issues these characteristics raise represent a constant challenge for decision­
makers. It means that there are three different policy inputs in medicines regulation: public 
health (drug quality, safety and efficacy); healthcare (financing and reimbursing 
medicines); and, in some countries, industrial policy (ensuring a successful and productive 
pharmaceutical sector). National governments thus seek to ensure their citizens the best 
possible access to the highest quality medicines, along with keeping healthcare costs 
down and drugs affordable. At the same time, many are interested in supporting local 
industry and generating employment. These objectives are not always complimentary. 
Moreover, they invoke numerous important actors and interests beyond the state, and the 
result is often a balancing-act or trade-off; in particular between healthcare policy interests 
on the one hand, and industrial policy interests on the other.
Reconciling such sensitive interests at supranational level is even more complex. The 
policy trade-off over pharmaceuticals exposes a gap between the EU’s legal and policy 
frameworks. It translates into a dissonance between the principle of subsidiarity on the 
one hand -  a Treaty-based legal stipulation whereby policy competence lies at the lowest 
level at which it can be effectively undertaken7 -  and the free movement goals (of goods, 
persons, services and capital) of the single European market on the other. The former 
enables member states to determine national healthcare policy, while under the latter, 
pharmaceuticals are treated as an industrial good and fall within the Community’s scope of 
competence under the SEM. Here, medicines are the remit of the European Commission’s 
internal market or industrial affairs office, the Directorate-General for Enterprise8. 
Responsibility for pharmaceutical policy is thus divided; between the EMEA and DG 
Enterprise at Community level, and the member state governments (generally ministries of 
health) at the national level. Member states’ unwillingness to accept any direct Community 
involvement in healthcare matters has been recently reaffirmed under Article 152 of the 
1999 Amsterdam Treaty, which requires the Community to "... respect the responsibility of
7 Article 3(b) of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the subsidiarity principle, specifies that the EU may act “only 
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member 
states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved 
by the Community”.
8 Before the establishment of DG Enterprise in 1999, Directorate-General V (Industrial Affairs) was 
responsible for pharmaceutical policy in the Community. Prior to that the responsible office was 
DG1A, the Directorate-General for the Internal Market.
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the Member States for the organization and delivery of health services and medical care”9. 
This, however, clashes with the free movement articles, as several rulings delivered by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in recent years have demonstrated (Kanavos 2000). 
There are also other articles, pertaining to the environment or workplace health and safety 
for example, which do impact on healthcare10.
Nevertheless, in practice, this means that while the Commission legislates over (single 
market) industrial policy issues such as common standards for advertising and package 
labelling -  and the EMEA has some say over public health policy -  the Community has no 
competence over healthcare matters such as the pricing and reimbursement of medicines. 
The implications of having EU policy-makers take decisions over healthcare budgets and 
social insurance systems, along with the potential accountability questions which would 
arise, are such that member states refuse to permit the Community a wider regulatory 
remit. It is for this reason that there is also no single market in healthcare11, and 
contributes to the considerable fragmentation of the European pharmaceutical market.
This fragmentation stems in part from the Thalidomide tragedy, in that member states’ 
regulatory regimes have since evolved in parallel, though in relative isolation. Each has 
developed its own approach to maintaining a regulatory equilibrium between health(care) 
requirements and industrial policy interests. As these relate to the organisation and 
structure of health services, healthcare financing and provision systems, and the 
sustenance of local industry, they reflect particular national circumstances and 
requirements. In a climate of increasing healthcare costs in Europe (Mossialos & Le Grand
1999) the divergence has become even greater, hardening member states’ resolve over 
restricting Community influence. The result is fifteen separate pharmaceutical markets, 
industries and regulatory regimes within the SEM, such that convergence over any aspect 
implies considerable political will, effort and sacrifice. Bringing these national regimes 
together under a supranational framework has been an expressed goal of the European 
Commission since its original 1985 White Paper on the Internal Market (CEC 1985)12.
Beyond their concerns over public health and the organisation and financing of their 
healthcare systems, another reason for the member states’ insistence on national 
autonomy in the sector is the contribution that pharmaceuticals represent to national
g
Article 152 also grants the Community a role in public health policy, which has an indirect influence on 
national healthcare priorities.
10 For example, Article 138 (ex 118) pertains to the prevention of occupational accidents and disease, 
and occupational hygiene; or Article 174 (ex 130r) or the protection of human health within the context 
of the environmental policy.
11 Via a growing number of ECJ rulings, an EU health framework is emerging (Mossialos & McKee 2001).
12 The White Paper in fact specifically cited pharmaceuticals as a problem area regarding the removal of 
barriers.
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economies. Medicines are an extremely profitable industry and one which generates a 
considerable number of jobs. As a single medicines market would mean both job and 
industry rationalisation13 -  and would undoubtedly favour the more established and 
globally-oriented industries -  national governments are unwilling to gamble over this 
potential winners and losers scenario. Hence their use of subsidiarity to prevent regulatory 
competence being devolved to the European Commission (ostensibly on healthcare 
grounds). This intransigence might, initially, seem to defy much theorising about the EU as 
a ‘regulatory state’ (e.g. McGowan & Wallace 1996); the ‘spill-over’ of Community 
economic regulation into social regulation (e.g. Liebfried & Pierson 1995); and the 
European Commission’s growing regulatory remit (e.g. Majone 1996). However, the 
reasons for the member states’ rigidity clearly relate to the interests at stake. This 
constraint on the Commission’s capacity for action has seen EU pharmaceutical 
competencies develop on an ad hoc basis, rather than reflecting a particular strategy.
A further issue, therefore, is that because of the sensitivities involved, pharmaceuticals are 
a highly politicised arena, with four main policy actors: consumer/patient interests, the 
member states, the industry and the Commission, all of whom are forwarding their own 
agendas. Consumers are primarily interested in efficacious medicines; the industry seeks 
a propitious regulatory environment to remain competitive (and profitable); the Commission 
is pushing for a more integrated market, though one which maintains jobs; and member 
states face the parallel challenges of ensuring access to quality medicines, cost- 
containment in healthcare, and (in some cases) providing support for a productive, high- 
employment industry. These potentially conflicting goals are developed at a later stage. 
But the result of the three policy inputs is that the stakeholders will agree (and co-operate) 
over some issues, but disagree and oppose each other over others.
For instance, while the Commission and industry may favour easing the band on medicine 
advertising in the Community14 to support or promote the industry, many governments, 
medical groups and consumer organisations are opposed on the basis of p o te n tia l 
negative public health effects. Another example is the parallel importation of branded 
medicines15 resulting from price differences for the same medicines between member 
states. The practice is supported by consumer groups, the Commission, and several 
member state governments as a means of keeping healthcare spending down. But it is
13 The Commission’s first report on employment identified the pharmaceutical sector as an industry 
where rationalisation was likely in view of a single market (CEC IP 1989).
14 Directive 92/26/EEC bans direct-to-consumer advertising of medicines, but the Commission has 
recently taken the first steps towards liberalising this. See footnote 183.
15 Parallel importing involves the purchase of branded medicines by a distributor (generally from 
wholesalers) in a less expensive member state (e.g. Spain, Portugal), and their export and resale at a 
lower than market price in a more expensive member state (e.g. UK). Typically, they are sold on to 
local wholesalers or even directly to pharmacies. See Chapter 7.
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contested by the companies and other governments as it affects the profitability of industry. 
The point to be stressed from the outset then, is that pharmaceuticals, and EU 
pharmaceutical policy in particular, are an inherently political matter where the main 
interests (and actors) can converge or clash depending on the issue at hand. This study 
seeks to analyse these clashes and the nature of the policy outcomes they generate.
1 -2 A constraint on further harmonisation
Pharmaceutical policy at EU level, at least in terms of how the Community can make and 
exercise competence, is thus compromised by a conflict between subsidiarity and national 
healthcare competence on the one hand, and the free movement principles of the SEM 
and Community industrial policy competence on the other. This dissonance results in a 
clash between the authority of the member states to set their own national medicine prices 
and reimbursement rates, and that of the Community which treats medicines as a tradable 
commodity demanding that there be no hindrance to their circulation within the EU. The 
former undermines the latter, something which the member states -  adamant on retaining 
their autonomy over healthcare provision issues -  have been able to exploit in limiting 
further development of the Community mandate. How this is played out in practice will be 
analysed throughout the study. But it leads to a situation where the European Commission 
has no authority to take the harmonisation process forward on its own.
Harmonising national policies under EU law along the lines of ‘minimum content in 
programming’ legislation in the EU television sector16, or the standardisation of national 
foodstuffs legislation towards the establishment of a Directive on food law17, is not 
therefore possible for pharmaceuticals. The integration of the EU telecommunications 
sector is also not a comparable case18. It was completed through a slow and deliberate 
process to which medicines cannot be subject19. For not only are national pharmaceutical 
sectors very divergent, but so too are member state healthcare systems; and this 
divergence is compounded by the lack of a single EU healthcare regime.
As suggested, the ECJ plays a major role where medicines policy is concerned. Although 
exercising no regulatory capacity per se, by delivering decisions in respect of many issues 
relating to healthcare policy, competition policy, and pharmaceuticals specifically, it has 
contributed to the environment in which decisions on pharmaceutical policy are taken. This
16 Directive 89/552/EEC.
17 COM (97) 176.
18 Directive 90/388/EEC.
19 Differences in speed of integration between member states’ markets would create imbalances in 
access to, and price differentials between, medicines; something neither the Commission nor the 
member states could defend.
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too represents a complexity to be taken into account when looking at how the EU 
medicines framework has come about.
It is therefore the disharmony between subsidiarity and the single market over medicines 
policy, along with the actors’ conflicting interests, which currently hinders further 
harmonisation. The dissonance also has a bearing on how and what sort of policy can be 
agreed. But while this point has been widely recognised in much of the literature on the 
EU sector, it is more observation than analysis. In looking at the complex, even if 
incomplete, supranational regulatory framework for medicines, the study analyses how this 
framework has been achieved. It examines the Community’s history of pharmaceutical 
regulation against the backdrop of how the healthcare-industrial policy balancing-act is 
played out. The study explores the development of the EU framework for pharmaceuticals, 
particularly since the early 1990s, to the continuing impasse over pricing which precludes 
completion of the single market today20.
2 Towards an Understanding of Pharmaceutical Policy-Making in the EU
In doing-so, the study raises questions and issues which have generally not been dealt 
with in the existing literature. Simply noting that pricing and reimbursement is the main 
sticking-point does not provide any insight into the development of the regulatory 
framework. How policy has been achieved within the subsidiarity-free movement clash, 
and whether the need for a successful pharmaceutical industry in Europe -  from both 
health and industrial policy perspectives -  influences the type of regulatory outcome 
reached, have for example not really been scrutinised.
For instance, it has not been asked why, if the Community is in essence empowered to act 
only in those (industrial) policy areas associated with the single market programme, has it 
been possible to establish a European licensing agency which is responsible for deciding 
upon the safety and efficacy of new drugs (what is essentially a public health role with 
healthcare policy implications). With the exception of Shechter (1998), how the 
Community agreed exceptional patent protection for medicines in 1992 -  given that longer 
patent times impact on drug prices -  has only been described rather than critically 
analysed. And if pricing is such a sticking-point, how is it that one of the pre-single market 
pieces of legislation is in fact a 1989 Directive requiring pricing and reimbursement 
transparency within the Community? These questions hint at some important 
considerations in regulatory policy-setting for medicines at EU level, and suggest that 
insufficient attention has been paid to the issues surrounding the accommodation of the
20 Although not looked at, the framework also covers biotechnology products, veterinary medicines and, 
now, orphan as well as ‘traditional’ medicines.
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oft-times divergent interests of the stakeholders, and how their requirements have or have 
not been served. Why, in spite of subsidiarity, there has been some progress beyond the 
industrial policy aspects of pharmaceutical regulation has not really been analysed.
2-1 The role of ‘politics’
One reason that such questions have not really been addressed, is that the political 
dimension of EU pharmaceutical regulation has generally been mentioned only in passing. 
Discussions on pharmaceutical regulation in general, and the Community’s role 
specifically, have for the most part focused on the economic and, to a lesser degree, the 
legal aspects. The majority of this material has taken the form of sector and management 
studies undertaken by private consulting companies, textbooks on pharmaceutical and 
health economics, or else as issue-specific articles published in law and economics 
journals. The tendency to examine only the economic determinants of policy outcomes 
may not seem surprising given the free movement goals of the single market. But what 
these studies generally fail to take into account is that the European Union (and European 
integration itself), although an outwardly economic construct, is in fact driven primarily by 
political impetuses. The preponderance of economic and legally-oriented research has 
been valuable in discerning certain industry and sector issues, not to mention helping 
understand the (global) legal and economic context in which policy is made. But it has 
generally not sought to address policy-making itself.
There are a scant number of articles about the sector to be found in political science or 
public policy publications, and even fewer expressly political studies (specific aspects of 
the wider regulatory regime have, occasionally, been looked at individually). That said, 
such pieces have been more descriptive, historical or legal than analytical in orientation. 
Three exceptions are Mossialos et al (1994a), Shechter (1998) and Abraham & Lewis 
(2000). Respectively, they are a collection of papers addressing various aspects of the EU 
framework and the interests of the member states in the immediate post-1992 period; a 
study looking at whether institutions matter with regard to where and how pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology firms lobby over EU policy; and research into the degree to which the 
European regulatory framework is geared primarily towards drug approval. There is, 
however, a growing number of policy-oriented articles looking at how EU regulation is 
working in practice (with regard to the number and speed of new drug approvals)21. These 
are relevant to this study and are taken up at various stages. But even so, most of this 
research is concerned with the basis for drug authorisation rather than how policy is-made.
21 For instance Abassi & Herxheimer (1998) and Lewis & Abraham (2001).
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What has been missing is an examination of the ‘politics’ of the sector. That is, a study 
which looks at (the political constraints on and behind) how EU pharmaceutical policy is 
actually made within the subsidiarity-free movement dissonance. As noted earlier, the 
sector is characterised by competing tensions: governments struggling to keep healthcare 
costs down and yet retain local industry; European companies seeking to remain profitable 
and competitive (vis-d-vis the United States and Japan in particular); and the European 
Commission pushing for at least some degree of (price) harmonisation- In addition,'A 
patients and healthcare professionals are increasingly demanding access to the best 
available medicines, and elements of the industry are fighting amongst themselves over 
how best to tackle declining global competitiveness. These all carry clear political 
implications. And as these competing objectives overlap, it would seem crucial to 
understanding how these tensions (and the actors they implicate) have contributed towards 
establishing the current framework. Furthermore, it would allow for a more complete 
picture of how the sector in fact operates and is governed at European level.
This gap in the literature exists primarily because research into EU healthcare policy has 
been a somewhat neglected field. Although this is changing as the effects of the EU 
integrationist dynamic on the national healthcare environment is increasingly being 
recognised -  particularly given the ECJ’s role in pushing the agenda (Palm et al 2000) -  
such articles or reports nevertheless tend towards overviews or summaries rather than 
being detailed analyses. As such, it is a political and policy-making perspective which the 
present study proposes. It endeavours to shed light on the politics of EU pharmaceutical 
regulation by offering a different lens through which to view the development of 
supranational competencies than is currently found in much of the literature. Bearing in 
mind that: i) pricing and reimbursement issues represent the main hurdle in the pursuit of 
further market harmonisation; and ii) that this is due to the clash between the requirements 
of the single market and the principle of subsidiarity in particular, the study examines how 
decisions have been reached and how policies have been taken forward. Amongst other 
things, this involves analysing/understanding:
• the special characteristics of the pharmaceutical market;
• the trade-off between industrial and healthcare policy interests;
• the policy context in which EU pharmaceutical regulation is agreed;
• the priorities and requirements of the major actors; and
• an assessment of what harmonisation might mean to these actors in terms of their own 
interests (vis-a-vis single market completion) and the role they have played in achieving 
policy outcomes.
The premise then is that politics matter. And based on this premise, this study assesses 
the politics behind the making of EU regulatory policy. No conclusions on how to breach 
the impasse and complete the single pharmaceutical market are proffered (beyond 
changing the Treaties, it is not clear that anything can be done). The study simply aims to
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highlight the constraints faced by policy-makers vis-a-vis Community medicine policy. It 
also assesses the influence of these constraints on the resultant regulatory framework.
2-2 Hypothesis and objectives
Within this broad aim to offer a political view of the sector, the study has a more specific 
and twofold purpose. First is to develop a wider understanding of how supranational policy 
for the sector is actually made. Secondly, the study seeks to test an underlying 
hypothesis. This being that the pharmaceutical industry is the prime beneficiary of the EU 
regulatory framework for medicines. The two are reinforcing in that it is via undertaking the 
former that the latter can be pursued.
Beginning with the hypothesis, this involves testing a contention which seems to run 
counter to existing views on the nature of EU regulation -  that consumer interests 
generally prevail over producer interests (Wallace & Young 2000). More importantly, it is 
one which carries potentially serious social implications given that national regulatory 
frameworks for medicines have developed primarily as a means of protecting patients 
(consumers) rather than serving the industry (Anon 1991). The Commission may claim 
that policies designed to foster the single market are a benefit to the European patient first 
(e.g. CEC IP 1995, CEC 2000), but as this is predicated on the assumption that quicker 
market access for new drugs automatically means a health benefit, it seems more intuitive 
than empirical. Indeed, studies have shown that there is no evidence patients have 
actually benefited from the quicker approvals the EMEA delivers (e.g. Edmonds et al
2000). It has even been argued by a member of the agency’s Committee for Proprietary 
Medicinal Products (which undertakes new drug assessments) that industry interests 
prevail in the work it has carried out to-date (Garattini & Bertele 2000). Simply saying that 
this inclination towards industrial policy and industry reflects the Community’s comparative 
impotence in health(care) affairs, or is the unintentional result of the push towards the 
single market, while true, is slightly superficial and does not adequately explain how this 
situation was attained22.
The contention is based on the claim that industry and industrial interests dominate the 
pharmaceutical policy arena, and the study posits three reasons for this: first, that there is 
a natural confluence between industry’s interests and the Commission’s industrial policy 
priorities; second, the institutional leaning within the Community framework -  where the
22 This industry-leaning at EU level has been noted by consumer and patient groups (e.g. NCC 1994) 
and in the odd journal article (e.g. Orzack 1996), but has not generally been dealt with from a policy­
making standpoint. An exception is the work carried out by John Abraham and Graham Lewis. They 
have argued a ‘neo-liberal corporate bias’ in European medicines regulation and remain fierce critics of 
the industry’s influence in drug authorisations (e.g. Abraham & Lewis 1998, Abraham & Lewis 2000, 
Lewis & Abraham 2001).
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Commission has industrial but not healthcare policy competence -  supports industry 
arguments; and third, the fragmented nature of the market enables the industry to exert 
undue influence within the policy arena. This latter point is perhaps the most contentious, 
it may even seem paradoxical. For if the market is fragmented it ought to be more difficult 
for a single actor to dominate. But as will be shown, not only is the industry the most 
stable actor within the policy-process, and with a consistent set of demands, but because 
of certain informational asymmetries which characterise the sector, the industry has been 
able to convince other actors of its arguments.
Indeed, one of the key issues raised in this study concerns the part played by the industry 
in the policy-process, along with the role of information. The latter issue has received a 
great deal of attention in policy-making generally, but it seems especially important here for 
several reasons. First is the lack of transparency which characterises the sector. Access 
to pharmaceutical industry information and activities, such as the results of clinical trials 
and the focus of investment, is notoriously difficult to come by23. As a high technology and 
high investment industry, companies are reluctant to share information, often citing 
‘commercial secrecy’ as grounds for not doing so. Second, even where the industry does 
make information available, it is really only accessible to those with specialised knowledge 
i.e. those with medical and/or scientific training. Third, because of this virtual ‘informational 
monopoly’ held by the industry, non-industry sourced data that is accurate and objective -  
such as on industry performance, R&D costs, market shares, and data on time to market 
periods for new drugs -  is severely lacking. And fourth, as will be shown, the information 
around which policy-makers tend to base their policy decisions (at both national and EU 
levels) is generally that provided by the industry itself. While the issue of informational 
asymmetries in the sector could constitute a study all of its own, it is dealt with here within 
the context of the policy-process.
In order to test this hypothesis of an industry-leaning framework, it is first important to 
understand how EU pharmaceutical policy is made. The approach adopted to do so must 
be able to take into account the complexities and policy-making constraints already raised. 
It is argued that existing theories of European integration and policy-making, while they 
provide important insights, are unable to provide a complete picture of how and why the 
framework for medicines regulation developed in the manner and shape that is has. 
Macro-theories are precisely that, macro; they highlight general patterns and tendencies. 
They can be used to identify broad influences and establish policy environments for 
pharmaceuticals, such as the integrationist pressure of the single market programme, but 
cannot really be used to assess how policy is made. Policy-making theories meanwhile
23 For instance IJRM (1996) or HAI (1997).
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are able to explain the dynamics at play in the sector, but are unable to account for the fact 
that pharmaceutical policy is a divided competence between the member states and the 
Community. While they may provide insight into a given policy decision, they do not really 
help to explain the Community approach to pharmaceutical regulation on a larger scale. 
Further, they are often process-oriented, and thus unable to take the actions of specific 
actors in specific circumstances into account. This is not to deny the value of both 
integration and policy-making approaches, but simply to point out that on their own they do 
not answer certain specific questions raised. What is needed alongside them, therefore, is 
a more meso(-level) analysis24. Here the umbrella of public policy theory provides more 
specific levels of analyses in terms of institutional and actor behaviour, the analysis of 
problem definition, agenda-setting, and the role of preferences amongst others -  
approaches which have already been transposed to the supranational context. More 
specifically, the policy network concept proves the most useful given the focus on actors.
As policy networks enable the student to focus on actors and their interactions in the policy 
process, it is a meso-level approach which lends itself to the study of EU pharmaceutical 
policy-making. Community pharmaceutical policy, it is argued, takes place in tight 
(network) configurations of four main actors at the supranational level. These are the 
member states, the industry, the European Commission, and consumer interests; which 
are presented as the sector’s primary stakeholders. Moreover, given the oft-times 
conflicting interests at stake where balancing public health, healthcare and industrial policy 
is concerned, pharmaceuticals can therefore be seen as an arena of 'antagonistic 
cooperation’25 between the stakeholders involved in such configurations. Decisions have 
to be reached, and policy networks are used in this context.
Importantly, policy networks can be tied into the macro environment. The study therefore 
seeks to be consistent with wider established perspectives on both the nature of European 
integration and the dynamics of EU policy-making. By way of contextualising the meso- 
analysis, the development of EU pharmaceutical competencies is first considered from a 
European integration perspective. In particular, neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist 
thinking, the ‘multi-level governance’ view of the EU policy-process (Marks et al 1996, 
Christiansen 1997), and the so-called ‘regulatory state’ conception of the Community 
(Majone 1996, McGowan & Wallace 1996) are consulted. Importantly, the latter two
24 This study’s use of the term ‘meso-level’ is based on Parsons’ (1995) definition: “Meso analysis is the 
way in which issues and problems are defined and agendas set. ‘Meso’ -  or a level of analysis which 
cuts across or through various phases of the policy process -  explores approaches which link the input 
side of the policy-making process with the policy/decision-making and output process by focusing on 
the relationship between the ‘pre-decisional’ dimensions of policy-making and its decisional and post- 
decisional contexts.” (82)
25 ‘Antagonistic cooperation’ is a term coined by Marin (1990) with regard to public policy-making over 
social welfare issues.
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approaches reflect a tacit acceptance of the EU as a new system of governance, and one 
which has spawned a growing body of academic research (e.g. Richardson 1997, Scharpf 
1999). As such, these approaches are examined in relation to the pharmaceutical sector 
later in the study, where their relevance and value are developed.
This multi-dimensional approach to understanding how Community regulatory policy for 
pharmaceuticals is made, is developed as the means via which the study’s contention can 
be tested. The idea is not a telos or single theory of EU pharmaceutical policy-making, but 
rather a lens through which to better understand the shape and development of 
supranational policy for the sector; one which can account for the claim that industry is the 
main beneficiary (before consumer interests).
3 Method and Study Outline
Before outlining the remainder of the study, a brief explanation of (and justification for) the 
choice of policy networks to underpin the theoretical framework is necessary; especially as 
it is an approach, the nature of which continues to be debated.
3-1 Using policy networks
Specific to an examination of those policy-processes which characterise an EU sector, a 
framework which is able to analyse decision-making with respect to political interactions 
(institutional or personal), 'pressure politics’, and the balancing of economic and social 
priorities, is crucial. The stakeholders and their place in the pharmaceutical policy clash 
make it clear that the approach must be able to account for their interests. It needs to be 
flexible enough to accommodate both institutional and inter-actor behaviour, and it ought to 
be based on verifiable (observed) examples within various empirical settings. Such an 
approach is being advanced as public policy scholars continue to develop the field of policy 
network analysis.
The policy network is a concept which has been given much attention in both the national 
and EU contexts. By focusing on actors and interactions in the policy-process, it is an 
approach which can take meso-level factors into account; that is, the linkages between the 
definition of a problem or issue, the setting of an agenda and decision-making process to 
address it, and implementation26. Although there is disagreement within the field -  that 
which is taken up later -  policy network analysis is here employed as a manner of 
understanding the nature of actor relationships and behaviour in the pharmaceutical sector,
26 For a discussion see Parsons (1995), 85-243.
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as well as to consider the manner in which the EU itself makes such policy. This is in 
keeping with Bbrzel’s (1997a) definition of the policy network as analytical tool for the study 
of policy-making which "... allows a more ‘fine grain’ analysis by taking into account 
sectoral and sub-sectoral differences, the role played by private and public actors, and 
formal as well as informal relationships between them.” (10) Employing this type of 
analysis also endorses Josselin’s (1994) definition of a policy network as consisting o f"... 
a set of linkages among a set of organisations sharing the same concerns about a 
substantive area, and whose preferences and actions must be taken into account.” (42). 
This acknowledges that while the main actors are in relationships of mutual dependence 
given certain shared interests (over pharmaceutical policy as the ‘substantive area’), they 
nevertheless seek to push their own specific agenda.
On this basis of these initial definitions, the study demonstrates that policy is made within 
policy networks comprised of the main stakeholders, representing various interests within 
the public health, healthcare and industrial sides of the sector. In this manner a distinction 
is made between the policy community and the policy network concepts. The actor 
groupings over specific pharmaceutical policy matters within the dichotomy are conceived 
of as the ‘networks’, and the division between healthcare and industrial interests can be 
seen as the two ‘communities’ within which the policy debate is undertaken. This endorses 
the view wherein "... the policy network is a statement of bound interests in a policy 
problem: a policy community exists where there are effective shared ‘community’ views on 
the problems.” (Jordan 1990, 327) It is a perspective which accommodates the policy 
network as an analytical tool for studying sectoral (in this case, pharmaceutical) policy­
making, with the locus, therefore, on interest-intermediation rather than governance27. As 
mentioned, however, in this study policy networks are meshed with broader perspectives to 
give a more complete understanding of the politics involved; to offer a conceptual 
framework rather than simple description of the policy-process as these definitions imply.
In arguing that EU pharmaceutical policy is made in network configurations of actors, it 
becomes necessary to understand the grounds for their behaviour. This is especially the 
case as the stakeholders are often ‘antagonistically co-operative’ in light of the competing 
interests already outlined. Here, the study looks to Wilson’s (1980) ‘politics of policy’ 
framework. It is an approach which characterises regulatory policies according to the 
perceived costs and benefits they bring to involved parties, and the type of politicking 
which results. Wilson differentiates between ‘economics’ and ‘politics’ in regulation. 
Consumers’ wants from the economic marketplace are shaped by external factors, while 
politics (and politicians) do not just provide these wants, but actually determine them in
27 This division in the policy network literature is elaborated at a later stage.
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many cases. It is argued that this framework -  which is outlined in more detail later -  helps 
to explain actor behaviour within EU pharmaceutical policy networks, by showing how 
politics can decide or at least shape regulatory outcomes (and even preferences).
The study acknowledges that the policy network approach is not without its problems. It is 
not an entirely novel one in examining the place and role of actors or interests in policy­
making. Similar concepts such as ‘policy communities’, ‘sub-governments’, ‘iron triangles’, 
‘issue domains’, and their linkages to systems or structural analysis, as well as to 
exchange network theory and sociological network analysis have all preceded the policy 
network as a concept unto itself. There are also more contemporary constructs such as 
the ‘epistemic community’, ‘advocacy coalition’, and ‘policy curtain’, all which encompass 
similar premises in addressing inter-actor or interorganisational behaviour and relations. 
Accordingly, it is the relationship to, and oft-times interchangeable use with, these other 
concepts -  along with the lack of consensus over a definition (or usage) within the policy 
network literature itself -  which has led some scholars to question the policy network as 
being a truly relevant, let alone distinctive, contribution to the study of policy-making28.
Without going into such critiques here -a more detailed discussion of the policy network 
and how it is used in this study will be provided at a later stage -  it should be noted that 
such differences are not definitive, and that the applicability of any given theoretical 
approach is often a largely subjective question. An approach which may not function within 
a particular context though works in another, cannot be deemed without merit simply 
because it is not all-encompassing. Policy-making itself has, after all, continued to defy 
theorists in make-up and manner since it was first developed into a field of academic study. 
There are no fixed rules and certainly no one theoretical approach is wholly satisfactory. 
The debate between the broader political science macro-concepts of pluralism and (neo- 
)corporatism, or the persistence of the realism/idealism schism in international relations 
theory, should serve as reminders of the difficulties in studying policy-making. So although 
one may be initially inclined to accept the critics’ view that “... while networks certainly 
have an intellectual pre-history, there is no conscious continuity” (Jordan 1990, 320), it 
must be left up to the individual student to formulate their own interpretations and 
applications as to the viability of the approach -  both as something distinctive and relevant 
to their own area of analysis. This is notwithstanding the fact that doing so proves a 
challenge given the variety (and resulting depth of disagreement) within the field.
In accepting the policy network as concept in its own right, therefore, what should be noted 
here, is that by using it alongside broader theories and Wilson’s politics of policy
OP
For instance Jordan (1990), Mills & Saward (1994), Kassim (1994) or Dowding (1994,1995).
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framework, the study aims to provide a more conceptual understanding of policy-making in 
the EU pharmaceutical sector, such that the underlying hypothesis can be demonstrated. 
The project seeks to offer a political perspective on the EU pharmaceutical sector and the 
regulatory regime; to understand the politics of the policy process given the dissonance 
between subsidiarity and the single market; and to provide evidence for the contention that 
industry is the main beneficiary of the EU regulatory framework. The study can also be 
seen to contribute to the continuing debate on the validity of the policy network approach 
by providing a further application in an empirical setting. The first and last purposes are 
mutually reinforcing in that the chosen setting, the EU pharmaceutical sector, is one which 
is not often studied from a political science perspective.
3-2 Empirical questions and case-studies
Towards showing how industry is the prime beneficiary of the current EU pharmaceutical 
regime, the study seeks to understand which of the stakeholders undertook what action(s), 
when, and why, and what the limiting factors might have been. It interprets these from a 
policy network perspective showing how each actor has been involved in specific policy 
outcomes. Questions thus include: what were the practical effects of their actions, how 
were they brought to bear, and whether or not the final policy outcome reflected the 
stakeholders’ preferences and actions. As the scope of this study does not allow for an in- 
depth analysis of all EU pharmaceutical policies, case-study examinations of how 
outcomes were or were not reached in three specific areas are laid out. Attention is given 
to: i) the Community’s 1992 decision to grant medicines a special intellectual property 
protection regime; ii) the background to the 1995 launch of the European Medicines 
Evaluation Agency and its operation since; and iii) the political wrangling and continued 
intractability over medicines pricing and reimbursement policy in the Community. Here, the 
various attempts made by the Commission towards promoting price harmonisation (or at 
least liberalisation) and the reactions of the other stakeholders are analysed.
These cases have been selected as they represent separate and crucial policy initiatives 
within the EU medicines framework and give a clear indication of the complexity in making 
policy at this level. As they are also ones which involved or continue to involve protracted 
negotiation amongst the main stakeholders, they have been chosen to show the relevance 
of the theoretical approach. Each is treated as a separate policy network, although as the 
third case-study involves looking at several initiatives, these are presented as individual 
networks. Within these case-studies, other, wider issues to be considered include 
transparency and access to information, parallel importation, attempts to establish a 
Community ‘industrial policy’ for pharmaceuticals, and the place of consumers/patients in 
the policy-process. These too reflect political agendas within the sector.
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Specific research questions are therefore developed in relation to the broad theoretical 
rubric proposed. If, as mentioned, traditional theories of European integration do not fit, 
what then is their relevance to harmonisation in the sector, and what do they reveal about 
the health-industrial policy clash? How do policy networks operate in the pharmaceutical 
sector, especially within the constraints posed by the regulatory context? Does the 
composition of the networks affect the final policy outcome; does the nature of the policy at 
stake affect the type of settlement reached; or both? In what way can the industry be said 
to be the most ‘stable’ actor within the policy networks? And, does the theoretical lens 
employed provide a clearer understanding of the policy-process as is posited?
Consequently, it must be noted that this study is not about EU (economic) regulation per 
se. A detailed examination and application of regulatory theory is not provided. But as the 
discussion does centre around the Community’s competencies in a particular sector -  
competencies which by their nature are regulatory -  a brief consideration of the unique 
nature of regulation in the EU is offered. The emphasis will be on explaining how certain 
interests are galvanised around specific issues into policy networks where EU 
pharmaceutical policy is concerned.
3-3 Qualitative analysis
With the empirical element of the study being an analysis of stakeholder interactions (via 
policy networks) at supranational level, this involves examining the behaviour and 
preferences of the European Commission, the member states, the industry, and 
consumers vis-d-vis certain policy issues (within the context of harmonising the market)29. 
Again, these are the primary policy actors for pharmaceuticals in the EU. How they push 
their agenda, how their agenda in fact change given the issue at hand, and how these 
agendas are (or are not) reconciled in the final policy decisions represents an important 
part of the project.
In examining these interactions, qualitative analysis not only proves itself more valuable 
than quantitative analysis, but so too more manageable. This is in part because of the 
earlier-cited lack of transparency in the sector. Independent data and information (i.e. non­
industry sourced) about the industry is difficult to come by, and companies tend to only to 
disseminate/share such information as is useful to their interests. Moreover, policy 
negotiations involving the industry, national governments and the EU, given the sensitive 
interests at stake, tend to be very secretive. The opaqueness and secrecy of the policy- 
process means that it is difficult to establish with any certainty which links were/are
29 The positions of other actors involved in the EU policy-process, such at the European Parliament and 
various consultative committees are also referred to where relevant.
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strongest, let alone when and why. In addition, the sheer number of actors, their interests, 
and the varying nature of their influence, along with the multitude of structures and 
avenues relevant to the policy-process in the EU, would all seem to preclude a numerical 
representation of the policy-making frame.
Consequently, although the focus is on stakeholders, the study does not aim to develop 
graded assessments of actor interactions in policy discussions, nor to attempt to quantify 
the relative strength of their relationships. Josselin (1994) has suggested a quantitative 
statistical assessment of policy network involvement in a sectoral context towards further 
developing the applicability of the approach at EU level, but it is too complicated in the 
context of the pharmaceutical sector. The practical difficulties of quantifying or valuing one 
interaction over another in a given policy network situation are too considerable to be 
overcome. As such, qualitative case-studies of policy outcomes are employed instead. 
They can be used to clearly show how decisions were reached, rather than attempting 
hollow quantitative valuations of the actors’ interactions (within networks).
Methodological issues
Despite the thrust of the study being qualitative and the stakeholders’ views being a central 
component, the methodology does not involve elite interviews. Interviews were originally 
expected to form the core empirical element; the case-studies in particular it was felt would 
benefit from the opinions of those key decision-makers who had been involved in the 
policy-process. As the research progressed, however, interviews were ruled out because 
of numerous difficulties regarding their implementation.
First, consultation with others working in the field of European pharmaceutical policy 
revealed the difficulty in securing interviews, far less using any that might be granted. The 
sensitivity of the issues at hand mean that many key officials (from industry, national 
governments and the EU) are either unwilling to be interviewed or prepared to answer only 
very general questions. And as EU pharmaceutical policy is still a developing field, many 
European policy-makers are therefore reticent about revealing too much30. In particular, 
several key officials in the ex-DGV/F (unit for pharmaceuticals and cosmetics) now have 
other positions in the Commission and cannot comment in detail on their previous posts. 
Moreover, getting interviewees to approve the context in which their views were to be used 
has posed a challenge to several (graduate) researchers spoken to. This was likely to be 
especially problematic for this study given the contentious nature of its hypothesis.
30 Fernand Sauer for instance, former Executive-Director of the EMEA, and now Director of the Public 
Health Unit of the Commission’s Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, was unwilling 
to be interviewed when approached during his time at the agency.
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Related to this was concern over the potential for ‘revisionist history’. In the course of the 
research it became clear that in some instances there were differing accounts of the part 
played by specific individuals in certain policy negotiations or discussions. Published 
interviews with parties who had been privy to specific events sometimes revealed a 
different view of their role than that described by others. Here, the historical nature of the 
case-studies also posed a problem regarding interviews. Most potential interviewees have 
left the posts they then held and many have retired. This is particularly at EU level since 
the 1999 resignation en masse of the 20 European Commissioners.
Source material
Despite ruling out interviews, it was clear that understanding the stakeholders’ Views’ and 
positions was crucial to support the arguments. Hence, much of the basis for the case- 
studies is provided via by official documentation and recorded statements which reveal 
their priorities and interests. Position papers, press releases, published interviews and 
other primary source material put out by the stakeholders themselves -  as well as minutes 
of relevant meetings -  were consulted. Not only did such material offer clear indication of 
stakeholders’ interests and actions, but reviewing it over a 20-25 year period permitted a 
historical perspective on their arguments (something bland interviews would have been 
unlikely to provide). Admittedly, the ideal scenario would have been to combine interviews 
with such primary source material. Nevertheless, with extensive reviews of all manner of 
official documentation having been undertaken, the study has been able to accurately 
represent the stakeholders views. Supplementary and supporting material came from the 
usual secondary sources, including articles taken from specialist trade publications and 
magazines, reports by interested parties such as non-govemmental organisations (NGOs), 
and studies undertaken by private firms.
As regards the case-studies, Commission Communications and draft documents; press 
releases; speeches by Commissioners and other key EU officials; internal Commission 
memos (where available); member state government (ministry) papers; minutes of 
European Parliament sittings and members’ questions as put to the Commission; letters 
exchanged amongst EU officials, other stakeholders and interested parties; and records of 
discussions held during various EU committee meetings, have all been consulted. Much 
information was sourced via EU databases; in particular, RAPID, EUR-LEX (and CELEX), 
PRE-LEX and CURIA31. As not all Community documentation is available via these
31 All available via the EU's website (www.europa.eu.int). RAPID provides access to EU press releases. 
EUR-LEX enables a search of the Official Journal of the European Communities and European 
Parliament documentation. PRE-LEX is the “database on inter-institutional procedures which follows 
the major stages of the decision-making process between the Commission and the other institutions”. 
And CURIA provides the text of all case-law from the European Court of Justice and Court of First 
Instance.
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sources, much of the earlier material required for the case-studies was obtained through 
library searches, and written requests for information/documents. So-called ‘grey literature’ 
and unpublished official material has also been used where available.
Additional information on discussions and meetings which took place behind closed doors 
-  and for which minutes or transcripts were not available -  was sourced via two main 
pharmaceutical publications: SCRIP World Pharmaceutical News (including its insert 
SCRIP Magazine) and MARKETLETTER. Both report on regulatory developments in the 
EU sector, and a hand-search of the issues published from 1985 onwards was conducted. 
It is worth noting that each has expensive subscription charges as these contribute to the 
lack of transparency in the sector. Other specialist magazines reviewed included 
Pharmaceutical Executive, Pharmaceutical Technology Europe and Pharmaceutical 
Technology International. Of especial value with regard to policy-makers’ views was the 
publication Eurohealth. A policy journal billing itself a forum for discussion, it publishes the 
opinions of European and national officials, along with those of academics, on a range of 
health issues. ‘Pharmaceuticals and the single market’ has been a special section on four 
occasions. Industry data was sourced primarily from the European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), EUROSTAT (the EU’s statistical 
office), Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) statistics, and 
IMS Health, a private organisation which provides global pharmaceutical information.
In addition, two broader literature reviews were undertaken. The first, pertaining to the 
theoretical element of the study, involved academic work on policy network theory/analysis 
and European integration and policy-making. The second, more empirical review, was of 
material/commentary on the EU pharmaceutical sector in general and that relevant to the 
case-studies specifically. Here the major information and bibliographic services, including 
BIDS, PAIS and PubMed32 were searched. The material sourced via these databases was 
used to supplement the primary source material, and often helped to guide the research, 
lending weight to the study’s main contentions.
3-4 Structure of the study
Broadly, the study consists of four parts. Part one identifies the issues surrounding the EU 
pharmaceutical market and examines the sector and its peculiarities. Part two develops 
the theoretical framework, tying it to the stakeholders and their agenda. The third provides 
case-study examples relating to elements of the regulatory framework for medicines; how
32 In order: Bath Information and Data Services (BIDS) which includes the International Bibliography of 
the Social Sciences (IBSS); Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS); and PubMed which provides 
access to medical journal citations.
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they were or were not reached, and what roles were played by the stakeholders. The final 
part offers selected conclusions in view of the case-studies. These relate to the main 
findings of the study as well as the future of medicines regulation in the Community and the 
use of policy networks at supranational level.
Chapter 2 discusses the peculiarities of the sector and outlines the issues involved in 
regulating medicines at national and EU levels. It profiles the EU’s competencies, thereby 
highlighting the gaps in its remit. The policy issues raised here set the stage for the 
remainder of the study by developing the backdrop to the discussions and divisions 
between actors which are highlighted.
Chapter 3 assesses the value of European integration and policy-making theory to 
understanding the ad hoc development of Community pharmaceutical competencies. It 
traces the evolution of the regulatory framework and initial insights from a macro- 
perspective are drawn. The chapter argues such perspectives are useful in a contextual 
sense, but that a more encompassing understanding is only offered through the addition of 
a meso-level line of analysis which looks at actor behaviour. Meanwhile Chapter 4 makes 
the case for a meso-analysis, outlining the more salient aspects of policy network theory to 
show the approach’s relevance to the study. To demonstrate why this type of analysis is 
necessary -  given that wider political dynamics can affect policy outcomes in the sector -  
the discussion also examines the nature of regulation in the Community. And here, 
Wilson’s earlier-mentioned ‘politics of policy’ approach is outlined. This is used towards 
providing a wider contextual framework of regulatory policy-making, and is shown to have 
repercussions for networks in terms of when and how they can form over specific issues. 
In this vein, the main stakeholders and their agendas are also detailed. With this wider 
view of regulatory policy-making in place, the study goes on to focus on three specific 
policy areas which form the case-studies of subsequent chapters.
The three case-study chapters relate to the development of the Supplementary Protection 
Certificate which concerns the extension of patent coverage for therapeutic drugs in the 
Community (Chapter 5); the rationale behind the creation of the European Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medicinal Products and what its mandate reflects in this regard (Chapter 6); 
and an examination of the impasse over pricing and reimbursement policy (Chapter 7). 
The case-studies reveal the depth of disagreement amongst the stakeholders, that which 
precludes further harmonisation.
Chapter 8 closes the study from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. It recaps the 
main arguments and condenses the findings from the case-studies, drawing out the main 
points and delivering some concluding remarks on the future of EU pharmaceutical policy
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within the single market. The chapter also looks at the ‘policy network-politics of policy’ 
lens, and assess its merits and restrictions as they relate to the study. By way of 
conclusion, potential further research and lines of enquiry are suggested.
Finally, it must be stressed that although the study focuses on the EU regulatory regime for 
pharmaceuticals, it does not aim to appraise its performance beyond showing industry as 
the prime beneficiary. Instead, it simply aims to answer the more basic question of ‘how 
did we get here?’ But as will be shown, the answer is not nearly as simple nor as 
straightforward as the question.
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Ch a p te r  2
Re g u la tin g  t h e  (E u r o p e a n ) M edicines  Sec to r
Introduction
The previous chapter asserted that the pharmaceutical sector is unique compared to other 
industries, resulting in complex regulatory issues. Divided into three sections, this chapter 
aims to develop this point. The first outlines the ‘peculiarities’ and dynamics of the market 
in order to explain why pharmaceuticals are such a highly regulated sector. Section two 
examines medicine regulation in the EU member states, and highlights governments’ 
competing interests in catering for health(care) and industrial policies. The third section 
examines the place medicines occupy in the EU frame and reveals the shape of the 
regulatory regime. The policy trade-off at the supranational level is detailed -  the 
Community’s role is shown to be obfuscated by the clash between its legal and policy 
frameworks -  particularly in relation to the competing priorities between the member states 
and the European Commission. This sets the stage for later examining how policy is 
made. By explaining how the industry operates and where regulation is applied, the 
discussion also shows why political considerations ought to be given more weight in 
explaining sectoral policy outcomes than has otherwise been the case.
1 What’s so ‘Peculiar’ About the Pharmaceutical Sector?
“All industries are different, but some are more different than others. The 
pharmaceutical industry fits the latter category.” (Scherer 1996, 336)
This designation stems from the fact that “The pharmaceutical industry resembles no other
industry, first, as to the nature of its products, and second, as to economic structure and
development.” (Pharma Info 1982, 9) As will be shown, the wider social implications that
medicines carry, and the unusual economic conditions they generate, result in a sector
subject to regulatory influences unlike those in any other industrial domain; particularly so
with respect to issues of product quality (Scherer 1996). Exploring the peculiarities of the
product, the market, and the structure of industry will enable a clearer appreciation of the
(regulatory) policy issues they raise for national and supranational decision-makers.
1-1 A unique product
The first peculiarity is that medicines are manufactured to bring a direct health benefit to 
consumers. In essence -  and this contrasts them from related products such as vitamins, 
cosmetics and food supplements -  they provide and ensure, if not create, health. No other
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industrial product can make the same claim. The two main categories of medicine are 
ethical or prescription, and over-the-counter (OTC).
Prescription medicines require a doctor’s prescription and differ from country to country 
according to criteria established by national governments or health bodies. They can be 
divided into proprietary medicines -  generally sold by brand-name -  and generic 
medicines. The former enjoy patent protection and represent the most profitable market 
segment, with Germany, Sweden and the UK as the main EU producers. A generic has 
the same active ingredient as an existing brand-name product and is interchangeable with 
it where patents or other legal regulations no longer apply. It is marketed either under its 
own brand-name, else by the internationally-approved non proprietary scientific name 
(INN), and many are available for consumer purchase. Generics can themselves be with 
or without patent coverage, and differ with respect to therapeutic value and price. The 
main generic producers in the EU are Germany, France and Italy.
Over-the-counter drugs are bought directly by consumers from a variety of outlets (though 
not to the same degree in all EU member states), generally without the need for a doctor’s 
prescription. They offer a wide range of choice and are procured from multiple producers. 
Within therapeutic categories, medicinal value and dosage tend to be very similar between 
products, and prices -  because they are generally govemment-set -  are also more or less 
equal. Unlike for prescription or branded generic preparations in the EU, ‘direct to 
consumer advertising’ (DTC) is permitted for OTC medicines.
There is a further category of drug, known as the ‘me-too’ product. This refers to a new 
proprietary pharmaceutical which has the same, or close to the same, therapeutic value as 
a product already on the market. The me-too drug differs in chemical composition from the 
original product, but its target group and therapeutic value remains very similar if not the 
same; and it too enjoys patent protection. Not many products have such subtle and 
nuanced differentiation between their sub-sectors.
This study focuses on prescription drugs, including generics. Beyond being the most 
profitable segment, unique issues pertaining to patent protection, research and 
development (R&D), pricing, consumer access, market structure and therapeutic value, 
raise important policy questions. Further, as prescription medicines are in essence 
supplied by national governments via the healthcare system, the industry does not operate 
like a traditional manufacturing sector. A brief overview of the demand and supply dynamic 
reveals several unusual characteristics and market imperfections which represent the 
second reason for designating the sector as peculiar.
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1-2 Atypical demand and supply
Demand for medicines is unique as the consumer does not usually choose the product; nor 
do patients generally choose to be sick. Instead, it is generally prescribed by a clinician. 
(In the case of OTC, however, patients do demand specific products, though their choices 
are often based on a doctor or pharmacist’s recommendation.) The ‘restaurant dinner for 
three’ analogy, which compares the demand structure of the prescription segment of the 
market with ordering a meal in a restaurant, captures this33: the pharmaceutical market 
(restaurant) is one wherein the consumer (customer) neither demands (orders) nor pays 
for (buys) the product (meal) she or he consumes. Demand comes from the prescribing 
doctor, and there is a third-party -  generally the state via some form of medical scheme or 
insurance -  which pays for the medicines. This characteristic three-tier demand system 
has been well-documented, and is a structure wherein doctors (and to a lesser degree 
consumers) make up the demand-side, and industry the supply-side (Figure 2-1).
Figure 2-1: Structure of Supply and Demand in the Pharmaceutical Sector
Supply  Pa y er  Dem and
M anufactu rers
Wholesalers
G o v ern m en t 
o r  In su re r
 _
Retailer Hospitals
(Pharmacies) (Pharmacies)
Hospital 
Physician or 
Specialist
(Via pharmacist) S/
General 
Practitioner or 
Consultant
Patient
----------- ► Direct distribution  ■> Indirect distribution (prescription)
................  Direct payment  >  Co-payment (where cost-sharing exists*)
----------- > Influence (on indirect distribution/prescription)
* Cost-sharing is a healthcare financing mechanism whereby part of the cost of medicines is 
passed to the patient e.g. prescription charges (See Section 2-3).
Source: adapted from Moore (1997), pg. 82.
The market imperfection captured in the restaurant analogy is furthered by the fact that the 
demand for medicines means that they are very price-inelastic. This is due to:
33 For instance Furniss (1996).
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... the debility-easing or even life-saving benefits unique drugs provide, because 
drug outlays are often covered at least in part by insurance, and because many 
physicians place little weight on price and much on good past therapeutic 
experiences in their prescribing decisions. (Scherer 1998, 205)
Consumers are "... basically egoistic about healthcare especially when [we] are ill and 
have little cost awareness... we simply want the best, most effective treatment regardless 
of the cost and the principle of solidarity tells us that we have a right to health.” (Belcher 
1994, 109) Indeed, as many politicians recognise that campaigning on the basis of a 
heavily-subsidised system of healthcare provision is a vote-winner, access to (the best) 
medicines (regardless of cost) is often portrayed as an electoral goal, if not fundamental 
right of the consumer. Thus, price tends not to affect demand (whether consumer or 
doctor-driven) as it would in other industries. It may affect doctors’ prescribing patterns, 
and does factor in government’s healthcare cost-containment calculations, but it does not 
influence consumer demand perse. As the general premise of ‘health having no price’ is a 
pervasive one -  again, particularly in Europe -  this price-inelasticity underlines the fact that 
medicines are not subject to traditional supply and demand forces.
Central to this demand-supply dynamic are certain informational asymmetries34 which 
represent a further market imperfection. Consumers’ lack of knowledge about the product 
means that doctors and pharmacists act as intermediaries in prescribing or advising on 
drugs for their patients, leading to so-called ‘proxy-demand’. However, doctors and 
pharmacy staff are themselves often unable to properly assess the clinical value of a 
medicine. Thus, treatment is generally based on the expectation that the assigned 
medicine will provide the health required (demanded) by the consumer. A further 
informational asymmetry lies in the fact that the public authorities who decide on licensing 
are dependent on the information provided to them by the industry. For in seeking 
regulatory approval for their products, companies are required to submit detailed files on 
the proposed drug with regard to its safety, efficacy and quality as measured in controlled 
conditions over certain periods of time (see Section 2-2).
It should be noted, however, that this proxy-demand framework in Europe is changing. 
Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) advertising of medicines is not permitted in the EU as it is in the 
US, but the European Commission has recently indicated its willingness to permit drug 
companies to provide information on their products if requested (see Chapter 8). Limited 
to AIDS, diabetes and asthma drugs only, this may indicate a readiness to slowly liberalise 
advertising. The move was in part driven by concerns over so-called ‘e-health’, where 
consumers are increasingly accessing health information via the internet -  much of this is 
unregulated -  or else looking up specific medicines on the companies’ own websites.
34 For a wider discussion see Davis (1997), 145-149.
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1-3 Market Structure: The ‘high-profits-low-entrants’ enigma
A further peculiarity lies in the structure of the supply-side of the market. First, it is 
characterised by considerable fragmentation. This is unusual compared to other sectors in 
that fragmentation takes place not just in terms of traditional market segmentation, but 
more with respect to the numerous sub-sectors of therapeutic category within product 
groups. Therapeutic drugs serve different needs, often specific to individual cases, and 
are not interchangeable; there can be no direct competition between medicines designed 
to treat different conditions. Competition between brands and manufacturers is at its most 
pronounced within rather than between therapeutic categories.35
Second, profits are exceedingly high in the pharmaceutical industry, both on its own merit 
and compared to other manufacturing sectors (Scherer 1996). While commercial success 
is not guaranteed -  even when an NCE is synthesised into a product which is granted 
market approval, it may not sell sufficiently to make back its development costs -  the top 
selling drugs in 2000 together had over US$34 billion in sales (Table 2-1).
Table 2-1: Global Pharmaceutical Sales in 2000 leading products
Rank Product 2000 G lo b a l Sales (US$ billion )
1 LosedPrilosec - an tiu lcerant 6.1
2 Lipitor - cholesterol-low ering 5.4
3 Zocor - cholesterol-low ering 4.4
4 Norvasc - anti-hypertension 3.3
5 Osastro/Prevacid - an tiu lceran t 3.1
6 Prozac - antidepressant 2.9
7 Seroxat/Paxil - antidepressant 2.4
8 Zyprexa - antipsychotic (treats  schizophrenia) 2.4
9 Celebrex - treats  adult osteoarthritis 2.4
10 Zoloft - antidepressant 2.2
TOTAL 34.5
Source: IMS Health data (2001).
A further peculiarity is that despite being extremely profitable, the pharmaceutical market is 
dominated by only a few genuine manufacturers. This is particularly in the ethical segment 
where eleven companies make up 47% of the global market (IMS Health 2001). In the 
generics and OTC segments, despite more players -  Mossialos & Abel-Smith (1997) 
estimated approximately 2,500 companies in 1996 -  it remains the case that 85% of 
therapeutic categories are controlled by the larger firms. This is partly because medicines 
tend not to be price-elastic, but also relates to the significant research and development 
costs involved in producing medicines. The length of the R&D process and, indeed, the
35 In the OTC market, because of the lack of consumer knowledge, this may have the negative effect of
actually leading to competition between products not designed to treat the same condition.
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costs involved are considerably longer and more extensive than for traditional consumer 
goods (see Section 1-3). In specific therapeutic categories, therefore, several companies 
have achieved near monopoly positions (Mossialos et al 1994b). This is not the case to 
the same degree in more traditional industries where product substitution and market 
segmentation are more easily defined.
That said, the question of competition is a point of contention amongst analysts:
Taking a static approach there are high concentration ratios, high prices and 
profits, a small number of large companies dominating a large number of smaller 
companies and a considerable lack of price competition... with a dynamic 
approach the impression is of cut-throat competition not only through product 
competition and differentiation, but through prices. (McIntyre 1999, 66)
This suggests that it is a matter of perspective: those with a pro-industry leaning, like 
McIntyre (1999), take the view that the market structure is natural and competitive, driven 
mainly by the dynamism, costs and risks associated with the R&D process; meanwhile 
those with a more sceptical view of the industry, such as consumer groups (e.g. NCC 
1994), consider the limited number of companies a situation of oligopolistic structure at 
best and monopolistic structure at worst. Their interpretation is a static and uncompetitive 
market because of the power wielded by so few players, which in turn helps to explain why 
profits in the industry are so high.
Regarding the dynamic approach, it is argued that as there is strong competition between 
brands within therapeutic categories, competitors not only have to ensure that their 
products are affordable but moreover that they are more innovative or efficacious than 
those of their competitors. Because of economies of scale, it is suggested that only a 
small number of large firms will ever be able to afford the R&D required of new drug 
discovery in the first place. Here the argument focuses on cost-effectiveness as a natural 
market element. The struggle to produce drugs cost-effectively is viewed as a guarantee 
of competition in the market, and market concentration is thus seen as the product of a 
natural evolution given the sector’s peculiarities.
The static approach is reflected in Davis’s (1997) view that “On closer inspection, however, 
it soon becomes evident that competition of this kind is more apparent than real.” (84) The 
contention here is that: “The moral to be drawn is that under conditions like those found in 
pharmaceuticals, first movers have natural product differentiation advantages that permit 
them to charge high prices and retain substantial market shares -  the essence of
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monopoly power.” (Scherer & Ross 1990, 592)36 Ardent critics, primarily from non­
governmental organisations (NGOs) are often less measured, suggesting the over-pricing 
of products by a cartel of globally-dominant companies. A brief look at entry possibilities 
for new players helps to assess to what extent the unusual degree of market concentration 
is either natural or competitive. For this apparent enigma of high profits but few players 
raises some important questions about market structure and industry behaviour.
Barriers to entry?
In consulting Porter’s (1980) widely-cited work on approaches to the analysis of industrial 
competition, it can be seen that the pharmaceutical market is characterised by significant 
barriers to entry. Moreover, these barriers are especially high compared to other 
industries37. Porter cites seven main impediments typical of traditional markets: economies 
of scale; product differentiation; capital requirements; switching costs; access to 
distribution channels; cost disadvantages (independent of scale); and government policy 
(Porter 1980, 7-17).
The size of the major drug producers obviously allows them to enjoy significant economies 
of scale in production capacity. However, it is not so much drug production itself, but the 
research and development costs behind the discovery and synthesis of the new chemical 
entities upon which medicines are based, which is the most expensive part of medicines 
development. The industry puts the cost of bringing a new drug to market at €500-560 
million (EFPIA 2001a). Although this figure may be somewhat generous (see Section 1-3), 
the industry is clearly dependent on continuous and high-cost innovation. It is here, 
therefore, that the large companies enjoy major scale advantages, and not simply with 
regard to existing facilities, but more in terms of the finance needed to undertake research.
Product differentiation, in terms of competing with well-known products, brands, and 
established firms, also acts as a deterrent to new entrants. The market shares which are 
achievable by individual products, and the fact that many of the large pharmaceutical 
multinationals are household names (often because they are also associated with a wide 
range of consumer products via subsidiaries), is indicative of the extent to which pre­
existing loyalties characterise the market. Doctors too may have preferences in terms of 
what they prescribe. This in turn discourages competition, with even the major 
manufacturers often specialising in specific sub sectors or therapeutic categories.
36 The authors make the point that this monopoly power can be ‘eroded’ or ‘undermined’, though only 
when consumers have sufficient financial incentive to make cost-saving decisions, and providing that 
objective product information is available. As neither of these conditions yet exist, the case for at least 
a quasi-monopolistic structure to the pharmaceutical sector can indeed be made.
37 Significant entry barriers are refuted by the industry, for instance: 
www.pfizer.com/pfizerinc/policy/stake.html.
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In terms of capital requirements, as the high R&D costs represent potentially 
unrecoverable spending, prospective entrants are immediately disadvantaged. The 
established firms thus claim that R&D is a natural impediment, arguing that entry barriers 
have more to do with knowledge accumulation vis-$-vis developing products and markets 
than they do with traditional economies of scale, and are not indicative of an uncompetitive 
market. Still, the resource question remains a hurdle to further competition and is also 
relevant to distribution access as another of Porter’s barriers. For the resources available 
to the dominant companies enable them to operate massive sales forces and extensive 
marketing38. Unlike for other industrial products, the commercial success of medicines is 
dependent on the number of markets the drugs are granted access to, rather than simply 
doing well in any one: “...it will be readily seen that, to render its activities profitable, the 
pharmaceutical industry must have access to as extensive a market as is possible." 
(Pharma Info 1982, 9) Only the largest companies have distribution infrastructures strong 
enough to penetrate several countries’ markets simultaneously. Competing here is a 
struggle for new entrants, especially as long-standing advertising may result in doctors 
prescribing only those products they know best. This relates to the proxy-demand 
structure -  it also raises the possibility of monopoly behaviour by the big players -  and 
means that the large companies can dominate the main distribution channel, allowing them 
to enforce brand loyalty.
In that they are higher than in traditional industries, switching costs are another impediment 
to increased competition. The one-off costs incurred by switching from one product or 
service to another -  which includes not only purchase costs, but also the related costs of 
changing the production system -  are not simply expensive where medicines are 
concerned, but are almost impossible. Medicine producers cannot simply swap products 
and production lines as is the case in other industries. The multinationals are also 
susceptible to switching costs in terms of potential loss of revenue, but the blow is 
considerably less than for new entrants. Most of the world’s leading medicine producers 
not only have established market shares, but are also involved in related industries such as 
chemicals, cosmetics or biotechnology, where there may be R&D and production overlap.
Because they are often mutually reinforcing, cost disadvantages (independent of 
economies of scale) and government policy can be lumped together as the final two of 
Porter’s seven barriers. Access to materials, patent protection, favourable locations, and 
the learning curve -  where costs decline relative to increased expertise -  all favour the 
existing players. Further advantages can be extended to the existing companies via 
government policy e.g. extremely strict and/or expensive industry-wide safety or
38 Unlike in the US, marketing and advertising of pharmaceuticals in Europe does not take place in the
public domain, and direct-to-consumer advertising of drugs has been banned since 1992.
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environmental guidelines which may discourage new-comers. Or else they are able to 
secure favourable financial and tax deals.
At this stage the question of research and development warrants a closer look. For not 
only does it represent a unique feature of the pharmaceutical market in its own right, but it 
lies at the heart of many issues concerning the industry and its regulation. These include 
market structure, profits, competition and market barriers (dynamic versus static 
approaches), and indeed healthcare and welfare gains (or losses). It should be stressed 
that much of the data cited in this section, even if from apparently non-industry sources, 
are in fact the industry’s own39. As mentioned in Section 1-2, this (necessary) reliance on 
industry for data is one of the informational asymmetries which characterise the sector. It 
is therefore advisable to treat such figures with some caution.
Research and development: pressure or smokescreen?
The modern R&D process for therapeutic drugs is unlike that in any other industry. 
Companies must first ‘discover* and patent new chemical entities (NCEs) as the basis for 
their medicinal preparations, before harnessing these compounds to produce new drugs 
and treatments. These they are then required to test for safety, efficacy and quality (not to 
mention cost-effectiveness) before proving this to national authorities. Public/regulatory 
bodies carry out their own reviews, also against the three public health ‘hurdles’. This 
culminates in a market approval process which, depending on the source, can take up to 
between ten and thirteen years40. No other sector is characterised by such a lengthy and 
strictly controlled market authorisation process, far less such a research-intensive and 
costly one (Danzon 1997).
As mentioned, the process of discovering new medicines is extremely high technology- 
oriented and expensive. Industry sources show that as the number of new discoveries is 
on the wane (EFPIA 2001b), R&D costs have been rising steadily since the 1980s, 
doubling in the last ten years alone41. The European industry claims that bringing a new 
drug to market costs €500-560 million (EFPIA 2001a). Along with the risks -  only 1-2 
products out of every 10,000 substances synthesised in a laboratory are said to pass all 
the tests and make it to market as a new drug (EFPIA 1998) -  this sees companies under
39 For instance, many scholars and commentators rely on data put out by the Tufts Centre for the Study 
of Drug Development (TCSDD) at Tufts University. The centre enjoys considerable sponsorship from 
several of the major pharmaceutical multinationals who themselves use this information to support 
their claims regarding approval times, declining competitiveness, etc. This is not to say that the TCDD  
is necessarily compromised in its work, but rather to point out that even so-called ‘independent’ 
sources of information are not without industry links.
40 For example Matthews & Wilson (1998) or EFPIA (2001b).
41 EFPIA -  ‘Did you know?' (available at: ww.efpia.org/2_indust/didyouknow.htm)
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intense R&D pressures. Sub-markets in which new and innovative firms can acquire 
expertise and specialisation, as characterise other industries, do not exist in the 
pharmaceutical sector. There are different therapeutic categories in which companies can 
concentrate their activities, but the research platform is high across the board. Established 
market-leaders thus enjoy an aggregate of latent knowledge which took years to build up 
and which they understandably wish to safeguard. Moreover, it is on the basis of such 
knowledge accumulation and its protection that the industry justifies its market shares and 
counters any charges of excess profit-making or a lack of competition. Looking at the 
growing emphasis on outcomes research for instance, there is much interest in:
... the comparative impact of pharmaceutical therapies on endpoints such as 
survival and disease progression in patients with chronic diseases; but such 
studies can take 5-15 years, require thousands of patients, and cost millions of 
dollars. When firms that are established in a chronic therapy market (e.g. 
hypertension) invest in such research, they... raise the ante for any newcomer 
wishing to enter the market [and] they create a “time-buffered” competitive 
advantage... (Gelijns & Dawkins 1994,169)
The knowledge-base developed by the established firms thus gives them a massive 
advantage over new competitors, especially in the future acquisition of knowledge. The 
expense and duration of R&D leads to the claim that it is the initial cost and potential lack 
of return on investment which discourages new entrants, not the behaviour of the 
established companies. R&D is here regarded as a pressure, and a natural feature of the 
market, making it unlikely that the market could bear any more than a handful of players.
According to company officials, the consolidation of the sector over the past few years is in 
large part due to these research-related pressures. As in other industries, drug companies 
seek to streamline their operations, improve the product pipeline, and eliminate overlaps. 
Between 1999 and the first half of 2001 there were some 678 mergers, acquisitions and 
strategic alliances in the global sector, with 243 of these in western Europe (PWC 2001). 
Even in the so-called £114 billion ‘merger of equals’ -  Glaxo Wellcome’s December 2000 
coming together with SmithKline Beecham (now GlaxoSmithKline or GSK) -  amongst the 
rationale offered by company officials was the improvement of the research-base and 
product pipeline (Pharma J 2000). For these reasons, not only do industry representatives 
expect to see sufficient gains to make their R&D investment worthwhile, but as drug 
development is almost exclusively carried out in the private sector, they seek government 
incentives and an unfettered environment in which to operate. The lobbying of 
governments by drug companies is commonplace. With regard to extra patent protection, 
for instance, the global industry’s fight has been especially energetic, with success in 
extending patent times in all the major markets: the EU, the US, Japan, and South Korea.
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The industry’s claims about costs and risks, as well as the data it employs are, however, 
being increasingly queried. The fact that the public sector cannot afford to undertake drug 
development is not disputed by critics, nor is the relationship between costly research and 
new medicines. But to what extent R&D is a pressure given existing profits is questioned, 
and several commentators have noted that the major research-oriented companies have 
generally spent more on promotion and marketing than they do on R&D (e.g. Wertheimer & 
Gruner 1992, Davis 1997). Moreover, the R&D cost data cited by the industry includes a 
host of inputs which do not directly apply to the generation of any single product. Included 
for instance are the costs of NCEs which were not/could not be synthesised into a new 
drug, as well as products which failed clinical testing (i.e. the industry’s claims of only 1 or 
2 of every 10,000 NCEs making it to market). For those who criticise the market’s 
dominance by only a limited number of players, not only does industry ‘massage’ its 
statistics to make its case, but R&D is not seen as a pressure. It is viewed a barrier which 
industry relies on as a smokescreen in pursuing favourable government policy.
Here, wide-ranging intellectual property rights are said to consolidate the position of the 
market-leaders, and mergers and alliances are thus more about profit than staying 
competitive. A look at the resultant market shares of several of the more high-profile 
mergers in recent years provides some of the basis for these arguments (Table 2-2).
Table 2-2: Major Mergers and Market Shares in the Global Pharmaceutical Market42
M erged Company Companies M erged Date M arket  Share
Pfizer Inc* Pfizer AND Warner-Lambert 06.00 7.3%
GlaxoSmithKline Glaxo Wellcome AND SmithKline Beecham 12.00 7.0%
Astra Zeneca Astra AB AND Zeneca 02.99 4.55%
Bristol Myers Squibb Bristol Myers AND Squibb Corp 07.89 4.0%
Aventis Hoechst Marion Roussel AND Rhone- 
Poulenc Rorer
11.99 3.95%
Novartis Ciba Geigy AND Sandoz 12.96 3.95%
Johnson fit Johnson Johnson & Johnson AND ALZA Corp 06.01 3.84%
Pharmacia Corporation Pharmacia & Upjohn AND Monsanto 04.00 3.2%
American Home 
Products
American Home Products AND Cyanamid 
Dow
11.94 3.1%
Sanofi-Synthelabo Sanofi AND Synthelabo 04.99 1.1%
Source: IMS Health data (2000, 2001).
* In July 2002 Pfizer Inc indicated that it  will take over the Pharmacia Corporation in a stock- 
for-stock agreement - potentially giving the new company over 10% of the global market.
It should also be noted that the ‘new’ companies are themselves often mergers between
two previously merged enterprises. Smaller manufactures suffer in terms of a lack of
financial as well as informational resources. The result is that they often sell their own
42 Together, these represent 10 of the top 11 companies in the global pharmaceutical market. Missing is 
Merck & Co. Inc. with a 5.1% market share. The 12 firms represent some 47% of the global market 
(IMS Health data 2001).
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(incomplete) research to the market leaders. Or else, they are simply amalgamated in 
what appears the ceaseless consolidation of the industry. This only widens the knowledge 
gap, further cementing the position of the very few global market leaders.
Not only are entry barriers high, therefore, but in medicines they manifest themselves 
differently than in other industries. The uniqueness of these barriers to increased 
competition are all reinforced by the research and development task (cost and knowledge 
accumulation). Nevertheless, as has also been argued, industry’s claims about increasing 
R&D costs, decreasing discoveries, and the need to consolidate -  along with the data used 
to make their case -  should not be unquestioningly accepted. Nor should it be forgotten 
that notwithstanding these claims, profits for the major companies remain high.
Multinational oligopoly or quasi-monopoly?
Irrespective of in which of the ‘high-profits-low-entrants’ camps one sits, it remains the case 
that the structure and operation of the market is in stark contrast to the higher levels of 
competition in other sectors. The greater demand and choice, and possibility for new 
entrants to exploit niche markets as exists in other industrial domains does not 
characterise pharmaceuticals. Traditional arguments about start-up costs, capital and 
marketing are alone not responsible for the dominance of so few firms. And though it is not 
clear whether this reflects an uncompetitive industry or not, it does, at best, reflect a 
structure which is less competitive than it could be43. So although scholars such as 
Feldstein (1988), Grabowski & Vernon (1994) and McIntyre (1999) argue that the dynamic 
approach is the more valid, this still accounts mainly for competition amongst those already 
in the market, rather than why there are so few companies.
In combination with the value and profitability of the sector, this lack of competition 
underlines the strength of position wielded by the industry where any (regulatory) policy 
may be concerned. Moreover, as patients (or the state) are obliged to pay high prices in 
order to secure a health benefit, this gives the producer of medicines a considerable hold 
on the market. According to one economist, the pharmaceutical industry is “extraordinary” 
"... for the amount of monopoly power held by sellers of important new products” (Scherer 
1998, 204-205). There is no hard proof that companies behave in monopolistic fashion, 
though there have been legal cases in both Europe and the United States which have 
found the industry to be guilty of cartel-like practices in areas such as pricing or in
43 With manufacturers focusing their activities in specific sub-markets and a few therapeutic categories, 
their power (and market concentration) is even greater than might initially appear.
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influencing the prescribing patterns of doctors44. As such, it is perhaps more accurate to 
deem the pharmaceutical market ‘quasi-monopolistic’. For irrespective of whether or not 
the existing players contribute to the market concentration, the pharmaceutical market 
does suffer from a lack of competition, and the leading companies are extremely powerful. 
The market structure should, therefore, be of concern.
A quasi-monopolistic view of the industry is important in the context of aims to complete 
the single market. First, because a fifteen-country medicines market concentrated in the 
hands of only a few multinationals is not going to inspire confidence in the provision of 
drugs for any other sake than profit (and profit for only some companies and some 
countries). And second, that as this market concentration becomes even greater given the 
continuing consolidation of the industry, it leads to questions about the Commission’s 
ability to act as a non-partisan regulator. Indeed, the power of so few companies is an 
important consideration given this study’s contention that the current EU regulatory 
framework favours the industry.
Here, given prevalent market barriers economic theory suggests oligopolistic behaviour by 
the established players -  indeed, McIntyre (1999) uses the term “multinational oligopoly” to 
describe the industry (57)45. An example would be predatory pricing where established 
companies exploit their cost advantages to bring medicine prices down to levels at which 
prospective entrants would be unable to recoup R&D expenditures. Squeezing out 
competition in the EU market in this way could be particularly egregious. Medical research 
is dependent on not just quality of research, but so too quantity. The more firms and 
member states engaged in medicine research, the better the chances of break-throughs. 
Ideally, more competition also means a better quality of product.
With respect to the Commission’s non-partisanship, as with national governments, it is 
nevertheless in its interest to see a profitable (Euro-)industry. More mergers and strategic 
alliances in the sector will strengthen the industry, and may therefore compromise the 
Commission’s position vis-a-vis its continued efforts at harmonisation. This raises the 
prospect of ‘regulatory capture’ i.e. when regulators advocate the interests of the industry 
they are intended to regulate. It is a concern in any industrial domain, but takes on 
especial significance where medicines (people’s health) are involved.
44 For example, in June 2001, the US Federal Trade Commission launched an investigation into 
complaints about companies having paid generic competitors to keep lower-priced drugs off the 
market. And in Europe, German drugs giant Bayer has been fined by the Commission for 
uncompetitive practices regarding distribution of its cardiovascular drug Adalat.
45 McIntyre (1999, 25-69) assesses the industry against numerous structural and behavioural criteria. 
She finds that it reflects several aspects of both an oligopoly and multinational enterprise, and 
concludes that it is a competitive industry.
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Regulatory capture
Briefly, regulatory capture is well-established both in theory and practice, particularly in the 
United States where the regulatory tradition has hinged on the state’s intervention in the 
market as a means of correcting failures, rather than it assuming a leading role in 
macroeconomic stability as is the case in Europe. Capture stems from a dichotomy 
between ‘public interest’ and ‘private interest’ theories of regulation.
The public interest view has a long history and is premised on a tension between producer 
and consumer. To what extent this tension exists in the pharmaceutical sector is 
debatable. But what is clear is that the companies aim to make a profit at the same time 
as consumers want the best possible medicines. Equally clear is the potential for harm (in 
terms of inefficacious or over-priced medicines) that an unregulated industry could inflict. 
The pro-industry view is equally well-developed. Amongst the first to articulate it was 
Stigler (1971) who argued that rather than being designed and implemented to protect the 
public’s interest, “... regulation is acquired by industry and is designed and operated for its 
benefit.” (3) This is particularly egregious in the context of medicines, for the ‘public 
interest’ is in fact public health, and regulating for industry implies reinforcing an already 
well-performing industry, one which is not necessarily delivering innovative medicines 
ahead of profitable ones. Nevertheless, the market structure of the EU pharmaceutical 
sector does seem to reflect several characteristics which make it amenable to capture.
Its quasi-monopolistic constitution and the peculiar role of the member states as purchaser 
and regulator (along with the Commission) mean that independent, objective regulation is 
difficult to achieve, making the market susceptible to capture. This is because of the 
position of strength held by the industry, based in particular on three bargaining-chips 
which it wields. First is the ethical or health policy argument that medicines research ought 
to be promoted given the direct health benefit that newer and better therapies can bring. 
Second is the argument that newer and more efficacious drugs will mean decreased 
healthcare expenditure, especially with regard to long-term or chronic illness. Third is the 
industrial policy argument focusing on balance of trade and employment concerns. This 
carries especial weight with pharmaceuticals representing one of the few high technology 
industries where Europe is a global leader.
Related to this is the ‘informational monopoly’ held by the companies. With the public 
sector not involved in the development of medicines, it is reliant on industry both for the 
provision of new drugs and the information which public bodies use to make their 
assessments on these products. This makes the market further susceptible to capture on 
two fronts. First is the potential for selective information being strategically provided, and
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second, it creates the potential for collusion between companies. Here the industry can be 
seen simply to present a unified front in trying to maximise its interests. As this study 
demonstrates, this it indeed does when it comes to specific instances of regulatory policy­
making (at both national and EU levels). More worryingly, however, such co-operation, 
given the strength of industry, may allow companies to pressure the regulators (whether 
national governments, the European Commission, or the EMEA). Without proffering an 
opinion on industry operations here -  as its behaviour and influence are examined in 
subsequent chapters -  the point to be made is that the structure of the market too warrants 
regulation, but that capture is a very real possibility.
1 -4 So, why regulate?
In concluding this part of the chapter, recalling that the discussion sought to provide 
reasons as to why regulation in the pharmaceutical sector differs from that in other 
industrial arenas, the discussion has advanced several responses. First, pharmaceuticals 
are a unique product. Medicinal preparations are researched, designed, and sold for profit 
in order to bring a positive health effect in the event of illness (whether cure or control). No 
other industrial product can make the same claim. Other industries are required to take 
consumer safety into account -  with some specialising in this area -  but consumer safety 
is in no way the same thing as public health. Governments need to ensure that medicines 
are safe, efficacious and efficient. And as drugs are costly, they have a further vested 
interested in regulating to ensure affordable prices.
The atypical supply-demand dynamic requires regulatory oversight given the market 
imperfections it creates. Here the patient/consumer does not choose their medication, nor 
does (s)he pay for it. In addition, a fear of illness can provoke a demand for medicine often 
irrespective of cost considerations, as most medication in Europe is reimbursed under 
health insurance. Governments must intervene to control the costs of programmes which 
serve to ensure access to medicines. The informational asymmetries which result from 
this demand-supply configuration also necessitate regulation. This relates to patients’ 
reliance on doctors given their inability to make independent, informed decisions on use, 
and doctors’ reliance on pharmaceutical companies for information on the therapeutic 
value of specific drugs; even governments and national regulatory authorities are reliant on 
industry for scientific information.
The market structure too warrants regulation. The imperfections mean that traditional 
market forces are unable to ensure adequate and beneficial competition; entry barriers are 
especially high. Moreover, given the at least quasi-monopolistic structure of the market, 
governments’ role in ensuring that this does not affect the provision of high quality,
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affordable medicines, is central. Manufacturers should not be able to collude in such a 
way that profit maximisation is placed ahead of the delivery of required medicines. And 
with a strong patent system in place, governments need to ensure that companies do not 
behave in a monopolistic manner with regard to the prices they charge for their medicines.
Ultimately, as ‘life and death’ questions characterise both the nature of the product and the 
operation of the market, there exists an ethical imperative which is stronger than in other 
sectors. Business interests cannot be permitted to over-ride it, and national governments 
are socially bound to ensure this. To what extent the ethical imperative actually prevails is 
debatable, and represents a pervasive theme in discussions about the industry.
2 Regulating Medicines
The next part of the discussion addresses the health(care)-industrial policy clash raised in 
the opening chapter. But before looking at how EU pharmaceutical regulation is pursued, 
a brief overview of the role of national governments vis-a-vis the regulation of their own 
medicines markets is necessary. This is important on two fronts. First because is reveals 
the incomplete nature of the EU regulatory framework. And second for "... while the 
Europeanisation of medicines control has undoubtedly been a supranational and 
transnational phenomenon, it has been built on existing national systems of drug 
regulation.” (Abraham & Lewis 2000, 43)
2-1 Pharmaceutical regulation in practice
Governments’ role is a complicated and multi-faceted one:
Public bodies determine which drugs can be provided to the public, exercise 
surveillance over production processes, limit distribution systems, control how 
patients obtain medication, establish standards for advertising as well as for 
printed inserts in packages, and often specify prices, insurance coverage, and 
reimbursement methods. (Orzack et al 1992, 850)
The remit is broad-ranging and diverse, and involves regulating not simply demand and 
supply, but so too market structure, industry conduct and market performance. This role 
spans both product and market regulation, and includes taking into account the wider 
social aspects of medicines. These are competencies which go well beyond their role in 
other sectors. And recalling the discussion on multiple policy inputs from Chapter 1, 
national governments must pursue overlapping economic and political interests over health 
and industrial policy. At the same time, the role of regulatory officials in pharmaceuticals is 
also to ensure that industry structure and/or conduct are enabling good economic 
performance (Scherer & Ross 1990).
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In addition, governments are generally responsible for a nation’s health. In their capacity 
as regulator and purchaser of drugs, this means ensuring that the safest and most 
efficacious medicines affordable within social security budgets reach the market. Given 
the economic contribution of the industry -  and the fact that a successful industry is a 
prerequisite for the production of high quality medicines -  so too must policies be
conducive to good business. Industry representatives argue that the two need not be
incompatible46, but there is no model; especially as governments have different priorities 
vis-a-vis cost-containment. This creates a policy overlap where regulation must enable 
manufacturers sufficient returns to produce as high quality medicines as possible, but must 
also serve to keep the prices of these drugs as low as possible. In other words, it meshes
public health, healthcare and industrial policy (Table 2-3).
Table 2-3: Competing Pharmaceutical Policy Interests*
Healthcare Policy Industrial Policy Public Health Policy
Cost-containment and 
improving efficiency in 
health services and care
Promoting local research 
and development capacity
Safe medicines
Cost-effective medication Intellectual property rights 
protection
High quality preparations
Regulating doctor and 
consumer behaviour vis-a-vis 
medicines
Supporting local scientific 
community
Efficacious treatments
Generic promotion and/or 
substitution
Generating and protecting 
employment
Innovative cures
Improving prescribing Promoting small and medium 
enterprise policies
Patient access to medicines
Ensuring access to medicines Contributing to positive 
trade balance
Sustaining the university 
research base
* This is a simple listing and does not indicate priority.
It is with any eye to balancing these policy interests and meeting the specific requirements 
they represent that governments regulate both the product and market aspects of the 
pharmaceutical sector. As their methods vary at times considerably, a brief profile of the 
main types of regulatory measure used in the member states is provided in following 
(Appendix 2-1 offers a country-by-country comparison).
2-2 Product regulation -  public health policy
Pharmaceuticals must pass three regulatory ‘hurdles’ before they are permitted to enter the 
market. The first is often called the ‘public health test’. Manufacturers are required to 
prove the quality and safety of new substances in terms of delivering a therapeutic benefit 
to patients under specific conditions and at a particular dosage. These assessments of
46 For example Lawton (2001).
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new chemical entities (NCEs) involve up to 10 years of pre-clinical and clinical evaluations, 
and entail tests on specific groups of individuals.
The second hurdle is one of review and approval. Regulatory authorities assess the 
‘dossier’ of a new drug that is submitted by the manufacturer after the completion of the 
trials. The dossier, or New Drug Application (NDA), contains the detailed results of the 
tests and outlines the purpose and target group of the proposed drug. It also specifies 
under what conditions the product can be administered. Review and approval can take up 
to 3 years, after which, if the regulator is satisfied that the public health test has been met, 
the medicine can be registered and marketed.
The final hurdle is that of pricing and reimbursement, and is:
... the most contentious issue in pharmaceutical production and one where health 
policy objectives clash directly with the objectives of industrial policy [as] it is the 
public bodies’ [regulator’s] intention to achieve the highest outcome with the 
lowest possible cost. (Kanavos 1998, 77)
Manufacturers engage in negotiations with ministries of health regarding the price of their 
new product and its inclusion in national formularies (drug-lists). Such discussions 
generally take place behind closed doors. The talks are crucial to both industry and health 
interests, as all EU governments (save Germany) directly influence pharmaceutical prices 
through a variety of measures. Both sides have a considerable amount to lose if a 
mutually agreeable price is not decided upon.
2-3 Market regulation -  balancing policy goals
In addition to setting the public health test for new medicines, governments are responsible 
for managing the market; the need for which, as has been shown, is perhaps greater than 
in other sectors given the market structure and welfare issues at hand. Market regulation 
involves supply and demand-side measures, both of which are geared towards promoting 
healthcare and industrial policy goals. The former implies regulating industry -  essentially 
through price or profit controls -  the latter involves regulating the consumer with regard to 
their demand for drugs (consumption behaviour). Methods of each have become more 
sophisticated as EU governments have sought to manage ballooning healthcare costs 
since the 1980s (Mossialos & Le Grand 1999).
Healthcare policy and cost-containment
Cost-containment has generally been the priority for most member states and supply-side 
measures have often involved targeting the industry. As this plays on popular opinion
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which holds that if not medicine prices, then manufacturer profits, are too high, it proves 
politically more viable to regulate the industry rather than consumers. With political 
mileage to be earned, price controls are favoured by most EU states, and these take the 
form of: direct price controls on individual medicinal products; profit controls or other 
limitations on industry; and reference pricing formulae (which involve setting benchmark 
prices by grouping similar products together and establishing a relative price for 
reimbursement by insurance). Table 2-4 reveals further approaches and shows that most 
governments use a combination these methodologies. With countries exercising such 
varied types of control, it is the harmonisation (or at least standardisation) of national 
pricing regimes which the Commission has pinpointed as the foremost obstacle towards 
completing the Single Market (Bangemann 1997a).
Table 2-4: Drug Pricing and Reimbursement Methodologies in EU Member States
Member State Free
Price
Profit
Control
Price
Control
Average
Pricing
Cross-
Country
Comparison
Reference 
Pricing (for 
generics)
Promotion 
of Generic 
Competition
Austria ✓
Belgium V y
Denmark y y y y
Finland V
France y y
Germany y y
Greece y y
Ireland y y y
Italy y y y y
Luxembourg y y
Netherlands y y y y y
Portugal y y
Spain y y
Sweden y y
United
Kingdom
y y
Source: adapted from Kanavos (1998).
The different cost-reduction policies mirror differences in health systems and health 
culture. This is important because such policy differences contribute to (considerable) 
price differentials within the EU for the same product. In the southern European states, 
particularly Italy, Portugal and Spain, medicines are relatively inexpensive compared to 
their equivalent prices in northern states such as Denmark, Germany, and the UK. This 
accounts for the former group of countries’ general preference for price controls and the 
latter’s use of reference pricing schemes47. It also reflects a range of national variances in
47 The UK is an exception within this group. For although medicines are expensive in comparison to the 
rest of Europe, prices are regulated in secret between the Department of Health and the industry 
through the Pharmaceutical Profit Regulation Scheme (PPRS), and are based on manufacturers’ 
profits through sales via the National Health Service.
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health and economic concerns, including: structural differences in healthcare system and 
drug reimbursement mechanism; drug consumption patterns; variations in tax systems and 
value-added-tax (VAT) rates applied to medicinal products; doctors’ prescribing habits; and 
the type and development of local pharmaceutical sectors. A single market for medicines 
would have to overcome such national differences.
Governments see price controls as the most effective manner to both regulate the market 
and cut back on costs incurred by health systems48. However, there is no consensus on 
their impact. Proponents point to lower prices, decreasing national drug expenditures and 
a tighter rein on a market where traditional market forces do not necessarily guarantee 
competition. Opponents -  primarily the industry -  claim that price controls: reduce 
innovation by limiting the returns companies can put into research and development; are 
awkward to implement and manage; they may create scarcities (real and artificial); and that 
they have no clear impact on the national drug bill as this is as much dependent on 
prescribing habits and consumption patterns as anything else. A detailed discussion of the 
merits and problems of price regulation, including the complex variations which exist, is not 
necessary here. But it does serve to underscore what potentially needs to be overcome if 
the single market is to be completed.
Looking at demand-side measures, cost-sharing and specifically co-payments is generally 
the most popular system in the EU. This means shifting some of the price for medicines to 
the consumer, and generally involves the establishment of a flat-rate payment for all 
prescription drugs. The premise being that patients are encouraged to think more cost- 
effectively when sharing in the cost of their medicines. However, cost-sharing has equity 
implications i.e. welfare being based on the ability to pay. Not all groups in society can be 
expected to share in the costs of their medicines to the same degree. The unemployed or 
elderly are generally exempt, whilst those in employment pay the same flat-rate (or 
percentage) irrespective of their earnings. Thus, it is a policy which has been said to 
discriminate against those more able to afford.
As with price controls, there is no firm proof that co-payments are effective in containing 
costs. Mainly this is because savings depend on the nature and size of the exemption 
group. Still, it proves a popular option given its relative simplicity to implement. When 
combined with a system of budgeting for doctors (e.g. fundholding), cost-sharing can also 
affect prescribing and thus consumption patterns. This allows governments to not only 
affect drug costs -  albeit indirectly -  but also to retain prices which are high enough to act 
as an incentive for the industry.
48 Though supply-side measures are the most popular method of cost-containment (and not just in
Europe), member states are increasingly using a combination of supply-side and demand-side
measures.
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This ability to influence indirectly relates to the use of drug formularies (lists), which dictate 
which drugs can and cannot be prescribed. ‘Positive’ lists identify those medicines which 
are reimbursed under national insurance systems, while ‘negative’ lists delineate those 
which are not -  these are subject to co-payment charges. All EU countries employ either a 
positive or negative list, and sometimes both. Again, there is again no conclusive proof as 
to the effectiveness of lists in reducing drug costs. Positive lists often cover only cheaper 
drugs for example, while a change in a patient’s course of treatment may involve switching 
them from a negative to positive list medicine. Here too the differences amongst the 
member states are considerable, with the financing aspects of national healthcare systems 
directly implicated.
A final demand-side measure necessitating mention given its increased use in Europe is 
generic substitution. While countries such as France, Italy and Spain49 may not yet have 
well-established generic markets, the policy of substituting branded medicines for generic 
equivalents is widely regarded as an easy way by which governments can cut costs and 
promote competition. Implementation can prove difficult, especially as doctors are 
generally against the practice, arguing that it undermines their autonomy (Burstall 1997). 
Despite growing in popularity, generic substitution is therefore likely to take a considerable 
time before becoming a standard policy option across the EU. And though the European 
Commission has strongly supported the use of generic policies (i.e. substitution, promotion, 
prescribing) in the member states, it has no competence to enforce this.
Industrial policy
Beyond controlling costs, national regulatory systems are also designed to serve 
governments’ industrial policy objectives (recall Table 2-3). The specifics of these goals 
differ between EU member states, even amongst those with a domestic manufacturing 
industry. In general, however, with pharmaceuticals representing an extremely profitable 
industry, governments are keen to support it for the economic rewards it brings. This is 
especially so for those countries with a research-oriented industry. In the UK for example, 
pharmaceutical production was worth some €18,478 million in 1999 (EFPIA 2001a). As to 
the sector’s value to the EU economy as a whole, it is the fifth-largest industrial sector, 
representing some 3.5% of total industrial production, and production was worth some €95 
billion in 1999 at current prices (Gambardella et al 2000)50. Much of the value of EU 
production is via exports -  particularly to the US where medicine consumption is much 
higher than in Europe -  which contributes to the Community retaining a favourable balance
49 This is due to pharmaceutical prices being considerably cheaper than in other member states, such 
that the need for cheaper generics is not necessarily an issue.
See Appendix 2-2 for EU production broken down by member state.
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of trade. Measured by sales, the combined European industry (the EU plus Switzerland) 
contributes almost a quarter (43%) of the world’s total output of pharmaceuticals (EFPIA 
2001a).
Medicines are an extremely research-intensive and high technology industry. In 1997 for 
example, Pfizer’s R&D spending was some US$1,710 million on one product alone: its 
much vaunted impotence drug Viagra. Although the drug did then achieve sales in excess 
of US$400 million in just the first three months of being on the market (Kanavos 2000), 
such returns are not the norm. Nevertheless, medicine research and production requires 
considerable investment and is therefore important in the domestic manufacturing context. 
Moreover, the industry is a major employer. From those involved in the ‘hands-on’ 
development of a new chemical entity (NCE) to those responsible for product distribution, 
the industry requires a range of skills. According to the Association of British 
Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), the UK industry not only employs some 60,000 workers 
directly, but it generates a further 250,000 jobs in related industries (ABPI 2001a). And the 
European sector as a whole directly provides around 520,000 jobs across the Community 
(Gambardella et al 2000). Here it should be noted that the number of jobs grew at a 
steady average of 2% per year throughout the 1980s (Appendix 2-3), representing a 
healthy increase considered against employments rates for other EU manufacturing 
industries. Understandably, this is something that all European governments and the 
Commission are keen to maintain51. The industry and the Commission continually stress 
the employment card in all supranational policy discussions regarding the future of the 
sector. In both employment and investment terms, therefore, the success of the 
pharmaceutical industry is crucial to national economies, and many governments are thus 
keen to promote R&D capacity in particular.
It is unsurprising then that governments seek to keep pharmaceutical firms on home soil. 
Recent murmuring by several of the larger European firms about relocating their R&D 
elsewhere (specifically to the United States where the research environment is said to be 
more conducive) has seen not just national governments, but so too the European 
Commission seek to placate the industry on a number of levels (Lewis & Abraham 2001) 
e.g. intellectual property rights and preferential tax arrangements. This has led to 
accusations of bias and unfair competition from several fronts, not least of which is the 
generics industry which feels that the research-oriented companies already enjoy favoured 
conditions. Where both a generic and research industry is present, therefore, governments 
face an even more delicate problem in balancing interests. Nevertheless, the reason for
51 See Appendix 2-4 for current employment figures by member state.
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the Commission’s conciliatory approach to the industry in general is clear: the 
pharmaceutical industry is central to the European economy.
2-4 Regulatory diversity in Europe
Before turning to the supranational context, it should be noted that the divergences in 
national regulatory method mentioned stem from country-specific factors. Different 
healthcare systems mean that relative government shares of total drug expenditures are 
considerably different, as is health spending (Appendices 2-5 and 2-6). The number of 
products available in national markets is not the same (Taylor 1992). This may reflect the 
subjective nature of therapeutic judgements (Dukes 1985), resulting in one country 
granting market approval to a given product and another not -  in turn reflecting medical 
differences between countries, both in training and practice. Ethnic and cultural factors, 
along with demography and relative wealth have also contributed to the evolution of 
differing regulatory systems. So too have different national consumer and patient attitudes 
towards medicines), as have different medical requirements (not all countries have similar 
patterns of disease). Economic performance has also helped to mould distinct 
pharmaceutical regulation practices and systems in Europe. Such socio-economic or 
medico-historic differences pose a considerable obstacle to be overcome if the EU is 
realistically to regulate over a single medicines market.
It is worth noting that these national differences have been increasing since the beginning 
of the 1990s. Beyond the countries having different industries, other reasons for this 
include: growing pressures on healthcare systems; patients’ changing drug consumption 
and lifestyle patterns; the realisation that current systems are inadequate in controlling 
costs; and -  despite the establishment of a European medicines agency -  the lack of a 
truly comprehensive European regulatory scheme. The result is that some member states 
are now looking to favour volume controls on pharmaceuticals in addition to price controls, 
others are working to stimulate the local industry, whilst yet others continue to tinker with 
their co-payment systems.
More recently, debate about combining clinical-effectiveness with cost-effectiveness as a 
so-called ‘forth hurdle’ has arisen in several countries. Again, this is because EU countries 
do not have the same history and experience with pharmaceutical regulation, nor do they 
have the same resource and administrative capacities dedicated to the purpose. Having 
seen how governments balance the sector’s competing interests, the discussion now turns 
to the supranational level to look at how the EU has addressed these issues.
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3 The EU Regulatory Framework for Medicinal Products
In looking at EU regulatory competencies for medicines, a far less reaching role than at 
national level can be seen. This is perhaps surprising in light of not only the volume of 
European legislation pertaining to pharmaceuticals, but so too a Commission whose role 
has been deemed as ‘entrepreneurial’ in pushing Community regulation forwards; a role 
which has in some cases granted it wider regulatory competencies than exist at national 
level (Majone 1996). On the other hand, it reflects not simply the member states’ interests 
in pegging the Commission back, but their ability to do so under the subsidiarity principle. 
In order to better understand what the Community -  and in particular the Commission and 
EMEA -  can and cannot do, along with what is at stake at supranational level, the 
discussion turns first to the context in which EU pharmaceutical policy is made.
3-1 Contextualising the EU pharmaceutical industry: A complex environment
In looking at the policy environment for the EU sector, important is the global nature of the 
industry: “Few industries are as multinational as pharmaceuticals” (Schweitzer 1997, 2). 
This may seem self-evident given that the leading producers are multinational enterprises, 
several of which are household names. But in practice it means that medicine 
manufacturers must remain abreast of and successful within a process of increasing 
globalisation (one reason for the number of mergers and acquisitions), yet their activities 
are decided predominantly by national interests (resulting, for example, in different prices 
for the same product in Europe). So while this international dimension has seen the EU 
industry benefit from global trade liberalisation measures via the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and indeed through the 
emergence of free trade areas such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the EU single market programme, industry activities are nonetheless framed 
within national policy interests and subject to domestic influences.
For European policy-makers, this means balancing the industry’s global concerns with 
member states’ requirements. Consequently, arguments about maintaining a ‘strong 
European industry’ are more involved than they might initially sound. Although several of 
the world’s leading research-based companies are European, this is not to say that they 
necessarily carry out their business in Europe. While they may be headquartered in the 
EU (though even this is not clear in terms of corporate versus operational headquarters), 
most European pharmaceutical multinationals seek to exploit cost and location advantages 
where possible. They therefore outsource much of their activities to foreign affiliates.
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In addition, European companies generate most of their considerable profits outside of 
Europe, most notably in the American market. In part this is due to a combination of cost- 
containment measures by European governments, low tax rates and higher profit margins 
in the US, and the lack of a unified EU market. Consequently, the more important issue is 
to what extent the companies’ research and development activities are undertaken in 
Europe. Domestic R&D spending has been decreasing over the past ten years in 
particular -  down from 73% in 1990 to 59% in 1999 -  with the US being the main 
beneficiary in this shift in research expenditure (Appendix 2-7)52.
It is this apparent declining competitiveness of the European industry which has seen the 
European Commission and member states keen to maintain a strong pharmaceutical 
presence in Europe; equally in terms of the local employment the industry generates, the 
considerable profitability of the sector, and in its contribution to the EU trade balance (in 
high technology and research-intensive sectors). Western Europe currently accounts for 
23.7% of the global market in sales terms, and its trade surplus in pharmaceuticals is 
approximately €28 million (EFPIA 2002). These domestic versus global concerns are 
especially complex given policy-makers’ attempts to balance national industrial and health 
concerns, and have contributed to the current shape of the EU regulatory environment. 
With these factors in mind, the discussion now turns to an overview of competencies which 
make up the Community’s regulatory remit in the pharmaceutical field.
3-2 Official EU competencies in pharmaceuticals
In looking at the competencies which make up the EU framework it is striking that the 
Community’s role is limited to industrial policy concerns such as product EU licensing, 
product marketing and sale, and patent protection. This is reflected in Table 2-5 (overleaf) 
which lists several of the major legislation for medicines central to the Community’s 
framework. The Table is limited to selected Directives and Regulations as binding 
instruments53 and hints at the breadth of Community competencies. More importantly, it 
captures the flurry of activity and around the time of the single market programme. So 
while the Community’s leaning towards economic and industrial policy competencies may 
seem logical given the aims of the SEM, it belies the fact that market harmonisation has 
progressed under a political banner, one which is equally responsible for the impasse over 
completing the market.
As recognised by both the European and US trade associations (e.g. EFPIA 2002, PhRMA 2002). 
Although not listed in the Table, the Community also has competence with regard to immunological
and homeopathic medicines, radiopharmaceuticals, medicines derived from human blood or plasma, 
and patent protection for products derived from plants.
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Table 2-5: Selected Community Pharmaceutical Legislation (vis-a-vis medicines for 
human use)*
Legislative Tool Year Purpose
Directive
65/65/EEC
1965 Approximation of provisions relating to proprietary 
medicinal products
Directive
75/318/EEC
1975 Approximation of laws relating to analytical, 
pharmacotoxicological and clinical standards
Pre-
Single
Directive
75/319/EEC
1975 Approximation of provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action relating to 
medicinal products
European
Market
Directive 
83/570/EEC
1983 Amending Directives 65/65/EEC, 75/318/EEC and 
75/319/EEC
Directive
89/105/EEC
1989 Relating to the transparency of measures regulating the 
pricing of medicinal products and their inclusion 
within the scope of national health insurance systems
Directive 
91/356/EEC
1991 Laying down the principles and guidelines of good 
manufacturing practice
Directive
92/25/EEC
1992 On the wholesale distribution of medicinal products
Directive
92/26/EEC
1992 Concerning the classification for the supply of 
medicinal products
Directive
92/27/EEC
1992 On the labelling of medicinal products and on package 
leaflets
Directive
92/28/EEC
1992 On the advertising of medicinal products
Directive
92/73/EEC
1992 Widening the scope of Directives 65/65/EEC and 
75/319/EEC ... and laying down additional provisions 
on homeopathic medicinal products
Post-
Single
European
Market
Regulation (EEC) 
No 1768/92
1992 Concerning the creation of a supplementary protection 
certificate
Directive
93/39/EEC
1993 Amending Directives 65/65/EEC, 75/318/EEC and 
75/319/EEC in respect of medicinal products
Regulation (EEC) 
No 2309/93
1993 Laying down Community procedures for the 
authorisation and supervision of medicinal products 
and establishing a European Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medicinal Products
Regulation (EC) 
No 540/95
1995 Arrangements for reporting adverse reactions, whether 
arising in the Community or in a third country
Regulation (EC) 
No 541/95
1995 Concerning the examination of variations to the terms 
of a marketing authorisation granted by a competent 
authority of a member state
Directive
1999/83/EC
1999 ... amending Annex to Directive 75/318/EEC concerning 
testing requirements and introducing the notion of 
'well established medicinal use’...
Regulation (EC) 
141/2000
2000 On orphan medicinal products
Source: adapted from EudraLex Volume 1: Medical Products for Human Use.
* The complete listing can be found in Appendix 2-8.
Another important point to be noted from Table 2-5 is that, despite the number of decisions 
agreed, the table shows what is missing from the EU’s role. Beyond Directive 89/105/EEC 
(and perhaps Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93 creating the EMEA) there is nothing pertaining 
to healthcare policy. Again, this is because of the Community’s formal exclusion from 
healthcare matters, both in relation to Article 152 and the member states’ use of the 
subsidiarity principle. Unlike in the member states therefore, market harmonisation
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motivations rather than health interests per se have led to the establishment of most EU 
responsibilities in the pharmaceutical sector.
3-3 Institutional capacity ws-d-Ws medicines policy
The EU bodies charged with overseeing the pharmaceutical sector are, primarily, the 
European Commission and the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicines. 
Specifically, it is the Commission’s Pharmaceuticals Unit (‘F2’) within the Directorate- 
General (DG) for Enterprise -  the DG for industrial affairs -  that has competence. 
Together, the two bodies work towards promoting the free movement of medicines. In 
addition, DG Enterprise, along with the European Court of Justice, is responsible for seeing 
that the legislation listed in Table 2-5 is applied. It should be noted that unlike for public 
health and healthcare, there are no Treaty references to pharmaceutical products perse.
What is important here is that pharmaceutical policy befalls the Directorate-General 
responsible for industrial affairs and promoting European competitiveness. This was the 
case from the outset when pharmaceuticals were first the domain of the industrial affairs 
DG1A until its replacement by DGIII, and now DG Enterprise. The DG for Health and 
Consumer Protection (DG Sanco) has no formal authority over pharmaceutical policy 
whatsoever. Although there is consultation between the two offices, this imbalance and 
neglect of the health policy dimension contributes to the industrial policy leaning of the 
Community framework, and is one of the sources for criticism of the EU’s role; particularly 
as the EMEA itself is located within DG Enterprise54. Nevertheless, it would also be 
inappropriate for DG Sanco to have authority. Its mission statement is to “ensure a high 
level of protection of consumers’ health, safety and economic interests as well as of public 
health at the level of the European Union.” The last of these is undertaken by its Public 
Health Unit (Directorate ‘G’) whose main responsibilities are the analysis, co-ordination and 
development of policies and programmes in the field of public health -  particularly those 
involving health promotion, disease surveillance, and matters of health and safety at work. 
Still, it is clear that DG Sanco should have a more formalised role. And its predecessor -  
DGV (Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs) -  has traditionally had to fight 
for its voice to be heard in pharmaceutical policy discussions.
This question of which office should regulate (or be involved) is further complicated by the 
fact that health issues play an important, even if indirect, role in areas such as the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), VAT policy and ‘e-commerce’. Thus, there are 
numerous other EU offices with a role or interest in the Community’s health and social
54 For instance Garattini & Bertele (2001).
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policy objectives as well, and these too are affected by or have an effect on pharmaceutical 
policy. A survey prior to the 1999 reform of the Commission, for instance, showed that of 
the old 24 Directorates-General, at least 16 had a significant involvement in matters related 
to health (Merkel & Hubei 1999); which itself is part of the problem in forming a 
comprehensive European public health policy (Holland & Mossialos 1999). According to 
Hancher (1991) this raises problems with respect to what she terms the “horizontal multi­
regulation" of the EU medicines sector. This multi-layered regulatory structure is made 
more difficult by the so-called ‘public health article’ of the Treaties. The 1992 Treaty on 
European Union introduced Article 129 and the provision that “... health protection 
requirements shall form a constituent part of the Community’s other policies”. This has 
been bolstered under Article 152 of the Amsterdam Treaty to now read: “A high level of 
human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all 
Community policies and activities”; responsibility falls to DG Sanco.
In terms of how the Community exercises regulatory policy over medicines, the European 
Commission has several legislative instruments at its disposal. The Commission is 
empowered to propose, and later adopt, proposals for Regulations, Directives, and 
Decisions (all which are legislatively binding on the member states), as well as providing 
Recommendations and Opinions (which are not binding). Unlike Regulations, which have 
to implemented into national law as they are, Directives allow the member states 
considerable leverage in terms of choosing their mode of implementation, provided the 
effect is ensured. Given this discretion, it is not surprising that the majority of EU 
pharmaceutical legislation (indeed EU legislation in general) consists of Directives. For 
with the sensitivities involved, the member states are unwilling to countenance the 
complete replacement of their national frameworks with rules from the Commission. This 
creates difficulties with respect to enforcement and, in conjunction with Treaty stipulations, 
exposes some gaps. As a result, the European Court of Justice too has a prominent role 
in the pharmaceutical field.
With regard to the ECJ, although not empowered to act in a regulatory capacity perse, as 
the guardian and interpreter of European law it does establish certain ‘rules of the game’. 
By insisting that national legal systems comply with European dictates, the development of 
European law complements the regulatory function of the Community. From relieving 
national decision-makers of certain responsibilities, to being integrated in full into national 
legislation, it continues to shape domestic legal systems and policy interests. As the Court 
also fills the gaps where the harmonisation of national provisions are concerned, it has 
helped establish the working rules of the SEM. Indeed, the ECJ’s ‘constitutional’ role in 
establishing European law as a sui generis system has had a major role in advancing 
integration in Europe generally (Wincott 1996).
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That said, the Court has at times been accused of undue judicial activism. Decisions are 
sometimes said to impinge on the member states’ decision-making sovereignty by 
underlining the principle of ‘direct effect’ and the ‘doctrine of supremacy’ of European law55. 
Nonetheless, the Court acts to smooth the surface where national and EU legislation are 
not concordant. Further, it makes clear any outstanding issues within the context of the 
single market. In the case of pharmaceuticals this has to do with the clash between the 
subsidiarity principle and the free movement of goods and services principles.
Via numerous rulings pre and post-SEM, the ECJ has had a considerable hand in shaping 
the Community’s market/free movement approach to pharmaceutical policy, and in 
promoting the evolution of a European healthcare policy more specifically (Mossialos & 
McKee 2001). With the Commission unable to make use of the public health related law of 
the Community to address pharmaceutical regulation, it has, under European law, 
concentrated on the harmonisation of national legislation through the dismantling of 
barriers to free movement. Several of the Court’s pharmaceutical rulings aimed at 
facilitating the free movement of products within the internal market, especially in terms of 
competition and industrial property rights issues, are taken up in Chapter 7.
Currently, therefore, the institutional capacity for pharmaceutical regulation in the EU is 
somewhat stilted. This is the direct result of the health-industrial policy trade-off as it 
manifests itself in the dissonance between subsidiarity and the single market programme, 
and the horizontal multi-regulation structure within the Commission. The gaps and clashes 
this reveals have given the ECJ an unduly prominent place in establishing policy in an 
industrial sector. Accordingly, it is now necessary to examine this clash more closely, and 
to elaborate how the health(care) and industrial policy interests of the EU vis-a-vis the 
pharmaceutical industry are played out.
3-4 National versus Community interests
In view of the overlap between health(care) and industrial policy interests in medicines 
regulation at national level, the picture which emerges in the Community context is even 
more complex. The reason being the dissonance between Articles 3(b) and 100(a). That 
the clash in interests takes on an added dimension is represented in Figure 2-2 (overleaf).
55 Cases C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [ECR-1], and C-06/64 
Costa v. ENEL [ECR-585]. Direct effect means member states must directly enforce European law 
such that it requires no additional implementing legislation. The doctrine of supremacy established the 
precept that, in the event of conflict, national law was to cede to European law.
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Figure 2-2: National versus Community Concerns in EU Pharm aceutical Policy
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The figure attempts to capture the nature of the policy deadlock which arises out of 
competing national and supranational interests and frameworks for action in the 
pharmaceutical sector. It shows the division between healthcare and industrial policy in 
the national and supranational contexts, and emphasises the result. Although the 
Commission and member states may share an interest in a strong pharmaceutical industry 
their visions are not entirely complimentary. What is not included is the place of public 
health in this equation. Public health interests are obviously part of medicines regulation 
on the national side, but as the EU has no formal competence in the area, it does not 
formally fall within the framework of pursuing a single medicines market. The diagram is 
limited to showing where national and EU interests collide over EU pharmaceutical policy.
Important in the centre of the figure therefore is reference to the subsidiarity principle, or 
Article 3(b). While the Community has pursued its designs for the sector under the banner 
of the single market, the member states have been able to opt out given that subsidiarity 
permits derogations to the SEM where important national interests are at stake. Here the 
Community’s free movement goals (Article 100) clash directly with the member states’ own 
industrial policy objectives. A single market would render many national sector jobs as 
superfluous capacity, impacting negatively on the economies of several member states.
Another of the Commission’s goals is reducing intra-EU price differentials for medicines. 
This would compromise member states’ authority to set their own pharmaceutical prices, 
as well as impacting on the manner in which they organise and finance their healthcare 
systems. Cost-containment may be a shared goal, but the manner in which the member
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states regulate the pharmaceuticals market towards this end is not. Because of the clash 
in interests and subsidiarity (not to mention Article 152), the result is an impasse over 
completion of the market. An examination of the pricing issue is taken up in Chapter 7.
3-5 Taking the discussion forward
This constricted competence over pharmaceutical policy appears to defy contemporary 
theorising about the nature of Community regulation. For it is generally held that the 
jurisdiction of EU regulation is not simply bound to the economic -  market-correcting -  
aspects of the single market. This wider role has given rise to the emergent perception of 
regulation as a new form of governance in the Community. Perhaps the most cited view 
on this is that of the EU as a so-called ‘regulatory state’56. The regulatory state model is 
dealt with in Chapter 4, but its mention here serves simply to make the point that the EU’s 
function vis-a-vis regulation is a complex one, and one which includes a considerable 
social policy element as well. Yet, even with such a broad-ranging role in regulation -  and 
the considerable volume of pharmaceutical legislation in force -  the Commission is unable 
to force the pricing issue, far less wider harmonisation.
The EU’s regulatory competencies thus extend principally to the market aspects of EU 
integration. Since the SEM, the European Commission has sought a market-oriented 
approach to the pharmaceutical sector. The emphasis has clearly been on liberalisation 
and the securing of an interventionist regulatory role with regard to ensuring the free 
movement of goods underpinnings of the single market, rather than outright harmonisation 
per se. In this vein, it is supported by a considerable body of European law which, in this 
case, is mainly concerned with freeing impediments to inter-EU trade. More recently, and 
particularly now with the establishment of DG Enterprise, the Commission has involved 
itself in promoting the competitiveness of EU industry. Regarding pharmaceuticals, its first 
major move in this direction was the publication in 1994 of a Communication on Industrial 
Policy for the industry (COM 1993). Though it should be added that this followed 
protracted negotiations and multiple drafts over several years (see Chapter 7).
There have been a spate of further initiatives since then. These have taken the form of 
meetings, advisory groups, commissioned studies, and policy papers by different EU 
offices. The most recent was the grounding of the ‘High Level Group’ (or G10) in 2001. 
Made up of what DG Enterprise considers key stakeholders, the G10 was established to 
“... explore how Europe as a whole can become more attractive for the pharmaceutical 
industry” (Lawton 2001), and reflects the Commission’s current thinking (see Chapter 7).
56 For instance Majone (1994,1996) and McGowan & Wallace (1996).
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Both the liberalisation and competitiveness approaches are ultimately aimed at achieving a 
single market, but represent different paths given the limitation imposed by subsidiarity. It 
is interesting to note that fostering the competitiveness of EU industry (and promoting 
industrial policy in general) was not a Treaty-based authority until 1992. Article 130 of the 
Maastricht Treaty outlined the Commission’s industrial objectives and enabled it to initiate 
and adopt policies towards this end. The only restriction being that such policies would not 
in any way distort competition or undermine single market objectives. As has been noted, 
the question of competition -  more specifically a lack thereof -  is important in the context 
of the pharmaceutical sector. Although not dealt with specifically in this study, it is worth 
considering whether the current industrial policy focus (and indeed, pro-industry bias) of 
the EMEA and the EU framework in general, thus poses a threat to what is already a case 
of limited competition.
As the Community is limited in its capacity for action, it is not surprising that the 
Commission has pursued its industrial policy mandate with some vigour. The result is a 
Commission interested in reducing intra-Community tariffs and promoting the 
competitiveness of the EU industry; both as a means of breaching the impasse and in 
order to ensure a strong European presence in the pharmaceutical arena. However, the 
sector still suffers from the lack of a singular EU policy direction. Strachan Heppell, former 
Chairman of the EMEA Management Board, recognised this in a discussion about 
harmonisation several years ago when he asked whether the industry is "... to be taken in a 
healthcare context or in a single market context [for] the answer to that question will 
determine the sort of regime which develops.” (Heppell 1994, 44) The Commission may 
be interested in pursuing the latter, but not only do the member states appear unwilling to 
support this unequivocally, the approach is in any event insufficient. For the healthcare 
and single market contexts are not so easily divisible where medicines policy is concerned.
With the problems and issues now laid out, the study can turn to its more specific aims. 
Towards understanding how the EU regulatory framework for pharmaceuticals developed 
and why an integrated analytical approach is employed to address the research questions 
and hypothesis raised in the opening chapter, the next chapter turns to existing theories of 
European integration and policy-making for some initial and crucial insight. The discussion 
aims to provide a theoretical perspective on the development of EU pharmaceutical 
competencies and assesses both the relevance and failings of the more accepted theories 
in terms of the trade-off in policy interests.
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Ch a p te r  3
T h eo r is in g  t h e  D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  Co m m u n it y  Co m p e te n c e  in  
Ph a r m a c e u tic a ls
Introduction
It has been argued that the national level clash between health and industry interests over 
pharmaceutical policy is not simply mirrored in EU policy-making, but is in fact manifest in 
the inability to complete the single market. Still, there are numerous Community Directives 
and Regulations pertaining to medicines specifically. This chapter now turns to the history 
and ‘europeanisation’ of pharmaceutical regulation. It aims to show the historical lack of a 
comprehensive pharmaceutical strategy at EU level, and how, as a result, policies have 
developed on a somewhat piecemeal basis. The discussion reveals that predominantly 
market harmonisation motivations rather than health interests have led to the 
establishment of those measures the EU currently oversees in the sector, and it highlights 
the incomplete nature of the regulatory framework. The second part of the chapter 
analyses this within the parameters set by wider theories of European integration and EU 
(regulatory) policy-making. This is to underline why meso-analysis is crucial to 
understanding the politics involved in setting pharmaceutical policy at supranational level.
1 The Development of European Pharmaceutical Regulation: A synoptic history
In reviewing this history it is useful to divide it into four phases: i) the initial establishment of 
Community rules for medicines beginning with the first piece of pharmaceutical legislation 
in 1965; ii) multiple state market authorisation commencing in 1975; iii) the need to address 
increasing international competition and the Single European Act of 1986; and iv) an 
agency approach to facilitating market access since 1995. It should again be noted that 
this study looks only at proprietary pharmaceuticals designed for human consumption.
1 -1 Establishing Community rules for medicines
Casual observation would seem to suggest that the focus of EU pharmaceutical regulation 
is improving the authorisation process (and promoting the industry’s competitiveness). In 
accepting that national divergence in member state pricing and reimbursement regimes 
precludes harmonisation, recent analysis has turned to improving ‘time to market’ (TTM) 
periods for new drugs, and much of the commentary on the European Medicines 
Evaluation Agency’s work of the last seven years has sought to assess its performance in
-65-
this regard57. Although reviews of the agency have generally been positive, as will be 
shown later, not everyone shares this perception. Nevertheless, all this industrial policy 
attention belies the fact that it was a health disaster which initiated the member states’ (and 
hence Community’s) interest in medicines regulation. As mentioned in the opening 
chapter, the Thalidomide tragedy crudely exposed the need for stricter medicines testing 
and market authorisation mechanisms.
In September 1963 the European Commission convened a meeting of industry 
representatives, trades union officials, pharmacists, doctors and consumers to discuss the 
prospective harmonisation of national pharmaceutical legislation. However, disagreement 
over whether proof of a drug’s ‘therapeutic potency’ was a necessary criterion for market 
authorisation meant that no consensus was reached. As the Commission noted in its 
subsequent press release: "... the doctors’, pharmacists’, consumers’ and trade union 
representatives took the view that the requirement was indispensable. The representatives 
of the industry... disagreed.” (CEC IP 1963). Notwithstanding this early hiccup, 
Community guidelines for the sector, and rules for medicines registration in particular, were 
an inevitability as European policy-makers sought to bring their countries closer together 
under the common market. Indeed, two years later, in addition to having established 
stricter guidelines at home, the six member states of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) agreed to Community-wide controls and standards.
Directive 65/65/EEC was the earliest piece of Community pharmaceutical legislation. It 
represented the first official recognition of the need for a separate policy area for 
medicines, and lay down two important definitions. A medicinal product was defined as:
... any substance or combinations of substances presented for treating or 
preventing disease in human beings or animals or any substance or combination 
of substances which may be administered to human beings or animals with a 
view to making a medical diagnosis or to restoring, correcting or modifying 
physiological functions in human beings or animals.
And it deemed a proprietary medicine as “...any ready prepared medicinal product placed 
on the market under a special name and in a special pack”. These definitions have been 
at the heart of all Community drug legislation since. Equally important were the rules 
regarding the development and manufacture of medicines which the Directive set out, 
along with guidelines for post-market monitoring of drug safety (pharmacovigilance). As 
these were agreed within the context of the free movement principles of the common 
market, rules for market authorisation were also elucidated. It was stipulated that a 
product would be granted market authorisation only if it was accompanied by
57 For instance Walsh (1999) or Hennings (2000).
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documentation indicating the product’s safety, efficacy and therapeutic benefit, as verified 
by the signatures of accredited experts. The Community was thus setting out the criteria 
against which the safeguarding of public health was to be measured in order for a drug to 
be launched. Accordingly, European industrial policy interests were to be balanced against 
national health policy concerns. And though some member states initially baulked at the 
use of the ‘proven therapeutic benefit’ criterion on the basis that it was too strict (Hancher 
1990), the proposal was eventually accepted in 1965.
Importantly, the Directive established the precept that medicinal products could not to be 
released onto the market of another member state without the prior agreement and 
authorisation (by a relevant public medical authority) of that state. It also set forth the 
Community’s original guidelines for the authorisation of medicines with respect to quality, 
time requirements, and decision-making procedures. The emphasis was decidedly on 
product safety and efficacy first, rather than market concerns. The Community’s initial 
move into pharmaceutical policy was thus a common health threat, which prompted a pro­
active approach fully endorsed by the member states.
1-2 Early European authorisations
With the basis laid, and progress on tariff elimination in other sectors progressing, the 
Commission’s next step was to facilitate intra-Community movement of medicines. Two 
new pieces of legislation were introduced in 1975. Directive 75/318/EEC created the so- 
called mutual recognition or Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) 
procedure, whereby a product that had been granted market authorisation by the 
regulatory authority of one member state could be then granted multiple authorisations to 
other member states’ markets. Prior to 1975 applications had to be made separately to 
each national authority. Directive 75/319/EEC set forth the original Community rules 
governing the conduct of clinical trials towards product quality and safety, and harmonised 
“... conditions for granting manufacturing authorisations, based on the principle of mutual 
recognition of national authorizations.” (Hankin 1996, 9) Where a product had been tested 
subject to these requirements it was then valid across the entire Community without the 
need for the individual member states to carry out their own tests.
Further, the Directive established the CPMP. Comprised representatives from each 
member states, it was to act as a single authorisation body for the EC market, reviewing all 
drug applications on the basis of the Community’s safety, quality and efficacy standards. 
Following this review, the Committee would issue an opinion on marketing approval. The 
Committee was also to arbitrate should a member state object to a product being granted 
automatic access to its market via the new procedure. However, despite being a "...
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landmark in European medicines harmonisation [which] attempted to alter the market 
behaviour of pharmaceutical companies” (Lewis & Abraham 2001, 62), the CPMP 
procedure did not fulfil its desired role.
First, the Committee’s opinions were only advisory and member states could choose to 
ignore them; which they generally did. Second, the sensitivity of healthcare concerns to 
national governments and the resulting derogation to the free movement rules under Article 
36 (now 30) of the Treaty -  where products could have potential negative health effects -  
meant that the new rules did not speed market authorisation as envisaged. In fact, the 
procedure caused major delays as the member states regularly raised objections. Quite 
simply, the national governments were unwilling to accept each other’s assessments.
The Commission sought to overcome this via amendments to the mutual recognition route. 
In 1983 Directive 83/570/EEC introduced the multi-state procedure under which the 
minimum number of countries to which authorisation would be extended was dropped from 
five to two. Manufacturers were no longer bound to seek approval in more than two 
markets unless they so chose. Although more successful than its predecessor in terms of 
the number of applications submitted (Mossialos & Abel-Smith 1997), the multi-state 
procedure also proved cumbersome. In 1994, its final year of operation, objections by one 
or more member states were registered for every product put before it (CPMP 1994). 
Although the Directives made a point of underlining that health matters were of primary 
concern, there was no hiding the fact that they were more aimed at progress towards a 
unified medicines market. This would become the Commission’s main agenda for future 
initiatives, especially following the Single European Act in 198658.
A divisive issue to emerge during this period was parallel trade in medicines. Beginning in 
the 1970s it had become widespread by the mid-1980s (Macarthur 2001) and has 
continued since. Price differentials were up to 10 times between EC countries in the mid- 
1980s (BEUC 1989), and European wholesalers and sellers of bulk pharmaceuticals 
became active parallel traders. The development of this arbitrage met with different 
reactions. Some member states supported it for the healthcare savings it brought, while 
others disputed it as it damaged local industry. Consumer and patient groups were in 
favour as the practice ensured cheaper and quicker access to high quality medication, 
while those companies whose products were being ‘parallel traded’ opposed it because of 
the lost earnings it carried. With the practice burgeoning, it was contested before the 
European Court of Justice on numerous occasions, and was essentially sanctioned by the
58 From 1986 onwards, legislation pertaining to the manufacture, assessment, and sale of various other 
types of medicinal product were also set down, each by separate Directive e.g. immunological 
products, veterinary products, homeopathic products, etc.
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Court in the seminal de Peijper case of 1976. The ECJ ruled that national medicine 
licensing rules were not to be regarded as a restriction on intra-Community movement until 
full market harmonisation in pharmaceuticals was attained59. This position has not 
changed, and has been given more scope in several rulings since then (see Chapter 7).
1-3 The Single European Market programme
The Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 re-ignited the integration process following the 
‘eurosclerosis’ of the 1960s and 1970s60. It elaborated a vision to establish a Single 
European Market for the free movement of all goods, services and capital by 1992. This 
was the Community’s response to the need to compete more effectively in global markets, 
especially with the US and Japan setting up free trade areas of their own. Despite 
derogations again pertaining to sensitive areas such as public health and national security, 
the single market measures laid down by the SEA demanded member state compliance. 
Policy decisions thus came to be taken within the context of meeting the 1992 deadline.
In 1986 the Commission asked a retired Commission official, Paolo Cecchini, to lead an 
investigation into the costs of ‘non-Europe’. This was to underline the benefits of a single 
market. Despite its optimism with regard to the market liberalisation process, the Cecchini 
Report, published in 1988, pointed out areas which required attention. In an echo of the 
1985 White Paper, pharmaceuticals were cited as a problem given that they were 
“irretrievably linked to public health”. Nevertheless, with the 1992 deadline looming it was 
clear that future regulatory decisions for medicines would now be taken under the auspices 
of the SEM rather than on the basis of public health requirements. Just as the push 
towards the single market has affected the nature of Community health and healthcare 
competencies61, so too has it impacted on pharmaceutical policy.
In 1987, once more with a view to rationalising the authorisation process, Directive 
87/22/EEC was agreed. This represented a major departure by the Commission from its 
previous approach to regulating the market. The Directive created a new process known 
as the concertation or centralised procedure, and was applicable only to biotechnologically- 
developed and other ‘high technology’ products. Manufacturers were obliged to 
simultaneously submit their applications to the CPMP and one member state (the intended 
market). Once both had completed their evaluations, together they facilitated discussions 
between the applicant and the other national authorities regarding access to their markets. 
This meant that the “... competent authorities [were required] to consult with each other
59 Case C-104/75 Officier van Justitie v. De Peijper [1976] ECR 613.
60 ‘Eurosclerosis’ refers to the slowdown in measures to facilitate European integration from the mid- 
1960s through the late 1970s which followed the ‘empty chair’ crisis of 1965 (see Section 2-1).
61 For a discussion see Theofilatou & Maarse (1998).
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systematically within the framework of the CPMP, from the moment an application was 
received." (Hankin 1996, 11) Although biotechnology is not part of this study, the 
Directive’s mention here is to underline the Commission’s agenda. For with biotechnology 
at the time an emerging field, the Commission was seeking harmonised standards before 
they had even created (Vogel 1998). This was with a view towards 1992 and the resultant 
need for a single evaluation procedure. Second, by limiting the products subject to this 
procedure, the Commission sought to allow a more general transfer of regulatory authority 
from the member states to the Community (Friedel & Freundlich 1994). The member 
states were thus not so much losing authority as the Community was gaining it.
Also important in the post-SEA period was the still-troublesome question of parallel trade; 
now in terms of a future single market. Price divergences between the member states on 
single products of up to five times in late 1980s (Chambers & Belcher 1994) had only 
consolidated the practice. Furthermore, via rulings in cases such as Stephar (1981 )62, the 
ECJ continued to permit it. In this somewhat unsettled environment, Directive 89/105/EEC, 
the Transparency Directive’, was passed. This required the member states adopt 
“transparent, objective and verifiable criteria” in setting medicine prices and their inclusion 
in national health insurance systems (see case-study in Chapter 7). Further legislation 
pertaining to labelling and packaging, advertising and sales promotion, and wholesale 
distribution followed63, all taken within the context of meeting the provisions of the SEM.
So too were intellectual property rights for medicinal products legislated for during this 
period. In 1992 Regulation (EEC) 1769/92 -  the Supplementary Protection Certificate -  
(SPC) set down details of a certification of extended patent protection for those drugs 
deemed to have had too short a period of coverage compared to the costs of their 
development (see case-study in Chapter 5). Despite the Community passing exceptional 
patent protection for medicines, and the other single market-related policies already 
mentioned, it was unable to tackle the issue of pricing. Its proposals for a second or at 
least amended Transparency Directive were shelved in 1992 due to the lack of member 
state support. The intractability of the pricing issue -  in terms of at least reducing intra-EU 
price (and product) differentials -  led in 1996 to the publication of a Communication on the 
development of an official EU ‘industrial policy’ for pharmaceuticals64. Agreed after several 
years of negotiation, the publication of the Communication was another major turning- 
point. It represented an acknowledgement by the Commission that there still remained 
considerable barriers to market harmonisation and that the requirements of the single 
market were not being adequately served (see Chapter 7).
Case C-187/80 Merck v. Stephar[ 1981] ECR 2063. See Chapter 7.
63 Directives 92/27/EEC, 92/26/EEC, and 92/25/EEC.
64 Resolution 96/C136/04.
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Eight years prior, the Cecchini Report had concluded that “...[regulation of] the market 
registration procedure for new products and price controls [is] the most important from the 
standpoint of the European market” (Cecchini et al 1988, 66). Yet, by the mid-1990s there 
was still no effective centralised authorisation process. The main problem was that the 
recommendations of the advisement board were not binding under either the multi-state or 
concertation procedures, and unanimity was seldom. Because of the failure of the former 
in particular, the Commission instigated a series of extensive consultations from the late 
1980s onwards regarding the need for a new, and more independent authority capable of 
binding decision-making. The end-result, some five years later, was the institution of a 
Community medicines agency designed to function as a centralised authorisation office for 
medicinal products in the single market. Despite little real progress on further 
'europeanising' the market since the Communication and EMEA, it is clear that the SEM 
had a major influence on the direction of EU pharmaceutical policy.
1-4 An agency approach to market authorisation
Established in 1993, the European Medicines Evaluation Agency represented the coming 
to fruition of many years of political ‘wheeling-and-dealing’ over medicines and the single 
market. Governments, consumer/patient groups, and various sectors of the industry were 
all, at different stages, involved in the negotiations. Ruling on applications for market 
authorisation, the agency is mandated the task of product assessment and approval for all 
prospective new medicines aimed for the European market. Complementary to the EMEA 
was Directive 93/39/EEC under which the multi-state procedure was replaced by a 
‘decentralised’ procedure via which applications are made directly to the agency. The new 
rules are much along the same lines of the multi-state avenue though in this case the 
decentralised procedure is binding. Member states are only able to query the agency’s 
authorisation decisions on the grounds that they can be shown to have a negative public 
health impact on their populations. The CPMP is again the arbiter where a member state 
may disagree with the agency’s decision, though applications rarely get this far.
Seven years since its launch and debate about the agency continues. Although it has 
already contributed to addressing the range of issues associated with pharmaceuticals and 
the single market, in looking at much of the literature on the EMEA, one could be forgiven 
for thinking that its role lies simply in the issuing of market authorisations for new products. 
This, however, is only the final step in its wider remit decide on which drugs are safe, 
efficacious and of high enough quality to be granted market access. Still, the agency is not 
-  as some originally thought it might become -  a European version of the US Food and 
Drug Agency. First, it is not responsible for anything beyond therapeutic medicines. 
Second, it lacks the FDA’s executive powers i.e. the ability to penalise any derogation from
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or misapplication of its rules. Further, healthcare considerations (i.e. pricing) are beyond 
its remit, and its relationship with industry has been much-criticised (e.g. Abraham & Lewis 
2000, Garattini & Bertele 2001). And unlike the FDA, which is a federal body, the EMEA 
regime co-exists with national procedures. It does not replace them. Still, given the clout it 
carries in terms of the Commission acting on its recommendations, it does represent the 
only quasi-regulatory body of its kind in the EU.
As will be shown in Chapter 6, the rationale for the agency’s creation are not entirely clear. 
The reasons cited by the Commission at the time of the EMEA’s inauguration in 1995 were 
not those invoked during discussions in the late 1980s when the plan for a medicines 
agency was still in its formative stages. What should be borne in mind here, however, is 
that since the SEM and the creation of the agency, there has been a new decision-making 
approach for medicine policy in the Community. The use of a US-style regulatory agency 
reflects the acknowledged need by both the Commission and the member states for 
independent regulation of industrial sectors within the single market. While the actual 
operations of the EMEA will be analysed later, its inclusion in this history serves to indicate 
the direction of Community objectives regarding pharmaceutical regulation.
1 -5 The ‘europeanisation’ of medicine policy -  lack of a coherent strategy
At this stage of the discussion, two things are clear. First, the history of EU pharmaceutical 
regulation reflects an uneven pattern. The earliest medicines legislation was passed in 
1965 in the wake of the Thalidomide tragedy and addressed public health concerns. Since 
then most competencies have fallen under the industrial policy frame, having been enacted 
under the single market programme. Second, while the SEM may have prompted much 
policy (from the Commission), a considerable amount of policy has been generated by 
other factors. Obligations under international trade regime agreements like the GATT have 
meant loosening the national protection of industry. And mounting pressure to address the 
question of affordable access to medicines for the world’s poorer countries has seen the 
member states recently agree to the suspending of drug patent rights in the case of a 
public health emergency. Other European institutions have also had a hand, even if 
indirectly, in shaping the regulatory framework as it currently exists. Most notable has 
been the role of the ECJ which, through various judgements in relation to healthcare, 
competition and the free movement principles, has fundamentally affected the policy 
environment in which pharmaceutical policy is set.
As a result, despite Community involvement in pharmaceutical regulation since 1965, there 
has not been a consistent strategy. There have been major steps forward in grounding 
EU-wide standards in some areas but stalemate and even backward steps in others.
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Because pricing and reimbursement remain national level concerns, the result for the 
Commission is a ‘mixed bag’ of competencies with an ability to legislate primarily over 
industrial policy concerns. This is in comparison to related sectors such as biotechnology 
or medical devices where the Community’s history may be comparatively shorter, but 
reflects a clearer purpose with wider powers (Altenstetter 2001). The lack of a singular 
strategy has also meant that policy developments have been somewhat reactive in 
response to particular requirements or obligations. Competencies have been added as 
necessary or even, as the case-studies will show, when pushed for by specific actors.
This section has shown that pharmaceutical policy does not have a truly clear status within 
the Community’s range of competencies. In order to make sense of this in some 
consistent manner, the discussion now turns to academic treatment of the integration and 
policy-making dynamics in Europe. The question to bear in mind is whether they are 
sufficient to explain the stop-and-start development of the EU regulatory framework, and to 
see if they help to explain how and why the industry is the main beneficiary of the 
regulatory regime as this study argues.
2 Medicines and Traditional Integration Theory
In consulting theories of European integration and policy-making, discussions and ideas 
can be found which are helpful towards understanding this history in terms of where and 
why specific pharmaceutical policies developed in the EU. These relate to both the macro- 
and meso-levels. This acknowledges the important and meaningful distinction made by 
Hix (1994) between theories of European integration in stricto sensu, and what he 
identifies as the ‘politics of the EU policy-process’. Beginning with the former, neo­
functionalism and intergovernmentalism, as the two main theories of European integration, 
offer some initial and important insights.
2-1 Neo-functionalism: Pharmaceutical policy and ‘spill-over’
Depending on their point of departure, the early European integration scholars of the 1940s 
tended to follow one of two main lines. The federalists and functionalists were led by the 
visions of Jean Monnet and the work of Mitrany (1966) respectively. Their focus was on 
the end-product of integration, that is, what form the integrated Europe should take. The 
transactionalists meanwhile, headed by Deutsch (1966), sought to understand the 
conditions requisite for political integration to be in the first place possible. Both 
approaches served to generate the academic debate that would later culminate in the 
development of neo-functionalism as the then leading theory of European integration.
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During the 1950s and 1960s, as a critique of deficiencies in the earlier functionalist 
conception, neo-functionalism became the theory of choice, particularly amongst American 
social scientists with Haas (1968) at the fore. By combining the competition element in the 
political process of traditional pluralist thinking with the (necessarily) gradual nature of 
political change understanding proffered by Mitrany, the neo-functionalists sought to show 
how the European political process was as much dependent on political action as 
economic determinism. Central to this was disproving the functionalist idea that a 
meaningful and lasting distinction could be made between policies involving functional or 
technical questions, and those which were more political or constitutional in nature. 
Pharmaceutical policy proves the point given its inextricability from the healthcare context. 
For while other industrial commodities and sectors may, from the EU standpoint at least, 
comply with the functional/technical category (i.e. where economic interests are 
concerned), medicines do not. The market remains unharmonised precisely because of 
political factors. The health and industrial policy implications mean that pharmaceuticals 
are both a functional (political) and technical matter, and member states are therefore 
particularly sensitive where any European policy is concerned.
Nevertheless, neo-functionalism does, initially, prove useful in terms of explaining the 
impetus behind how the Community framework for pharmaceutical regulation developed. 
What is arguably its best-known premise, the concept of ‘spill-over1 -  where Community 
authority develops or evolves as a result of policy developments in related fields -  is 
particularly relevant. Central to the spill-over premise was that the integration process 
would prove self-sustaining. Developing this idea as an inheritance from Mitrany, the neo­
functionalists attempted to gauge the relevance and role of the new European Community 
institutions in the integration process. They argued that as supranational constructs, these 
new bodies could (and did) foster integration of their own accord. And while the role of the 
ECJ as guardian and instigator of Community law (superseding national legislation via the 
principle of ‘direct effect’ and the doctrine of supremacy) may have been the embodiment 
of this idea, some member states were not entirely comfortable with a dynamic that they 
felt they might not be in control of. In this vein, the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 
represented a watershed and put paid to any illusions those who sought a federalist 
European ‘super-state’ might at the time have had.
The Compromise followed French President de Gaulle’s precipitation of a constitutional 
crisis over the use of qualified majority voting for decisions affecting the common market. 
The ‘empty chair1 crisis, when France refused to take its seat in the Council, culminated in 
agreement on the need for unanimity to pass legislation in instances where “very important 
[national] interests are at stake”. Along with defence and national security, health and 
welfare policy fell within this qualification. Bound to national healthcare systems and social
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security budgets, pharmaceutical policy is also an issue of important national sensitivity 
and interest. Without engaging the specifics of the Luxembourg Compromise -  especially 
as it has not frequently been invoked -  it served to underline that the integration process 
was not self-sustaining without member state support. Later, however, with the SEA of 
1986 the integration process was revived and a new brand of spill-over emerged. This 
related to establishing a common European market by 1992.
The SEM demanded the elimination of inter-Community tariffs and other access to market 
barriers, towards creating an arena for the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital. Despite the 1992 deadline having long since passed and there still being no single 
medicines market, it was earlier shown that most aspects of the Community’s regulatory 
framework can in fact be attributed to the pursuit of the SEM. Many Community medicine 
competencies thus evolved as spill-over from other provisions relating to the ‘1992 
programme’. As Table 2-5 showed, legislation pertaining to the standardisation of 
packaging guidelines for medicines, the type and manner of presenting information on 
package inserts/leaflets, and common rules on the advertising of medicines, all reflect 
priorities related to the single market. Thus, the idea of integration taking place in small 
steps where "... pressure in one sector could demand integration (or changes in standards) 
in order to complete the process of policy change” (Church 1996, 17), not only coincides 
with efforts to establish a single market for medicines, but in fact defines much of the 
regulatory framework. Neo-functionalism, and spill-over more specifically, thus goes some 
way to explaining how the single market programme came to dominate the Commission’s 
approach to pharmaceutical policy during the 1990s.
Nevertheless, spill-over is not the sole influence on the EU’s competencies in the sector. 
As cited several times so far, important questions relating to both the pricing and 
reimbursement of medicines have not been addressed at EU level. This gap in 
supranational policy makes it clear that the member states retain a considerable degree of 
autonomy where important national interests are concerned. It was established in the 
previous chapter that this lack of progress can be attributed to the explicit exclusion of 
healthcare matters from Community competencies under the Treaties, and that Article 152 
of the Amsterdam Treaty was penned at the request of the member states. Neo­
functionalism may explain developments within the industrial side of the policy dichotomy, 
but it cannot explain why the national governments pursued this line; nor indeed why SEM 
spill-over did not flow into pricing and reimbursement competencies. That European 
integration does not succeed without member state support -  that spill-over is not an 
unchecked momentum generated by the European institutions -  is one of the key tenets of 
intergovemmentalism as the other classical theory of European integration.
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2-2 Intergovemmentalism: No Community role in healthcare
Developed out of the realist position in traditional international relations theory with 
Hoffmann (1966) as its leading proponent, the intergovemmentalist perspective evolved as 
a critique of neo-functionalism. It offers a check on the spill-over idea by showing that the 
member states, particularly via the policy-making structure and procedures of the 
Community, remain firmly in control of both the pace and direction of integration. There 
are numerous variations on intergovernmental theory65, but the discussion here keeps 
within a basic understanding which asserts the pre-eminence of the member states over 
the Community institutions in the integration process. This is not to underplay the 
relevance of the institutions, for there is an increasingly impressive body of ‘institutions 
matter1 literature; particularly under the banner of ‘new institutionalism’66. Rather, it is to 
simply accept that the member states are the primary actors in the integration process.
As considerable a simplification as this is, relating it to pharmaceutical policy reveals 
several important points. First, that the issue of national self-interest may help to explain 
why the member states have not devolved the healthcare aspect of medicines regulation to 
Community authority i.e. why subsidiarity plays such a major role. Governments are 
neither practically nor ideologically prepared to have the EU legislate over national 
healthcare structure and spending as would be required of a single medicines market. It is 
for this reason that the member states insisted on the exclusion of healthcare from 
Community competencies at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Amsterdam. 
The unambiguous language of Article 152 of the Amsterdam Treaty compared to that in the 
Maastricht text (ex 129), makes clear the strength of their resolves.
Hoffman’s (1966) distinction between high’ and ‘low’ politics matters also provides a useful 
backdrop to understanding the place of pharmaceutical policy. The former encompasses 
security, defence and foreign policy, while the latter is concerned with welfare and 
economic policy. The division was designed to reveal the limits of the neo-functionalist 
premise that integration was a self-sustaining dynamic. The argument was that it could not 
be taken as a foregone conclusion that the member states would accept integration in 
areas of high politics simply because they were more or less agreed on low politics 
concerns such as single market tariff elimination and any social policy implications. In 
terms of positioning pharmaceutical policy in this division, it might initially seem to fall 
within the low politics category, as a welfare matter; especially since, as was observed
65 For a discussion see Haltern (1995).
66 A growing stream in political science which reasserts (through redefinition of) the role and place of 
‘institutions’; that which includes structures, treaties, legislation, etc. Policy-making does not simply 
take place via such institutions as neutral vehicles, but rather they contribute to the policy environment, 
thereby affecting outcomes e.g. Armstrong & Bulmer (1998), Checkel (1998), Bulmer (1997,1998) or 
Warleigh (2001).
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prior to the Maastricht Treaty: “In sum, health is an EC-policy of minor priority.” (Leidl 1990) 
Yet, given that intergovernmental co-operation towards achieving common policies is to be 
expected in areas of low politics (e.g. the single market), why then does the 
pharmaceutical market remain incomplete? The reason is that while healthcare concerns 
may be a ‘low’ political area for the Community, they are in fact a ‘high politics’ area for 
national governments. Consequently, there is intergovernmental agreement. It is simply 
with regard to not mandating the Community a wider role rather than doing so. Community 
pharmaceutical policies exist, therefore, where economic priorities are at stake (low 
politics) but do not involve the exercise of executive powers over areas such as the pricing 
and reimbursement of medicines (high politics). This reflects the policy clash which lies at 
the heart of the sector. As such, a competence division exists over pharmaceutical policy 
on two levels. Not only does it remain a shared responsibility between the Community and 
member states, but the EU has to-date only been able to legislate in areas relating to 
industrial policy. According to intergovernmentalist thinking then, it ought not be surprising 
that medicines policy remains in large part a national level concern.
This competence-sharing can also be seen as the manifestation of European law being 
supranational and European policy-making being intergovernmental (Weiler 1994). The 
national sensitivity of health and healthcare means that governments are cautious with 
respect to any expansion of the EU’s competencies. Meanwhile, as European legislation 
on the single market aspects of the sector finds its constitutional basis in the Treaties, 
much of it supersedes that of the member states. Infringements against Treaty stipulations 
can result in sanction, though the development of EU policies/competencies within the 
framework set down by the Treaties first requires each member state to agree in the 
Council of Ministers. Pharmaceutical policy finds itself in the grey area of the middle given 
that its industrial policy side fits within the SEM and is therefore supranational, while its 
healthcare aspects ensure that it remains an intergovernmental matter.
Two important points are to be noted from the discussion. First, neo-functionalist spill-over 
is perhaps more intuitive than it is empirical. According to Pollack (1997), It has not been 
shown to generate testable hypotheses regarding the conditions under which supranational 
institutions exert an “independent causal influence” on the integration process. Institutions 
may indeed matter in the integration and policy-process, but neo-functionalist theory is not 
really able to go beyond suggesting a de jure link between them. Second, the 
intergovernmental focus on member states pursuing self-interested goals may serve to 
elucidate their behaviour in the integration process, but does not necessarily explain policy 
outcomes. And where both theories are deficient is in accounting for non-EU factors i.e. 
circumstances which exert integrationist pressures from outside the immediate Community
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frame i.e. where policy decisions are taken neither on the basis of ‘simple’ member state 
self-interest, nor the result of an inherent supranational dynamic.
2-3 Liberal intergovemmentalism: Domestic priorities and supranational policies?
Recognising this common failing, more recent work has focused on how member state 
agendas are shaped. Here, the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective generally 
accredited to Moravcsik (1993) concentrates on links between national decision-making 
and international co-operation. The intergovernmental accent on the member states is 
taken one step further with the very idea of supranational decision-making questioned. As 
a two-pronged approach, liberal intergovemmentalism is a “... liberal theory of how 
dependence influences national interests, and an intergovernmentalist theory of 
international negotiation” (Moravcsik 1993, 474). It sees integration from a demand and 
supply perspective. The former results from member states’ domestic priorities while the 
latter is manifest in bargaining at the EU level. Moravcsik’s premise is that “An 
understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, the analysis 
of strategic interaction among states” (481) for the member states do not have fixed 
preferences as these change just as governments change. And as the priority for any 
government is to remain in office, this influences the demand side in any given 
intergovernmental bargaining on the supply-side.
In arguing that national governments are the main actors, they may be motivated to co­
operate in the pursuit of further integration because of a combination of externalities and 
particular internal circumstances which affect them all. More specifically, common goals, 
although deriving from differing national circumstances, may promote integrationist 
tendencies. Because of this,"... fundamental decisions in the EC can be viewed as taking 
place in a non-coercive unanimity voting system.” (Moravcsik 1993, 498) Here, one can 
look to the pressures exerted by the global trade liberalisation regimes of the GATT, and 
now the World Trade Organization (WTO) on domestic politics. Or else, it may in part be 
because of the local effects of negative externalities such as air and water pollution that 
member states have agreed EU environmental standards. Pertaining more specifically to 
pharmaceuticals, the International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) -  which aims to 
negotiate common standards for the regulation of pharmaceutical preparations in Europe, 
the US and Japan, with a view to speeding the market approval process -  exerts a 
pressure on European governments both individually and within the context of the SEM. 
The ICH is co-sponsored by the national regulatory bodies and medicines manufacturers’ 
trade organisations in each country. So too does the Pharmaceutical Inspections 
Convention (PIC) push for common policies -  towards the mutual recognition of 
inspections of pharmaceutical manufacturing companies.
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In other words, EU governments are willing to pool effort towards further integration, both 
in order to fulfil domestic requirements and as manner of consolidating their position 
relative to each other. They are agreeable to the concession of authority over issues 
where they feel the Community is more likely to be able to conserve their interests -  
particularly in a redistributive and equalising manner -  with the single market being the 
prime example. At the same time they remain steadfast over issues where national 
interests are at stake. Applying this again to medicines, since member states accept that 
certain aspects of policy -  such as market access and advertising (i.e. those matters 
relating to the single market) -  are better regulated on their behalf by the Community, there 
is intergovernmental co-operation. Other areas which are more sensitive, such as the 
pricing of medicines, they continue to guard jealously. That national governments may 
share objectives which are driven by domestic impetuses is relevant to medicines policy in 
that all countries may be agreed on not conceding pricing and reimbursement to the 
Commission, but their reasons stem from domestic factors. Their respective lack of 
interest in a consolidated single medicines market -  and indeed the variance in their 
support for specific initiatives -  are based on individualistic concerns. These may in many 
respects be common concerns e.g. cost-containment, but they are not necessarily shared 
given each country’s particular requirements.
Where Moravcsik’s assessment flounders, however, is the degree to which it minimises the 
role played by the European institutions. Although there are other critiques of the theory, 
this is the main one67. In their examination of the Single European Market, Armstrong & 
Bulmer (1998) argue that Moravcsik’s original work reduces the part played by the 
European Parliament, the Commission, the European Council and the European Court of 
Justice (30-33). They also note his neglect of the burgeoning comparative politics 
literature on how actors’ agendas are shaped, arguing that "... there is a danger in 
Moravcsik’s analysis that it overly rationalises the negotiation process through a 
reductionist emphasis on the role of national governments.” (33) These criticisms are 
relevant to the emergence of EU medicines regulation as well. As the later case-studies 
will show, the European institutions have played a considerable part in developing the 
regulatory framework. Moreover, medicines policy cannot simply be slipped into a two- 
level analogy. Specific regulatory policies may be shaped by national circumstances, 
which member states seek to protect at EU level. But common health threats and wider 
duties regarding (public health) criteria for market authorisation medicine testing interest all 
member states equally.
67 See for instance Rosamond (2000), 136-147.
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On their own, therefore, the neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist theories are 
incomplete in accounting for the development of EU pharmaceutical policy68. While the 
former (spill-over in particular) is relevant to understanding the economic rationale and 
industrial policy nature of the majority of Community pharmaceutical policy (single market- 
related), it fails when the healthcare aspect is invoked. The latter can explain why 
healthcare policy concerns, including pricing, remain a sticking-point, but does not 
necessarily explain policy outcomes. And the ‘liberal’ version can (to a degree at least) 
account for exogenous factors such as the ICH in influencing integration and member state 
co-operation, but cannot sufficiently account for the roles of the ECJ and Commission in 
shaping the framework; nor why the EMEA has a remit which goes beyond industrial policy 
functions to include elements of public health policy. The reason these are not decisive is 
that although macro-theories are germane to ‘history-making’ decisions, they ‘tend to lose 
their explanatory power1 when it comes to policy decisions (Peterson 1995, 84).
Nevertheless, as “Integration is an inherently dynamic, expansionary process which 
serves, amongst other things, to construct and reconstruct the contexts in which 
governmental choices and intergovernmental bargaining takes place" (Stone Sweet & 
Caporaso 1998, 119), they do establish certain over-arching characteristics of Community 
policy-making. As this is particularly with respect to where and when the EU is able to act, 
they are useful in relation to the pharmaceutical sector. So although offering only a fleeting 
consideration of European integration theory, the discussion has served to contextualise 
the development of EU pharmaceutical policy from a wider perspective.
2-4 Multi-level governance and contemporary perspectives
Because of this lack of explanatory power, and particularly since the Maastricht Treaty, 
there has been a shift away from the broader perspectives proffered by the neo­
functionalists and intergovernmentalists. Notwithstanding liberal intergovemmentalism, the 
focus has become more specific and inward-looking. The internal dynamics of the 
Community polity have become an area of considerable academic discourse e.g. the 
‘agenda-setting’ role of the European Commission (Peters 1996); interest group activities 
in driving policy (Mazey & Richardson 1993); and the de facto integration role of the ECJ 
and European legislation (Wincott 1996). Much contemporary work has also focused on 
the role of specific institutional actors -  the question has often been to what extent 
Parliament, the ECJ or the Commission push an integrationist agenda in their own right.
68 It is acknowledged that since macro theories delineate the pattern and impetus for integration, neither 
neo-functionalism nor intergovemmentalism makes any claim to be able to explain all elements of EU 
policy-making. As already mentioned, Hix has pointed to the need to differentiate between the ‘politics 
of the EU policy process’ and theories of European integration.
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This reflects an acceptance of the EU as a new system of governance69, and one which 
does not readily lend itself to any singular theoretical categorisation. More importantly, it 
also acknowledges Hix’s distinction between the process of European integration and the 
‘politics of the EU policy-process’. There has generally been a renewed focus on the 
Community institutions -  new institutionalist theory -  though in a more explicit and less 
assumed manner than expressed under (neo-)functionalism.
Much attention has recently been paid to an emergent form of governance in the EU based 
on subnational dynamics at European level70. The most widely-cited of these perspectives 
is multi-level governance. It forwards the notion of a blurring between domestic and 
international politics wherein the Community plays the lead role by fostering co-operation 
between member states. They “share... rather than monopolise, control over many 
activities that take place within their respective territories.” (Marks et al 1996, 96) The EU 
is treated as a sui generis form of policy-making which breaks with traditional levels of 
analysis71, resulting in Hooghe’s (1995) conclusion that “The European polity has come to 
resemble multi-level governance much closer than either the state-centric or supranational 
model.” (33) This view sees Community policy-making as "... a series of multi-level 
games fought out between an increasingly large number of policy actors -  public and 
private -  who exploit the many opportunities presented by different policy arenas...” 
leading to the conclusion tha t"... there is some kind of internal dynamic which has the 
capacity to generate new policy proposals over time.” (Richardson 1997, xi) This is in 
place of an all-encompassing theory and, since it highlights the role of national and 
subnational actors, it focuses on the policy-process. It is at the level of policy analysis that 
the evolution of EU pharmaceutical competencies can be best understood, and this ‘multi­
level’ view thus relates to the regulatory framework. It accommodates the argument that 
medicines regulation at EU level results from the interplay between many actors spanning 
both the healthcare and industrial policy communities, all of whom are embedded in the 
policy process in a manner not typical of other industries.
Critiques of this internal gaming view of the EU polity centre around multi-level governance 
offering a good description but being limited in terms of offering an explanatory or 
analytical perspective (Pierson 1996). However, such theoretical disagreement is not of 
concern here. The conception of the EU as a new form of governance is of interest insofar 
as it is descriptive. This captures the dispersal of power within EU policy-making and 
accommodates that there are a host of subnational actors beyond the Community
For instance Sbragia (1991), Peterson (1995), and Scharpf (1999).
70 The governance conception of policy networks relates to this ‘multi-tiered’ governance conception of 
EU policy-making and integration (see BOrzel 1997a,b).
71 For instance Marks et al (1995), Risse-Kappen (1995,1996), Cram (1996), H6ritier et al (1996), 
Kohler-Koch (1996), and Richardson (1997).
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institutions and member state agencies which are also involved in the pharmaceutical 
policy-process. In other words, that it is not a simple case of intergovernmental bargaining. 
Consequently, it is the fact that such a criss-crossing of actors and interests does 
characterise the policy-process -  not whether or not this amounts to a predictive view 
thereof -  which is relevant.
A more detailed examination of multi-level governance or these newer approaches is 
beyond the purposes of this study. What should be noted is that they all relate to specific 
levels of policy analysis rather than singular theoretical explanations. For it is the inability 
of macro-level analyses (integration theories) to offer explanatory insight into EU policy vis- 
a-vis medicines which has led to this study’s use of a policy-making frame of analysis. 
Accordingly, the next element of the discussion is how the EU regulates or sets policy 
within the multi-level governance conception. This provides further insight into how EU 
regulatory competencies for medicines have developed.
3 Regulatory Policy in the EU: Medicines and the ‘regulatory state’
The continuing ‘encroachment’ of Brussels into many areas of national public policy has 
EU regulation become an area of much academic work. In particular, the Community’s 
shift from ‘simply’ controlling the economic reins of the single market to exercising a role 
which encompasses wider and more complex social policy responsibilities has generated 
much of the research (Majone 1996). For while this progression may fit with the spill-over 
logic of neo-functionalism, it might at the same time seem somewhat strange from an 
intergovernmentalist point of view in light of the widespread feeling amongst many 
European citizens and politicians that Brussels already has too much power. How this 
transfer of authority could have taken place when -  at least publicly -  so many national 
politicians are keen to keep the ‘Eurocrats’ out of domestic affairs, is a question several 
scholars have sought to investigate. The practice of regulation in and by the Community 
has been central to the integration process, especially since the SEM.
3-1 The practice of regulation in the EU
The increasingly broad nature of EU regulation can in part be traced to the long histories of 
the European state being responsible for not only the prosperity of the market through 
public ownership of enterprise and centralised administration, but also for social control. It 
is a tradition that helped give rise to the European welfare democracies which emerged in 
the post-World War II era, and which many countries are now struggling to maintain. This 
European approach is distinctly opposed to statutory regulation in the United States. The 
American model involves the use of independent, autonomous agencies which exercise
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legislative and administrative functions beyond state control. In keeping with the American 
laissez-faire approach to business, these multi-functional agencies have been employed to 
ensure the correct functioning of the market. So while American regulation has developed 
primarily as a means of correcting market failures through a restrained state function, in 
Europe the state has been at the heart of macroeconomic stabilisation by serving a 
redistributive function in society.
Looking at the EU model which is emerging, it would seem to incorporate aspects of both 
American and European practices. For while on the one hand Community regulation 
involves a direct hand in the operation of the single market and, as a result, certain social 
responsibilities as well, it is also the case that more recently the EU has turned to a variety 
of quasi-independent agencies to oversee particular policy areas. Where industry is 
concerned, the EMEA oversees the pharmaceuticals sector, while for social policy 
concerns, the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work and the European 
Environment Agency are models. This is a relatively new trend which mirrors 
developments in some member states (e.g. France and the UK) themselves.
In light of this changing environment (both supranational and domestic), the in part 
constricted competence the Community currently exercises over pharmaceutical policy 
would appear to defy contemporary theorising about the nature of Community regulation. 
For it is generally held that the jurisdiction of EU regulation is not simply bound to the 
economic aspects of the single market72. Instead, given the Community’s unique status, 
the perception has arisen that the EU is predominately concerned with regulation in a 
broader sense -  the Community has been forced to "... embark upon the task of meditating 
between mainly functional needs of market integration and broader regulatory concerns of 
the European Polity.” (Joerges 1997, 1) More specifically, this view holds that the 
Commission’s role -  abetted by ECJ decisions -  is predominantly concerned with:
... the shaping of market processes i.e. with defining the conditions for market 
access and market operation (old or classical regulatory theory); and second with 
curbing negative external impacts on the public or workforce from productive 
activities and individual consumption (new regulatory policy). (Heritieretal 1996,9)
Accordingly, it ought not be surprising that the EU’s role has extended beyond an 
economic remit to cover social areas as well; at least insofar as they are related to the 
single market. Nor should one be surprised at the ever-growing volume of Community law 
being generated under this broad-ranging function. Since the 1960s there has been a 
marked proliferation in Community legislation such that the yearly increase in the number 
of new Directives and Regulations in the EU (binding legislation) has been referred to as
72 For example Majone (1996) and Wallace & Young (2001).
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“almost exponential”. (Majone 1996, 57) Looking at the EU in this light offers a perspective 
which can help account for the increasing pervasiveness of Community influence in 
member state affairs. It is also a view which holds that Community legislation can be 
equated with more or less the same thing as public policy (Radaelli 1998).
EU regulation is an interesting and challenging area of study precisely because it is not 
limited to correcting market failures as is the case in the United States. This wider role has 
given rise to the perception of regulation as a new form of governance (Majone 1994), and 
helps to explain where Community regulation over medicines has gone beyond simple 
market-correcting mechanisms.
3-2 The ‘regulatory state’
Perhaps the most developed expression of this sui generis system of governance is the 
‘regulatory state’ model. First set out by Giandomenico Majone, it has since been given 
extra depth by other European scholars including Helen Wallace, Alisdair Young and 
Francis McGowan. The regulatory state shows the development of Community regulation 
as something distinct from both the American system of statutory regulation and the 
European dirigiste state, though having clearly been influenced by both. It argues that 
because the EU lacks the means to undertake two of the main functions executed by the 
executive branch of nation-states -  redistribution and stabilisation -  it relies on (and seeks 
to consolidate) its regulatory competencies to establish its authority. Hence, the EU may 
not be a state per se, but via the European Commission it clearly does exercise one of the 
primary functions of government; and it does so to a greater degree than national 
governments given the lack of other state-like functions.
Perceived of in terms of a demand-supply configuration for regulatory policy, with the 
European Commission on the supply-side and organised interests (including member state 
governments) on the demand-side, the regulatory state model shows how three variables 
in particular are responsible for the growth of Community regulation. These are:
... the tightness and rigidity of the Community budget; the desire of the 
Commission to increase its influence by expanding its competencies; and the 
preference of multinational firms for dealing with a uniform set of rules rather than 
with [fifteen] different national regulations. (Majone 1994)
This view of how and why EU regulation has developed is applicable to the pharmaceutical 
industry on two fronts. First, with regard to the (supply) role played by the Commission in 
establishing the framework as currently exists. And second, the (demand) lobbying of the
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Commission undertaken by medicine companies73. This can be seen in the Commission’s 
continuing pursuit of an ‘industrial policy’ for pharmaceuticals and its attempts to shore up 
support for addressing the pricing issue within a single market context (see Chapter 7). 
These can be seen as examples of its desire to increase its authority. That the European 
Medicines Evaluation Agency serves as little more than a quick route for the market access 
of their products is also a case-in-point. This is one of the main contentions made in 
Chapter 6, for the EMEA clearly benefits the industry by acting as a centralised approval 
procedure which bypasses having to make fifteen different national applications.
The perception of the EU as a regulatory state thus offers a plausible clarification of the on­
going proliferation of Community regulation in all fields. First in terms of the extent to 
which its role goes beyond economic regulation, and second, through the willingness of 
member states to devolve responsibilities to the supranational level. Because of this, the 
Community’s regulatory competencies continue to grow; although this does not deny that 
intergovernmental processes are at its heart. Nevertheless, the willingness of the member 
states to empower the Community in this way -  a transfer of economic powers without a 
complimentary transfer of political powers as noted by Tsoukalis (1998) -  means that the 
regulatory state is in essence a manner of de-regulation at national level. This is not only 
in instances where the member states feel that the EU may be better placed to oversee 
certain interests, but also where they are willing to accept EU regulation in order to shirk 
responsibility or shift the blame over politically sensitive matters.
With regard to the former, Majone (1996) cites the comparatively tenuous nature of 
traditional international regulatory arrangements between one or more governments as one 
reason that member states are willing to empower the Community. This is supported by 
Wilks’ (1996) argument that because of chronic budgetary difficulties in the EU -  thereby 
limiting the possibility of developing new spending programmes on a continuous basis -  
regulation in fact provides the best means by which the EU can make policy i.e. it is a 
relatively cheap way of making public policy. Unsurprisingly then, most of these new 
pieces of legislation pertain to the single market. As Hgritier’s earlier citation alludes to, 
this is either in terms of extending direct Community control over particular sectors (e.g. 
telecommunications and transport), or with regard to legislating over externalities which 
impact on business in Europe (e.g. environmental and working safety standards). As neo­
functionalism would predict, it is to a considerable degree spill-over into social regulation.
Pertaining to the latter: “These are the circumstances where European measures are a 
useful scapegoat, a way of avoiding direct political responsibilities in difficult areas like 
cutting back industries with excess capacity... or structural readjustment of public finance”.
73 For a discussion of lobbying in the EU pharmaceutical sector, see Shechter (1998).
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(Radaelli 1998, 5) With the Council of Ministers taking all final policy decisions, this helps 
unravel the paradox of national politicians complaining over excess bureaucracy being 
imposed by Brussels at the same time as they invite it in. And it of course reinforces the 
intergovernmentalist view that the member states are in charge of the integration process.
Negative versus positive integration: Which way for medicines?
Related to the broader theories of European integration and crucial to understanding the 
Commission’s focus on industrial policy for medicines since the TEU, is the wider question 
of process. By setting 1969 as the date for attainment of a European common market, the 
1957 Treaty of Rome invoked the two political dynamics of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
integration. These are relevant to the discussion on Community pharmaceutical regulation 
as they support the earlier arguments regarding spill-over and intergovernmental 
bargaining over sensitive policy areas. Furthermore, they can also be tied into the old 
versus new regulatory policy division.
Negative integration involves the elimination of national barriers to the free movement of 
goods and services (old regulatory policy). Positive integration is concerned with “... the 
reconstruction of a system of economic regulation at the level of the larger economic unit.” 
(Scharpf 1999, 45) This is the establishment of common policies, including social 
regulation, to define the conditions under which EU markets operate (new regulatory 
policy). The former involves liberalisation and the rescinding of national authority to the 
Community through tariff and quota reductions, and is therefore a more straightforward 
process given Treaty obligations (supranational). The latter requires the active 
harmonisation of national regulations, such as in the fields of consumer protection and 
environmental risk, and goes through the Council of Ministers (intergovernmental). The 
former applies to the industrial policy dimension of pharmaceutical regulation, and the latter 
to the healthcare dimension. Both processes were envisaged to run concomitantly towards 
achieving the common market, but the Luxembourg Compromise represented a setback. 
The requirement that unanimity be achieved in the Council meant that negative integration 
came to the fore. As arbiter over matters involving the single market this accorded the ECJ 
a prominent role in the integration process, and through a considerable amount of case law 
generated between 1970 and 1985, the Court has in fact been credited with giving rise to 
the SEA via negative integration (Stone Sweet & Caporaso 1998).
The Court has been involved in positive integration as well. A host of legal decisions in 
social policy fields has granted the Community a greater mandate than was perhaps 
envisaged in 1957. Expansive rulings in some cases have ensured the Court (and the 
Commission) a major say in certain areas, such as with respect to issues of gender equity
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and social protection. This ‘regulation-creating’ ECJ role has been shown to result in 
changes on a national level which would otherwise have taken considerably longer to 
occur (Pierson 1996); thereby pushing integration. For instance, in many member states 
(particularly those of southern Europe) ECJ rulings in the field of environmental protection 
and ‘green’ policy for business have resulted in completely new legislation in the absence 
of earlier national regimes (Majone 1996). Where pharmaceutical policy is concerned, 
issues such as parallel imports and trademark exhaustion fall within this pro-active ECJ 
mandate. In these matters it was the Court which established Community policy, not the 
Commission or other EU institutions via spill-over, nor the member states rescinding 
authority of their own accord. In several important areas, therefore, the Community legal 
system has had a positive (integration) effect in establishing pharmaceutical policy.
Product versus process regulation: Healthcare versus industrial policy?
A further distinction of relevance to medicines to be drawn from Heritier’s new and old 
regulatory policy is ‘product’ versus ‘process’ regulation. Product regulation involves the 
establishment of common standards on goods and services (negative integration) and 
characterised early Community legislation. Intergovernmental agreement can be expected 
in such areas because differing national requirements over product safety and quality 
would undermine the market harmonisation goals of the SEM74. Despite derogations on 
the grounds of public health, public policy or national security amongst others75, it is thus 
assumed that member states will reach agreement on product regulation because of their 
common interest in single market tariff elimination. This is not the case for process 
regulations which affect the more social and externally-impacting factors involved in 
regulating economic activity, and where a pro-active hand is required (positive integration) 
e.g. environmental and occupational safety requirements. Here the absence of a ‘Euro’ 
regime may allow member states to cut back on national standards to increase their own 
competitiveness. The incentive to raise standards individually or jointly is thus limited.
The rationale for member states to pursue harmonisation, therefore, is to avoid having to 
compete on an unequal footing with those countries with laxer standards, but is a classical 
prisoner’s dilemma situation in the absence of binding EU legislation. In fact, it was really
74 Articles 28 and 39 (ex 30 and 34) read: “Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having 
equivalent effect shall be prohibited between member States.” and “Quantitative restrictions on exports 
and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between member States.”
75 Article 36 (now Article 30 of the Amsterdam Treaty) reads in part: “The provisions of Articles 28 [ex 30] 
and 29 [ex 34] shall not preclude prohibition or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit 
justified on the grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and 
life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or 
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or 
restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction 
on trade between Member States.”
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only with the SEA that EU regulation in areas such as environmental policy became 
possible. Even then it was up to the Commission rather than the national governments 
themselves to ensure that a situation of social and ecological dumping in some member 
states did not take place (Scharpf 1996). Positive integration can thus be linked 
predominantly with progress in the harmonisation of product regulation, though it has had a 
much weaker impact on harmonising process regulation.
As pertains to pharmaceutical policy, product regulation has dominated the agenda. Most 
regulatory policy is ‘old’ having come about as spill-over from the single market 
programme. Only perhaps the Transparency Directive and the grounding of the EMEA -  
both which have a healthcare and/or social policy dimension -  can be seen as process 
regulation. These two policies required considerably longer to be agreed, and involved 
detailed and protracted negotiations amongst the affected parties. The outstanding issues, 
including pricing and reimbursement, also relate to process regulation, and are those the 
member states are unwilling to devolve to the Commission. Fears over what a single 
medicines market may mean in terms of their own authority over healthcare matters and 
local industry prevents agreement on mandating the Commission a new or process 
regulation role. Again, this is in contrast to other industrial sectors where there has been 
more consensus on a broader Community function.
The regulatory state model thus establishes a framework which contextualises policy 
decisions generally, and those over pharmaceuticals specifically. A Commission relying on 
regulation to increase its authority is applicable to the pharmaceutical framework in light of 
the impasse over the single market. Policy is made wherever it can be achieved, resulting 
in much ‘old’ regulatory policy and the ad hoc framework. What it does not do, however, is 
to show why in specific cases Community regulation exists but does not in others. That 
said, the regulatory state model is one in which a more meso-level approach such as that 
offered by policy networks can be used. The relationship between a Commission 
supplying regulation and demand-side actors vying for influence means not only a blurring 
of the public and private, but also that groups of (competing) actors form over specific 
proposals. Conceiving of the Community as a ‘regulatory state’ therefore provides an 
understanding as to why the EU is bound to making the kind of policy it does.
As the focus of this study is not EU regulation itself, a more expansive treatment of the 
regulatory state model and the related distinctions between negative versus positive 
integration, new and old regulatory policy, and product and process regulation is not 
offered. This summary has simply served to show that by virtue of the single market, the 
EU is able and required to regulate in both an economic and social capacity. It also shows 
that under the SEM framework, member states lose much of their ability to regulate over
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their own national markets and that the Court has had a major hand in pushing integration 
and promoting the consolidation of the regulatory state. The ECJ has been especially 
active in the pharmaceutical field given the gap in Community competencies.
3-3 Making pharmaceutical policy in the regulatory state
The discussion on the regulatory state makes clear several further points important to the 
study. First, it fits squarely within the multi-level governance view by offering insight into 
the unique dispersal of authority in the EU frame. It shows that"... ‘state’ capacity at the 
EU level is overdeveloped in the area of regulation and underdeveloped in terms of 
redistribution and stabilization functions.” (Rosamond 2000, 154) This explains the nature 
of the Community’s regulatory framework for medicines: heavy on single market industrial 
policy concerns, and light on substantive healthcare policy competencies.
Second, one dimension of the regulatory state holds that policy is made as a trade-off 
between the Commission on the supply-side and organised interests (including the 
member states) on the demand side76. Majone’s model accounts for the Commission’s 
function as ‘supplier’ of regulation (supported by the ECJ), such that various demand-side 
actors are constantly trying to have their interests met by or in EU policy. While relevant to 
all policy fields it is especially so for pharmaceuticals. And not simply in terms of the 
Commission acting as regulator over both private and public interests, but also with regard 
to the healthcare versus industrial policy bargaining scenarios in which the Commission is 
involved. For the Commission has often found itself at odds with both industry and the 
member states, not to mention with the host of variegated interests in between e.g. 
wholesalers and distributors, pharmacists, doctors’ and patients’ groups etc. The case- 
studies provided later will elaborate on this.
With the emphasis on negative integration, it is not surprising that the Community’s 
regulatory framework leans towards support of the industry. (Single market) policy is 
simply easier to agree and implement, and the Commission is generally seeking to 
increase its powers where and whenever possible. As a consequence, Lewis & Abraham 
(2001) point to a decided neo-liberal bias inherent in European pharmaceutical regulation. 
It has already been shown that the regulatory state is susceptible to influence, and the 
regulatory framework for medicines is thus heavily shaped by the interests of the industry 
and the research-oriented companies in particular. This is because of a similar bias in 
countries with a strong innovative industry (the UK, Germany and Sweden), and a
76 The regulatory state model also captures the ‘normative’ and ‘positive’ theories of (economic)
regulation. The former cites protection of consumer interests (from a host of potential market failures) 
as the rationale for state (in this case, Commission) intervention in the market. The latter regards the 
purpose of regulation as protecting the interests of the regulated industries themselves.
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Commission which, above all else, is seeking to promote an ‘efficiency regime’ to "... meet 
the political objectives of a single European market and the commercial agendas of 
transnational pharmaceutical companies.” (Lewis & Abraham 2001, 53)
Furthermore, despite the Commission being totally biased towards policy 
entrepreneurship” (Radaelli 1998, 4), the single-market subsidiarity clash precludes it 
taking wider harmonisation forward of its own accord. Where positive integration is to be 
achieved, therefore, it is posited that pharmaceutical policy is often driven by networks 
comprising the Commission and actors (including the member states) whose interests are 
from both the healthcare and industrial policy spheres. These form over specific policy 
proposals to see to what extent they can influence the final outcome77. Support for this 
assertion is not difficult to find. Even if not specific to the pharmaceutical case, the unique 
system of EU regulation and governance leads to Heritier et al’s suggest ion that:
The EU, with its sectoralization, the functional differentiation and fragmentation of 
policies, as well as the dominance of corporate actors in a horizontal web of 
interorganizational relationships at the negotiating level, appears the most ideal 
area of application for policy network analysis. (H6ritier et al 1996, 7)
This view has as much to do with the nature of the EU policy-making process as it does 
with a particular conception of policy networks. Although it appears to take a seemingly 
specific and exclusive definition of networks, the increasing body of theoretical and 
empirical literature on the EU as new form of policy-making (and the role of networks 
therein) would lend support to such a view.
Nonetheless, the study’s concentration on the making of EU pharmaceutical policy as 
infringing on the goals of competing interests in the sector can be better understood within 
this frame. From the Commission itself, to the manufacturers, member state governments 
and consumers, Community pharmaceutical policies represent a formal regulatory 
influence on their activities and objectives. Whether it concerns package-labelling and 
market authorisation requirements or a future uniform pricing regime across Europe, 
supranational policy in this sector is -  by definition -  regulatory; Community competencies 
vis-a-vis pharmaceuticals relate to both ‘old’ and ‘new’ regulatory policy. And while it is 
clear that the framework which governs medicines in the EU has been predominately 
shaped by old regulatory policy, so too is it obvious that the healthcare dimension, as a 
member state competence, precludes all policy being made by the Commission. The 
former is driven by the single market and the latter is dependent on meso-level policy 
outcomes achieved amongst networks of actors. As such, the next chapter turns to policy
77 The Court plays a pro-active (positive integration) role here as well.
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networks themselves. It is necessary to understand what they are, how they operate, and 
where they are useful with regard to the policy-process for EU pharmaceutical policy.
3-4 Adjusting the lens
In concluding this chapter, the remainder of the study keeps with the dynamic, multi-level 
gaming view of EU policy-making outlined above. It is argued that the nature of current EU 
pharmaceutical policies, and the ad hoc framework which has resulted, stems in large part 
from the competing interests of the main stakeholders. As it is necessary to understand 
how policy has been made, the remainder of the discussion concentrates on Hix’s ‘politics 
of the EU policy-process’ for pharmaceuticals, though bearing in mind the context provided 
by the wider European integration theories. This accommodates the fact that there is a 
plethora of inputs into European pharmaceutical policy -  whether internal or external -  and 
is able to contextualise the role of actors within such an environment. It is also compatible 
with both neo-functionalism and (liberal) intergovemmentalism as it recognises the role 
played by the European institutions and the member states.
The aim here was not to provide a coherent theory of EU pharmaceutical policy 
developments; assuming that this would actually be possible. Instead, it was to provide an 
initial theoretical perspective on how EU competencies have unfolded, by assessing the 
relevance and failing of the more accredited theories in view of the trade-off in policy 
interests which define the sector. The discussion has served to contextualise the 
development of the EU pharmaceutical framework and why, therefore, there remains a 
policy impasse over completion of the single market. Although a somewhat terse overview 
given the ever-evolving body of academic literature in the field, this initial look at integration 
and policy-making processes is an important element of the overall discussion. It shows to 
what extent macro-level influences can shape the EU’s capacity to make policy for 
medicines, and equally, where this level of analysis falters. And it outlines the boundaries 
which frame the behaviour (and indeed, effectiveness) of the policy networks at the meso- 
level. This helps further the argument that politics and political factors have moulded the 
regulatory framework as currently exists.
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Ch a p te r  4  
In te g r a tin g  t h e  M eso-L evel  -  N etw o rks  a n d  t h e  'P o lit ic s  o f  
Po l ic y ’ f o r  Ph a r m a c eu tic a ls  in  t h e  EU
Introduction
The previous chapter teased out certain insights into EU pharmaceutical policy-making 
from European integration and policy-making perspectives, arguing that to go beyond 
these initial observations -  and in order to test the study’s main hypothesis -  they needed 
to be supported with a more focused level of analysis. The policy network was advanced 
as a meso-level approach through which to better understand the politics involved. It is the 
purpose of this chapter to develop this line of analysis. The discussion concentrates on 
how the unique regulatory role of the Community creates a policy environment for 
medicines which influences policy outcomes. What this regulatory environment means for 
the sector’s four primary stakeholders is also developed. Specifically, as networks do not 
act in a vacuum, Wilson’s (1980) ‘politics of policy* typology of regulatory decision-making 
is applied in order to set out a more complete conceptual framework than would be 
achieved by simply applying the ‘macro’ and ‘meso’ on their own.
1 Meso-Analysis: Focusing on actors
Because of the sector’s inherent peculiarities, the complexity of the interests at stake, and 
the (often) competing interests of the stakeholders, a policy network framework as been 
chosen to help understand the dynamics at play in setting regulatory policy for 
pharmaceuticals. This acknowledges that, compared to other public policy theories, policy 
networks can more lucidly accommodate the argument that political and actor influences 
play a defining role in policy decisions. In order to justify this claim a brief examination of 
its more contemporary application proves a firm starting-point.
1 -1 Contemporary policy network application: Structure, model or theory?
As mentioned at the outset of this study, there is no single view of policy networks. 
Moreover, there is no consensus over the approach’s value. Nevertheless, policy networks 
continue to be used by students seeking a meso-level understanding of policy-making. 
The respective failures of pluralism and (neo-)corporatism as complete models -  or at least 
their lack of significance in the face of evolving policy-making dynamics in western 
societies -  have resulted in a host of actor-oriented public policy theories of which policy 
networks are just one. Networks offer a more fluid and relevant view of how actors interact
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within different levels of the policy-process than either pluralism or neo-corporatism. 
Nevertheless, the literature on policy networks reflects aspects of both, as detailed in 
Borzel’s (1997a,b) overviews of the literature. Posing the question as to whether policy 
networks are best seen as a structure, model or theory, she distinguishes two schools of 
usage: as a model of interest-intermediation or as a mode of governance. The division 
would appear a legacy of the pluralist-neo-corporatist debate, with the former conforming 
to the structural notions of pluralism and the latter relating to the more dynamic 
interpretation proffered by neo-corporatism.
In simple terms, the interest-intermediation view sees the policy network primarily as a 
generic representation of state-interest (bargaining) relations, while the governance view 
defines it in terms of political resource mobilisation in instances where such resources are 
shared or dispersed between public and private players. Given the latter interpretation it 
becomes immediately apparent that the division between the two is not always a clear one, 
and this is particularly so in empirical terms. Indeed, this division would appear to lie at the 
heart of contemporary discrepancies in conceptualisation and should be consulted in order 
to help clarify them78. Without engaging the minutiae of policy networks, a prdcis of some 
of the more widely-cited conceptions makes Bbrzel’s point.
In the language of Kenis & Schneider (1991), the policy network concept is an ‘analytical 
toolbox’ which helps define actor relationships and their consequences in issue-specific 
decision-making (25-29). Others who agree in principle with this, nevertheless see policy 
networks more as a diagrammatic model of ‘interest group mediation’ (Marsh 1995, 2) -  
one which helps fill the gaps left by pluralism and neo-corporatism. A further assessment 
is offered by those who view the policy network less as a tool for analysis and more as a 
tangible construct unto itself, as “... an arena for the mediation of interests of government 
and interest groups... [wherein] clusters of actors representing multiple organisations 
interact with one another and share information and resources”. (Peterson 1995, 76) 
Citing these definitions is not to imply that the concept has an accredited understanding, 
for there is a plethora of further interpretation; even within schools.
Nevertheless, these represent examples of the more widely-cited theoretical perspectives 
to be found in the literature. They show is that the spectrum of views on both construct 
and applicability of policy networks covers inclusively all ground between an analytical and 
operational perception, to it simply being more of a structural/descriptive and summary- 
providing approach (governance and interest-intermediation schools). This has spawned
78 The policy network as used by the interest-intermediation scholars is considerably modelled after the 
earlier (primarily American) iron triangle and ‘sub-government’ concepts. For the governance theorists 
meanwhile, the primary influence has been sociological network analysis.
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criticism that the approach suffers from a “lack of substance” (Jordan 1990, 319), and is 
“...more a map of the policy process, than a fully fledged explanation of it... [one that is ]... 
inadequate in providing fully determined causal analysis.” (Dowding 1995, 157-158) As a 
consequence, one of its main exponents has bemoaned the fact that the policy network is 
"... becoming ubiquitous... it is most commonly used as a metaphor... is infrequently used 
with precision... [and] it is rare for it to have any explanatory value.” (Rhodes 1990, 293)
Yet the concept undoubtedly holds some currency, and not simply because of its recent 
popularity. Wherein does such value lie? Is the approach as critically evaluative in 
assessing policy outcomes as some would claim, or is its significance more in being a 
general ‘model’ of interest mediation. Is it a viable theory for explaining sectoral policy 
outcomes in cases where there exists a tightly intertwined group of interests bound 
together in relationships of so-called ‘antagonistic cooperation’? (Marin 1990) Or is this too 
specific an application for it to be used as a conceptual tool? Can policy networks can be 
employed as an emergent form of governance in the EU, as argued by more contemporary 
scholars (e.g. H6ritier et al 1996); or is the policy network better regarded as a manner of 
depicting and comparing inter-actor relationships towards the making of specific policy 
within transnational EU sub sectors (Josselin 1994, 295)?
The simple answer to these questions is that the student’s focus of analysis will decide the 
choice of approach; each is valid in its own way. In the context of this study the interest- 
intermediation view is the more useful. For in using networks primarily as descriptor for 
studying policy-making in the sector, this could contribute to understanding outcomes as 
they manifest themselves in specific decisions and policies. In other words, it could help 
merge the (politics of) decision-making with the regulatory policies which result. 
Furthermore, given the lack of transparency in the pharmaceutical arena, there is a clear 
impetus for an actor-based clarification of the policy-process79. Even a crude 
understanding of the policy-making architecture based on the use of networks would be 
germane to understanding the political forces shaping policy outcomes. This use of 
networks also goes some way towards confirming the study’s hypothesis i.e. by showing 
how industry can dominate the policy networks which form over aspects of EU policy. The 
more fluid and active governance interpretation of policy networks, while interesting and 
relevant to the EU pharmaceutical sector, does not serve the aims of this study. This is not 
to decry its value -  especially as the dividing-line between the two applications can be a 
thin one -  but rather to keep within a manageable and relevant frame of analysis.
79 Criticism of a lack of transparency is also levied against the EMEA. Based on the secretive nature of 
national-level pharmaceutical policy-making (particularly in pricing matters), European policy-makers 
are under pressure from both supply and demand-side actors to ensure that the same does not 
happen at supranational-level. This would undermine any legitimacy that the arguments in favour of 
EU-level regulation of the sector might espouse. See for instance Abbasi & Herxheimer (1998).
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1-2 Using policy networks to depict the policy-process: Interest-intermediation 
reviewed
As the earlier and arguably more prominent of the two schools of policy networks, the 
interest-intermediation view offers the best indication of the theorists’ disenchantment with 
the pluralist-corporatist debates. By employing the network as an alternative interpretation, 
they have for the most part limited its usage to the sectoral level where balancing the 
needs and resources of state and (private) civil interests is most apparent. This is the level 
where pluralism and corporatism would both seem to have failed. In this regard, scholars 
such as Wilks & Wright (1987), Rhodes (1988), Atkinson & Coleman (1989), and Jordan 
(1990) laid the initial lines for the development of further research by constructing various 
theoretical typologies of policy networks, and then applying them to particular empirical 
case-studies80. Their typologies, however, differ, causing some to question the entire 
approach altogether81. Nonetheless, between them, their original categorisations of policy 
networks set the guidelines upon which not only other proponents of the interest- 
intermediation school were able to build, but also scholars from the governance school 
could adapt in grounding their own understandings.
It is beyond this study to critically evaluate these typologies, and thus only those elements 
relevant to the study’s theoretical component are referred to. The discussion serves to 
show how, within a network configuration of interests, actor behaviour over a (regulatory) 
policy issue can influence policy outcomes.
Leitmotifs and relevance
A precis of some of the better-known interest-intermediation typologies of policy networks 
reveals three common threads relevant to EU pharmaceutical policy-making. First, the 
policy network is treated as an analytical tool which "... allows a more ‘fine grain’ analysis 
by taking into account sectoral and sub-sectoral differences, the role played by private and 
public actors, and formal as well as informal relationships between them.” (Borzel 1997a, 
10) This is a valuable level of analysis for looking at competing actors in a multi-level 
(governance) EU polity. Also, not only does the pharmaceutical industry span both 
sectoral and sub-sectoral levels, but the interplay between institutionalised interests and 
actors is considerable given the overlap between healthcare and industrial policy areas. 
The (corporatist) blurring of the public/private divide is here of especial importance given 
the issues at hand and with respect to the structure of the pharmaceutical industry and
80 Another early contributor was Katzenstein (1978), who sought to use policy networks in the context of 
international relations theory.
81 As the typologies often differ"... according to the dimensions along which the different types of 
networks are distinguished" (Borzel 1997b, 08), this would support the earlier-posited idea that 
language is often the cause of discrepancies between theorists’ usage.
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influences upon the market. And all actors do their best to ensure that regulatory 
outcomes reflect their interests.
A second major leitmotif to be identified amongst several of the interest-intermediation 
scholars is that of the policy network being able to influence the policy process. The notion 
of resource dependencies leading to stable and established relationships over time is an 
assumption shared by most theorists in this field. Wilks & Wright (1987), for example, write 
that actors seek to ‘balance’ and ‘optimise’ their ‘mutual relationships’ via resource 
exchanges, and that these then constitute policy networks:
...the linking process, the outcome of those exchanges, within a policy community 
or between a number of policy communities... A policy network describes the 
general properties of the processes by which some of the members of one or 
more policy community interests in a structure of dependent relationships. (297)
This disaggregation to sub-sectoral policy networks leads them to conclude that the type of 
issue at hand defines the type of relationship and, therefore, that not all policy issues within 
a policy community will necessarily involve the same network. This too is an important 
consideration to be borne in mind through the remaining empirical sections of this study. 
For as already hinted at, the number of actors and resulting disparate interests which are 
at stake in the pharmaceutical sector mean that not all policy issues involve the same 
actors. The networks can and do change even if the main players are always present.
Based on the stability ascribed the interest-intermediation construct, it can be inferred that 
the policy network itself does influence the policy process -  especially given that some 
actors develop a certain degree of clout within it. This inference, though debatable, is also 
relevant. For while “The EU decision-making process is fluid, open, and largely 
unpredictable” (Josselin 1996, 300), it does remain the case that EU level interests and 
institutions do, to a considerable degree, develop (resource) dependencies with each other 
in a relatively stable manner. Indeed, risk aversion for fear of failure compared to other 
actors or interests often precludes any attempts to be innovative in either pushing one’s 
own agenda else forwarding a new policy idea. Instead, a type of established status quo 
prevails with actors more or less content in the stability of their existing relationships. This 
has led to the development and application of ‘path-dependency’ theory to the EU context.
Although path-dependency falls outside the discussion, as it generally asserts a type of 
‘institutionalisation’ amongst actors (based on historical decisions which bind the actors 
together in a given infrastructure, thereby also setting their future preferences), it is 
applicable to pharmaceutical policy. The incomplete regulatory framework is the result of 
an impasse which cannot be broken by the main players within their current constellation of 
decision-making patterns and inter-relationships. These ‘dependencies’ are very strong
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both as constructs unto themselves and in the stakeholders’ relationships with other policy 
actors. The subsidiarity-free movement clash ensures that the nature of their relationships 
and future policy actions remain very much fixed -  choices and behaviour within certain 
constraints. This, in turn, can be related to the ‘joint decision trap’ view of European 
integration and policy-making first developed by Scharpf (1988).
Briefly, Scharpf argued the development of institutionalised policy-making arrangements at 
EU level, resulting in ‘sub-optimal’ outcomes from the member states’ perspective. This is 
based on the two-part dynamic of pro-European governments pushing for integration but 
not being willing to rescind their veto power, while less Europhile member states agree 
certain compromises, but mainly in order to maintain their influence within the European 
policy-process.
In noting the relevance of these perspective, the aim is not to offer a (new) institutionalist 
examination of EU pharmaceutical policy-making. Instead it is to understand the policy- 
process from a more complete perspective, albeit one which acknowledges an 
institutionalist framework. The focus is on the meso-level, and the study seeks to show 
how the regulatory environment -  admittedly in part a result of path-dependency -  can 
affect outcomes. The argument being that the regulatory issues associated with the 
pharmaceutical sector, in combination with the Community’s unique -  though in this case 
inadequate -  regulatory functions, have an impact on what sort of outcomes can be agreed 
through the policy networks. There are major constraints facing policy-makers where 
pharmaceutical policy is concerned.
The final understanding to be gleaned for the interest-intermediation school is that policy 
networks are valuable in reaching difficult consensual policy decisions where other forms 
of interest mediation fail. Here the network is understood as a “... web of relatively stable 
and ongoing relationships which mobilize dispersed resources so that collective (or 
parallel) action can be concentrated toward the solution of a common policy problem.” 
(Kenis & Schneider 1991, 36) This relates to path-dependency and can be used to support 
the idea of a new decision-making dynamic emerging in the EU. For the purposes here, 
however, it underscores the salience of actor (stakeholder) relationships in the policy- 
process within the regulatory state conception of the Community. It also fits squarely with 
the single market-subsidiarity clash. The Commission is unable to push any policy through 
without the support of the member states, with the latter’s interests ‘conditioned’ as much 
by budgetary and public constraints as industry and private requirements. The degree of 
interdependence between the actors in the sector is therefore very high.
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Policy networks and the EU policy-process: Scepticism?
It is recognised that use of the policy network within the realm of EU policy-making also 
has its detractors. Perhaps the main problem here is the terminology82. There is overlap 
with looser concepts such as the policy community and the issue network, but there is also 
overlap between the interest-intermediation and governance conceptions. In a critical 
article regarding the application of policy networks to EU policy-making processes, Kassim 
(1994) for example discusses ‘policy networks’ as something different from the ‘network 
model’. The former grew out of the pluralist-corporatist debates in political science, and 
the latter finds its origins in international relations theory. This seems very much along 
similar lines to Bbrzel’s distinction, although she refers to policy networks throughout. And 
while she claims that both are relevant to the study of the EU -  the one to policy outcomes 
and the other to European governance -  Kassim argues that neither is applicable.
He cites three grounds for this: ‘elusive fluidity’, a lack of attention attributed to institutions, 
and the ‘boundary problem’. The first refers to the near impossible task of capturing the 
fragmentation of the EU policy-process under a single conceptualisation. Regarding the 
second, Kassim argues that both the policy network and network model fail to account for 
the institutional architecture through which EU policy is made. The final critique is that both 
views are predicated on being able to delimit networks, but that this is not really possible in 
the supranational context. These are valid concerns, and his conclusion that “... the 
search for a framework for analysing the policy making processes of the EU must continue” 
(Kassim 1994, 25) remains current. Others sharing this sceptical view include Mills & 
Saward (1994), Thatcher (1995), and Dowding (1994) who perhaps sums it up best when 
he suggests not to ‘stretch a good idea too far*. Their scepticism is over policy networks as 
a new form of governance or, as seen with Kassim, as a complete framework cum theory.
Detailing their arguments is not the purpose here. It must suffice that they have been 
raised -  especially as many other scholars feel that the governance view of networks does 
hold validity at EU level (given the multi-level gaming structure which characterises it). 
This is not to duck the issue, but rather to re-iterate that this study is uses networks as: a 
“... descriptor for policy making arrangements” in the policy process (Kenis & Schneider 
1991, 32), not a mode or emerging theory of governance in the EU or elsewhere. In other
82 Dowding (1995) for example writes: “I will use the term ‘policy network’ as a generic category and 
'policy communities’ and ‘issue networks’ as subsets.” (140) Jordan (1990) meanwhile essentially 
argues the opposite: “The policy community is thus a special type of stable network... the policy 
network is a statement of shared interests in a policy problem: a policy community exists where there 
are effective shared ‘community’ views on the problem.” (327) Both are referring to the role and place 
of a specific level of interests in policy-making. But their differences have more to do with whether it is 
the policy network or the policy community which is the more overarching concept, than whether the 
approach itself is applicable.
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words, an apparatus of structure and process, rather than a theory of process. It should 
also be noted that policy networks -  as Bdrzel has shown and as this study understands 
them -  do not aim to offer a complete framework. Perhaps some of the governance or 
process-oriented theorists come closest to proposing this, but even they do not hold up the 
approach as an authoritative model for understanding the EU policy-process. Within this 
study, the approach is simply accepted as a manner of conceptualising policy-making in 
the EU, and the interest-intermediation view is employed insofar as it fits with the multi­
level governance view of Community policy-making not because it helps define it.
1 -3 Employing policy networks -  taking the approach forward
As they pertain to the EU pharmaceutical sector then, policy networks are treated as meso- 
level constructs with more formal relationships existing (in almost institutional terms) 
between the constituents. Identification of the major interests and actors (both domestic 
and supranational), as well as their relations and behaviour, falls within the remit of such 
an analysis. This involves assessing qualitative interactions amongst the networks’ 
primary players and, where relevant, the ties between them and other actors or bodies in 
the EU. The study thus considers how networks work within the health and industrial 
policy communities of the pharmaceutical arena. The character of stakeholder relations 
within the sector is taken as interest-based towards achieving particular policy outcomes.
What appears to be lacking in the interest-oriented conception, however, is its linkage to 
wider contextual frameworks. For the most part the approach been used at a very specific 
level of analysis -  the meso-level -  and can perhaps be justly criticised as being either too 
context-specific, else too removed and unrelated to what goes on about the networks 
themselves. This has led some to deem the approach as overly-descriptive83. It is a failing 
which has been noted by Marsh (1995) who, in support of the concept, has sought to show 
the relevance of networks to wider political science theories. Although the approach has 
been used effectively at the meso-level, it is his view that not only must it be integrated into 
micro-, but more importantly, macro-levels of analysis. His conclusion is not only that 
networks do fit within broader perspectives, but that the value of the approach could in fact 
be bolstered through its alignment with wider views84.
For this study policy-making is the locus and the interest-intermediation approach is 
therefore valuable. That said, the reasons behind the development of the EU regulatory
For instance Jordan (1990).
Marsh demonstrates the concept’s applicability within a macro-frame of analysis as pertains to theones 
of state-civil society relationships. Specifically, he undertakes an evaluation of the concept’s relevance 
to ‘elitism’, ‘pluralism’ and ‘marxism’ as comprehensive political ideologies commensurate with his own 
conceptualisation of the need for macro-level analysis and application.
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framework for medicines are not solely the result of what transpires in the networks. As 
the earlier discussion on liberal intergovernmentalism has shown for example, external 
factors play a major role in influencing actor behaviour with regard to their pursuit of 
specific policy outcomes. In particular, the EU’s policy and legal frameworks ensure that 
discussion and outcomes -  even at national level -  are confined to specific arenas. 
Consequently, the study agrees with Marsh’s underlying argument on the importance of 
context and integration with wider theories.
The discussion on the applicability of macro-theories of European integration to policy 
decisions in the sector -  neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism specifically -  has 
already shown their relevance and failings in this regard. In the opening chapter, a case 
was made for tying the network approach to a wider theoretical perspective in order to look 
at how the nature of the issue at hand can influence the policy-process. The regulatory 
policy environment created by the subsidiarity-free movement clash represents this liaison. 
As a cost-benefit framework of regulatory policy-making which accounts for interest and 
actor bargaining over regulation issues, Wilson’s (1980) ‘politics of policy’ regulatory 
typology is invoked. It is employed towards presenting a wider and more integrated 
manner of examining the development of EU pharmaceutical competencies than a simple 
application of meso-level analysis. Section 3 develops this level of analysis further, 
thereby reinforcing the network approach and giving rise to a broader theoretical context 
within which policy networks can be examined.
Rather than seeking to explain current understandings and usage, this section has simply 
opened the ‘can of worms’ that is policy networks. It has served to introduce the complex 
theoretical issues at hand, reviewing in particular the applicability of the interest- 
intermediation literature to the study. Above all, the discussion has made it clear that the 
adoption of policy networks to set out EU policy-making in the pharmaceutical sector is in 
keeping with a policy level approach. Wider theories do provide an interesting and 
important level of analysis but on their own they are too sweeping to explain outcomes. 
They offer a contextual understanding of the broader influences at work in shaping policy 
for the sector, and have shown the difficult environment in which policy is to be made. But 
they are not able to explain the more localised dynamics involved. Consequently, it is in 
order to supplement the insight provided by the wider theories that the study turns to 
networks and Wilson’s ‘politics of policy’. As this means understanding the perspectives 
and roles of the stakeholders in the policy-process, this is the next part of the discussion.
2 Constituent Interests and EU Pharmaceutical Policy
A delineation of all actors involved in the EU sector proves a complex task. First, there are 
so many implicated, and second because the health-industry duality means that their
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interests tend to be quite specific and disparate. Deciding on which actors are or are not 
important in Community medicines regulation, particularly within the context of multi-level 
governance, thus presents a challenge and leaves open the possibility of omissions. It 
also means that assessing their relative influences proves difficult. As such, the study 
employs the terms ‘stakeholder1 and ‘stakeholding’ (used several times to this point). The 
use of the term stakeholder is to capture the main actors’ vested interests and the nature of 
their involvement and interdependencies in a sector where traditional industrial 
relationships between consumer, producer and regulator do not feature.
2-1 Pharmaceutical stakeholders
By shedding the ideological and jingoistic accoutrement which some politicians have 
recently attached to the term, the discussion here simply accepts the concept as more “a 
matter of common sense” (Darling 1997) than a strict category of actor or actor behaviour. 
Although simplistic, this means that within the context of this being a study of sectoral 
policy-making (specifically, supranational regulation), those actors or groups of actors with 
enough of a vested interest to be able to affect the policy-making process -  and having 
therefore obligations to each other as well as to the sector as a whole -  are considered as 
stakeholders. There are therefore dependencies amongst the actors within the networks.
In most industries, the most obvious division to be made between stakeholders is between 
those actively involved in making policy and those who are either indirectly involved or are 
simply affected by such decisions. As was hinted at earlier, however, because of the 
nature of the actors’ involvement, this is too facile a division to be made with respect to 
medicines policy. The EU pharmaceutical sector’s constitution in stakeholder terms 
represents an unusually wide cross-range of interests and actors compared to other 
manufacturing sectors: from the (multinational) companies researching and making the 
drugs, through medical and scientific advisement bodies, consumer groups, governments 
and public regulatory bodies who assess medicines and their effects; to hospitals and the 
individual healthcare providers who prescribe them; to insurance agencies who pay for 
them; and ultimately to the patients themselves who consume them. Appendix 4-1 
identifies several of the main national actors and their specific policy objectives in the 
pharmaceutical sector generally, while Appendix 4-2 presents a selected listing of the more 
salient individual actors and their vehicles for expression at EU level. Although simple 
indexes, they provide an idea of how many interests and actors are involved on both sides 
of the health-industry dichotomy. It is not difficult to imagine to what extent the 
pharmaceutical sector is characterised by a tight (often competing) intertwining of these 
actors in policy networks; such that the division between active and less active players 
becomes difficult to delineate.
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The direct involvement of such a diverse range of interests reflects in large measure the 
public health and healthcare issues. Accordingly, all have at least a say in the policy- 
process, although, given their respective stakes, none find all policy decisions to their 
benefit. In looking at these players, a subdivision of the interests at stake leads to the four 
main supranational stakeholders already mentioned: consumer, industry, member state 
(government), and the Commission. These players and their interactions represent the 
focal point for the remainder of the study in light of the policy network frame of reference, 
and are deemed the primary stakeholders. Other actors or groups of aggregated interests 
also involved at EU level. Doctors’ federations, non-EU industry associations, and 
international pharmaceutical standards groups such as the ICH may be seen as secondary 
stakeholders, but they are not examined in this study.
The stakeholder interpretation thus gives additional elucidation to the peculiarities of the 
sector, particularly with respect to the two-part fact that: a) at national and subnational level 
there are many more players involved in pharmaceuticals than other sectors (recalling the 
direct link to healthcare and (public) health policy); and b) at European level, given the 
plethora of national and subnational players, the EU’s role is not entirely clear and remains 
complicated -  which is not as much the case in other industrial sectors within the 
framework of the Internal Market. Importantly here, the concept of stakeholder-oriented 
actors fits in ideally with the use of policy networks. For the nature of the relationships it 
assumes is clearly the case in the pharmaceutical sector.
2-2 Interest and priorities Ws-d-v/s pharmaceutical regulation
In concentrating on the primary stakeholders, the actions of the Commission, the industry, 
and the member states are seen as the most important in policy-making terms. While 
consumers are the critical element -  indeed it is their interests which underlie policy -  as 
they are not involved in the decision-making process directly there is no vehicle for 
assessing their role beyond the positions expressed by patient or consumer organisations 
(generally from outside the policy-making arena). With regard to public health priorities, 
the member states do represent an element of the consumer view within their own aims. 
But in terms of any single consumer actor having a major say in the policy-process, there 
appears to be none. While the Commission claims to engage patient’s perspective via 
dialogue with representative groups, it appears more a case of lip-service than a real 
commitment to involving them in a meaningful way.
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The exclusion of consumers is a major failing of the EU medicines policy-process. It has 
been highlighted by numerous analysts, academics and scholars85 for it is less the case at 
the national level where patients organisations and even doctors associations have at least 
some degree of say. Nonetheless, in order to understand what a single medicines market 
might mean in practice, the consumer (patient) perspective is paramount. So although 
patients are not involved in the decision-making perse, their positions and priorities require 
elaboration alongside those of the other main stakeholders. Indeed, as the discussion will 
show, consumer interests have featured, even if from the fringes.
Consumers: Medicines to bring public health benefits
Although not formally represented in the policy-making process, consumer interests are not 
entirely neglected. If a medicine is to sell it must work, and for it to work, it must pass the 
three hurdles of safety, quality and efficacy. These pertain not simply to ‘consumer safety’ 
(as in other sectors), but more specifically to public health. Still, consumers are the most 
marginalised of the sector’s stakeholders primarily because, as a group, they have the 
least influence, compounded by the poorest access to information. Further, as noted in 
Chapter 2, their position within the market’s demand structure means that they are unable 
to affect the market on their own. Their interest is simply in the best medicines irrespective 
of cost, and demand is via an intermediary. Indeed, one of challenges for both the industry 
and regulator in the future is going to lie in making the consumer more socially responsible 
and cost-conscious; for ultimately, as the end-user in what is a healthcare concern, the 
consumer’s interests should play a bigger part in pharmaceutical policy decisions.
At the same time, consumers are becoming increasingly educated. Notwithstanding the 
amount of inaccurate, out-dated and unregulated information to be found, the Internet in 
particular has helped improve consumer awareness about diseases and medicines86. 
Consequently, patients are increasingly organising "... on questions of access, on the use 
of particular treatments and on other causes.” (Davis 1997, 20) A host of patient groups, 
disease-specific organisations and lobbying bodies have sprung up in recent years, and 
doctors are increasingly reporting that patients come with requests for specific treatments 
or medications (Spurgeon 1999). The development of these ‘secondary’ interests is in part 
due to the industry’s growing willingness to provide information, but so too is it the result of 
greater awareness -  both of industry activities and specific healthcare questions. And as 
doctors and other health providers are becoming more involved in the debates about cost- 
containment, especially cost-effective prescribing, consumers are no longer as uninformed
85 For instance Orzack (1996), Abraham & Reed (2001) and Garattini & Bertele (2001).
86 However, many health and health-related websites -  including those providing disease and medicine 
information -  are sponsored by the pharmaceutical industry. This raises questions as to the 
impartiality (and even accuracy) of the information provided.
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as they were even five years ago. But it remains a paradox of the pharmaceutical arena 
that consumers have so little market power over a sector which deals in their health.
Regarding a future single medicines market, as there is so much uncertainty surrounding 
what form it would take and what benefits it might or might not bring, the consumer position 
is unclear. Access to the same products at the same price across the Community may 
seem a good idea, but questions regarding pricing and a lowest common denominator 
approach to quality qualify this. Patients in the UK and Sweden may for instance be 
envious of the comparatively low out-of-pocket expenditure on medication and health 
insurance of their southern Mediterranean neighbours, but the reverse may be the case in 
terms of access to newer, innovative preparations and simply more choice. Chances are 
that neither would be willing to compromise the benefits they currently enjoy under their 
national framework. What they are likely to agree on, however, is that any further 
movement on completing the market be based on public health requirements to the same 
degree as other, primarily industry, interests.
Industry: A regulatory environment conducive to business
As a collective stakeholder of its own, industry is often said to put profits ahead of public 
health and manufacturers are frequently accused of seeking increasingly exclusive patent 
rights while baulking at the prospect of increased competition. This, however, is not to say 
that the industry has no justifiable interests or concerns of its own. Notwithstanding that 
generic and research-oriented manufacturers have different priorities, balancing profits with 
escalating research costs, increasing government price controls to restrain healthcare 
budgets, and growing consumer demand (quantitative and qualitative), is no mean task. 
So while industry representatives may accept that their profits seem high relative to other 
industries, they argue that these are still not always in proportion to the costs which go into 
developing a product. According to the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry 
Associations (EFPIA), the EU research industry’s trade body, these costs have been rising 
at a constant rate through the 1980s and 1990s (EFPIA 1998). And they stress that such 
returns are necessary to the production of high quality medication. Consequently, drug 
companies (research-oriented manufacturers especially) seek government incentives given 
the health importance of the work they are engaged in, and push for what they view as the 
‘fair*, market-based (free) pricing of their products.
Fair prices are a subjective matter, generally dependent on whether one adopts a health 
budget or shareholder perspective. Nonetheless if, as industry claims: effective patent life 
times have decreased with the costs of discovering and developing NCEs increasing by 
over 50% between 1987 and 1990 alone (EFPIA 1995); only 1 or 2 of every 5,000-10,000
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laboratory products synthesised are actually marketed as a drug (EUROSTAT 1998); and 
European companies are losing out to US manufacturers (Lawton 2001), then perhaps the 
industry does have a case regarding its future competitiveness. Indeed, Europe’s 23.7% of 
the global market (by sales) is down from 28.9% in 1995 (EFPIA 1995), and the number of 
new chemical entities being discovered is going down relative to the US (EFPIA 2001b). 
Nevertheless, it should again be stressed that this data comes from the industry, even if it 
is also released as ‘official’ figures by the EU’s statistical office EUROSTAT87. They have 
been cited here to briefly indicate those arguments industry brings to the table.
Industry wants a regulatory environment which fosters and rewards innovation, where 
natural (as possible) market forces prevail, and in which the state (or EU) plays as minor a 
role as feasible. Here member state cost-containment measures which target the supply- 
side are often regarded as impediments to industry performance (EFPIA 1996), and a 
recent study revealed that a country’s economic and regulatory environment impacts 
considerably on the drug manufacturers’ competitiveness (Agrawal et al 1998). Still, as 
there is an appreciation that the relationship is one of co-dependence, the industry loudly 
proclaims that it is complying with, for example, demands for greater transparency in its 
operations e.g. the provision of information on clinical trials and testing (Sykes 1998). 
Whether the new regulatory system and conditions ultimately envisaged by the EU under a 
single market would meet industry’s interests is not at all clear. And as is shown in the 
following chapters, the industry is concerned about what the future holds in this respect. If 
increased EU regulatory competencies in the sector will impinge on industry’s behaviour 
(and affect profits), the industry may simply push to retain the status quo of a fragmented 
EU market. Simply put, the industry as a whole (i.e. both research and generic companies) 
wants to improve its global competitiveness -  vis-d-vis the US industry in particular -  and it 
wants to see EU regulatory policy designed to facilitate this.
European Commission: Pushing for a successful ‘euro-industry’
Ostensibly the European Commission’s responsibilities, as with those of the national 
governments, are as much to the consumer as they are to industry. As the only 
supranational stakeholder it also has an additional responsibility to the wider integration 
process. This means not only trying to balance industrial and health(care) questions, but 
equally, to reconcile economic and political interests towards fostering completion of the 
Internal Market88. Thus, the Commission seeks to apply the free movement of goods
87 For instance, this 1998 EUROSTAT citation on the number of products making it to market is a figure 
that EFPIA has long bandied around; EFPIA now cites that only one or two of every 10,000 
substances synthesised in a laboratory will make it to market as a medicine (EFPIA 2001).
88 One of the key issues on the Commission’s pharmaceutical agenda is how best to adapt the current 
framework so as to integrate the healthcare markets of the accession countries.
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requirements of Article 100 and to reduce intra-EU price differentials; both in order to 
diminish market fragmentation and to regulate towards a single pharmaceuticals market in 
some form. The Commission has identified its priorities as:
• Better medicines for all EU citizens, with fast access to innovations, better 
information and involvement in decisions affecting their health.
• Continued provision and funding of medicines by Member States and Insurance 
Funds with necessary safeguards on expenditure achieved with the minimum of 
legislation and regulation.
• Development of informed customer-supply negotiations on both prices and volumes, 
which provide a basis for enhanced competition.
• A steady stream of valuable innovative medicines from Industry and a thriving 
generic sector, both of which will make a supply side contribution to a genuinely 
competitive market.
• An attractive European investment environment in the biosciences and 
biotechnology for the R&D based Industry which will assume a prominent position for 
European Industry in world markets. (WG 11997, 7)
In order to achieve any or all of these goals, the Commission mandate will require more 
formalised establishment in terms of specific competencies. As noted in Chapter 2 it is 
currently institutionally incapable of regulating the medicines sector appropriately and 
completely -  given the proliferation of Community regulation, the Commission has in fact 
been shown to suffer from a management deficit more generally (Laffan 1997). It will have 
to develop further competencies which, notwithstanding the EMEA, build on the member 
states’ own roles. Aspects of healthcare policy are necessary if the EU is to eventually 
preside over fifteen very different systems and traditions.
That said, as a completely harmonised market would mean equality of product (including 
branding and packaging), uniform (free) pricing, common reimbursement mechanisms, and 
equal access and supply of medicines in all member states, it would mean, first, a single 
market in healthcare89. This does not exist and is clearly unattainable as things stand. 
The Commission recognises as much: “The problem is that the Community’s health 
systems are not harmonised, and this is preventing completion of the standardisation 
process”. (EUROSTAT 1998, 79) Complete market harmonisation is thus not necessarily 
the Commission’s goal, at least not in the short to medium-term. Consequently, the 
Commission has set about trying to improve the competitiveness of the industry as a 
means to increasing its own competencies (related to the ‘efficiency regime’ referred to in 
the previous chapter) and towards pursuing some degree of price harmonisation. What 
this means in practice is outlined in Chapters 7 and 8.
89 Recent ECJ rulings in cases such as C-158/96 -  Raymond Kohll v. Union des Casses de Maladie and 
C-120/95 -  Nicholas Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des Employes Prives (on the cross-border provision 
of medical services), or Joint Cases C-157/99 Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds and Peerbooms 
v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen (on the reimbursement of hospital costs incurred outside the 
country of origin) are, however, setting the stage for some harmonisation.
-106-
Member states: Protecting national interests
The third stakeholder -  insofar as they can be lumped together -  are the member states. 
Pinpointing a set of finite interests for fifteen EU governments requires some 
generalisation. Each has different priorities with respect to its own national industry, and 
each has a different healthcare system. Nevertheless, common ground can be found in 
that national authorities must ensure a certain quality of health and healthcare for the 
consumer through product safety and efficacy testing, along with maintaining control of 
medicines bills. They must equally make provisions for the industry in order to ensure both 
a high quality of product and national competitiveness. Governments’ responsibilities are 
to industry, consumers, and the healthcare market, all within the context of the SEM.
This multi-role position is difficult in itself, but is hampered by the fact that governments’ 
priorities for the pharmaceutical sector often have as much to do with electoral success as 
anything else. Keeping the voters happy is any government’s primary concern. But how to 
do so when cutting costs through drug pricing controls may be a vote-winner on the one 
hand, but is seen as an impediment to a successful and contributing industry on the other? 
Failure to control expenditure leads to measures which are unpopular with consumers e.g. 
higher taxation or insurance contributions. Failure to meet the needs of industry i.e. a non- 
conducive regulatory environment, means a potential loss of jobs and, ultimately, a 
decreasing quality of healthcare. With the Commission potentially looking to take the lead 
in the sector, this puts an added strain on national authorities who must still ensure the 
sustainability and success of the local sector. For as highlighted in Chapter 2, current 
Commission and industry goals such as free movement and free pricing would undermine 
both. Furthermore, as some member states’ industries would benefit from a single market 
at the expense of others’, there is an added incentive to maintain the status quo.
2-3 The EU policy clash
A more tangible understanding of what the clash means at EU level is now clear: A 
Commission interested mainly in promoting the free movement of goods (single market), 
improving the competitiveness of European industry (industrial policy), and some degree of 
price harmonisation (healthcare policy). The member states are pursuing similar, national 
industrial policy interests (supporting the industry and promoting employment), along with 
local healthcare and public health objectives (cost-containment and high quality of 
medicines). The emphasis is on retaining control of healthcare spending, and subsidiarity 
permits them this opt-out. The industry is lobbying for its interests to be met at national 
and supranational levels. Finally are the consumers. Although virtually excluded from the 
debate, the irony is that their interests are invoked by each of the other stakeholders to
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justify their own positions. As a result, the lack of clarity over what sort of regulatory 
regime will actually develop means that policy-decisions (and the degree of consumer 
involvement in the process) will continue to be treated on an issue-specific basis.
Earlier it was shown how the dissonance between subsidiarity and free movement impedes 
the Commission (Figure 2-2). When the stakeholders’ differing interests are added, the 
Commission’s role is made even more difficult; especially as the EU’s public health 
mandate is also limited (Holland & Mossialos 1999). This is represented in Figure 4-1.
Industrial Policy
Cell 1:
• Strong EU industry
• Job creation/ 
employment
• International 
competitiveness
Cell A:
• Price 
harmonisation
• Free pricing
Cell 5:
• Drug licensing
• Market approval 
competence
Cell 7:
• Single European 
Medicines Market
Healthcare Policy
Cell 3:
• Pricing 
competence
• Reimbursement 
competence
Cell 4:
• Price 
harmonisation
• Free pricing
Cell 6:
• Cheap(er) 
medicines
• Generic promotion 
and/or substitution
Cell 7:
• Single European 
Medicines Market
Figure 4-1: Overlapping Policy In terests in EU Pharm aceutical Regulation
Industrial Healthcare
Policy (A) Policy (B)
Public Health 
Policy (C)
Public Health Policv
Cell 2: Cell 5
• Safe medicines • Drug licensing
• Efficacious medicines • Market approval
• High quality medicines competence (3 'hurdles’ )
Cell 6: Cell 7:
• Access to care • Single European
• High quality medicines Medicines Market
The figure captures the multiplicity and variety of interests involved in the policy overlap. 
Each circle (A,B,C) represents one of the wider policy spheres assumed in medicine 
regulation, while the numbered cells correspond to groups of specific policy goals. The 
‘healthcare policy’ sphere (B) is the domain of the member states. Any policy interests that 
fall within it, even overlapping from another sphere, are subject to subsidiarity and member 
state approval i.e. Cells 4, 6 and 7. The ‘public health’ policy (C) and ‘industrial policy’ 
spheres (A) meanwhile, are areas in which the EU has at least some degree of 
competence and where, therefore, the EMEA, DG Enterprise and DG Sanco play a role.
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The specific policy goals represented in the diagram are equally applicable to the national 
context in terms of domestic policy, but in the EU frame a single market would need to 
accommodate this structure 15 times over; each member state has specific requirements 
and expectations corresponding to these goals, and none will permit any Community 
incursion into its healthcare sovereignty.
Looking more closely at the figure, while the Commission may be interested in price 
convergence from an industrial or single market point of view, because this impacts on 
national healthcare systems there is no progress (Cell 4). The same applies for the EMEA 
in that its mandate represents an overlap between public health and industrial policy 
interests (Cell 5), but it has no pricing and reimbursement authority. Cell 6 shows that the 
issue of high quality medicines (and access), while clearly a public health matter and to 
some degree therefore a Community field, is nevertheless also a healthcare financing 
matter and beyond EU competence. Finally, the concept of a single medicines market is 
shown in Cell 7 to be an overlap of all three spheres, and one which is severely 
compromised given that not even Cells 4 and 6 show prospects of being devolved to the 
supranational level. The result of this is the Community’s ability to only involve itself in 
industrial -  and to a lesser extent -  public health policy concerns. Though, as the figure 
shows, its competencies in the latter are also limited by the healthcare element.
With the differences in objectives of the primary stakeholders now clear, as well as the 
clash between free movement goals and the subsidiarity principle, it becomes necessary to 
see how they interact within the context of EU pharmaceutical policy. Understanding how 
policy networks form around policy proposals and in what way the regulatory environment 
impacts on the type of policy that can be agreed (in this case imposing constraints) is the 
next step. Industrial policies may dominate the EU regulatory framework for 
pharmaceuticals, but as some of these impact negatively on interests in the health(care) 
policy community, it is important to see how they have been reached. This is something 
macro-theories are unable to demonstrate.
3 The ‘Politics of Policy’: Recasting Community pharmaceutical regulation
The earlier discussion on the interest-intermediation application of policy networks made 
the point that networks do not operate in a vacuum. Instead, they take place within the 
constraints and boundaries of the policy environment. Nevertheless, much of the literature 
appears not to take this into account. Marsh (1995), however, has noted that: “Policy 
change is clearly not just a function of what occurs in the network: it is also strongly 
influenced by the economic, political and ideological context within which the network 
operates.” (3) This is relevant to EU pharmaceutical policy, in that understanding the
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regulatory environment will help to explain why some policies have been successfully 
carried out and others not. For although single market priorities resulted in the need to 
standardise package guidelines, advertising, and wholesale distribution among other 
issues, the sensitivity of healthcare matters have ensured that member states retain control 
over pricing and reimbursement concerns.
In order to address this and to understand how policy has been achieved given the clash 
represented in Figure 4-1, the discussion now turns to the ‘politics of policy’ approach 
formulated by Wilson (1980). It represents a framework of regulatory policy-making which 
characterises choices on the basis of perceived costs and benefits, arguing that the 
resultant cost-benefit configurations give rise to different modes of politicking. Having been 
effectively used to show at what level lobbying can prove effective (Hood 1994), it has also 
been applied to explain EU regulation more generally (Majone 1996). And its use here is 
to show how actors behave within the networks which form around (proposed) EU 
pharmaceutical policies. Understood as taking place within the broader perspectives 
outlined in Chapter 3, this offers a clearer picture of how policy is actually made. 
Moreover, it enables the study’s main contention -  that industry is the main beneficiary of 
the regulatory framework -  to be tested in relation to the case-studies of later chapters.
3-1 Costs versus benefits: Four scenarios
As a student of regulation in the US, it is not surprising that Wilson’s politics of regulation 
model was developed around the ‘iron-triangle’ conception of 1970s and 1980s American 
politics90. And his conclusion that this regulatory view was valuable in explaining how 
industry interests could come to dominate policy discussions and, indeed, outcomes, 
represented a clearer elucidation of the earlier arguments made by other American 
scholars such Gabriel Kolko and George Stigler that regulation was designed by and 
operated for industry (regulatory capture). The ability of his framework to incorporate the 
trade-off between private and public interests within the policy-process, as opposed to 
seeing it as a by-product, is perhaps the main reason that scholars have since sought to 
apply it beyond the American context. It also firmly integrates business interests (and 
lobbying specifically) into policy-making, rather than treating them as an external influence 
-  something which, as already noted, is prevalent in all areas of EU policy-making. The 
.‘politics of policy’ is thus particularly relevant to the EU in that traditional pluralist and neo- 
corporatist configurations do not adequately capture the dynamics at play in the 
Community’s multi-level governance structure. It is, therefore, compatible with the policy
90 The ‘iron triangle’ in American public policy theory referred to the relationship of interdependence 
between the state (or agency), a Congressional committee or subcommittee, and an interest group.
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network approach which, as argued by HSritier et al (1996), is perhaps ideally suited to the 
‘sectoralised’ EU frame.
Wilson’s assertion, quite simply, is that "... policy proposals, especially those involving 
economic stakes, can be classified in terms of the perceived distribution of their costs and 
benefits” (Wilson 1980, 365); that is, the trade-off price of implementation to the involved 
parties. These costs can be either (or both) economic or non-economic, and the value 
they carry is changeable according to the political climate. It seems a common-sense and 
straightforward enough view, but its value is perhaps in the detail. Not only does Wilson 
qualify regulatory decision-making according to the distribution of costs and benefits 
(concentrated or diffuse), but he argues that for each of the four possible configurations 
this generates, there results a specific type of politicking via which outcomes are achieved. 
This goes some way towards supporting Lowi’s (1969) argument of some years earlier that 
the policy arena often determines the nature of the political processes within it. Figure 4-2 
offers a matrix representation of Wilson’s four-dimensioned framework.
Figure 4-2: A Typology of th e  'Politics of Policy’
Ben efits
Diffuse Concentrated
Diffuse Majoritarian politics Client politics
Concentrated Entrepreneurial politics Interest-group politics
Source: Majone (1996), based on Wilson (1980).
The typology depicted in Figure 4-2 characterises the manner of politics via which different 
types of policy interest are resolved and, correspondingly, at what level this takes place. 
This is on the basis of what each player believes they have to gain or lose in a given policy 
scenario. From Wilson’s perspective, as he was concerned primarily with economic 
regulation at the national level, the stakeholders were industry, the state and the general 
public, with the latter understood in terms of representing the wider ‘common good’. As 
mentioned earlier, the EU the multi-level governance conception implies a host of further 
embedded actors, and policy-making in the pharmaceutical sector reflects this view quite 
clearly. However, as the study is concerned with the making of supranational policy, its 
looks only to the industry (particularly the research-based industry), the European 
Commission, the member states, and consumer interests (in whatever format or group 
represents their interests) as the main stakeholders. This allows for further inter-actor 
divisions where the policy issue at hand may provoke disparate reactions.
This model is relevant for two reasons. First, it shows how a more targeted decision­
making framework ties in with the integration and regulatory theories already profiled. 
And second, it establishes the fact that policy networks operate within certain
- 1 1 1 -
constraints. The politics of policy matrix thus fixes a set of parameters within which 
networks can operate, as well as acting as the liaison between ‘meso’ and ‘macro’ 
environments. It is able to accommodate both.
Majoritarian politics
According to politics of policy framework, in instances where the costs and benefits of a 
proposed regulatory policy are both diffuse, as there is little incentive for those involved to 
collaborate, the likelihood of policy outcome is fairly slim. The question of who pays, or 
more specifically, who is willing to pay what for a share of the benefit, means that 
resolution will only take place where there is sufficient political will and popular support. 
Both sides will have to agree such that a policy outcome will only be achievable via 
majoritarian politics. In the EU context, where the issue is about extending supranational 
regulatory authority, this means that all the stakeholders -  including the Commission and 
the member states -  will have to consent to bearing some of the costs of a policy which will 
benefit the others as well; costs which are extremely high at least in the short-term. 
Majone (1996) has cited social policy as one such example. Indeed, the sluggishness of 
some member states in implementing the 1993 Working Time Directive91, for example, 
would seem to bear testament to this.
In light of the wide distribution of both costs and benefits, matters involving member state 
healthcare systems and the provision of health also fall into this category. The 
Commission may favour an increased Community role in health matters -  though this 
needs centralising given that several Directorates-General affect matters pertaining to 
health policy (Merkel & Hubei 1999) -  but the member states remain very much against in 
view of not simply the potential economic costs, but so too the political consequences. 
Relating this to EU pharmaceutical policy thus gives a potential view into why the 
healthcare policy dimension of drug regulation remains a national level concern.
Client politics
Over issues where costs may be diffuse but the benefits concentrated, as only a small 
group stands to derive the most gain, the conditions raise the possibility for client politics to 
emerge. There is considerable incentive for one or more of these small groups to 
collaborate in order to influence the policy-process in their favour. Their chances of 
success are potentially bolstered with the costs being so widely distributed that the per 
capita price becomes negligible. The likelihood of widespread opposition is therefore
91 Directive 93/104/EC.
*112*
diminished. This is the classic business lobbying profile which asks who regulation is 
intended to serve: business/industry interests or the wider public good. Accordingly, 
multinational companies and other business interests fit within this model. The potential 
dominance of industrial lobbies under this scenario is usually countered by the use of 
independent regulatory bodies. But where such agencies lack the clout necessary to 
enforce their views, Wilson suggests the 'producer-dominance model’ (regulatory capture) 
can and does result. Industry may thus receive favourable treatment by government via 
subsidies or simply a laxer regulatory environment.
Industry lobbying over specific policies has been a trait of the EU pharmaceutical market 
since the SEM, and it has for the most part been successful in such endeavour. The first 
reason for this is the market’s fragmentation. Second is the nature of the policy-making 
process; multi-level governance proposes multiple levels for lobbyists to target. In addition 
to its ability to organise, its success it also because the issues at stake tend to be similar 
across national boundaries and the multinational nature of the industry has enabled it to 
gain significant lobbying experience in a host of environments (Greenwood & Ronit 1994).
Entrepreneurial politics
The term entrepreneurial politics is used to characterise policy decisions involving a wide 
distribution of benefits though a more concentrated spread of costs. With only a small 
group responsible for bearing the burden of the proposed policy, it is unsurprising that they 
are often vociferous in registering their protest. At the same time, however, as the benefits 
are so widespread and diffuse, they are on their own insufficient to capture the imagination 
and mobilise actor support for the policy. This may be the result of a lack of knowledge, or 
it may simply reflect a general apathy in that the relative per capita gain does not warrant 
activism. With there being little incentive to support such legislation, some persuasion (of 
both sides) becomes necessary.
Wilson thus proposes that a 'policy entrepreneur* is needed to take the issue forward. This 
implies an actor able to galvanise public support and undermine any arguments the 
policy’s opponents (those bearing the costs) may present. This the entrepreneur usually 
does by dramatising an issue or associating the benefits of the proposed (corrective) policy 
with values or the common good. For example, by revealing environmental 
mismanagement by multinational companies and associating them with things such as 
children’s health, a skilled actor can engender support for sustainable environmental 
practices such that they become law. It is to be noted, however, that the entrepreneur may 
not be a completely objective party. More often than not it will have its own agenda.
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At EU level, in light of its initiator role, the European Commission can often be seen to fulfil 
this entrepreneurial role. It is able and has a responsibility to galvanise support on a host 
of issues, primarily on the basis of the widespread Community benefits a policy could offer. 
Indeed, in the Commission’s role has been characterised as exactly that of a ‘policy 
entrepreneur1 (Laffan 1997). As mentioned, environmental policy can be regarded as an 
area in which an entrepreneur is generally needed, and the Commission can and does play 
a role here. For although the benefits of stricter environmental standards are to be enjoyed 
by the member states’ populations, the costs are concentrated; generally limited to private 
enterprise which is responsible for financing and implementing any requisite measures. 
When broken down into individual policy fields such as air or water pollution, the costs 
become even more concentrated requiring an entrepreneur. This is also the case where 
the costs of a given policy may disproportionately affect one member state, such as under 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). As for medicines, given the difficulty in sourcing 
information on the industry and the informational asymmetries which characterise the 
market, it is clear that a policy entrepreneur (the Commission) is needed to bring the issues 
into the open and to educate people about potential ramifications.
Interest-group politics
Finally, a policy offering high benefits to only a small number of interests, though at the 
expense of an equally small number of others who will bear the costs, gives rise to interest- 
group politics. In an industrial setting government subsidies or other incentives will usually 
favour one segment of industry at the expense of others (this may even be with regard to 
single companies gaining some type of competitive advantage). As noted in the 
pharmaceutical sector, priorities differ between generic and research-based companies, 
with one side usually standing to gain from the other’s loss i.e. stricter intellectual property 
rights. Accordingly, the motivation for both sides to organise in order to influence the 
policy-process becomes acute. Since the costs and benefits are seen as not really 
affecting the wider population, the question of the 'public good’ is not normally raised.
The result is a multitude of groups representing a kaleidoscope of specific interests all 
campaigning to ensure their own welfare as much as pushing a particular proposal: the few 
on the basis of the benefit they stand to derive, the majority on the basis of the harm or 
cost they may have to bear. The gains and losses potentially implicated by such policies at 
European level means a variety of bargaining scenarios, more often than not involving 
member states competing against each other, and disagreement with European 
institutions. EU Structural Funds, where the emphasis is on the redistribution of (and 
competition for) financial support is an area where interest-group politics can develop. 
Given the interests at stake, and the stakeholding nature of actor relationships, this
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dimension is clearly relevant to EU pharmaceutical regulation; discussions and bargaining 
between the main actors is a defining characteristic of the sector.
These are the four categories that Wilson sets out. Given the regulatory state conception 
of EU policy, wherein the Commission, the industry and the member states are all doing 
their best to preserve their own interests as much as they are trying to improve their 
respective lots, its relevance to the pharmaceutical sector is immediately clear.
3-2 The politics of policy and EU pharmaceutical policy
Wilson’s framework is not perfect. It is very much a ‘black or white’ view grounded in the 
American rational actor tradition. There will be intermediate cases, and the high-low 
(concentrated-diffuse) measurement is inevitably a relative one. However, this does not 
diminish the conceptual value of the approach. After all, politics is not an exact science, 
and a degree of generalisation is usually necessary. Discussions over perceived costs and 
benefits can be made within reason. And as the study uses the framework in conjunction 
with other analytical perspectives -  rather than claiming that on its own it offers all the 
answers -  it can be seen that it is extremely useful in elucidating stakeholder interests 
within networks as they form over given policy proposals.
The application of Wilson’s framework to selected policy issues in the EU pharmaceutical 
sector (past and present), will be offered in the case-study chapters (6, 7 and 8). These 
case-studies reflect not simply the relevance of the framework, but more the fact that 
supranational policy-making where medicines are concerned is an extremely sensitive 
affair with an appreciable effect on the stakeholders’ interests. That various aspects of the 
EU regulatory framework correspond to different configurations within the Wilson approach 
reflects this complexity. While regulatory policy in more traditional industries might apply to 
only one or perhaps even two of the scenarios, it certainly does not involve all of them.
The first case-study looks at the successful industry lobby over intellectual property rights 
in the early 1990s and argues this as a case of client politics. The industry’s claims that 
the patent protection rights accorded medicines were not sufficient to sustain the requisite 
research and development costs resulted in the Supplementary Protection Certificate 
legislation of 1992, which extended the protection period accorded new medicines. The 
second case-study concerns the establishment of the European Medicines Evaluation 
Agency. As mentioned earlier, the EMEA is a unique body, and is the office responsible 
for granting drugs EU market authorisation. The discussion will show that its establishment 
seems to have been a case of entrepreneurial politics within the network, though later 
discussions perhaps shifted the final decision towards client politicking. The third case-
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study is the pricing and reimbursement debate. Commission initiatives to overcome this 
impasse are looked at, as are the reasons for why this area has remained such a sticking- 
point. This is seen as majoritarian politics given the continuing deadlock; with all sides 
having to agree, this explains why there is no progress.
An application of the politics of policy approach to the policy issues already raised 
(including the case-studies) thus generates the following matrix (Figure 4-3).
Figure 4-3: The 'Politics of Policy' as Applied to  Selected  E lem ents of th e  Community 
Medicines Fram ework
Costs  versus  Ben efits
Diffuse-Diffuse Diffuse-
Concentrated
Concentrated-Diffuse Concentrated-
Concentrated
• Pricing • Patent protection • Packaging, inserts • A fu lly integrated
• Reimbursement and leaflets single market for
• European Agency for the Evaluation • 
of Medicinal Products
pharmaceuticals
Majoritarian Client Entrepreneurial Interest-sroup
T ype  o f  po lit ic s
Wilson’s typology has four dimensions. The interest-group cell concerns a small group 
seeking to protect their interests in the face of benefits being accrued by another group. 
The respective win-loss trade-off and strength of bargaining which accompanies it means 
that policy is extremely difficult to agree, if at all. Consequently, Table 4-3 reflects the 
argument that a fully integrated EU medicines market corresponds to the interest-group 
politics scenario. Some of the reasons i.e. why a single market has not been achieved 
(most notably the winner-loser division which would emerge amongst the member states) 
have already been raised. As there is too much uncertainty for the stakeholders: what 
would a single market mean in practice, who will benefit more (which countries, which 
industries) and by how much, the interest-group scenario cannot really be tested 
empirically. There is no one policy which fits. Rather than compromising the applicability 
of the approach, not developing the fourth cell it in fact strengthens it. For the inability to 
attain a harmonised market reflects the impasse and extent of the constraints. There are 
many actors, representing a panoply of interests, all trying to ensure that they do not have 
to bear the very high costs in order for another party to benefit; not just the main 
stakeholders are involved. Chapter 8 provides a more detailed discussion.
Outlining Wilson’s approach here was to introduce and show the utility of the matrix as a 
background to studying the Community’s formulation of pharmaceutical regulatory policy. 
It adds another level of analysis with which policy networks can be integrated. And it can
-116-
be tied into both the multi-level governance perception of the EU as well as the regulatory 
state perspective on policy-making. Furthermore, it does not preclude the involvement of 
outside actors or external influences on the policy-process. The predominately clarifying 
(and positive integration) role of the ECJ has already been stressed, and there is no 
reason to suggest that this does not fit. As far as policy networks go, the politics of policy 
approach lays down some essential ground-rules which will affect the nature of outcomes 
irrespective of the degree of network activity. Wilson’s model can supplement the interest- 
intermediation approach by showing how the nature of the issue at stake can impact on the 
manner in which policy is or is not developed.
Firstly, the cost-benefit configuration can determine whether networks will form and, to a 
degree, determines in what cases they might be successful. This is, however, where the 
framework’s explanatory power stops. On its own it cannot reveal the nature of 
interactions within the styles of politics it distinguishes, nor can it account for instances 
where a policy issue changes i.e. where more interests and actors join the policy fray or 
where externalities force decisions. Network analysis provides insight into the former, 
while integration theories can account for the latter -  the ‘politics of policy’ sits squarely in 
the middle. And it is precisely herein that its value is to be found. It acts as the liaison to 
link the ‘macro’ and ‘meso’ within the conception of the EU as a regulatory state subject to 
the dynamics of multi-level governance.
As noted earlier, the study does not offer a purely (new) institutionalist analysis. Path 
dependency within certain structural arrangements does characterise policy-making in the 
pharmaceutical sector, and here the use of Wilson’s framework would seem to fit within 
this. As Rosamond notes (2000), “Rational choice institutionalism tends to define 
institutions as formal legalistic entities and sets of decision rules that impose obligations 
upon self-interested actors” (115), and this is clearly the broader environment which 
contextualises the study92. The discussion characterises the stakeholders’ choices in large 
part on the basis of costs versus benefits, and subjects these to the formal decision­
making dynamics of, for instance, EU voting rules within the Council of Ministers. And it is 
clear that this in turn will affect any policy outcome. That said, the study keeps within the 
politics of policy approach, focusing on policy networks and the meso-level. The analysis 
is very much oriented around what each stakeholder in a given network perceives it has to 
gain or lose over a specific policy proposal (and whether the status quo might in fact 
represent the best option). The study Wilson’s matrix is thus used as an important 
contextual framework which provides important insights into the policy-process(es) of the 
case-studies which follow. Further, it enables a testing of the contention that the industry
92 Rosamond highlights the diversity in the institutionalist literature and posits ‘historical’, 'rational choice’ 
and ‘sociological’ institutionalism as the main variants. See Rosamond (2000), 109-122.
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dominates the networks such that the regulatory framework favours its interests. So 
although in some ways perhaps conforming to a new institutionalist framework, the study 
acknowledges this rather than seeking to detail or elucidate it in any way.
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C h a p te r  5 
'C l ie n t  Po l it ic s ’ : T he  Su p p le m e n ta r y  Pr o t e c t io n  C e r t if ic a te
Introduction
Intellectual property rights are generally regarded as central to the activities of highly 
research-intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals -  the costs and length of time 
required to develop a new medicine are considerable. Moreover, the period from 
identification of the new molecule to the launching of the derived product represents a 
much longer registration and market approval process than is found in other sectors. What 
is less widely held, however, is what the appropriate robustness of this intellectual property 
protection should be when bearing in mind consumer interests, healthcare costs, (generic) 
competition and, in the EU, the principle of the free movement of goods.
Notwithstanding that pharmaceuticals fall under the auspices of the 1973 European Patent 
Convention (EPC), in legislation enacted in 1992 the Community seemed to deliver its own 
answer to the question of adequate robustness. The Supplementary Protection Certificate 
(SPC), was introduced to extend patent protection times for medicines in the Community. 
Manufacturers were granted a 5 year post-patent expiry extension93, or 15 years total 
protection from the date of first market authorisation in the Community. This was as 
opposed to the 20 years from first patent application under the EPC. The SPC thus 
represented a derogation to both the European Patent Convention and the free movement 
of goods principles of Article 100.
This chapter examines how this piece of legislation came to pass, what the interests and 
roles of the stakeholders in the policy network which developed around the patent 
extension issue were, and how the policy-process fits within the politics of policy 
framework. Beginning with a brief overview of patents in Europe, the discussion turns to 
protection expressly for medicines. A brief outline of the arguments in favour and against 
patent-term extension of is then followed by an analysis of the political interactions behind 
the SPC. It is expected that such an analysis will not only show that actor (inter- 
institutional and even interpersonal) relationships and resource dependencies via a policy 
network configuration played a considerable role in this process, but will also indicate how 
industrial policy interests came to the fore. Specifically, the discussion agues that the 
Commission came to be influenced by the research industry on the basis of a client politics 
configuration (vis-£-vis the policy network’s other stakeholders).
93 Although industry commentators see the SPC as a patent-term restoration, this chapter uses the term 
(patent-term) extension given the limits it set on generic research during the extra period. Given these 
limits, other commentators regard the SPC as granting a period of ‘marketing exclusivity’.
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1 Protecting Intellectual Property
As with most other innovative and high technology-driven industries, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers place considerable emphasis on the role of intellectual property legislation 
as a means of securing rights and ensuring returns. A patent accords the holder the right 
to exclusive use of an invention (product or process), and provides legal grounds for 
preventing its unauthorised use. But for a medicines sector perhaps moreso than any 
other, the role of patents and the security they afford manufacturers is regarded as a ‘make 
or break’ issue given the costs involved. Moreover, industry representatives are often at 
pains to point to a causal link between a prospering European pharmaceutical sector 
where adequate intellectual property protection is in place, and better healthcare94. As 
noted in Chapter 2, however, this proves a tenuous link even at the best of times.
1-1 Patents in Europe
Before looking at pharmaceutical patents, the general nature of European patent legislation 
requires brief mention. This underlines just to what extent the SPC is a unique piece of 
legislation. The origins of patent protection stem from the 1883 Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property. It covered issues including trademarks, patents, 
tradenames, and even regulations pertaining to unfair competition. In Europe specifically, 
patent protection is legislated for under the European Patent Convention (EPC), 
established in 1973 in Munich, Germany. The EPC set down the principles of a Europe- 
wide patent for single applications for all industrial products/processes, which now applies 
to twenty European countries, not all of which are current EU member states.
The EPC grants the patent holder the same rights as would be accorded under a patent 
granted nationally. A single application is thus given multiple country accreditation by an 
international body, but is nevertheless subject to the national legislation of the individual 
countries. The term of coverage for all industrial patents is a standard 20 years from the 
date the application has been registered. Subject to several notable exceptions including 
certain biotechnology applications, medical (surgical) procedures and computer 
programmes, patents under the EPC are granted to new inventions which incur a 
significant ‘inventive step’ and which could be commercially exploited by parties other than 
the inventor. There are a host of internal definitions, clauses and conditions within this 
simplification, but they are too detailed for consideration here.
94 For instance EFPIA (1995) and Gilmartin (1997).
-120-
Co-existing with the EPC is the Community Patent of the European Union. As the EPC 
covers several countries outside the EU, the European Community has long sought to 
establish its own patent system. The principle of a Community-wide patent was to provide 
an alternative (not a replacement) to individual national patents in the member countries. It 
represents an adaptation of the EPC, and was designed within the context of removing 
obstacles to the free movement of goods and services in the single market. Several of the 
more notable measures under the Community patent include:
• a single patent applicable in all EU member states;
• a process whereby an application approved in one member state becomes effective 
in the others following a so-called ‘transitional period’;
• national authorities retain the ability to invoke national legislation in the granting of 
compulsory licences;
• making available the option to pursue a single country patent to applicants; and
• protected products to be subject to the free movement of goods and services 
principle of the single market.
Originally agreed at the Luxembourg Convention on the Community Patent in 1975 and 
amended in December 198995, the Community Patent is still not in force; and its 
implementation remains high on the agenda for European policy-makers.
The benefits of a single EU patent include uniformity and Community validity with a central 
jurisdictional authority; the obsolescence of the current requirement that in order for a 
patent to be recognised in a country it must first be used there; and the removal of fees 
payable in each separate country for patent renewal. However, there are also drawbacks. 
These include that: a challenge or infringement in one member state becomes relevant to 
all and may result in an EU-wide revocation of the patent; companies with the same patent 
in several countries (on an individual basis) will no longer be allowed to let it lapse in one 
or two while maintaining it in others; and the administrative (including translation) and 
transaction costs may in fact be higher for the maintenance of a Community patent than for 
individual patents in each country. The aim in pursuing an EU patent system is to 
“...eliminate the distortion of competition, which may result from the territorial nature of 
national protection rights. It should also ensure the free movement of goods protected by 
patents”. (EP 2001, 2) Once this legislation is finally enacted, it will have a considerable 
impact on pharmaceutical patents in the Community96.
1-2 Pharmaceutical patents
For medicines, the purpose of patents is "... to stop competitors selling: the identical 
product, a similar formulation of the active ingredient, or a product incorporating a ‘me-too’
‘Agreement relating to Community patents’. OJ L401, 30.12.89: 1-27.
96 For an outline of the European pharmaceutical industry’s views on the Community Patent issue, see 
EFPIA (1997).
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active ingredient for as long as possible.” (Wright 1997, 19) Companies argue that 
particularly in less-developed countries "... patent infringements resulting from lax laws 
allow local generic companies to reap undeserved financial rewards. Multinational 
pharmaceutical companies lose revenue and market share...” (Ganorkar & Korth 2000, 
77). As this costs them huge sums in legal costs, the patent-holding companies are keen 
on stricter intellectual property rights. Medicine patents are thus intended to lower the 
profitability of imitation by enhancing that of innovation. In principle such rationale are no 
different than in other sectors. But in practice, the intellectual property protection afforded 
drug producers is unlike that applicable to other industries.
Pharmaceutical patents apply to the discovery of new chemical entities and afford the 
holder the exclusive right to make and market drugs using that compound for the lifetime of 
the patent. In addition, multiple patents apply to any given medicinal product. These cover 
most notably: substance, compound, formulation, usage and process. SmithKline 
Beecham’s antiulcerant drug Tagamet, for example, carries some 26 separate patents 
(EGA 2000a), precluding research into any of these areas. The breadth of this protection 
is a consequence of the costs and registration times for new drugs, as well as the 
knowledge-accumulation on which they are based (see Chapter 2). Not just the length of 
protection accorded patent-holders, therefore, but the fact that patents cover the discovery 
and any prospective application of a new chemical entity represents a situation not seen in 
more traditional manufacturing sectors. With this the case, why have pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in most major markets (the EU, the United States and Japan) sought, and 
been successful in securing, longer patent terms than are offered other products?
The reasons stem from the fact that pharmaceuticals are concomitantly an industrial good 
and healthcare commodity. Recalling that under the EPC patent-life is the length of time 
between the original application for a patent and the time the patent expires (20 years), the 
three hurdles of safety, efficacy and quality which must be overcome by new products 
seeking market authorisation, mean that a considerable amount of this protection period is 
lost before the product makes it to market. Consequently the phrase ‘effective patent life’ 
is used to denote the period of time a product is covered by a patent whilst on the market. 
The length of the pharmaceutical approval process not only compromises the duration of 
the effective patent-term, but the industry argues that "... since many persons and 
organisations other than the innovator are involved” (REMIT 1996, 20), patent protection 
should nonetheless apply during such assessment periods. And as approval and testing 
times are much shorter for more traditional industries, it does perhaps seem somewhat 
inequitable that products subject to such strict and important pre-marketing requirements 
receive briefer patent protection terms than products which are not.
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As noted in previous chapters, rising R&D costs in the medicines sector have been 
commensurate with the amount of time it takes to develop a new product -  the so-called 
‘golden age’ of drug discovery of the 1950s and 1960s has long since passed. No longer 
do new compounds suggest themselves so readily, and the breakthroughs in areas such 
as histamines, steroids, and penicillin are not forthcoming (Sharp et al 1996, 3). Industry 
officials put cost of bringing a new drug to market at €500-560 million (EFPIA 2001a)97 and 
argue that this expense alone justifies the need for patent protection which goes beyond 
that in other industries. In addition, the complexity of current genome research has led to 
claims that the cost of researching a single medicine is set to increase by more than 100% 
over the next few years98. This represents a worrying direction for the companies, and 
reflects their strongest argument for patent-term extension. It is perhaps not surprising, 
therefore, that the Community has therefore legislated in this area.
That said, some see the industry’s claims as more of a smokescreen in the pursuit of 
higher profits and increased market shares. They question whether the medicines truly 
warrant exceptional patent-term coverage. New innovative medicines can, after all, 
achieve up to US$1 million a day in global sales (Vogel 1998) and, despite increasing R&D 
costs, pharmaceuticals continue to be one of the most profitable of all industries (Scherer 
1996). Furthermore, critics counter the industry’s complaints about unduly long registration 
times as a worst-case scenario, with many more drugs making it to market more quickly 
than before. As one commentator puts i t , "... the industry in totality seems to have fared 
pretty well in spite of the encumbrance of ‘inadequate’ patent cover.” (Paltnoi 1998, 55)
Thus, pharmaceutical patents are generally viewed from two camps. The pro-industry view 
holds that stringent intellectual property rights on medicines act as an incentive to industry 
with regard to innovation99, thereby promoting public health, healthcare and welfare:
It is imperative that the legitimate budgetary concerns of governments be 
reconciled with the needs of an innovative pharmaceutical industry, as in the long 
run, innovation and technological progress can supply a lasting contribution 
towards solving the problem of paying for healthcare... Innovation, with the stimuli 
of fair and healthy competition, can meet the healthcare expectations of the 
authorities and patients alike. Ultimately, only fair and healthy competition at 
various levels within healthcare systems will both contain costs and meet public 
health and patient needs and expectations. (EFPIA 1996,11)
97 Again, this is an industry figure, and one which includes a host of exogenous variables relating to R&D, 
risk and failure of other chemical entities and, furthermore, reflects the industry’s unwillingness to 
acknowledge that there is a ceiling in innovation capacity.
98 EFPIA -  ‘Did you know?’ (available at: ww.efpia.org/2_indust/didyouknow.htm
99
A study undertaken by the US Office for Technology Assessment in 1981 concluded that “The 
evidence that is available neither supports nor refutes the position that innovation will increase 
significantly because of patent-term extension. Thus, the net effects of patent-term extension on 
pharmaceutical innovation cannot be ascertained.” (OTA 1981, 4)
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Those who cast a more dubious eye over industry claims argue that extended patent-terms 
are sought simply to boost companies’ profitability by insulating the holders from 
competition, and result in higher drugs bills and welfare losses. The former hails from an 
industrial policy position and the other primarily from the health(care) vantage-point. These 
competing perspectives, along with the uniqueness of pharmaceutical patents, should be 
borne in mind as the background to the ensuing discussion on the Community’s decision to 
extend patent times in 1992.
The discussion has hinted at the rationale, and pros and cons for (extended) 
pharmaceutical patent protection. What is not as clear is whether long(er) protection 
periods represent a boost to healthcare and patients or not. Protecting innovative 
medicines may indeed help companies recoup their investments, and it may provide them 
with a tangible incentive to continue the search for new and better drugs, but as there is no 
definitive correlation between extended protection and (quality of) health, it is a question 
which remains unanswerable. The relationship is nevertheless an important one to bear in 
mind given the research industry’s (ongoing) arguments for extending protection periods. 
As regards the European Community’s 1992 extension of patent-terms for medicines under 
the SPC, it is therefore perhaps surprising that the Commission should ultimately deliver a 
proposal so clearly in favour of the research industry.
1-3 The Community Supplementary Protection Certificate
The Supplementary Protection Certificate became effective on 2 January 1993 and applied 
to drugs granted market authorisation after 1 January 1985100. A synopsis of its main 
terms reveals just to what extent the SPC represented a major boost to Europe’s research- 
driven companies. First, it extended the effective patent life on new and innovative 
medicines by 5 years101. The Certificate provided a longer period of coverage than 
previously available -  a maximum 15 years ‘effective monopoly’ from the date of the 
medicine’s first market authorisation within the Community. This prolongs the profit-life of 
covered products as it is during the period of marketing exclusivity that drug sales are 
generally at their highest (IMS Health 2001). Second, it prevented ‘unauthorised third 
parties’ (generic companies) from engaging in R&D prior to patent expiry.
Generic manufacturers had previously been able to begin their own testing and research 
from the date of the original patent submission, potentially releasing their copy on the very
100 The SPC came into force on 01.07.93 for Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and on 01.01.98 for 
Greece, Portugal and Spain.101The time difference (years) between the date of patent application and first market authorisation minus 
5 years decides the length of the SPC period. If the product was approved within five years of patent 
application, then it does not qualify for the SPC. A period between 5-10 years qualifies for a certificate, 
and anything longer than or equal to 10 years receives a maximum five years extra SPC coverage.
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day the patent on the original had expired. By preventing generic research during patent 
coverage, longer shelf-life for the branded products was ensured. The legislation 
ostensibly shields the research industry further from the more traditional levels of 
competition seen in other sectors. More importantly, the total coverage period of 15 years 
was more generous than what was available in the US and Japan at the time -  as will be 
seen, the Commission had originally proposed a 10 year SPC with up to 30 years 
coverage -  helping boost the research industry’s position in the global market.
An example of the degree to which the research companies benefit from the SPC comes 
from Eli Lilly’s antidepressant Prozac. In the UK Prozac came to market in 1986 and the 
patent expired in early 1995 (around 9 years effective patent life). The company applied 
for the extra coverage which was granted until the end of 1999. According to IMS Health 
(2001) data, Prozac achieved approximately 80% of its total sales between 1990-1999 in 
the last 5 years alone i.e. during the extension period granted by the SPC. This was the 
situation in the UK; Eli Lilly had SPCs on Prozac in 8 other Community countries (any 
company seeking an SPC is required to submit an individual national application for each 
market). With Prozac achieving UK sales in the vicinity of £100 million a year, the overall 
benefits to the company on this one product alone have been substantial. Two years after 
the enactment of the SPC, one analyst commented that “The pharmaceutical industry, 
owners of patents covering successful commercial products, have been trying to get the 
highest profit from the EC Regulation and National Laws.” (de Pastors 1995,192)
How was it, therefore, that Regulation (EEC) 1768/92 and extended patent protection was 
agreed by the Community, especially as it is clear that the research companies alone stood 
to gain from any extension? First, there is no verifiable link between more drugs and better 
healthcare (it depends on what is being researched and licensed -  see Chapter 6) but 
there is a correlation with increased drug prices. And second, “Although the additional 
patent protection period clearly helps the innovative industry, it may not necessarily 
encourage innovation; it may simply create inertia and a disincentive for rapid innovation 
and transition to a new product cycle.” (Kanavos & Mossialos 1999, 324). So given that 
patents on medicines clearly impact on national healthcare financing -  and bearing in mind 
the EU’s lack of competence in healthcare policy -  how did the SPC come to pass?
2 Extending Medicine Patents in the European Community: Initial dialogue
Because of the issues already outlined, the passing of the legislation was not an easy 
affair. The policy network which emerged consisted of the major stakeholders: the 
Commission, industry (research and generic), the member states and consumers, all with 
their own views and interests on the matter. Consequently the Commission was subject to
-125-
intense lobbying and detailed representations by these and other actors, particularly after 
publication of the Commission’s proposal document. The preliminary draft proposal of 
September 1989 was soon followed by the official Proposal in April 1990 (CEC 1990a). 
After some revisions, based also on the Parliament’s reading (EP 1991a), the Council 
Common Position was published in February 1992 (CEC 1992a) before the final text was 
agreed and adopted by Regulation (EEC) 1768/92 in July 1992 (CEC 1992b). It was a 
decision openly in favour of the research industry though, as the discussion will show, prior 
to the amendments the Commission’s proposals had actually gone even further. An 
examination of the interests expressed by the stakeholders during the policy-process 
reveals to what extent the Commission was influenced with regard to the content of the 
new Regulation, why in the final legislation the Commission’s proposals were diluted and, 
ultimately, why the client politics scenario is therefore invoked to characterise its passing.
2-1 Industrial policy’ and the research industry lobby: The case for an SPC 
scheme
In light of ever-decreasing effective patent life terms since the 1973 EPC, not to mention 
having already seen both the US (1984) and Japan (1988) introduce new and extended 
patent protection measures for pharmaceuticals, the need for effective protection was 
slowly being recognised by the European industry during the 1980s. Manufacturers felt 
that because of growing research and development costs, the lengthening of pre-market 
testing periods, and extended registration times, they were not earning sufficient returns on 
their products to warrant their expenditure. The industry claimed that as the number of 
new chemical entities being discovered was diminishing, the length of the discovery and 
approval processes (and hence their own costs) were increasing, compromising European 
competitiveness vis-d-vis the US and Japan. Figure 5-1 (overleaf) shows that NCE 
discovery in Europe dropped in the mid-1980s commensurate to the US closing the gap 
(see also Appendix 5-1). As mentioned in Chapter 2, however, the issue of R&D is not 
quite so clear-cut: companies may be spending more, but it is difficult to ascertain just how 
much of this is pure R&D expenditure.
The industry claimed that stricter licensing procedures in the member states and growing 
pressures to look into as yet untreatable conditions such as human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV) and cancer were behind these trends. They claimed that lengthier patent protection 
would allow them to recoup their costs and reinvest them in research and development for 
new preparations. A 1996 report commissioned by the European Commission estimated 
that R&D intensities in the main drug-producing countries rose from between 7-8% to 10- 
12% between the 1970s and 1990s, with the main causes being increased regulatory 
requirements combined with the difficulty of testing drugs for chronic long-term diseases, 
and diminishing returns to drug discovery (Sharp et al 1996).
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Figure 5-1: Number of NCEs Discovered - Europe versus United States, 1980-1999*
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Source: EFPIA (2001b), OECD Health Data (2001).
* For 2001, of the 36 NCEs launched on the world market, 13 are European in origin 
while 18 are American.
The fear expressed by many national politicians and commentators was that Europe was 
losing its hitherto dominance in the sector, and that research-bases would be re-located to 
the US where innovation was better rewarded. The statements by Lords Butterfield and 
Hacking during an April 1991 House of Lords debate makes the point:
Lord Butterfield: I am for British industry and I am for the pharmaceutical industry. 
I have a nightmare in which the West Germans, the French, the Americans and 
the Japanese run our pharmaceutical industry off its legs, (as cited in Hansard 
1991a, 1326)
Lord Hacking: What then should the government be doing? They should certainly 
not be dithering. Perhaps I may gently suggest that they should adopt the 
posture of supporting their industries. They should support their research-based 
industries; they should support skilled scientists who work in such industries and, 
above all, they should encourage investment in the United Kingdom. (1320)
It was with similar justification, and to attract foreign direct investment, that both the French 
and Italian governments unilaterally introduced national ‘supplementary protection’ 
legislation in 1991 for their respective industries (France proposed 17 years effective 
protection and Italy 18). However, as it was obvious that such national approaches would 
have ramifications for the single market, the need for a Community-wide policy was 
recognised (with the adoption of the Regulation all such national measures were to be 
abandoned). But rather than emanating from the Commission itself, the impetus for the 
prolongation of patent protection on medicinal products in fact originated from the industry.
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The European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), the self- 
styled ‘voice’ of the research-based industry since 1978, took up the baton. At the time of 
the SPC, the association represented eleven of the twelve member state organisations 
(excluding Luxembourg) along with those of five European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 
countries: Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. EFPIA’s job was to ensure 
that the industry’s interests were heard in the European arena, and this it did through the 
organisation of meetings, the drafting of reports and position papers and the running of 
information seminars. More importantly, the association was the industry’s official 
representative in negotiations with the European institutions. EFPIA was created 
specifically"... to bargain with the EC’s institutions over the precise forms of regulation and 
self-regulation compatible for example with the Community’s drug information policy, 
harmonization, pricing and patent law.” (Middlemas 1995, 468) This led to it being targeted 
by individual firms seeking to lobby in Brussels (Abraham & Lewis 2000), and in 1997 it 
was restructured to account for this. Membership is now held not just by the 15 member 
state organisations (plus those of Switzerland and Turkey), but also by 40 of the world’s 
largest research-driven firms. Organisationally EFPIA consists of four policy committees: 
Economic and Social Policy; External Trade Policy; Scientific, Technical and Regulatory 
Policy; and Intellectual Property Policy, which are responsible for issuing the association’s 
recommendations and positions on relevant issues.
From as early as 1988 EFPIA and its members were lobbying the Commission over patent- 
term extension (SCRIP 1287), and the association published its vision for the sector in a 
booklet entitled ‘Completing the Internal Market for Pharmaceuticals’ (EFPIA 1988). As 
patent extension was an issue which affected the European industry as a whole, EFPIA 
saw it as a matter which could be most effectively handled in a centralised Community 
manner, rather than on a member state basis. In lobbying the Commission, however, 
EFPIA’s initial contact did not go well. In mid-1997 Nelly Baudrihaye, EFPIA’s Director- 
General, met with Berthold Schwab, Head of Unit for Intellectual and Industrial Property in 
the Competition Directorate-General (DGIV), to discuss the issue. She found that he did 
not see this as a matter for the Commission (Shechter 1998). As noted in Chapter 2, 
pharmaceutical policy was the domain of the industrial Affairs DG, and the Commission 
could (can), therefore, only act where industrial policy issues are at stake. Mr Schwab 
recognised that patents on medicines impact on national healthcare financing and did not 
see how DGIV, far less the Commission itself, could take the issue forward. The industry’s 
calls for a Community response to the question of inadequate protection were thus rejected 
at the first hurdle. This was to change dramatically.
The industry regrouped, altered tack, and aimed to sell the idea from an industrial policy 
stance. EFPIA set about making a unified and well-presented case, centring its arguments
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around the idea that current patent protection terms were beginning to starve innovation, 
and that this could potentially have negative effects on the Community’s industrial 
competitiveness. They turned their attentions from Mr Schwab to DGIII (Industrial Affairs), 
and pinpointed Fernand Sauer, then head of its Unit for Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics 
(DGIII/E/F), aiming to convince him of the merits of their case102. In the course of their 
discussions with Mr Sauer it seems a deal was struck: for Commission support on the 
patent issue, the industry would trade in their objections to Commission proposals on 
Community pricing rules -  they would at least be willing to engage in dialogue over the 
matter. At the time DGIII/E/F was trying to secure support for Community rules on 
medicine pricing transparency (what was to later become Directive 89/105/EEC), which the 
industry had until then regarded as an unfair interference in their affairs (see Chapter 7).
Discussions about Community rules on the transparency of drug prices were at a fairly 
advanced stage at this time, and Shechter (1998) has stated that “He [Mr Sauer] then 
promised a trade-off -  if the industry accepted the Price Transparency Directive, the 
Commission would take the initiative with regard to the SPC issue.” (83) When asked 
about the Commission’s stance on the SPC in a 1993 interview, needless to say Mr Sauer 
made no mention of this. Furthermore, his answer: “We are neutral” (as cited in Koberstein 
1993, 32) seems unlikely in light of the clear pro-research industry recommendations made 
by the Commission in the 1990 proposal (see Section 3-1 )103. Irrespective, this concession 
or trade-off by EFPIA’s members appears to have been a successful one. DGIII helped to 
make the industry’s case within the Commission and Mr Schwab amongst others came on 
board. With influential ‘insiders’ not just sympathetic to their cause but actually embracing 
it, EFPIA then set about lobbying the other Community bodies and sought also to curry the 
support of the national associations.
2-2 Creating the Commission’s proposal document
With DGIII and the Commission in support and pushing the policy -  and the industry 
making its case to the other European institutions as well -  discussions between EFPIA 
and the Commission turned to the specifics of an official proposal. How was the 
Commission going to sell this industrial policy slant to the European Parliament and 
Council, and on what grounds; especially when its own initial reaction (under DGIV) had 
been negative? It was going to need ‘proof and thus EFPIA was requested to provide 
substantial evidence as to their claims of patent time erosion.
102 Interestingly, Fernand Sauer went on to become the first Executive Director of the EMEA before 
returning to the Commission in December 2000 as Director of the Public Health Unit (Directorate 'G') in 
DG Sanco.
103 Later in the same interview Mr Sauer refers to the SPC as “clearly a message in favour of innovation” 
(34). This can surely be interpreted as reflecting a conscious decision by the Commission to side with 
the research-oriented industry.
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A veritable ‘blitz’ campaign of data, fact and detail on all aspects of the industry and indeed 
the economic costs associated with patent protection was launched. Amongst other 
things, the companies cited the 6 year registration and approval process in some member 
states (CEC 1993a) -  which, when substituted from the 20 year protection accorded by the 
EPC, resulted in a much diminished effective patent life compared to other products -  as a 
major impediment to their operations. In Germany the effective period was around 8 years 
at the time of the discussions, while in the UK the effective period of protection on some 
drugs was cited as only 6 years by the Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry 
(APBI) in a memorandum to the House of Lords (Hansard 1991a). The EFPIA members 
pointed to the revised patent legislation in America and Japan to support their case. 
Europe was not only losing out they argued, but patent-term restoration in the other two 
countries could be linked to their closing the competitiveness gap (see Appendix 5-2). This 
could be measured in terms of total sales, employment, R&D spending and, as Figure 5-1 
hinted at, the number of new discoveries being made. Closer to home, EFPIA was also 
able to use France and Italy’s earlier pursuit of patent restoration measures for their own 
industries as further indication of the pressing nature of their claims.
A special group was set up within EFPIA to deal with the Commission’s request for 
evidence. It was charged with drafting a report to demonstrate diminishing patent periods 
for several hundred products across a host of therapeutic categories. The British trade 
body, the Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), played a leading role as 
the UK industry had already been extremely vociferous on the matter at home; highlighting 
declining exports and growing imports in Europe compared to the US, and criticising the 
UK government’s lack of initiative to address this (e.g. SCRIP 1291, HoL 1991a). The end 
product of the group’s work was a ‘study’ entitled ‘Memorandum on the Need of the 
European Pharmaceutical Industry for Restoration of Effective Patent Term for 
Pharmaceuticals’ (EFPIA 1988). The report spanned the period 1960-1986 and was 
presented to the Commission in early 1988. The Commission apparently needed no 
further convincing and, in April of 1990, it presented its ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation 
Concerning the Creation of a Supplementary Protection Certificate for Medicinal Products’ 
(CEC 1990a) to the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Economic and 
Social Committee for their consideration.
After the initial hiccough regarding DGIV’s lack of interest, things had very much gone 
EFPIA’s way. The Commission had adopted an industrial policy (rather than competition- 
oriented) view on the issue and drew up a proposal which more than met the industry’s 
demands -  as already noted, the Commission’s proposals were considerably stronger than 
those ultimately agreed. Indication of the Commission’s commitment comes from the 
Proposal’s suggestions for a 10 year SPC with 30 years maximum patent coverage. This
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was notably more generous than the periods agreed in other countries following their own 
lobbies over patent-term extension issues. Both the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act in the US 
and its 1988 legislative equivalent in Japan allowed for (up to) a 5 year extension and 
maximum 25 years protection. And whereas these pieces of legislation contained 
provisions for generic competition -  the Hatch-Waxman Act included a ‘fast track’ 
procedure for generics, and the Japanese legislation was agreed in a climate of healthcare 
cost-containment -  in the case of the SPC the Commission essentially sought to stifle it.
Generic companies were to be prevented from engaging in research during patent 
coverage on the branded product. This should be compared with the US where it has 
been claimed that “The robust generic industry owes its very existence to the [Hatch- 
Waxman] act...” (Mossinghoff 1999, 54) and was noted in the Opinion of the Parliament’s 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy Committee on the issue: “... what is 
striking, of course, is that this competition-boosting aspect of the US legislation is totally 
absent from the Commission’s proposal.” (EP 1990a, 20) In light of the implications such a 
blatant one-sided position carried, it is not surprising that an opposition lobby emerged 
during Parliament’s discussions over the Commission’s submission.
3 Adopting the Proposals
Until now the Commission and EFPIA had been working together behind closed doors 
(Shechter 1998); none of the other stakeholders had been involved. But with the proposals 
leaving the Commission for a wider readership, the other policy actors were to get their 
say. For as part of the Parliament’s reading procedures it is required to consult numerous 
committees and outside groups. Equally, as the ministers in the Council must deliver a 
response which reflects the position of all member states, they too must consult with a 
broader constituency. As might have been expected with the Commission’s proposals now 
under scrutiny from a broader range of actors, the more sceptical position outlined at the 
outset of the chapter was voiced. With more actors now part of the policy-process, most 
notably the generic industry, the national governments, and consumers/patients, a policy 
network emerged around the SPC issue. Needless to say, as these latter stakeholders 
were to bear the costs of the research industry’s gains -  with no immediately apparent 
benefits to themselves beyond the anecdotal evidence given to the Commission by EFPIA 
-  they were understandably critical.
3-1 Debate and amendments
With the Council as the real decision-making authority the agreement of the ministers was 
crucial if EFPIA were to have their way -  the Proposal was assigned to the Internal Market
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Council. However, several of the member governments had concerns with the 
Commission’s proposals. Their primary interest was in controlling healthcare costs and it 
was felt that patent extensions could delay the introduction of cheaper generics, thereby 
keeping drug prices high. Of course not all member states had identical interests within 
this broad objective. While those with generic industries (or no real indigenous industry per 
se) such as Greece, Portugal and Spain opposed the proposals outright, countries such as 
the United Kingdom and Germany which have major research-based industries were 
reluctant on other grounds104. As cost-containment was a political priority at home, their 
reservations had to do with the potential effects any changes to patent times might have 
had on pharmaceutical prices. UK Minister for Industry and Enterprise, Douglas Hogg, 
noted that: “In its Fiche Financiere, the Commission suggests that the proposal would have 
no effect on the EC budget. While this may be so, there are implications for the prices of 
and expenditure on drugs, which the Government are currently considering.” (as cited in 
HoL 1991a, 11-11) Nevertheless, both the UK and German governments supported the 
revised proposals in the end.
In light of this EFPIA would have to convince the Parliament. As outlined in Chapter 2, the 
co-operation procedure allowed the Parliament a second reading of proposed legislation. 
As the Commission had based the SPC legislation on Article 100(a) -  free movement, 
single market concerns -  it was subject to co-decision. This meant that should the 
Parliament reject the legislation, the Council would only be able to enact it via unanimity. 
And with Greece, Portugal and Spain going to vote against in the Council, EFPIA needed 
Parliamentary support. But much to its chagrin some forceful opposition was voiced during 
the MEPs’ consideration of the proposals.
In May 1990 the document was assigned to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens 
Rights. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection, the 
Committee on Energy, Research and Technology, and the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy were also asked for their opinions. In delivering its 
view, the latter committee in particular expressed reservations, questioning many of the 
Commission’s assertions. Most notable of these pertained to the risks of R&D relocation, 
the discouragement of generic competition, and the supposed benefits to the European 
patient (EP 1990a). Indeed, as one commentator noted from the outset:
... no company will give a commitment today to close down an R&D laboratory if 
patent-term restoration does not happen in Europe, any more than it will formally 
undertake to open a new one if patent-term restoration does come into effect. 
Nor can any firm or group of firms guarantee to discover more, or fewer, new 
medicines as a direct result of the outcome of this debate. (Albedo 1990,16)
104 Germany also has the largest generic industry in Europe.
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The Committee was in essence challenging the basis for the research industry’s claims.
The European Economic and Social Committee (ESC) -  which is always granted a reading 
of proposed legislation -  raised some crucial questions in its own Opinion (ESC 1991a). 
Handled by the Section for Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services, the ESC Opinion 
opened by questioning the legal basis for the Commission’s action: “This proposal, which is 
based on Article 100A of the EEC Treaty, falls within the framework of a Community health 
policy or, more specifically, of an Internal Market for medicinal products.” (point 1.1) This 
was exactly the point Mr Schwab had raised in his first meeting with the EFPIA Director- 
General when he expressed the view that was not a matter the Commission could deal 
with. Although the ESC agreed with the Commission on the effects of patent-term erosion 
and the to need remain competitive with the United States and Japan, pointing out that “A 
fair solution would be to align on US and Japanese patent protection laws so as to 
safeguard the competitive position of the Community’s pharmaceuticals industry 
worldwide” (point 3.3), it adopted a health(care) policy line throughout its Opinion.
For instance, noting the specific claims of the Commission (research industry) about 
unduly long registration times, it pointed out that these were "... administrative procedures 
which are recognized as necessary precautions for the marketing of medicinal products. 
Furthermore, the effect of brand loyalty over longer periods should not be underestimated 
in the case of many products.” (point 1.4) The Committee also voiced its concerns on the 
potential impact on the generic industry. It accepted the 10 year extension under the SPC 
as necessary in order to compete with the US and Japan, but it stressed that:
The interests of generics producers, who have an influence on price competition 
in a number of market segments must also be borne in mind. In this connection, 
a balance must be maintained between the interests of this industry and 
pharmaceutical research... The Committee urges the Commission to verify 
whether the direct interests of generic producers will be damaged, (point 3.4.1)
Furthermore, it asked the Commission to take into account the price increases which would 
result from extended patent periods. Despite such intense scrutiny of the proposals, 
however, the Committee gave its approval, with 81 members voting in favour with 5 
abstentions. The irony in its doing so, was that, unlike the Commission, its main interests 
had to do with the benefit to the European patient and healthcare policy in general. As part 
of the rationale given for approval, the Opinion reads:
The Committee recognizes that, in the interests of health protection, the 
marketing of medicinal products in the Community must be subject to stringent 
quality and therapeutic requirements... Patent protection for innovation in the 
Community pharmaceutical industry can also be said to contribute to health 
protection, (point 3.1)
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However, as the ESC is only a consultative body within the legislative process, its calls for 
clarification were not taken on board by the Commission.
The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights, to which the legislation was 
assigned, gave its approval to the document in its Opinion of 29 November 1990 (EP 
1990b). However, it argued that the SPC be extended to include patents on plant 
protection research as well. The argument being that plant protection research is also 
central to improving public health by helping ensure supplies of good quality food, and that 
plant protection products as an R&D intensive industry would also cease to be produced in 
the Community without patent-term extension. This of course was not what EFPIA had in 
mind, and the Council in fact dropped the motion in its February 1992 Common Position. 
What should be noted, however, is that the Committee was agreeing the legislation 
principally on the grounds of health policy concerns.
3-2 EPC compatibility and agreement
Concurrently, an important parallel debate was taking place regarding the legality of the 
SPC proposals with the terms of the European Patent Convention. Article 63(1) of the 
EPC stipulated the 20 year patent term from date of patent filing, and the question was 
how to bypass this. This point was in fact tabled by one MEP as a written question to the 
Commission asking: “The Commission will shortly submit a proposal to the Council 
concerning the introduction of a patent protection for new medicines; what legal basis will 
the Commission use for this?” (CEC 191/91) Any changes to the Convention required the 
approval of three-quarters of its signatories (fourteen countries at the time), more than a 
quarter of which were not Community member states. An exception for only the EC 
countries was thus not likely. In addition, simply tacking on an extra 5 years to the EPC 
period would affect patents on all industrial products and would not result in the derogation 
the pharmaceutical industry was seeking for itself.
Following pressure by the EC member states and the Commission, a diplomatic meeting 
was called in 1991 to discuss the issue. The result was agreement on an addition to 
Article 63. This enabled any EPC contracting state to extend the terms of the European 
patent immediately following its expiry. This was, however, only applicable where the 
subject-matter of the patent"... is a product or process of manufacturing a product or a use 
of a product, which has to undergo an administration authorisation procedure required by 
law before it can be put on the market in that state.” (as cited in SCRIP 1993, 94) It was a 
compromise which suited all parties and the Commission was now free to advocate the 
SPC without fear of contravening the EPC.
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With EPC compatibility secured, Parliament agreed the legislation on second reading 
subject to certain revisions in the Council common position. The first was that some 
member states were granted different implementation dates. A transition period was 
permitted for those countries which had opposed the legislation outright. Greece, Portugal 
and Spain were given until January 1998 to implement the SPC in order to protect their 
local (generic) industries. The second was that the date of first authorisation for drugs after 
which an SPC could be granted would be different in some member states. The legislation 
covered medicines authorised as of 1 January 1985, but Germany was allowed until 
January 1988 on account of its introduction of a new reference price system which would 
have been affected by the legislation. Denmark too was permitted until 1988, while in 
Belgium and Italy the corresponding date was in fact pushed backwards rather than 
forwards, to 1 January 1982, in order that more drugs would qualify. The third amendment 
was a reduced SPC term. The Commission’s 10 years were cut to 5.
EFPIA, needless to say, was disappointed with the latter revision in particular. John Griffin, 
Director of the ABPI, was reported to have given a ‘guarded welcome’ to the decision, 
saying that the association would "... obviously have preferred the Commission’s 
‘imaginative and constructive’ original draft regulation.” (as cited in MARKETLETTER 
1992a, 17) Still, the SPC was an obvious ‘win’ for the research industry, and one which 
demonstrated its strength within the policy network.
3-3 Health(care) policy interests and opposition
Generic manufactures had been dead-set against the proposals. No longer able to begin 
their own testing and research from the time of patent submission for the original product, 
they would have to wait until patent expiry, thereby further delaying the release of their own 
medicines. And while EFPIA’s members viewed this as rectifying what they perceived to 
be an unfair competitive advantage, generic manufacturers saw it as threatening their very 
raison d’etre -  they too faced growing research periods and rising costs. The generic 
producers sought to bring this to the Commission’s attention, and in their representations, 
their position was boosted by data showing that patent expiry did not mean an automatic 
end to a medicine’s market life as the research-based industry was claiming (Anon 1990). 
They also tried to have the SPC limited to only the first drug in a new class of compounds, 
as was the case under the data exclusivity rules of the US Hatch-Waxman Act.
The generic industry thus sought support from outside Europe, particularly from their US 
counterparts. For with much of the generic industry’s output being sold to American drug- 
makers as bulk pharmaceuticals, the SPC would negatively impact on the US industry (and 
healthcare system) as well. When asked about the imminence of the SPC legislation in
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Europe, the view expressed by Dee Fensterer, President of the US Generic 
Pharmaceutical Industry Association, was: “It’s the same crazy battle we had here in the 
US in the early 80s, with the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association saying that US 
patent life was only about eight or nine years. And, of course, that was a horrendous lie.” 
(as cited in Bahner 1993) Indeed, some commentators were sceptical of EFPIA’s ‘proof:
... it must be admitted that, at present, there are insufficient data to support the 
generalisations, particularly with respect to Europe. The more closely one 
examines this putative evidence, the more one wonders if the data couldn’t give 
rise to queries regarding the size of the samples in the studies and the 
comprehensiveness of the raw data... Above all, the most striking feature of the 
current industry argument is the rather general tone of the statement that patent- 
term restoration will have a beneficial influence on the range and quality of 
products in the future. This still has the ring of assertion rather than 
demonstration. (Albedo 1990,15-16)
Unsurprisingly, patient and consumer groups rallied against the proposals during and after 
the policy-process. They expressed concerns surrounding the length of protection under 
discussion and, consequently, the speed of access to new products and potential for 
higher prices. In early 1991 the Bureau EuropGen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC, 
the European Consumer’s Organisation) issued statement claiming the proposals 
represented ‘a blank cheque’ for industry (BEUC 1991). In a memorandum circulated later 
the same year, the UK’s National Consumer Council (NCC) spelled this out in more detail: 
"... even if the erosion of patent life has been as large as the industry claims... The expiry 
of patent protection does not mean an end of the drug’s role in the market, or the return on 
the patentee’s investment.” (as cited in HoL 1991a, 23) More importantly perhaps, the 
NCC made the point that “Increasing patent life passes the cost to consumers, or 
taxpayers. The balance on interests on patents is innovation, but not at any cost.” (24)
The Consumers in the European Community Group (CECG)105 made similar 
representations. It argued that lengthy patents, as they limit the speed of access to new 
therapies, were more of a public health matter than a simple industrial policy concern. On 
this basis, and fearing higher prices, they felt that the Commission ought not to have taken 
a decision so easily. In a letter to the UK House of Lords, they wrote that"... we believe 
that extending patent protection will undoubtedly restrict the production of generic drugs -  
which are cheaper than branded drugs -  and therefore we oppose the Commission’s 
proposals.” (as cited in HoL 1991a, II-9) This view was not limited to the consumer 
organisations. At least one industry analyst warned against a “price explosion”, arguing 
that the only safeguard against it “... is the acceptance, indeed encouragement, of
105 The CECG is an umbrella group of UK organisations concerned with the effects of Community policies 
on British consumers.
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legitimate generic competition for products whose patent (and in future, Supplementary 
Protection Certificates) had expired.” (Redwood 1992, 22)
Opposition continued even after the proposals were agreed. The CECG now argued that:
...increased protection should apply only to new molecular entities which 
represent a genuine therapeutic gain. CECG sees no reason why virtual copies 
of old medicines should receive extra protection and the production of cheaper 
generics be impelled. (CECG 1993, 28)
This had been one of the generic industry’s main points, one which the Parliament had 
also endorsed during its first reading. It had sought the inclusion of a provision limiting the 
certificate to products which are "... already protected by a patent and which provides for 
the effective treatment or diagnosis of a condition which has not hitherto been adequately 
treated or diagnosed by a medicinal product already on the market.” (Article 1 new) The 
fear was that extended protection across the board would act as an incentive for industry to 
research products which were more profitable than they were therapeutically valuable. 
And that it would have been more equitable to the generics industry to have the SPC 
limited to only the first drug in new class of compounds, rather than including everything 
which might follow as well. As the Commission ignored this, thereafter both the generics 
industry, via its trade association, the European Generic Medicines Association (EGA), and 
the BEUC called on the Commission to codify generic substitution as a quid pro quo for the 
extended patent-terms granted the research industry under the SPC (SCRIP 1993). Not 
only was this rejected by the research lobby at the time, but with no competence in 
healthcare policy, it was (and still is) something beyond the Commission’s remit.
Within this generalised opposition, there existed further differences in opinion and more 
specific interests vis-d-vis the Commission’s proposals. Nevertheless, the one thing all 
had in common was the potential negative effects the SPC would have on healthcare 
policy and/or welfare. The problem, however, was that they either came too late, else were 
simply not strong enough.
Prior to the single market for example, there was no official European representation for 
generic producers. The EGA was only formed in early 1992, the very year the SPC 
legislation was passed; indeed, in part as a result of the SPC (Shechter 1998). Institutional 
opposition from generics companies as a unified group within the policy-process was 
therefore heard only after the Council Common Position was released in February. 
Consumer interests via the CECG, the BEUC and the Parliament were also tabled late in 
the game. But, as highlighted in the previous chapter, compared to the other stakeholders 
they in any event carry comparatively little sway in the EU policy arena.
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4 Conclusions
It is clear from the discussion that the path to agreement of the SPC was a complicated 
one. The major stakeholders were not in agreement as not all would find their interests 
served by the legislation. The policy network which developed was one in which the actors 
were scrambling to protect (if not maximise) their own interests, allowing the application of 
Wilson’s politics of policy framework. More specifically, it can be seen that even if the 
research industry did not get all that it had wanted, EFPIA had been spectacularly 
successful; not simply in putting the issue of patent-term extension on the Community 
agenda, but also in convincing the Commission to support and help push it through. This 
allows several conclusions to be drawn in support of the contention that the Supplementary 
Protection Certificate policy-process was a case of client politics.
4-1 Costs versus benefits
First it is clear that the cost-benefit configuration to the stakeholders’ interests is applicable. 
Patent-term extension was a policy issue which involved concentrated benefits for a small 
group, with diffuse costs to be borne by a much wider constituency. The SPC, like any 
longer marketing exclusivity period for innovative products, was going to benefit the 
research-driven industry at the expense of the sector’s other actors. For patent-holding 
companies not only does longer intellectual property coverage help make up the effective 
patent-life lost by the approval process, but it serves to keep their drugs at a higher price 
for longer, maximising their returns -  Prozac was shown to be an example. Such 
concentrated benefits induce co-operation between otherwise competing firms in pursuit of 
a common goal which would benefit them all. The gains to be made by collaborating 
outweigh those to be made individually by not. And this can be seen in the cohesion 
achieved by the companies during EFPIA’s lobby.
The costs of the SPC meanwhile were to be fairly widely distributed amongst a larger 
group of actors. These included the generic companies, patients, and those interested 
primarily in controlling healthcare costs; most notably the member states. Beyond granting 
the research industry an extra 5 years extra coverage, the SPC actually sought to 
constrain the generic industry by preventing any R&D until after patent expiry. This may 
also harm patients’ interests by preventing cheaper products being made available, else 
inhibiting new, innovative and more efficacious treatments being made available more 
quickly i.e. older products remaining on the market for longer. Not only does patent-term 
extension not offer a guarantee of better healthcare, but it is generally accepted to result in 
higher drugs prices; higher prices tend to disproportionately affect the elderly and those 
suffering from long-term or chronic maladies i.e. those most vulnerable and potentially
least able to pay. And it is especially with regard to research into chronic disease and 
illnesses associated with ageing that the industry feels that patents should be used as an 
incentive (Goldberg 2000).
Another potential cost (to the consumer) is that with extended patent terms, companies are 
likely to seek protection for those products which are most profitable. This is only natural, 
but the issue is that these products are not necessarily in therapeutic areas which serve 
society’s greatest needs. As shown earlier, this was formally noted by the consumer 
groups, the generics industry and the Parliament in their respective representations to the 
Commission. Along with higher prices and patents on drugs for chronic illnesses, this 
carries healthcare financing repercussions for national governments (and insurance funds) 
who pay for medicines, making cost-containment goals vis-d-vis the national drugs’ bill 
more difficult. It was for these reasons that Greece, Portugal and Spain opposed the SPC 
legislation in the Council, while Germany and the UK were, at least initially, hesitant.
This meant that industry had to act strategically. In the words of one commentator (who at 
the time questioned many of the research industry’s claims) it was to tread a difficult 
tightrope in simultaneously demonstrating its desperate need without scaring off support 
with fears of the likely costs.” (Albedo 1990, 19) As shown, these ‘cost’s saw other actors 
express their objections to the proposed regulatory intervention. And although the need for 
the beneficiary(ies) to ‘act strategically’ clearly fits with the client politics scenario, the 
extent of the opposition expressed by those bearing the costs (even if late), does not. The 
typology assumes that the costs to the non-benefiting actors are so diffuse and insufficient 
as to not warrant opposition; hence it is only the beneficiary who lobbies. That said, 
several mitigating factors resulting from the SPC for the opposition actors can be identified, 
such that the costs to each were eventually made more palatable.
For instance, while generic manufacturers were justifiably up in arms over the restrictions 
to be imposed on their activities, they admit that the research industry needs incentives to 
continue to invest. For without someone else doing the discovering, the generic industry 
has no market. At the time of the discussions, when asked about the response of the UK 
generics industry, Edward Leigh, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, responded:
The representations received from the manufacturers of generic medicines have 
covered a range of views. None has given unqualified support to the 
Commission’s proposal; indeed, some have not favoured any supplementary 
protection. Most, however, have recognised the case for some supplementary 
protection, but have advocated a shorter period. (Hansard 1991b, 19)
This was echoed in a recent discussion paper by European Generics Association:
-139-
The EGA believes that pharmaceutical innovation is critically important to both 
European healthcare and industrial policies. Innovative pharmaceutical 
companies should be allowed to enjoy premium prices and market exclusivity 
under patent periods to reward them for the high cost of developing genuine [sic] 
innovative medicines. (EGA 2001,12)
The CECG may have objected to the Commission’s proposal document but it too will have 
been aware that a happy industry is an innovative one, and that innovation is key to future 
cures. In a 1993 report following the SPC legislation, they wrote that: “Consumers have 
always accepted that, where a drug is genuinely innovative and required substantial 
research effort and investment by the manufacturer, it is right that there should be a 
stronger element of protection.” (CECG 1993, 28) In addition, the financial impact of 
longer patent protection on patients themselves is minimal as they generally do not bear 
the true costs of the medicines they consume. It can be presumed that the potential for 
more and better products -  and the potential long-term benefit to the European patient -  
was also in the minds of the Parliament and Council when they agreed the legislation. 
During the ESC’s deliberations at least, the benefit to the consumer/patient was raised.
Regarding the mitigating influences on the costs to the member states, there appear 
several. First, increased patent protection helps to ensure a successful national sector 
where a research-driven industry is present and, theoretically, could help in the provision of 
better quality products within the healthcare system even where it is not. As well, if patents 
do promote innovation and research into new drugs, they may help to foster pricing 
competition among comparative products. They may also generate research into new 
drugs for chronic and long-term illnesses (areas in which governments are keen to make 
savings). These latter points are debatable, but a successful ‘Euro-industry’ is definitely in 
the interests of all member state governments. And as the SPC was expected to improve 
the research climate compared to Europe’s competitors it is perhaps not surprising that the 
majority eventually adopted a ‘pro’ stance subject to the different implementation dates 
already mentioned. Furthermore, what all countries were aware of was that all these 
discussions were taking place within the context of developing the Single European 
Market. The differing transition periods notwithstanding, the SPC would in the long-term 
standardise medicine patent-terms and times across the Community, thereby helping to 
promote the free movement of goods and services.
Finally, a successful industry is also in the interests of the Commission given its pre­
occupation with promoting European industry. Extended patent protection on medicines 
boosts this. At the time same time, however, it may be argued that the SPC legislation -  in 
allowing different implementation times -  complicates the pursuit of the single market as 
the Commission’s other main goal. But perhaps the two cancel each other out. Or at least 
one can assume this from the Commission’s push for the SPC legislation throughout the
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policy-process and its trade-off over the transparency proposals. For the latter represented 
more of a problem within the single market framework than the former.
4-2 Collective action and capture
Another relevant element of the client politics scenario is that the concentrated costs can 
bring the likely beneficiaries together. And further, that a relatively small number of these 
interests (actors) can, if sufficiently well-organised, come to dominate the policy agenda to 
their obvious gain. This is especially the case where a weak regulator is present, resulting 
in the ‘producer-dominance model’ or regulatory capture.
Addressing these points with respect to the SPC legislation, the research companies 
banded together under EFPIA’s lead. This group included not just the major European 
companies of Germany and the UK but, ironically given the arguments for boosting the 
competitiveness of European industry, many of the American multinational drug producers 
with operations in Europe as well. The US firms were concurrently represented by their 
own umbrella group, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America (PMA) -  now the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) -  which had an office in 
Brussels. This led to close collaboration between the two trade organisations over the 
SPC issue within the framework of the so-called ‘Dolder Group’ (named after the Dolder 
Grand Hotel in Zurich, where representatives of the two groups held regular, informal 
meetings) (Scherer 2000).
Such collaboration between otherwise competing companies has long been a feature of 
the pharmaceutical industry, reflecting its truly global nature. More importantly, it led to a 
single face being presented to the Commission and resulted in a Proposal document which 
could have been drafted by EFPIA’s members. It echoed the industry’s argued link 
between stricter patents to further innovation, more drugs and, as a by-product, greater 
pricing competition amongst medicines designed for similar purposes. Intellectual property 
rights were not only deemed necessary to the delivery of new, high quality, innovative and 
efficacious drugs, but they were justified as important in the context of global market 
competition. The small but well-organised EFPIA lobby had influenced the policy agenda 
to its benefit.
Wilson asserts that within this cost-benefit scenario the ‘producer-dominance model’ can 
result where a weak regulator is present. As the regulator in the SPC policy-process, the 
Commission may not have been weak -  in fact the opposite is perhaps the case -  but it 
clearly was steered by the industry lobby. It was mentioned earlier that information plays a 
crucial role in the pharmaceutical sector. Not only is independent information difficult to
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come by, but with the Commission’s limited resources, it would gave been an almost 
impossible task had the Commission tried on its own to procure such sensitive data as on 
patent-term expiry for medicines, and R&D expenditures. Thus the Commission virtually 
unquestioningly accepted and acted upon the data and information put to it by EFPIA in its 
1988 memorandum. Through the strategic use of information, therefore, the industry was 
able to convince the Commission as to the merits of its case. According to the UK’s NCC 
at the time of the initial proposals,"... the drugs industry has so far won the battle for the 
hearts and minds of many policy makers in Europe by default.” (as cited in HoL 1991a, 24)
Just as important in the Commission’s capture, however, was the fact that the industry’s 
interests coincided with the Commission’s wider agenda -  the promotion of European 
industry and progress towards the single market. These are reflected in the Commission’s 
Proposal where the sixth and fourth recitals read respectively:
Whereas a uniform solution at Community level should be provided for, thereby 
preventing the heterogeneous development of national laws leading to further 
disparities which would be likely to create obstacles to the free movement of 
medicinal products within the Community and thus directly to affect the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.
Whereas medicinal products that are the result of long, costly research will not 
continue to be developed in the Community unless they are covered by 
favourable rules that provide for sufficient protection to encourage such research. 
(CEC 1990a)
Given the Commission’s priorities then, in its eyes the SPC legislation represented the 
stone with which it could kill two birds. That the Commission not only endorsed EFPIA’s 
position but effectively campaigned on its behalf shows to what extent this agenda 
coincided with the industry’s more specific demands. Indeed, the unmitigated support of 
the Commission went a long way to convincing key individuals in the EU frame as to the 
merits of patent-term extension (Shechter 1998). And though the final Regulation may not 
have been all that the industry had hoped for, the Commission’s original Proposal had tried 
to meet all its demands. In Section 1-3 it was asked why the Commission delivered a 
Proposal so blatantly favouring the research industry. The answer is now clear. The SPC 
was a case of client politics in which the Commission as regulator was ‘captured’.
4-3 Final remarks
Perhaps the most important factor behind the SPC legislation was the regulatory context in 
which it took place. The creation of the Single European Market by 1992 was the pre­
occupation in all areas of Community affairs. For the research-oriented industry, therefore, 
the timing of their lobby was very good. The Commission was not simply interested in 
promoting European industry, but it was more focused on removing market impediments
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across the board and, as the Cecchini Report had noted some years earlier, 
pharmaceuticals were an area in which comparatively little progress had been made.
More than that, however, the Commission was seeking to maximise its own sphere of 
influence. Recalling Majone’s (1994) point that the proliferation of Community regulation 
can in part be put down to the Commission’s attempts to increase its influence by 
expanding its competencies (Chapter 3), the SPC is a case in point. Irrespective of 
healthcare considerations, it took the view that medicine patents fall into the industrial 
policy side of pharmaceutical regulation. For it was only by making this an industrial policy 
issue that the Commission could have competence. Thus, not only was the Commission’s 
position during negotiations handled by DGIII, but the Commission in fact took a pro-active 
stance in selling the matter as an industrial concern to other Community institutions. Here 
it perhaps again worth stressing that the Commission’s move to enact the SPC as a 
Regulation was a strategic move. Regulations are uniformly binding pieces of legislation 
across the Community and would over-ride any national level measures, thereby giving the 
Community (the Commission) exclusive competence.
Early on, therefore, the Commission displayed its hand. By proposing the SPC as a 
Regulation, in addition to sanctioning the research industry’s arguments, the Commission 
demonstrated the strength of its conviction on the issue: this was an industrial policy 
matter; the Commission and DGIII in particular had competence106; and all the member 
states would be obliged to implement the legislation in full. Given the prominence of the 
Commission’s role one might be tempted to see this as a case of entrepreneurial politics. 
But despite the Commission’s own interests in seeing a strong industry and internal market 
for medicines, it is clear that the impetus actually came from the industry. The fact that the 
final Regulation reflects so blatantly the industry’s agenda shows just to what extent it was 
able to influence the Commission’s thinking in a client-oriented manner. So although not a 
distinction to be found in Wilson’s approach, it would appear that the Commission thus 
acted more as policy ‘manager* than ‘entrepreneur* (Laffan 1997).
Finally, the industry’s successful campaign over the SPC shows two other details relevant 
to the remainder of the study. First, the dilution of the original Proposal was the result of 
the interplay and exertion of pressures by cross-cutting interests amongst the stakeholders 
in a policy network configuration. Although initially sidelined, once the proposals were sent 
to the Parliament and Council, the other stakeholders were able to voice their interests.
106 In 1992 Spain challenged the use of Article 100(a) for the SPC legislation. Its position -  recalling that 
Spain voted against the Regulation -  was that patent-terms on medicines were not a single market 
issue; something that the ESC had also raised (see Section 3-2-1). In its 13 July 1995 judgement, 
however, the ECJ dismissed the case, finding in favour of the Commission (Case C-350/92 Kingdom 
of Spain v. Council of the European Union. ECR 1-1985).
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And secondly, that the policy network which developed around the SPC was constrained 
from the outset. Beyond having initially been excluded from the policy arena, patients, 
national governments and the generics industry did not have too much to lose (or at least 
the costs were diffuse and carried something in compensation). Accordingly, they did not 
(were unable to) oppose the legislation as intently as they perhaps could have. In other 
words, the issue at hand, in involving concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, essentially 
dictated the outcome from the outset -  client politics would result.
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C h a p te r  6  
'E n tr ep r e n e u r ia l  Po l it ic s ’ : T he  Eu r o pea n  A g en c y  fo r  t h e  
Ev a l u a t io n  o f  M e d ic in a l  Pro ducts
Introduction
Based in London and responsible for granting EU market approval to new medicinal 
preparations, the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) 
celebrated its seventh birthday on 26 January 2002. Established via Regulation (EEC) 
2309/93, the agency occupies a unique place in the EU frame. Rather than gathering and 
disseminating information or issuing generic opinions in the manner of other EU agencies, 
by delivering specific recommendations which result in Community decisions that are 
binding on the member states, the EMEA exercises a quasi-regulatory role107. It is 
perhaps something of an irony that such a body exists for the pharmaceutical sector, an 
area of EU policy for which there is neither a single market nor a coherent Community 
strategy; wherein the Commission has but limited competence; where the EU’s legal 
(Treaty) and policy (free movement) frameworks clash; and where the member states have 
very different interests which they collectively defend in reference to the principle of 
subsidiarity. At the same time, it is precisely because of this that an agency exists.
The idea of a centralised authority emerged in the mid-1980s. The Community 
authorisation regime was not proving popular and it was becoming clear that a more 
efficient and binding system was required. Yet the explanations offered by the 
Commission for creating the EMEA at the time of the agency’s launch in 1995 had less to 
do with single market designs than they did with public health protection. In the press­
release accompanying the agency’s inauguration, the Commission proclaimed: “The 
creation of the European Medicines Evaluation Agency is firstly a benefit for the European 
patient.” (CEC IP 1995) This does not sit with the preparatory work behind its 
establishment. In the words of one commentator, “But five years ago no one thought of 
seriously selling the idea as a patient benefit.” (Albedo 1995a, 10) That the Commission 
changed its tune suggests pressure from other actors within the policy network which 
developed around the proposals.
In light of this, the aims of this chapter are threefold. First, to show that the rationale for the 
establishment of the agency had less to do with patients’ interests than they did
107 Under the ‘Meroni Doctrine’ -  resulting from the 1958 judgement of the ECJ in Case C-36/56 -  Meroni 
v. ECSC High Authority- European law prevents the Commission from delegating decision-making to 
any other party. But as the Commission is reliant on the EMEA to a much higher degree than the 
other EU agencies (see Section 1), the agency’s role can be seen as (quasi-)regulatory.
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Community industrial policy goals. Second, to demonstrate that, as a result, the agency 
serves the interests of the pharmaceutical industry -  both in practice and by design. And 
thirdly, to provide evidence for the contention that the regulatory policy represented by the 
creation of the agency was a case of entrepreneurial politics with the Commission acting 
as entrepreneur in the policy network.
In pursuing these aims, the discussion first sketches the agency’s functions and purpose. 
This serves to differentiate it from other EU regulatory agencies. Next, an outline of the 
stakeholders’ positions on a Community pharmaceutical agency at the time of the original 
discussions is provided, before detailing how, given the differing views which prevailed, the 
final Regulation establishing the EMEA was agreed. This is followed by an examination of 
the criticisms which surround its work and examples of its industry leaning. Here several 
points of comparison are made with the US Food and Drug Administration which, as part of 
a wider remit, decides on new drug authorisations108. Although this helps to underline just 
to what extent industry is the prime beneficiary of the EMEA regime, this does not de facto 
imply an endorsement of the FDA model.
1 The EMEA: Reassessing Community authorisation
The significance of the EMEA should not be under-stated, neither in respect of its unique 
(quasi-regulatory) function in the EU generally, nor in terms of what it means for the 
pharmaceutical sector specifically. The discussion in Chapter 4 referred to different 
regulatory traditions in Europe and the United States: Europe with a strong state role, the 
US with minimal state intervention relying instead on the use of expert agencies where the 
market fails. As this derogation of responsibility to independent regulatory bodies is 
frequently based on the government’s lack of expertise in the area, such agencies are 
often granted judicial and executive powers by which to enforce the implementation of their 
decisions. Although most of the EU member states still rely primarily on public bodies for 
addressing the market, the American model has impacted on the way regulation is carried 
out at the supranational level. For there are now 10 such independent Community 
agencies; that is, bodies outside the central administration of the Commission.
1-1 The EU agency ‘model’
In addition to the EMEA, the 10 EU agencies are: the Community Plant Variety Office; the 
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training; the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions; the European Environment Agency;
108 The FDA carries regulatory responsibility for a wide range of consumer products beyond medicines. 
Its Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) is responsible for pharmaceuticals.
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the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction; the European Training 
Foundation; the Office for Harmonisation of the Internal Market; the European Agency for 
Safety and Health at Work; and the Translation Centre for Bodies of the European Union.
The use of independent regulatory bodies represents a break with the more statist 
traditions prevalent in much of Europe after world war two, especially in those member 
states with a (neo-)corporatist or dirigiste history such as Austria and France. The 
Community ‘model’ is not commensurate with that in the US, but “... is based on the 
quantitative expansion of EC jurisdiction, and might be seen at the same time as a 
qualitative change within EC policy-making through both horizontal and vertical co­
ordination and co-operation.” (Kreher 1997, 241) Consequently, there are increasing calls 
for the development of further independent offices in other areas of Community policy, 
including for instance in telecommunications and maritime safety, and a European Food 
(Safety) Authority is hoped to be up and running by mid-2002. This increased use of 
independent agencies is an element of Majone’s (1994) earlier-cited ‘regulatory state’ 
characterisation of the EU polity.
Without comparing in detail the ten agencies, it should be noted that there is no single cast. 
They are structured, staffed and financed differently (see Appendix 6-1), and in terms of 
their function, they operate across the three EU pillars. For instance, the drug addiction 
monitoring agency works in the fields of health protection and safety; the harmonisation 
agency with regard to competition and free movement; the EMEA’s functions combine free 
movement and public health aims (with emphasis on the former); while the environment 
agency’s powers developed out of existing Community environmental goals (Chitti 2000). 
All the agencies, as Majone (1997) notes, regulate on the basis of information i.e. 
influencing/affecting behaviour indirectly "... either by changing the structure of incentives 
of the different policy actors, or by supplying the same actors with suitable information.” 
(265) While the agencies differ along a host of dimensions, where they are similar is that 
they"... owe their existence to a kind of paradox. On the one hand, increased uniformity is 
certainly needed; on the other hand, gradual centralization is politically inconceivable, and 
probably undesirable.” (Dehousse 1997, 259) Their broadly-shared ‘regulation by 
information’ mandate is an attempt to account for this.
Nevertheless, the EMEA is something of an anomaly amongst the agencies; that which 
reflects the peculiarity of the pharmaceutical sector. Unlike the other agencies, instead of 
regulating by gathering and then sharing information -  towards co-ordinating networks of 
actors (Dehousse 1997) -  it has information provided to it (by the pharmaceutical 
companies) and which it guards in drawing up opinions on market authorisation for new
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medicines. Rather than linking actors through information within the regulatory process, as 
the chapter shows, the agency uses information to exclude them.
1-2 The Community medicines agency: A unique institution
The EMEA’s establishment elicited headlines such as ‘A drug Tsar is bom’ (Anon 1994) 
and ‘A real European milestone’ (Albedo 1995b). Such applause was because, unlike 
previous attempts to create a unified approval procedure for new medicines, the 
authorisations issued by the EMEA are binding and valid throughout the Community. A 
single process was to relieve the duplication of effort by (then 12) different national 
regulatory procedures, thereby easing bureaucratic and administrative pressures on 
manufacturers and national administrations alike. It was also to speed the time required to 
bring new medicines to market; a review process which, as noted in previous chapters, is 
unique in terms of the time and detail required. By streamlining the regulatory environment 
in this way, not only has the agency contributed to the Commission’s free movement goals, 
but it helps to make the EU a more attractive place to do business.
The agency can also help national regulatory authorities by filling knowledge gaps; none 
can on its own keep up with all the latest advances in the technology of drug development. 
Though its own core staff is small -  the secretariat consists of about 200 people providing 
technical and administrative support to the scientific committees and working parties -  the 
EMEA brings together the expertise of some 2,400 experts from across the EU, including 
from Norway and Iceland (as part of the European Economic Area both are subject to the 
original 1965 Directive on medicines). Thus, it is national experts working on the agency’s 
behalf who carry out the assessments.
The emphasis may be on speeding approval times, but the safety, efficacy and quality 
criteria for authorisation as set down in the 1965 Directive have been retained, and the 
EMEA has a role in pharmacovigilance (via the issuing of updates and alerts relevant to 
specific products or compounds). The Commission stressed that the new agency "... 
allows for a quicker and simpler access [for medicines] to the single market, with the 
guarantee of an evaluation of the highest scientific standard.” (CEC IP 1995) And though it 
is the Commission rather than the agency which delivers the final ruling on market 
authorisation, as “...the Commission has to take into account the expertise produced within 
this agency before it can take a decision” (Kreher 1997, 237) -  not to mention that its 
opinions are almost always accepted -  the EMEA’s role is not only more imperative, but 
the agency is closer to an independent regulatory office than any of the other agencies.
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1 -3 New licensing procedures
Charged primarily with the task of fostering market access for new medicines, two new 
systems were put at the EMEA’s disposal109. Subsuming the CPMP (concertation) and 
multi-state (mutual recognition) procedures outlined in Chapter 3, these are the 
‘centralised’ and ‘decentralised’ procedures. Again, both are based on the Community’s 
safety, efficacy and quality criteria as laid down in Directive 65/65/EEC. In addition, as 
communicating information towards demystifying the drug approval process has been a 
self-declared priority from the outset, the agency maintains a website (www.emea.eu.int) 
which posts material relevant to its work.
A detailed review of the centralised and decentralised authorisation procedures is beyond 
the scope of this study and can be found elsewhere110. Hence, only the main features and 
steps are highlighted in following. The aim is to consider how the EMEA works, what it can 
and cannot do, and what its focus in practice has been. Such an overview serves to 
qualify the Commission’s claim of it having been designed as a benefit first to the 
European patient, helping set the stage for later elaborating why the policy-process leading 
to its establishment can be characterised as one of entrepreneurial politics.
Centralised procedure
The centralised route is an updated concertation (multi-state) procedure with approval now 
by majority vote (Appendix 6-2). Mandatory for all products derived from biotechnology, it 
is also optional for those conventional products with an innovative or high technology 
element. According to Vogel (1998), “Biotechnology was targeted because of its potential 
for economic growth and, because since it is such a new field, individual states have not 
yet created their own testing infrastructures.” (6) Companies send an application to the 
agency (in a standard format, the drug dossier) which refers it to the Committee for 
Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) for review. Itself revised under Regulation (EEC) 
2309/93, the CPMP is the body assigned the task of preparing the agency’s opinions on 
medicines for human consumption (under the decentralised procedure as well).
As the body responsible for deciding on behalf of the EMEA, the probity of the CPMP must 
be ensured. The committee is comprised of scientific experts from each of the member 
states who are nominated by their national administrations, and they are required to put
109 Accompanying the new procedures was The Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the European 
Community’, a 6 volume publication (now 9 volumes) which sets out common guidelines in areas such 
as pharmacovigilance and clinical testing requirements.
110 For example Kingham et al (1994), Jeffreys (1995) and Cameron McKenna (2000).
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aside any national sympathies or private interests111. By keeping national politics and 
industry ties out of the mix, the intent is to guarantee scientific decision-making of the 
highest quality112. The CPMP evaluation is undertaken by experts drawn from a list 
provided by the member states, and the committee has 210 days to carry this out.
Towards ensuring an objective report, two assessment teams are appointed to produce 
concurrent independent reviews (rapporteur and co-rapporteur). The committee evaluation 
-  consisting of the committee’s opinion, the assessment report, the Summary of Product 
Characteristics (SPCs)113 and the text for labelling and the packaging insert -  is passed to 
the Commission, the member states and the applicant, along with a recommendation, and 
the Commission is required to prepare a draft decision on authorisation within 30 days. 
During this period both the member states and the applicant may raise concerns or query 
the CPMP opinion. Should a member state appeal against the decision, they must do so in 
writing within 28 days and only on the basis o f"... important new questions of a scientific or 
technical nature which have not been addressed in the opinion of the Agency” (CEC 
1993b); the committee is then required to take this into account in drawing up a new 
opinion. Barring unnecessary delay, the process from application to final national decision 
was designed take a maximum of 310 days. According to the December 2001 update on 
use of the centralised procedure, authorisation has been granted for 183 products via this 
route (EMEA 2001a). And with the majority of the 150 approvals issued by late 2000 
having been completed within a timeframe of 240 days, the agency has been feted as a 
major success by Fernand Sauer, its first Executive-Director (Sauer 2000).
Decentralised procedure
The decentralised procedure is a revamped version of mutual recognition and was revised 
to improve the member states’ faith in each others’ assessments (Appendix 6-3). It applies 
only to conventional products and involves the company making an application for 
marketing approval to one of the national agencies. Designated the ‘Reference Member 
State’ (RMS), this is the market targeted for initial product launch. Should approval be 
granted -  the documentation includes a detailed assessment report, approval of the 
company’s submitted SPCs, and the proposed text of the accompanying labelling and
1 This failed to prevent a scandal emerging around Dulio Poggiolini, former chairperson of the CPMP, 
who was accused of accepting up to US$180 million in ‘gifts’ from pharmaceutical companies during 
his 30 years at the Italian Ministry of Health.
112 However, the grounds for selecting and appointing these representatives differ by member state, and 
not all are necessarily completely free of industry connections. Since the ‘Poggiolini Affair’, a 
declaration of interests is required, and a code of conduct applies for all CPMP members.
113 The SPCs -  created via Directive 93/570/EEC -  is part of the marketing authorisation and represents 
the scientific text which contains all of the important information on the product. The information leaflet 
is derived from the SPCs (see Section 3-1).
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patient information leaflet -  additional member state authorities are expected to recognise 
the authorisation. These become ‘Concerned Member States’ (CMSs). A right of appeal 
exists should a CMS refuse the authorisation, with a formal arbitration procedure going 
through the CPMP. In such cases the committee issues a verdict on extending marketing 
access to the CMS(s), which is then reviewed by the Commission before it delivers a final 
decision. As was the case with its predecessor, however, the member states’ commitment 
to the decentralised procedure has been sketchy. Brian Ager, Director-General of the 
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), is quite frank 
about this: “Countries simply balk. Suppose you’re a German regulator and someone 
comes along with a product approved in Greece or, once the EU is enlarged, Estonia -  
how are you going to react?" (as cited in Ross 2000a, 65) The CMSs thus continue to 
simultaneously assess applications themselves.
While not an FDA, the EMEA serves a combination of public health policy and industrial 
policy goals, as well as fulfilling economic (market-related) and social policy interests -  
“The EU’s goal [in establishing the agency] was to transform the relationship between 
national regulatory authorities and those of the Union, thus finally creating a common 
market for pharmaceutical products.” (Vogel 1998, 5) None of the other agencies can 
make a similar claim about the policy field in which it operates. Recalling the Community’s 
history of regulatory competence in the pharmaceutical sector from Chapter 3, the 
institution of a centralised agency is undoubtedly the most important achievement to-date. 
However, despite the satisfaction expressed by the previous Executive-Director, the EMEA 
and its authorisation procedures have not been free from criticism.
Before looking at such criticism, it is first necessary to understand ‘how we got here’ and 
what the involvement of the stakeholders was in creating the agency. Beginning with the 
consultations of the late 1980s, the next part of the discussion lays out the path to adoption 
of the final Regulation in July 1993. The focus is on the stakeholders’ positions during the 
run-up to its establishment rather than the intricacies of the legislative process. This 
provides insight into actors’ interests and what weight they carried in the policy network. 
Further, it supports the contention that the EMEA came about as the result of 
entrepreneurial politics according to the Wilson framework.
2 Establishing the EMEA: Putting a new face on medicines control in the EU
Notwithstanding more recent pronouncements regarding the ‘European patient’, the main 
rationale cited by the Commission during the deliberations over the potential for a 
European agency was the need to speed market access for new medicines. There were 
several reasons for this. First, drug registration was slowing down in most European
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countries -  according to the Commission’s background document on the agency, 
authorities in Germany needed up to six years to review a product in the early 1990s (CEC 
1993a). A surge in the number of products and applications, a growing industry, and 
increasingly technical and complex scientific issues were contributors to this trend. 
Second, the CPMP and mutual recognition procedures were deemed slow and inefficient, 
and were not facilitating the process as had been envisaged. Third, the ‘1992’ deadline 
was imminent, and it was clear that the pharmaceutical sector was not ready. This latter 
point was the most important from the Commission’s perspective, as the failings of the 
Community authorisation procedures represented a setback in its aims to promote the 
single market. Thus, it was in a 1988 report on the work of the CPMP that the Commission 
first raised the possibility of a single, unifying regulatory office for medicines (COM 1988).
2-1 The Commission agenda
The 1988 report is significant on several fronts. Having asked the member states and so- 
called ‘interested parties’ "... as to the form which any definitive system for the free 
movement of medicines might take (mutual recognition, a centralized Community system 
or an intermediate approach)” (COM 1988, 23), it laid the basis for the Commission’s later 
formal proposal for an agency. As the interested parties consisted of industry and 
consumers, the Commission essentially established the policy network from the beginning. 
Furthermore, as the report was issued by the Industrial Affairs Directorate-General without 
consultation with the Social Affairs Directorate-General, the nature of the relationships 
within the network were also established; consumer interests were somewhat marginalised 
from the outset. Indeed, the report concentrates primarily on the need to improve the 
system from an industrial rather than patient health standpoint.
But perhaps the most important element of the document is that it reveals the 
Commission’s agenda. The report reflects on the failings of the multi-state route, pointing 
out that the number of applications discussed by the committee was:
... very few in comparison to the hundreds of applications made separately each 
year in each Member State... [and] it is unfortunate that, to date, every dossier 
has systematically been the subject of reasoned objections, in spite of the 
obligation on Member States to take due consideration of the initial authorization, 
save in exceptional cases. (COM 1988, 6 and 11)
More precisely, during the eight years of the CPMP procedure (1978-1986) only 41 
dossiers were considered and all were referred back to the committee. Mutual recognition 
was proving equally inefficient, and as the member states consistently raised objections to 
authorisations granted by other national authorities the industry’s pursuit of single market 
applications had continued unabated. With multiple national approval systems having
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been identified as an impediment to completion of the single pharmaceuticals market in the 
Cecchini study, the report concludes that:
In accordance with Article 15 of Directive 75/319/EEC as amended, and also 
within the legislative programme set out in the White Paper on the Internal 
Market, in light of experience, the Commission must, before 1 November 1989, 
submit to the Council a proposal containing appropriate measures leading 
towards the abolition of any remaining barriers to the free movement of medicinal 
products within the Community. (COM 1988, 23)
The Commission regarded an authoritative Community system as necessary to address 
the failings of the two procedures; to promote multiple market applications by the industry; 
and to overcome disparate national approval procedures (thereby eliminating varying 
authorisation times), all which hampered the development of a single medicines market. 
Underlying this was "... the assumption that many national regulatory standards are really 
disguised barriers to trade: their primary purpose or effect is to protect domestic producers 
from international competition." (Vogel 1998, 16) There is, therefore, an element of ‘spill­
over’ in the establishment of the agency. But a neo-functionalist explanation of how and 
why an agency emerged is a somewhat superficial one which fails to acknowledge the 
direct role played by the Commission. For DGIII found that its priorities did not gel with the 
views of the other stakeholders in the policy network, and that it would have to push hard if 
its agenda was to be implemented.
2-2 Stakeholders’ interests -  costs versus benefits
In order to understand the positions of the other stakeholders during the policy-process 
leading to Regulation 2309/93, a brief outline of several of the more important issues under 
consideration helps to establish the backdrop. Table 6-1 (overleaf) generalises the actors’ 
concerns during the late 1980s when it was still unclear as to what form, if any, a new 
authority might take. For while all were agreed on the necessity of quicker approvals, they 
did so for different reasons and therefore had different hopes and fears.
From the table’s admittedly simplistic division between the then (perceived) pros and cons 
of what an agency might have brought, the potential costs and benefits to the stakeholders 
-  and hence their representations during subsequent negotiations -  can be contextualised. 
Each had different interests and each would be affected. The Commission’s April 1989 
compilation of responses document (CEC 1989) revealed the extent of this lack of 
consensus (including the depth of scepticism), and these views were to harden as 
discussions developed around more concrete proposals.
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Table 6-1: Perceived Pros and Cons of a Potential European M edicines Agency (prior 
to  th e  EMEA)
Stakeholder Pro (Ben efit) Co ntr a  (C o st)
Industry
• a standard application format and single 
approval mechanism could ease companies’ 
administrative difficulties vis-a-vis 12 
disparate national procedures (in several 
different languages) and save costs
• a system geared towards speeding the 
approval process may serve as a boost to 
industry generally, and help to promote 
small-to-medium sized companies 
specifically
• quicker approvals (via a new body) would 
lim it the erosion of the effective patent 
life for new drugs
• one EC system (via a centralised office) 
might mean higher levels of scrutiny across 
Europe, thereby undermining their ability 
to 'pick and choose’ amongst national 
authorities according to perceived ease of 
assessment criteria
• the potential for an overly politicised body 
staffed by bureaucrats, wherein decisions 
on marketing authorisation are taken on 
political rather than scientific grounds
M ember
States
• a Community body would not have to 
preclude the continuation of a 
complimentary system of single country 
applications
• might promote collaboration with other 
member state scientists and regulatory 
offices, and foster the exchange of 
knowledge
• political, scientific and legal liability to be 
shifted from the national to the 
supranational level (Commission)
• a loss of sovereignty - not just in political 
terms but with regard to:
i. the ability to decide on which drugs are 
appropriate for their populations
ii. healthcare financing autonomy, and 
control of the drugs bill
• a centralised mechanism for all companies 
irrespective of origin may harm local 
industry
• loss of national responsibility for the health 
protection of its citizens; how would an EU 
agency be held accountable, and who is 
then liable?
Patients
The drug cor 
European offi 
single centrali 
their growing 
document EF 
with decisions 
would the woi 
danger that ; 
scientific deci 
The worry wa: 
mutual recogr 
under a revise
• national approval procedures (often) relate 
to other political or economic goals, and 
can mean delays in the introduction of new 
medicines to the detriment of patients - an 
EU agency would not have such wider 
responsibilities
• an EC system could overcome disparate 
member state approval procedures, 
eliminating differences between member 
states in approval times for the same 
products
npanies seemed to think that they stooc 
ce not directly geared towards industrial | 
sed procedure (via an agency) was unlike 
expenditure on new drugs with more < 
PIA said that its members were firmly "...
; being made by a European body.” The a 
rkload prove too great -  and therefore app 
any Community agency would be a pol 
sions in the hands of bureaucrats rather 1 
s that authorisations might be politically del 
lition be made binding, arguing that compc 
id (centralised) Community regime becaus'
• the potential for a 'lowest common 
denominator’ approach to safety and 
efficacy guidelines i.e . those member 
states with strict approval procedures 
having to dilute them given a European 
'efficiency regime’ approach
•  resulting in a body in which they might 
have less say (compared to the national 
level) and one susceptible to regulatory 
capture because of a reliance on 
(European) industry fees for its financing
i to lose the most from a single 
policy interests. It was felt that a 
sly to be able to adequately match 
Bfficient approvals. In the 1989 
against a fully centralized system 
ssociation suggested that not only 
)rovals too slow -  but there was a 
litical construct leaving important 
:han appropriately-trained experts, 
termined. EFPIA thus insisted that 
mies should not be disadvantaged 
e of political imperatives. The fear
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was of a ‘Euro-FDA’114, and John Griffin, Director of the Association of British 
Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), referred to the Commission’s early vision for an agency as 
a ‘recipe for disaster* (as cited in MARKETLETTER 1989). Because of these fears (and 
the potential costs to be assumed) EFPIA even suggested that it be consulted and involved 
in all preparatory work for future Community legislation in the area.
Although sharing an interest in preserving sovereignty and controlling healthcare 
expenditure generally, the 1989 document showed that the member states’ views were not 
uniform. While some (such as Ireland and Luxembourg) reflected on the merits of a single 
supranational license issued by a Community office, others (most notably France) favoured 
a revised mutual recognition procedure with national authorities at the heart of the system. 
And the UK’s qualified support for an agency in principle can be compared to Germany’s 
outright opposition to any such body. The differing member states’ views would later prove 
problematic in agreeing the legislation.
The consumer position was, and would remain, the most straightforward (even if the least 
heeded). Responding to the 1988 consultation, the European Consumers’ Organisation 
(BEUC) echoed the other stakeholders’ dissatisfaction with existing arrangements. Its 
primary concern, however, was the persistence of different safety standards in the member 
states (Anon 1988). For instance, while the drug Halcion -  designed to treat sleeping 
disorders -  was withdrawn from the UK market in 1993 on safety grounds, it continued to 
be marketed in other member states115. The BEUC thus endorsed the creation of a 
binding Community agency providing that it would harmonise safety and quality standards 
upwards. Its stance was that"... from a consumer point of view it is doubtful that they [the 
existing procedures] represent the safest methods for authorising new drugs”, and that 
patients would be best served by a pan-European office with stringent approval standards, 
rather than continuing with twelve national regimes exercising different criteria.
Notwithstanding the stakeholders’ opinions, the Commission was not to be deterred. DGIII 
was wary of the 1992 programme and, after stressing in the 1989 document that a “major 
transfer of executive competence” was necessary to complete the single market, in 
November 1990 the ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down Community Procedures for the 
Authorization and Supervision of Medicinal Products for Human and Veterinary Use and
114 This was a reference to the US FDA which was seen by both European and American industry officials 
to be overly-bureaucratic and slow in reaching decisions on market authorisations. See for instance 
Matthews & Wilson (1998).
115 The UK’s grounds for first suspension and then withdrawal of Halcion in October 1991 had to do with 
certain side-effects. The CPMP’s response was to commission two position papers (released in 
October and December 1991), both of which concluded that the drug was safe if used in strict 
accordance with the labelling information -  this despite internal recommendations for its withdrawal 
throughout the Community.
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Establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products’ (CEC 1990b) 
was submitted. This was presented to the Council as part of a package of four “future 
system’ instruments representing broader plans for the free movement of medicines (COM 
1990). But the discrepancy in the stakeholders’ positions meant that it would only be in 
July 1993, after several important amendments, that the final text of Regulation (EEC) 
2309/93 was agreed (and yet another two years before the EMEA became a reality).
2-3 The route to approval
The Commission’s proposals made clear its goals. An agency would be established to co­
ordinate two new authorisation routes: a centralised procedure applicable to biotechnology 
and certain high technology products, and a decentralised procedure for the majority of 
other products (based on mutual recognition). Initially optional, the decentralised route 
was to be mandatory after 1996. Member states’ objections to authorisations granted 
under the former were to be permissible only for “objectively defined reasons of public 
order or public policy”, while under the latter, the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal 
Products would arbitrate where bilateral agreement failed. The aim was to deliver 
Community authorisations subject to efficacy, quality and safety criteria within a timeframe 
of around 300 days. Given the clear internal market orientation of these proposals, the 
Commission put it to the member states that Article 100(a) of the Treaty -  designed to 
facilitate completion of the single market through harmonising national laws -  was the 
appropriate legal basis for establishing the system.
The German government rejected the applicability of Article 100(a). In addition, it claimed 
that subsidiarity precluded the Commission taking decisions on drug authorisations, and 
was, therefore, only willing to countenance a small ‘technical secretariat’. According to 
Robert Hankin (then of DGIII), in his testimony to the UK House of Lords Select Committee 
on the European Communities, this was because o f"... the German concept of federalism 
and the view that the role of the Community should be limited to decisions of principle while 
decisions on individual products are the responsibility of the individual Member States.” (as 
cited in HoL 1991b, 56) Other governments, including those of Ireland and Luxembourg 
had no difficulties with the proposals, and accepted the use of Article 100(a).
More subtle views were revealed in the member states’ answers to the Commission’s 
December 1990 request in the Council for written responses to the future system plan. 
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain were in favour of an administrative agency 
(retaining the member states’ technical competence), while France preferred to continue 
with a strengthened mutual recognition principle. The French position was essentially that
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of its industry, and was set out by Yves Juillet of the French industry association, the 
Syndicat National de I’lndustrie Pharmaceutique (SNIP) at a 1988 conference116:
It is the view of SNIP that the operation of the future European system, 
harmonized with the two alternative procedures [the proposed centralised and 
decentralised routes] which may be used at the choice of the manufacturer, 
should remain in line with texts and procedures which already exist, with no break 
in the structures that are already set up... with the only changes being:
-  that States which make remarks or objections would have to justify their 
position
-  that the European Committee in charge of judging the validity of these refusals 
would issue a ruling which the Member States would have to respect.
(Juillet 1989, 262-263)
In favour of an agency, the UK position was nevertheless that if it were to rule on ‘scientific 
issues’ (i.e. drug approvals), then Article 100(a) was inappropriate for its establishment and 
that Article 235 was required instead. Article 235 -  which allows the Council to take 
decisions on fostering the common market where existing Treaty provisions are insufficient 
for the Commission to do so -  had already been invoked to create other Community 
agencies. That said, the UK government’s official response was that
... ministers wish to reserve their position on the acceptability of any particular 
proposals until they can satisfy themselves that the proposals are capable of 
meeting satisfactorily the objectives set and of maintaining acceptable standards 
of protection of public health.” (as cited in HoL 1991b, 11-18)
In other words it wanted further consultation with its industry, as the ABPI had already 
made clear that was dead-set against a centralised European agency (Griffin 1990).
What the ABPI was after, as set out in its 1988 policy document ‘ABPI’s Blueprint for 
Europe’, was a single authorisation regime characterised by unambiguous data 
requirements and overseen by an independent authority, separate from the CPMP, which 
would reach decisions within 210 days (Abraham & Lewis 2000). All biotechnology 
products would be automatically scrutinised by this new authority, but companies would 
retain the right to choose whether to submit all other products to this regime or continue 
with mutual recognition. In the case of the latter, the Community authority would be 
empowered to make binding decisions. This is very much the system which emerged, 
albeit based on an agency with a revamped CPMP at its heart.
Not just the British, but the Belgian, Italian and Spanish governments all saw Article 235 as 
necessary if the agency were to be delegated any scientific powers. Even if opposed to
116 At the same conference, Trevor Jones, head of the UK’s Medicines Control Agency, argued that 
what is required for the future is an efficient, authoritative central agency which operates to a high 
standard of scientific and clinical understanding with a minimum of timescales.” (Jones 1989, 255)
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the agency, the German authorities also agreed that this provided a more appropriate 
basis. The French view was more nuanced: were Article 100(a) used for the creation of 
the agency, then the centralised procedure would have to be based on Article 235. So 
despite both the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) 
having earlier endorsed the use of Article 100(a), it was decided at the Internal Market 
Council meeting in December that Article 235 would provide the appropriate legal basis117. 
As this meant the consultation procedure and unanimity in the Council, it may seem an odd 
decision given Germany’s clear opposition and France’s scepticism. Since consultation 
only allows the Parliament a single reading, the choice of Article 235 was to ensure that the 
MEPs did not have much say. The Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Consumer Protection, which had been assigned the text, had already 
suggested numerous amendments with which the Commission was unhappy (EP 1991b).
As a forum where wider interests are heard, particularly those from consumer groups, the 
Parliament focused largely on the only tangential attention paid to consumer and public 
health requirements in the proposals. It suggested that ‘medicinal products belonging to 
specific pharmacological categories of particular social significance’ be added to the 
biotechnology and high technology designation of the centralised procedure (Article 18(4)). 
This was to ensure that products designed to treat diseases or conditions of especial 
concern would qualify for the quicker, multiple market route. Unlike the Commission, the 
Parliament envisaged a sparing use of the centralised procedure.
In its consideration the ESC also suggested that public health protection feature more 
prominently (ESC 1991b). Recognising that “The importance of the Agency lies in the 
remit and role which will be assigned to it” (Point 1.2), the Committee asked whether the 
division between types of product qualifying for the two procedures "... protects the 
interests of either the ‘passive consumer’ (i.e. patients) or the ‘active consumer’ (the doctor 
who prescribes the drug and is thus the real promoter of its consumption.” (3.7.3) The 
point being that drug approvals carry a social element not adequately addressed in the 
proposals. Prepared by the Protection of the Environment, Public Health and Consumer 
Affairs section, the ESC report stressed that transparency needed to be a central element 
of the new agency, with the names of the national experts carrying out reviews on its 
behalf being made public. As this did not happen -  ostensibly in order to protect the 
experts’ safety (see Section 3-2) -  the ESC’s further calls for the agency to "... avoid 
interference from industry and intervention by the national authorities which would be 
incompatible with assessment duties” (4.2) were also disregarded.
117 A switch from Article 100(a) to 235 would also prove the case for the Community Plant Variety Office.
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The industry did not impassively watch these debates unfold. There was a great deal to 
gain from a revised regime, but it saw the Commission’s plans as going in the wrong 
direction. EFPIA took the view that as the CPMP procedure had not worked the first time, 
there was no reason to believe that an agency would make it any better. It criticised the 
Commission’s call for further centralisation, reiterating its members’ frustration at the lack 
of any real (i.e. binding) mutual recognition in practice. According to Orzack et al (1992):
... industry objected to the bureaucratic prolongation of approval processes, 
feared the creation of a centralised agency empowered to render final decisions 
that would override national regulations, called for effective mutual recognition of 
national decisions, desired quicker action from existing agencies, and hoped for 
close links between industry and regulatory bodies. (860)
More specifically, it expressed its fear that the culture of mistrust between the member 
states would continue, leading to overwhelming use of the centralised procedure and 
resulting in the national authorities trying to outdo one another in terms of who could set 
the strictest approval criteria.
Beyond representations to the Commission and the national governments, industry 
representatives voiced their concerns more publicly. For instance, in clearly playing to the 
audience, John Griffin asked in a letter to the British Medical Journal at the time of the 
proposals: “Is patient safety being put at risk in the decision making process offered by the 
Commission?” (Griffin 1990, 1537) He argued that CPMP members were not always 
medically or pharmaceutically trained, and that the committee ought to be comprised of 
recognised scientists to ensure rigorous assessments. This health protection line belied 
the industry’s underlying interest in ensuring that the appeal/review process would not go 
back to the same officials who rejected the authorisation in the first place. A further 
example is the point made by William Currie (1990):
There is little to support haste in the creation of such a European Institution. We 
must remember that currently the time to achieve market authorization in the 
Member States of the EC is not greater than that taken in other geographic areas 
and that comparable statistics reviewed periodically by the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association (PMA) of the US often show the European national 
performance in a favorable light. (388)
Representing an American company, Dr Currie’s agenda was slightly different from that of 
his European counterparts i.e. expressing a preference for the European status quo over 
the US system. But what is interesting is that his assertion contradicts EFPIA’s position in 
its 1988 memorandum to the Commission on the need for extending patent protection 
periods. The argument then was that improved protection was necessary because of 
slower registration times in Europe (recall Chapter 5). Ultimately, industry was wary of a 
Community equivalent to the FDA and was prepared to try all lines of argumentation.
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Nevertheless, the companies acknowledged that some type of Community authority was 
necessary if the regime was to be improved, and if they were to glean any benefits from 
the SEM. With the Commission pushing for an agency, EFPIA sought to ensure that 
authorisation decisions would serve industry’s interests and be based on a wider 
perspective than that generated solely by political considerations. It thus insisted on 
manufacturers’ freedom of choice between mutual recognition or the centralised 
procedure. The former -  subject to the addition of certain procedural ‘safeguards’ in terms 
of ensuring that national authorities were bound to recognise each others’ approvals -  was 
to remain the heart of the ‘future system’, with the latter based on a fortified CPMP with the 
authority to enforce its decisions (especially regarding appeals). EFPIA was also adamant 
about companies retaining the right to choose the rapporteur in applications.
Although this is very much the current system (and that proposed by SNIP), the problem at 
the time according to Dulio Poggiolini, Chairperson of the CPMP, was that:
An improvement in the legal situation of the CPMP will only be possible if the 
Council of Ministers is charged with making the opinions of the CPMP mandatory 
and operational... The acceptance of EEC opinions on marketing authorizations 
of new medicines implies a renouncing of sovereignty and sovereignty includes 
political and legal aspects. (Poggiolini 1989, 243)
With the impending single market, sovereignty was a concern for the member states 
generally. But the potential ‘free movement of medicines’ represented a particularly 
difficult prospect at a time when national governments were struggling to control health 
budgets; Community approval of expensive medicines could mean higher drug bills. 
Further, any loss of sovereignty was seen as potentially damaging to local industry, and 
public health concerns too would be affected.
Indeed, the BEUC expressed serious concerns about the potential public health 
implications of the proposals. Having accused the Commission of being “... more 
concerned about promoting the recognition of other countries’ medicines, despite differing 
safety standards... Proposals for opening up the market take precedence over those which 
have to do with the quality of health care” (as cited in Orzack 1996, 20), so too was it 
sceptical of industry’s vision. Irrespective of whether the member states would show more 
faith in each other’s work, or of a binding mutual recognition route, the BEUC was against 
both the industry having a choice of procedure and national agencies competing against 
each other. The worry was that this would:
... create the strong possibility of a Community licensing system containing 
double standards... medicines assessed by a newly created, highly scientific 
central body may be scrutinised more critically than those submitted to a less 
resourced and sophisticated national agency. (Currie 1989, 771)
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Were this the case, industry could be expected to overwhelmingly turn to the latter. The 
BEUC envisaged a policing rather than policy-making role for the national authorities 
towards attaining higher Community-wide standards.
The Consumer’s Consultative Commission (CCC)118 also insisted on a stronger public 
health protection element to any new authority. It argued the agency should be able to 
assess medicines according to ‘specific therapeutic advantages’ vis-a-vis products already 
on the market (CCC 1991). This echoed the Parliament’s call for products of ‘particular 
social significance’ to be granted centralised approval119. To facilitate this, the CCC sought 
consumer representation in the CPMP, suggesting that its independence “... is not 
guaranteed, for research in the area of pharmaceutical products is largely funded by the 
industry.” The Commission ignored this, as well as most of Parliament’s submissions120. 
DGIII’s single-mindedness is reflected in a May 1991 unpublished correspondence from 
Fernand Sauer, when still in charge of the Pharmaceuticals and Cosmetics Unit, to Ricardo 
Perissich, Industrial Affairs Commissioner:
Thus at the present time it appears that the current proposals do provide a good 
basis for negotiation within the Council, and no fundamental review is required. 
Consideration needs to be given to the extent to which the Commission can 
accept ‘Communautaire’ amendments from Parliament, bearing in mind that such 
amendments may provoke a counter reaction from Member States. (Sauer 1991)
It would appear Mr Sauer had foreseen that public health concerns would be raised by the 
Parliament and was suggesting, if not recommending, that any prospective Parliamentary 
amendments be disregarded for fear of the policy being rejected by the member states. 
Patients were obviously not the Commission’s nor the member states’ prime concern.
2-4 Final obstacles
Returning to the legislative process, just two months after the ESC’s July 1991 report the 
Commission agreed an amended proposal for the agency based on Article 235. But 
Denmark now expressed reservations. Its national authorisation criteria were seen as 
stricter than most of the other member states’, and it was concerned that unanimity under 
Article 235 meant no possibility of opting out. Although the details of the centralised
118The CCC is a consultative body of the Commission which represents consumer interests before the 
Commission: its views are not binding.
119 This ‘need’ criterion in approving new drugs is not part of the agency’s mandate (see Section 4-1).
120 One amendment adopted by the Commission was for limits to be imposed on the member states’ 
power to temporarily suspend authorisation. Based on reservations about governments’ protectionist 
motives, the Parliament argued that suspension should be permitted only after assessment of the 
harm likely to be accrued during the wait for a Commission decision i.e. unless there were justifiable 
public health reasons for not waiting, the product could not be withdrawn until the Commission had 
assessed the reasons. This was accepted by the Commission, for the unilateral right of the member 
states to withdraw products was seen as undermining its internal market goals.
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procedure were still under discussion within the member states (in consultation with their 
industries), once Danish opposition faded it looked more-or-less a ‘done deal’. However, 
at the 10 November 1992 Internal Market Council another obstacle emerged when Belgium 
and Spain raised the issue of ‘headquartering’ the new agency.
At Belgian and Spanish insistence, a Council Declaration stating that the agency would 
only begin operations eighteen months after its headquarters had been decided was 
agreed. It had been expected that the decision on the EMEA’s location would -  along with 
the new environment agency and internal market harmonisation office (and drug addiction 
monitoring centre, training foundation and police force which were still ‘homeless’) -  be 
decided via raffle at the December 1992 Edinburgh summit meeting. But under the 
Declaration, the location of the EMEA would have to be decided by the leaders of the 
member state governments. And now that it was clearer how the agency and a centralised 
procedure would work, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK launched 
campaigns to host it. Eventually a decision of the heads of state and governments on 29 
October 1993 agreed London as the EMEA seat.
The reason for the bidding war was the perceived industrial policy gains to be accrued. 
When asked why the UK government had fought to have the agency in London, Virginia 
Bottomley, then minister of health, stated unequivocally that it had done so because:
The British pharmaceutical industry will have the advantage of easy access to the 
agency, which will be working in its language and will offer its products quicker 
access to the European single market, all of which means that there will be 
increased inward investment in the UK, more exports and more jobs. (Hansard 
1995)
Unsurprisingly, the ABPI had spearheaded the UK’s campaign (Jackson 1993). And with 
Prime Minister John Major stating that “I and the British government support the 
pharmaceutical industry’s initiative in proposing that the Agency should find its permanent 
home here.” (SCRIP 1820), it clearly did so with full governmental backing.
What proved to be the final sticking-point emerged over the fees to be paid to the agency. 
Several member states objected to the proposed cost of applications as too high compared 
to those charged by national authorities. It was feared that the result would be increased 
overall expenditure on drug regulation and a loss of national fee revenue to the member 
states. And while some governments sought Commission oversight of EMEA financing via 
a subsidy from the Community, the UK favoured an agency funded solely by fees as was 
the case for its own Medicines Control Agency (MCA).
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This dragged out the opening of the EMEA’s doors by another few months, especially as 
the Parliament had a vested interest here. Any Community budgetary plans would have to 
be granted Parliamentary approval and MEPs wanted to retain some control over agency 
financing (Gardner 1996). The end result was a ‘half-and-half agreement under 
Regulation (EEC) 297/95, but not before the Parliament and Council reduced the amount 
of the subsidy in late 1995, with financing to be reviewed after three years. Since revision 
of the ‘fee schedule’ under Regulation (EEC) 2743/98 of 14 December 1998 -  the main 
changes being the addition of an annual fee for each medicinal product already authorised, 
a fee for scientific advice rendered prior to application submission, and an administrative 
fee for supplying documents or certificates -  the agency is now financed mainly through 
fees much to many people’s unhappiness (see Section 3-2).
Differing industrial policy goals, and to a lesser degree public health concerns, were implicit 
in the member states’ disparate reactions and positions throughout the policy-process, and 
all shared an uncertainty about the Commission’s vision. Initially, most feared that their 
own regulatory authorities might slowly be squeezed out and that a streamlined 
authorisation procedure could mean rationalisation of local industry. This has not really 
happened in practice, though some agencies are more used than others. And by working 
with the companies the agency in fact helps to promote the European industry. Ultimately 
then, it seems that for the member states the costs to be borne were less significant than 
the gains -  the amended proposals were endorsed in the Council on 23 July 1993121.
2-5 The Commission’s new line
Following Council’s adoption, the Commission sought to distance itself from its position of 
industrial policy first and health policy second, and set about presenting the agency as a 
patient benefit. Dr Bangemann, successor to Mr Perissich, and known for his strong 
commitment to a single pharmaceuticals market (see Chapter 7), immediately adopted this 
new health protection line. Gone were his earlier references to “... quicker access for new 
medicines to the enlarged Single Market” (Bangemann 1991) and the agency’s role in 
fostering “... consolidation of the internal market” (CEC IP 1994). Now he stressed that by 
improving market authorisation procedures, the new structure “... generates consumer 
protection thanks to severe test criteria.” (as cited in Albedo 1995b)
More recently, in an information booklet on the EU pharmaceutical sector published by DG 
Enterprise, the agency is claimed to have been established “... partly in response to 
demands from consumers’ organisations, particularly the BEUC and the European
121 Parliament conducted a second reading, but its amendments (26 May 1993) were again disregarded.
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Parliament.” (CEC 2000, 7) The discussion has already shown that this was not the case. 
The BEUC may have endorsed the principle as first raised by DGIII, but it had a completely 
different vision, and most of the Parliament’s amendments were ignored. What is true is 
that the decision to draw up and publish the EPARs was the result of consumer and 
Parliamentary pressure for transparency, and it was at the Parliament’s insistence that two 
members of the EMEA management board are nominated by the Parliament to increase 
accountability -  the other members comprise two representatives of each member state, 
and two from the Commission122. As stated at the outset of the chapter, ‘no one thought of 
seriously selling the idea as a patient benefit’, and there is in fact no proof that patients 
have benefited from the revised approval procedures under the EMEA123.
The Commission’s change in how it came to promote the agency reflects the criticism it 
drew both before and after the deal was done, especially as the policy network involved no 
consumer representation during the policy-making process (Mossialos & Abel-Smith 1997). 
(After the initial consultation, the discussion has shown that formal patient/consumer 
interests were not solicited.) The Commission sought to deflect criticism by insisting that 
the patient had always been the prime concern. Indeed, one of the characteristics of 
Wilson’s policy entrepreneur is that (irrespective of an agenda of its own) it often aims to 
associate the proposed regulatory intervention with broader social concerns or widely-held 
values. Despite the Commission’s new sell, it is clear that DGIII’s single market pre­
occupation, along with industry pressure, had been the driving force. Further evidence of 
this comes from the agency’s operation in practice. Particularly the degree to which it 
works with, rather than independent from, the industry.
3 Persistent Criticisms
As a unique body it should not be surprising that the EMEA has its share of detractors. But 
what is perhaps surprising given the Commission’s insistence that the agency is designed 
primarily for European patients, is that its critics are primarily those with patients’ interests 
in mind. Dissatisfaction relates mainly to the nature of the system and the resultant loss of 
responsibility at the national level. Criticism has generally taken two, albeit related, faces. 
The first has to do with a perceived lack of transparency in the agency’s work. Not only is 
the CPMP secretive in its deliberations on product assessment -  the minutes of which are 
not publicly available -  but neither consumers nor patients have the access they perhaps 
should. Stemming from this, the second critique asks whether the agency’s operations 
(and even its remit) are therefore geared more towards the needs of industry (i.e. the 
applicant) than the patient. The criticism being that the EMEA’s emphasis is on improving
The Commission representatives are from DG Enterprise and the Agriculture DG.
123 For instance Cameron McKenna (2000) or Edmonds et al (2000).
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time-to-market (TTM) for new drugs rather than protecting public health per se. Bringing 
new medicines and treatments to market more quickly does serve a public health function, 
but the question is whether speeding TTM as an end in itself is sufficient to meet patients’ 
interests as the Commission seems to assume. These are charges which reverberate 
especially sharply with those interested in the public health side of medicines regulation124, 
and they relate to the earlier discussion on how and why the agency was established.
3-1 Transparent, accessible?
The lack of transparency criticism is one which the agency has fought since its inception 
with but limited success. Primarily through the maintenance of an oft-updated website, the 
EMEA has striven to make its activities open and accessible. The site posts an array of 
material, ranging from the usual ‘Who we are/what we do’ and ‘Frequently-Asked 
Questions’, through summaries of meetings and assessments of its operations. It also 
provides a listing of all legislation pertinent to medicines in the Community. More 
importantly, it publishes two sets of document. First is the Summary of Product 
Characteristics (SPCs) for new drugs. These provide detail about individual drugs so that 
interested parties -  primarily doctors and national regulatory officials -  can obtain objective 
information about clinical effectiveness. Second are the European Public Assessment 
Reports (EPARs). These are detailed assessments of new applications for all positive 
opinions granted under the centralised procedure. Publishing such information is intended 
to demonstrate the agency’s self-declared open approach. But the nature and value of 
what is published has been questioned, and accusations of non-transparency therefore 
persist. One of the most openly critical voices has been that of the International Society of 
Drug Bulletins (ISDB). Founded in 1986 with the aim of promoting “the international 
exchange of information of good quality on drugs and therapeutics, to encourage and to 
assist the development of professionally independent drug bulletins in all countries and 
facilitate cooperation among bulletins”125, it has consistently questioned the extent of the 
EMEA’s commitment to transparency.
According to the ISDB, the material provided by the agency on its website, along with the 
way it is presented, is opaque, often inconsistent, and even unhelpful (ISDB 2001). In a 
1998 report assessing nine EPARs, the society characterises them as “hazy and 
irrelevant.” (ISDB 1998) This is a sentiment echoed by the BEUC, which recently 
expressed its view that, at around 30 pages, the EPAR:
... requires a high level of technical knowledge about pharmaceuticals and is
therefore adequate for professional use. Consumer organisations usually have
124
For instance Dukes (1996), Abraham & Lewis (1998) and Garattini & Bertele (2001).
125 Mission statement available at the ISDB website: www.isdbweb.org.
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very limited financial resources and it is hard to get experts with this kind of 
knowledge willing to work for small money. For the ordinary consumer/citizens 
the publication is not useful. It is too technical and very difficult to find your way 
around in for an unskilled person. (BEUC 2000, 3)
The ISDB report concludes that the major problem with the EPARs, however, is the "... 
lack of a clear and consistent policy on the reporting of the clinical trial data which 
influenced the decision on whether or not to license a new drug.” More recently, the group 
has accused the EMEA of employing obscure and coded language in the presentation of 
these reports; that which diminishes the reliability of their content (ISDB 2001).
The SPCs have also been criticised, and not just by the ISDB. Critics identify two main 
failings. Doctors do not have the ease of access they might i.e. they are expected to look 
up the SPCs on the EMEA website themselves (assuming they have the means and time). 
It has, therefore, been suggested that the national regulatory agencies be able to supply 
their local doctors with hardcopies of the summaries (Garattini & Bertele 2001). More 
importantly, in the SPCs the drugs are described without reference to comparable 
preparations, let alone those designed to treat similar conditions. This hinders doctors’ 
ability to make comparative assessments for prescribing purposes, raising questions about 
the value of the summaries as they are now drafted.
Beyond containing unclear information, a further concern is that the manufacturers are 
involved in writing the SPCs and EPARs (although the CPMP has final say over the text of 
the latter). Not only may this result in documents of variable quality126, but it may 
compromise their objectivity or accuracy. For instance, even though the direct-to- 
consumer advertising of medicines is prohibited in the EU127, it has been alleged that:
In practice, drug companies have failed to fulfil their duty to inform via the patient 
leaflets and SPC. By completely blurring the dividing line between information 
and promotion, they have developed highly effective promotional tools and 
methods that ignore the very special nature and utilisation of the “merchandise” 
they produce. (Bardelay 2001,4)
Another example comes from a question tabled by MEP Nel van Dijk in 1996 (CEC 
814/96). He asked why the package leaflet for the drug Fareston -  designed to treat 
breast cancer -  does not actually carry the word 'cancer', using the word ‘tumour’ instead. 
As ‘cancer’ features in both the EPAR and SPCs and is not interchangeable with ‘tumour’,
126 This variability prevails despite the harmonisation of SPCs under the centralised procedure. And while 
the majority of medicines circulating in Europe pre-date the procedure and thus already carry differing 
SPCs, the EMEA could make more of an effort to ensure that all drug reporting is more objective and 
to a high standard.
127 Directive 92/28/EEC.
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he claimed that this was misleading to patients128. The Commission’s response was that 
the leaflet text was in accordance with Article 7(2) of the labelling of medicinal products 
Directive129, which states that “The competent authorities [CPMP] may decide that certain 
therapeutic indications shall not be mentioned in the package leaflet, where the 
dissemination of such information might have serious disadvantages for the patient.” While 
the applicability of the Article may be questionable given that cancer is such a widely- 
reported issue, the Commission did concede that steps needed to be taken to ensure a 
higher degree of comprehension for patients. And it should noted that the Commission’s 
response was given by Martin Bangemann, then Industrial Affairs Commissioner, rather 
than Social Affairs Commissioner P£draig Flynn.
Not just the ISDB, but consumer groups too have demanded clearer presentation of 
material and have sought improved access to the EMEA’s work. The BEUC has long 
complained about the lack of patient representation in the CPMP, registering its 
dissatisfaction as early as 1986 that consumer groups were not formally included in 
discussions on drug approval under the multi-state procedure, while industry’s views were 
in fact solicited (Orzack 1996). In France for instance, both industry and consumer 
representatives are both permitted to make observations during scientific deliberations 
(Vos 1999). Relating their attempts to access from the agency what they felt was ‘general 
information’ that the average patient might be interested in, two British academics write:
... despite European Commission and EMEA support of greater freedom of 
information, the European procedures for medicines regulation remain opaque to 
public scrutiny. We found it impossible to get basic information from the EMEA 
about mutual recognition applications, such as names of products, RMSs 
[Referring Member States] and CMSs [Concerned Member States]. The EMEA 
referred us to the Mutual Recognition Facilitation Group of the national regulatory 
authorities; the chairman of that group, Dr D Lyons, told us in a letter dated Sept. 
5, 1996, that ‘only the applicant, the RMS and CMSs need know’ such details. 
Moreover, there is no public right of access to CPMP meetings or minutes. 
(Abraham & Lewis 1998, 481)
According to the authors’ more recent work, this situation has hardly improved (Abraham & 
Lewis 2000). While issues of commercial and industrial secrecy must be respected, this 
exclusion of the public from even basic information does not inspire confidence where 
public health is concerned.
The agency admits the importance for increased transparency and access. Not only does 
it hold yearly audit meetings of its performance to which numerous non-governmental
128 Ellen t’Hoen of HAI Europe also queried the Fareston package leaflet. In a letter to Fernand Sauer 
she makes the point that “The use of Fareston (toremifene) is restricted to the treatment of breast 
cancer and is not indicated for benign tumours.” (t’Hoen 1996)
129 Directive 92/27/EEC.
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groups including the ISDB and BEUC are invited, but another series of annual meetings 
discusses specifically how the agency can work towards increased openness, and again a 
range of interested parties take part. At one such meeting in June 1998, the ISDB put the 
findings of its study on the 9 EPARs to Rolf Bass, head of the agency’s Evaluation of 
Medicines for Human Use unit. Acknowledging the need for improvement, he said that the 
agency’s website would soon be carrying a full index of trials to accompany the EPARs, as 
well as the complete list of documentation generated in each drug approval case (HAI 
1998). This was understood to include even restricted documents which, while remaining 
so, would at least acknowledge their existence.
It addition, and as a follow-up, Professor Bass issued a letter to Ellen t’Hoen of the ISDB in 
December 1998 responding in detail to the group’s 1998 study (Bass 1998). Based on 
consultation with the CPMP, Prof Bass addressed the ISDB’s complaints on a product-by- 
product basis, generally acknowledging ‘shortcomings’ and 'inconsistencies’. However, he 
refuted that the EPARs did not provide sufficient scientific data, arguing that “in accordance 
with current legislation”, only"... commercially confidential information e.g. pharmaceutical 
development details” were not included. Further, he claimed that the reports were a 
“readable and digestible volume of text” based on the full study reports. And again, 
assurances were given with regard to improving the quality of the reports, particularly in 
relation to common standards under the International Conference on Harmonization with 
the US and Japan. In a follow-up report two years later, however, the ISDB complains that 
these assurances have yet to be met (ISDB 2000).
Still, the publication of the EPARs and SPCs, and the maintenance of a website is, as even 
the critics admit, a laudable step. Few national agencies are so forthcoming (Abbasi & 
Herxheimer 1998). But given that much of this information is quite specialised, and 
assuming that transparency really is an EMEA priority, a more realistic attempt should be 
made to facilitate public understanding of the authorisation process -  this includes 
providing the types (and names) of drugs under consideration. Ultimately, a website, 
irrespective of how often it is updated, is simply not sufficient when the material posted 
remains selective and/or inaccessible to a broad readership. The charges of a lack of 
transparency or inaccessibility are not likely to dissipate soon.
3-2 Favouring the industry?
Such failings have led to the second main line of criticism: wider questions about what the 
agency’s function really is. Despite regulating for the safety, quality and efficacy of new 
medicines, many commentators remain unconvinced that public health is the first priority 
as the Commission, agency representatives and industry all consistently stress. And here
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they point to the degree of co-operation extended to the companies -  co-operation which is 
unlike the industry’s relationship with the FDA in the US.
For example, the applicant is allowed to nominate one of the two rapporteurs in the 
assessment. The result is that they usually choose someone from one of the larger, better 
resourced and ‘quicker’ agencies (see Section 4-3)130. Even before choosing the 
rapporteur, a company is permitted to seek scientific advice from the agency four to six 
years in advance of the application. This is to ensure that its clinical research protocols 
comply with the types of questions the EMEA is likely to ask about the product come the 
evaluation (Ross 2000a). Highlighting this function is not to suggest that anything 
untoward takes place, but it more than likely results in companies ‘tweaking’ their 
documentation so that the drug stands a better chance of a positive opinion. By contrast, 
the FDA is often involved in the whole development plan for a new medicine, which is 
aimed more at ensuring the product meets approval standards than simply fulfilling 
licensing requirements.
A more worrying issue is the access to the agency’s evaluation work which the industry 
currently enjoys. Silvio Garattini, one of the two Italian CPMP members, has asked why 
the applicant companies are privy to the committee’s consultation documentation (which 
includes preliminary votes) prior to the final decision (Garattini & Bertele 2001). This gives 
manufacturers an initial ‘feel’ with regard to how the authorisation is going, and allows them 
to either withdraw the product before assessment, else accept a preliminary negative 
decision at an early stage in order to have time to prepare an appeal. Between 1999 and 
2001 there were some 30 withdrawals prior to the CPMP opinion (EMEA 2002)131. The 
details of negative decisions or those in progress before a company’s withdrawal of the 
application are not published alongside the positive decisions. Withholding this information 
and not divulging the reasons for withdrawal (nor the names and types of drugs withdrawn) 
is clearly not an attempt to serve patient interests as much as it is an attempt to placate the 
industry. As noted by the ISDB,"... it is not by working hand in hand with drug companies 
to produce documents stamped ‘controlled’ that drug agencies can make themselves most 
useful and credible.”132 This also compares badly with the US where, according to Gerald 
Deighton, formerly head of the FDA’s freedom of information office, public access is 
permitted to around 90% of the FDA’s records (as cited in NCC 1993). Although secrecy 
and opaqueness are features of the national regulatory process as well (Dukes 1996), the
130 The rapporteurs, indeed none of the 2,300 experts at the agency’s disposal, are named on the 
agency’s website. According to Abraham & Lewis (2000,107), this is "... largely at the behest of the 
UK which cites ‘personal safety’ reasons”; though what these reasons are remains unclear.
131 Concerns about the rising number of pre-CPMP opinion withdrawals saw the 1999 establishment of 
the Working Group on Withdrawn Applications.
132 ISDB Newsletter 1999; 13(1): 5.
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EMEA leaning towards industry does remain in stark contrast to the member states’ own 
regimes at home which reflect much more of a health protection mandate. It should, 
however, be noted that prior to 1995 when there was no centralised Community agency, 
information about the specifics of the review process and applications under consideration 
was even less available than now.
The reason that the companies are involved in the EMEA’s operations to such an extent 
(including in the drafting of the SPCs and EPARs which are essentially matters of public 
health) is because the products are theirs and it is assumed that they therefore know its 
indications best. Another perspective is that company fees represent an increasingly large 
share of EMEA receipts133. Applicant fees accounted for about 71 % of total EMEA receipts 
in 2000 (EMEA 2000a), continuing an upwards trend: 39% in 1996, 48% in 1997, 53% in 
1998 and 70% in 1999134. The agency, the Commission and the industry refute any link 
between the fees paid and the agency’s work; indeed, most national authorities are 
financed mainly by industry in this way (and the fees paid to the EMEA are split between 
the agency and the member states). Still, some commentators maintain that this reliance 
on the industry does mean that the companies are bound to have a considerable say in 
how the EMEA operates and that TTM is going to be the priority (e.g. Abraham & Lewis
2000). Evidence for this comes from the FDA where, following the enactment of the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) in 1992135, it was found that approval times for 
new chemical entities declined by 51% (TUFTS 2000).
Such collaboration with the companies makes it clear that the relationship with industry is a 
close one. In a recent interview, Brian Ager concedes as much: “The essential fact is, 
though, that what we have is not a case of the regulator versus those regulated when it 
comes to improving performance. It’s a partnership...” (as cited in Ross 2000a, 62) Even 
the American interviewer expresses his surprise at this admission: “That’s a far more 
cooperative system than anything we have in the US... It strikes me that the EMEA has 
really made a tremendous effort to form a partnership with industry.” The emphasis on 
TTM around which this relationship revolves has even seen the US government’s General 
Accounting Office (GAO) raises the question as to whether “... the new European drug 
approval processes may provide some alternative approaches for improving the timelines 
of FDA’s drug approval.” (GAO 1996, 1); something which American industry 
representatives have themselves not missed (e.g. Miller 1999). It thus seems widely
133 The distribution of EMEA fee revenue is 30% to staff costs, 30% to rapporteur and co-rapporteur, 30% 
to ‘special activities’ as agreed by the management board, and up to 10% for ‘sampling and testing 
costs for centrally authorised medicines’ (EMEA 2000a, 13).
134 Commission financing was designed to be phased out after 5 years, and represented 24% of EMEA 
receipts in 2000 (EMEA 2000a).
135 The PDUFA is a scheme whereby the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry pays ‘user fees’ to 
the FDA in exchange for the it setting of performance standards aimed at reducing approval times.
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recognised that the industry enjoys (undue) access and participation in the work of the 
EMEA. Having considered the criticisms pertaining to the agency’s pro-industry design, it 
is now necessary to look at how the EMEA’s work reflects this leaning. This is particularly 
in relation to both the member state authorities and the US FDA, for which the Thalidomide 
tragedy had provided the impetus.
4 Working as “ Firstly a Benefit for the European Patient” ?
How does all this square with the Commission’s insistence that the agency was designed 
to benefit patients? In its recent information document on the EU pharmaceutical market, 
DG Enterprise stresses the EMEA’s more efficient approvals ensure quicker access to new 
innovative medicines, thereby contributing to improved health protection (CEC 2000). 
Again, the causality may be tenable, but “to contribute to the protection of public health” is 
the thrust of the EMEA’s mission statement according to its annual Work Programmes. 
This it does by:
• Mobilising scientific resources from throughout the European Union to provide high 
quality evaluation of medicinal products, to advise on research and development 
programmes and to provide useful and clear information to users and health 
professionals.
• Developing efficient and transparency procedures to allow timely access by users to 
innovative medicines through a single European marketing authorisation.
• Controlling the safety of medicines for humans and animals, in particular through a 
pharmacovigilance network and the establishment of safe limits in for residues in food 
producing animals. (EMEA 2000b, 2)
Without putting too much stock into the specific wording, it is perhaps interesting to note 
that in respect of public health the mission statement has evolved (been diluted?) since the 
founding Regulation, which called on the protection of public health "... by mobilising the 
best scientific resources within the European Union [emphasis mine].” The goal to 
“promote health care through the effective regulation of pharmaceuticals within the single 
European market” has also been dropped. Notwithstanding that the agency to a degree 
fails in at least the first two aims, does such a mandate warrant claims of a benefit firstly to 
the European patient?
4-1 A public health mandate?
The answer for many analysts is no. As different countries have nuanced standards in 
terms of approval requirements, the single authorisation process raises the possibility of 
standards being laxer at EU level. This is especially as the decentralised procedure leads 
to competition between the national agencies, with only the largest and best-resourced 
really benefiting (the RMS receives the largest share of the applicant’s fee). By inducing 
competition between national agencies, the procedure may result in a race to the bottom
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rather than to the top i.e. who can turn applications over most quickly rather than who has 
the strictest standards. Fernand Sauer may claim that “They [national agencies] really 
enjoy working together, and instead of worrying about sovereignty issues, they now feel a 
degree of competition to prove that they are able to do the work in the required timeframe” 
(as cited in Ross 2000b, 56), but others have expressed concerns and the need to ensure 
that “... the rush of competition does not overwhelm the fundamental responsibility for 
safety and efficacy in drugs.” (Gardner 1996, 62)
Indeed, it has been suggested that member state authorities are often less enamoured with 
this type of competition than Mr Sauer, and that it does lead to the bar being set lower. 
Abraham and Lewis (2000) for instance find that some German and Swedish regulatory 
officials concede to having accepted products approved via the agency which, under their 
own national safety standards, they would not otherwise have granted authorisation (147- 
171). Technology is changing not only the development process, but so too the 
assessment procedure, and though some states are more advanced than others or have 
higher standards, the EMEA regime does not account for this.
The degree of health protection afforded via the centralised procedure has also been 
questioned. In a letter to Mr Sauer asking about the marketing approval of certain anti­
depressant medications in 1997, Charles Medawar of Social Audit Ltd136 suggests that"... 
the scientific evidence on which the [national] authorisations have relied is so flawed as to 
leave open the possibility that even basic assumptions about safety and efficacy (and 
therefore benefit and risk) may be quite wrong.” (Medawar 1997) Amongst other reasons, 
he suggests this is due to the lack of transparency, no consumer or patient involvement in 
the regulatory process, and inherent conflicts of interest between regulatory authorities and 
industry. He puts it to Mr Sauer that: "... these are serious shortcomings also in the 
EMEA/CPMP system.” This letter sparked a three year exchange of correspondence 
between, primarily, Mr Medawar, Fernand Sauer, Rolf Bass, and Patrick Deboyser (then 
Head of DGIII/E/F) and is too lengthy for examination137. Its mention here, however, is to 
reflect to what extent the agency has a public health protection role.
Another area where the EMEA has no say, is in pursuing the ‘need’ element in drug 
registration i.e. helping to see that those drugs for which a clear need is established are 
granted approval. Although this is because the 1965 Directive stipulates safety, quality 
and efficacy as the only criteria permissible for approval, according to CPMP member
136 Social Audit Ltd is the publishing arm of the Public Interest Research Centre (PIRC). PIRC is an 
independent UK charity which aims broadly to represent the ‘public interest’ in pharmaceutical 
medicine, and is financed largely by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust.
The full chain or correspondence is available on the Social Audit Ltd website at: 
www.socialaudit.org.uk.
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Silvio Garattini, the EMEA ought to be given the power to "... acquire the rights on drugs 
abandoned by the industry because of the lack of commercial interest despite their clinical 
importance.” (Garattini & Bertele 2000, 441) The companies (and member states) would 
never agree to this, but were the agency able to pursue/complete the development of such 
products and then perhaps sell the licenses to companies interested in marketing them as 
generics, its commitment to health protection could be strengthened. By comparison, the 
FDA grants ‘priority review status’ to those products it deems to represent a potential 
significant therapeutic advance138. With patient and consumer groups not involved in the 
CPMP’s evaluation work, need is not a consideration in any form. The agency simply 
considers those products the industry brings before it139.
4-2 Qualifying innovation
Related to this is the lack of a official EMEA definition of ‘innovation’. Unlike the strict 
safety, efficacy and quality standards in place since 1965, criteria for the evaluation of 
therapeutic value have not been laid down in similar manner. The agency instead enjoys 
the discretion to decide whether a product constitutes a significant innovative gain or not. 
Along with no mandate to assess ‘need’, this means an inability to prioritise products for 
approval, and results in a clash between industry and patients' interests.
Since innovative products qualify for the quicker and wider market access of the 
centralised approval, the companies favour a definition which allows more of their products 
to qualify. Consumer groups meanwhile would prefer a stricter elaboration towards 
ensuring that only truly therapeutically superior products are granted centralised access. 
Industry representatives claim that stricter innovation criteria at EU level would have 
repercussions on reimbursement decisions in the member states (Mossialos & Abel-Smith 
1997). But as this is not likely -  national authorities do not employ innovation as a 
reimbursement criteria for their own markets -  the industry’s argument is something of a 
smokescreen. Patient groups have therefore criticised this discretionary element of the 
agency’s remit, and a study commissioned by the DG Enterprise found that:
... only 37% of patient associations feel the availability of innovative products is
satisfactory or very satisfactory, and their concerns are increasing as
Governments seek to control the rising expenditure on health caused by
138 The FDA also has an Office of Orphan Drug Products which actively encourages the development of 
medicines for rare diseases via the provision of grants.
139 Although not part of the centralised process and not bound by EMEA decisions, as a member of the 
EEA, and thus subject to Directive 65/65/EEC, Norway had to drop its own need clause in 1994. The 
Norwegian national centre for medicines control, the Statens Legemiddelkontrol (SLK), had used the 
need clause since 1938 to limit the number of medicines available on the market. Serving public 
health needs had been its priority in this regard (Norris 1998).
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demographic change and scientific developments. (Cameron McKenna 2000, 
51 )140
Even earlier, MEP Adriana Ceci referred to the Community’s “discretionary structures” as 
potentially promoting the “corrupt acceptance” of new medicines (as cited in STOA 1993). 
Indeed, looking at the FDA’s criteria for priority review, the EMEA’s innovation criteria -  
while more technical in language -  are vague by comparison; dependant very much on the 
‘opinion’ of the agency (Table 6-2).
Table 6-2: FDA 'Priority  Review’ Versus EMEA 'Innovation’ C riteria (centralised  
procedure)
FDA (US) EMEA (EU)
The drug, if approved, would be a significant 
improvement compared to marketed products 
[approved (if such is required), including non- 
"drug” products/therapies] in the treatment, 
diagnosis, or prevention of a disease. 
Improvements can be demonstrated by, for 
example:
(1) evidence of increased effectiveness in 
treatment, prevention, or diagnosis of 
disease;
(2) elimination or substantial reduction of a 
treatment-limiting drug reaction;
(3) documented enhancement of patient 
compliance; or
(4) evidence of safety and effectiveness of a 
new subpopulation.
• Medicinal products developed by other 
biotechnological processes which, in opinion of 
the agency, constitute a significant innovation.
• Medicinal products administered by means of 
new delivery systems which, in the opinion of 
the agency, constitute a significant innovation.
• Medicinal products based on radio-isotopes 
which, in the opinion of the agency, are of 
significant therapeutic interest.
• New medicinal products derived from human 
blood or human plasma.
• Medicinal products the manufacture of which 
employs processes which, in the opinion of the 
agency, demonstrate a significant technical 
advance such as two-dimensional 
electrophoresis under micro-gravity.
• Medicinal products intended for administration 
to human beings, containing a new active 
substance which, on the day of entry into 
force of the regulation, were not authorised by 
any Member State for use in a medicinal 
product intended for human use.
Sources: FDA Manual of Policies and Procedures (CDER) and List 'B', Annex, Regulation (EEC) 
2309/93.
This has meant that a significant proportion of products approved via the centralised 
procedure may not be strictly innovative in terms of therapeutic gain. According to a 
review of the 129 products granted centralised approval by the end of 1999, about half 
were copies or ‘me-too’ drugs (Garattini & Bertele 2000). This discretionary interpretation 
of innovation is a benefit to the industry; the authority to limit such potentially superfluous 
duplication might help to ensure that patient requirements are better met. And while an 
advisory role for the agency in conducting cost-effectiveness studies to help in 
differentiating products of similar therapeutic value might represent a contribution here, it is
140
In the same study, companies have unsurprisingly expressed their interest in an expansion of the 
scope of products covered by the centralised procedure.
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not likely. Beyond consumer groups, neither the Commission nor the member states 
appear interested in a tighter definition of the EMEA’s innovation criteria.
From the Commission’s point-of-view, time-to-market and high use of the centralised 
procedure is a good thing. Not just with regard to promoting the single market, but also in 
making Europe more attractive for pharmaceutical research and development. Here, as 
“The first aim would be to make an absolute priority of raising the number of innovative 
drugs produced” (Bosanquet 1999, 136), limiting what constitutes an innovation would 
prove defeatist. Indeed, a paper recommending clarification of the innovation criteria -  
based on a five-point innovation capacity scale -  was put to the agency’s management 
board by Gianmartino Benzi of the Italian Institute of Pharmacology141 already in December 
1995 (SCRIP 2106), but was not acted upon. And as each of the member states employs 
its own criteria (Table 6-3), the imposition of a single model is not likely to prove 
acceptable.
Table 6-3: Selected  M ember S tate Definitions of 'Innovation '
Country W orking Definition/G uidelines
France 'one that will bring more therapeutic benefits to the market than existing 
products’
Germany 'a new indication/faster mode of action/reduced side-effects/better potential 
for patient compliance’
Italy 'one which treats a previously untreatable disease or has fewer side effects’
Spain 'provides advantages that existing products do not have’
Source: adapted from IMS Health (1997).
The loose EMEA understanding of what constitutes an innovative gain nevertheless carries 
a drawback for manufacturers. While many products qualify for centralised authorisation, 
the result is potentially longer approvals because of backlogs. The fear that the agency 
would not be able to cope with all the applications was expressed by many commentators, 
even prior to the agency’s establishment142. Given the gains, however, this appears 
something the companies can live with.
4-3 Other considerations
Other concerns have to do with the appointment procedures. Regulation 2309/92 
stipulates that CPMP members be “ ... chosen by reason of their role and experience in the 
evaluation of medicinal products for human and veterinary use as appropriate and shall 
represent their national authorities.” (Article 52(1)). This is a somewhat vague criterion for 
appointment. For despite members being required to sign a declaration of interests, it
Prof Benzi is also one of the European Parliament nominations to the EMEA management board.
142 For instance Griffin (1990), Gardner (1996), or Mossialos & Abel-Smith (1997).
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means that each member state can appoint according to its own view of appropriate 
‘experience’. There is also no common appointment protocol and no central EU 
accreditation for the net of experts used by the agency. Further, the EMEA has no internal 
mechanisms for quality assessment. It relies on the degree to which the companies 
express satisfaction with the work carried out; and it is clear that the main measure for 
company satisfaction is speed of approval. An independent (internal) scientific review 
committee to assess the quality of the assessments undertaken by the experts ought to be 
a priority here, especially as not all experts are used with the same frequency and national 
authorities retain their own procedures and requirements.
This relates to the earlier point that the companies generally choose rapporteurs they 
perceive most sympathetic to their needs. Hence, the first and second-choice rapporteur 
was overwhelmingly the UK, with France second and the Netherlands third (Cameron 
McKenna 2000, 86-87). These tend to be the preferred rapporteurs primarily because they 
are the best resourced and most efficient agencies (Abraham & Lewis 2000). Although all 
member states should have ‘equal opportunity’ to be both rapporteur and co-rapporteur, 
looking at total distribution of rapporteurships between 1995-2000, France led the way with 
46, followed by Sweden and the UK with 45 each and the Netherlands with 42 (EMEA 
2000a, 27). Most member states have at least once acted as rapporteur (except Austria, 
Greece and Luxembourg) or co-rapporteur (except Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg).
A further issue is that, unlike many national authorities, the EMEA has no say in the pricing 
and reimbursement of the medicines it approves -  neither in terms of insisting a product be 
reimbursed, nor with regard to participation in the national pricing debates which follow 
approval. The preamble to Regulation (EEC) 2309/93 reads in part:
The provision of this Regulation shall not affect the powers of the Member States’ 
authorities as regards the price setting of medicinal products or their inclusion in 
the scope of the national health system of the of the Member States’ authorities or 
their inclusion in the scope of the social security schemes on the basis of health, 
economic and social conditions. (CEC 1993b)
The industry does not favour any Community influence on pricing (unless, possibly, to 
establish free pricing), while the member states often pursue industrial policy goals in their 
exercise of these measures, and will not therefore accept any impingement on their 
authority. Moreover, Article 152 rules out any Community involvement in member state 
healthcare systems. Pricing and reimbursement remains a matter between the companies 
and the national governments (see Chapter 7).
The agency also has a minimal role in post-approval regulation. Phamnacovigilance is part 
of its remit, but as this is limited mainly to issuing documents on guidelines and practices to
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be observed by the member states and marketing authorisation holders143, it pales 
compared to the FDA’s post-approval activities. These cover: post-marketing surveillance; 
monitoring and reporting on medication errors (due to poor advice, incorrect labelling, etc); 
ensuring accurate prescription drug advertising and promotional labelling; evaluation of 
drug shortage situations (with plans to alleviate them); monitoring industry behaviour; and 
reporting on ‘therapeutic inequivalence’ -  that is, evaluating reports of “therapeutic failures 
and toxicity which might indicate that one product is not equivalent to another similar 
product”144. This clearly reflects a more dedicated focus on consumer safety and patient 
health, particularly as the FDA has the power to punish.
Another example of the difference in approach between the agencies is their handling of 
product applications in so-called ’specialist areas’. The FDA’s ability and willingness to 
review products in oncology for instance, can be compared to the EMEA’s shunning of 
such therapies (Cameron McKenna 2000). The FDA is regarded as less conservative, 
which can be seen as a patient benefit in bringing more therapies to market. Although this 
could be viewed as a boon to industry as well, industry officials often argue that the FDA 
does not adequately take their costs into account when making its decisions. Here the 
EMEA is held up as the preferred model (particularly by officials from American industry): 
"It tries to be client-friendly... the FDA, by contrast, is oriented towards compliance and 
comports itself like a policy agency. The FDA commonly treats drug companies like 
adversaries and constantly pushes the regulatory envelope.” (Miller 1999, 3)
Notwithstanding the benefits a single mechanism brings in minimising protectionism and 
preventing the authorisation of new products being denied because of reimbursement 
concerns, it should also be noted that the creation of the EMEA has had certain negative 
repercussions for the member states. National cost-containment goals (healthcare policy) 
have been affected given the agency’s role in deciding on approvals. Sovereignty more 
generally has also been affected as the states lose much of their ability to decide according 
to their own (often historical and cultural) criteria, what medicines are appropriate for their 
market. A right of appeal exists, but as Fernand Sauer has noted, “In practice, however, 
the CPMP’s recommendations are almost always followed.” (as cited in Ross 2000b, 50) 
Also, with potential disputes referred back to the CPMP for resolve, this ultimately means 
that that national regulatory officials are generally excluded from deliberations which 
directly impact on the health of their constituencies. The Commission’s underlying 
assumption that"... the national regulatory agencies are more alike than they are different” 
(Kidd 1996, 201) is, therefore, debatable. Nevertheless, the devolution of authority to the
For example, the 2001 position paper on pharmacovigilance regulatory obligations (EMEA 2001b).
144 According to the FDA’s CDER Handbook.
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agency promises to continue once the recommendations of the Commission’s recent 
review of pharmaceutical legislation are implemented (COM 2001).
Finally, although not a failing of the EMEA itself, patients often face long delays between 
(supranational) market approval and (national) market availability145. Despite a centralised 
procedure, the availability of new medicines post-authorisation varies considerably 
between the member states (Edmonds et al 2000). The agency is not required to 
accommodate the circumstances specific to each member state and its healthcare system 
-  and accepting that some of these delays are unavoidable given differences in marketing 
and pricing systems -  but this lack of a post-approval mandate begs two questions. First, 
what contribution the agency actually makes to a single market in pharmaceuticals: a 
single binding approval regime without commensurate health(care) authority (such as over 
pricing and reimbursement) is on its own insufficient. And second, whether speeding time- 
to-market represents a patient benefit in practice as opposed to simply in theory.
4-4 Regulatory capture?
On the basis of the discussion so far, it can be seen that the main beneficiary of the EMEA 
procedures is the pharmaceutical industry. Compare the public health oriented criticisms 
already outlined with the fact that 92% of applicants declare themselves ‘satisfied’ or ‘very 
satisfied’ with the work of the CPMP, and that 83% of those who received scientific advice 
from the agency felt that it was ‘useful’ or ‘very useful’ (Cameron McKenna 2000, 80). 
Such satisfaction is also due primarily to the EMEA’s reduction in approval times for new 
products (Koberstein 1999). While a link between quicker approvals and improved health 
protection can be drawn -  as the Commission does -  it is contingent on numerous 
assumptions or conditions. These include that the drugs being authorised are those which 
are most needed; that medicine licenses are actually sought by producers primarily to 
improve public health (rather than to turn a profit); and that the authorising body is 
empowered to serve public health interests.
As already evidenced, none of these hold. Instead, it is far easier to see how industrial 
policy and industry interests are served by a binding authorisation regime which, rather 
than assessing products against stricter approval criteria than those employed in the 
member states, instead emphasises time-to-market and turning over applications as 
quickly as possible. As noted, its limited mandate is in stark contrast to the FDA’s more 
pro-active role. This is only compounded with no consumer/patient representation in the
145 This affects the companies as well. But as they are used to engaging in lengthy post-approval 
discussions with national governments (about pricing in particular), their primary concern is quicker 
authorisation.
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work of the agency, and intimates some degree of regulatory capture146. Here, further 
evidence comes from the Commission’s recent review of pharmaceutical legislation (COM
2001). Not only does it contain suggestions for speeding market access for new 
medicines, but the Commission proposes a review of the agency’s management board to 
include two representatives from industry147. This is not tempered by the inclusion of two 
patient representatives to be chosen by the Commission; especially as so many patient 
and disease groups are today sponsored by the industry.
5 Conclusions
One of the purposes of this chapter was to refute the Commission’s claims that the EMEA 
was set up firstly as a benefit to the European patient. Here, it has been demonstrated that 
economic (single market) rationale were the driving force. Consequently -  and in support 
of the chapter’s second aim -  it was shown that the industry is the main beneficiary. 
Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that the Commission’s prime concern in replacing 
the failing authorisation procedures under the auspices of an agency was patients’ needs; 
rather, progress on the single market was the underlying objective.
5-1 Involving patient interests?
Evidence of this comes from the gradual freezing out of the consumer position from the 
policy-process. Despite calls for patients (and the medical profession) to be consulted 
before any final decision was reached (e.g. Mann 1988), consumer groups -  with the 
exception of the Consumer’s Consultative Commission -  were really only involved until 
mid-1989. The BEUC had been asked to comment on the 1988 CPMP report and the April 
1989 compilation document, but a third document was circulated in December 1989 which, 
according to Mr Hankin of DGIII"... had a slightly more limited circulation in that it primarily 
went to the governments of the Member States at that stage as the ideas were beginning 
to harden further into the beginnings of formal proposals.” (as cited in HoL 1991b, 55) Mr 
Hankin further stated that while none of the three documents was formally published by the 
Commission, ”... they were as public as an unpublished document can be.” The cryptic 
nature of this statement aside, the reason for not publishing them was -  apparently -  the 
problematic nature of having to translate them into all Community languages.
146 Vos (1999) suggests, perhaps conservatively, that there is a ‘risk’ of capture. Others, such as 
Abraham & Lewis (2000) are more critical.
147 The proposal is to drop the number of members from 34 (2 from the Commission, 2 nominated by 
Parliament and 2 from each member state) to 16 (4 from the Commission, 4 from the member states, 4 
from the Parliament, and 4 from industry and patient groups; with the latter to be nominated by the 
Commission).
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Further evidence comes from the fact that the original 1988 report did not involve DGV. 
Responsibility for pharmaceutical policy at the time fell to DGIII’s Pharmaceuticals and 
Cosmetics Unit, but the repercussions of an inefficient CPMP procedure should also have 
been discussed from a welfare point of view i.e. asking how patients could be better served 
under a revised regime. Were initial interest in a future ‘centralized Community system’ 
truly based on concerns for the European patient, DGV would have been at least consulted 
before the report went to the Council. Moreover, it was shown that beyond the 
Parliament’s two appointments to the management board, there is no consumer 
representation within the EMEA structure. As Vos (1999) notes, this need not be the case:
Although the EMEA increasingly seeks contacts with interested parties (as 
required by Community legislation), the way in which contacts are made depends 
on the goodwill of the Management Board and the Commission; they determine 
who may participate, where and how. (250)
By marginalising one of the stakeholders in the policy network in this manner -  and by 
keeping them out of the agency’s current work -  the Commission made it clear that single 
market concerns were (and remain) its priority.
Streamlining the approval process was more a means to standardise national authorisation 
regimes, serve national industrial policy interests and address industry concerns, than it 
was to improve the quality of drugs available in Europe via more stringent assessment 
criteria. According to the German consumer association, the Arbeitschaft der 
VerbraucherverbSnde e.V. (AgV)148, “Centralization is supposed to lead to increased 
transparency of the evaluations in the single market... Main aims of the EMEA have to be 
to define high standards of admission criteria i.e. quality, efficacy, and safety of products.” 
(AgV 1994, 3) But as already shown, transparency is clearly lacking. The AgV goes on to 
note that instead of establishing strict registration criteria, the "... short duration and low 
costs of admission procedures are described as aims of the European Medicines 
Evaluation Agency.” (3) The agency thus represents -  and was clearly intended as -  a 
major step in the Commission’s search for: i) an integrated pharmaceuticals market; ii) a 
successful European industry in industrial policy terms (e.g. employment); and iii) 
competitive advantage for Europe vis-£-vis the US and Japan -  both in terms of attracting 
and rewarding R&D, and strong global sales by domestic EU industry. Maintaining a high 
standard of health protection was implicit in the new regime, but definitely not its focus.
The last of the chapter’s aims was to provide support for the contention that the 
establishment of the agency was a case of entrepreneurial politics within the policy 
network. Although this has in part been done through an examination of the positions of
148 Since 2000, the AgV is under the umbrella of the Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V., the 
Federation of German Consumer Organisations.
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the stakeholders and the role of the Commission in proposing and pushing the legislation, 
a final look is required. What requires brief explanation is why and how the EMEA ‘policy’ 
came to favour the industry in the manner it does. For as a case of entrepreneurial politics 
it ought to have been a regulatory intervention where the ‘producer’ loses out to the ‘public 
interest’ due to the presence of an entrepreneur. As this was not the case, the argument is 
that in the latter stages of the EMEA’s creation i.e. once the decision to set up an agency 
was all but taken, the policy shows characteristics of client politicking.
5-2 The industry ‘hand’
Recalling the industry’s representations, it is obvious that EPFIA lobbied hard employing 
arguments about competitiveness vis-ci-vis the United States and the need to support 
Europe’s industry. Thus, in assessing the extent of the industry’s influence one need only 
consider that the agency’s structure closely resembles that of the UK’s Medicines Control 
Agency. Primarily because the MCA was seen as one of the most conducive to industry’s 
interests in terms of time-to-market, it was the preferred model as expressed by industry 
officials (Staples 1994). Unsurprisingly, this has meant that it is the MCA and its officials 
which, more often than other national regulatory authorities, act as the rapporteur for the 
EMEA under the centralised procedure (recall Section 4-3).
A more tangible example of the industry’s hand is that the format of the authorisation 
procedures clearly reflects the wishes of industry to avoid a single route along the lines of 
the FDA which was seen to be unduly bureaucratic and excessively slow. Its demands for 
a binding mutual recognition process (based on ‘safeguards’) and a loose definition of what 
constitutes an innovative product were met. Furthermore, the companies’ insistence on 
control over who was to undertake the evaluation resulted in the centralised procedure 
being revised to include a co-rapporteur ot the applicant’s choosing.
The competition between national agencies brought about under the decentralised route -  
once it was clear that they would compete over time-to-market rather than who could set 
the strictest criteria -  was also in the industry’s interests. For the ability to select the 
Reference Member State allows companies to exploit the disparate national regulatory 
systems to their advantage; for example, by putting their products on those markets first, 
which other member states who employ either a reference or average price system may 
use as benchmarks in setting their own prices. This allows the companies to indirectly 
affect the price of their products. Even the choice of location for the agency -  London, with 
the UK as Europe’s biggest investor in pharmaceutical research and development -  can be 
attributed to industry pressure (NCC 1994). If one takes the view that this not 
inconsiderable influence played a major role in setting the agency’s mandate, the
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establishment of the EMEA may, like the SPC, be regarded as a case of client politics. 
That said, the early background was different.
There was a clear political element involved. Industry data was not as important -  DGIII in 
any event had the 1988 memorandum prepared by EPFIA to support its case during the 
SPC campaign. And the Commission had a very fixed aim and accompanying deadline. A 
centralised approval process via a Community agency was viewed as a major step in 
promoting an integrated pharmaceuticals market, and in pushing it through, the EMEA 
undoubtedly represents the Commission’s biggest achievement in this direction. An 
acknowledgement of the Commission’s role can be found in the EMEA’s first annual report 
where the DGIII is cited as primarily responsible for the preparatory work behind the 
agency’s establishment (EMEA 1996). It should also be added that complimentary to the 
provisions establishing the agency in 1992 were four Directives pertaining to wholesale 
distribution, classification of the supply, labelling, and advertising of human medicines 
respectively149. Known together as the ‘rational use’ package, these Directives were aimed 
at completing the internal market.
5-3 Costs versus benefits -  final remarks
The costs versus benefits configuration in the entrepreneurial politics scenario involves a 
policy outcome in which a small group is likely to bear the (high) costs on behalf of a much 
larger group expected to reap the benefits. The likely ‘losers’ within the policy network are, 
therefore, expected to campaign against the policy; either behind the scenes trying to keep 
the debate quiet, or else publicly opposing the legislation (often by resorting to the use of 
misinformation). Meanwhile, because the benefits are to be widely spread -  so much so 
that individual gains will be fairly minimal -  most people outside of the network are 
unaware of or even apathetic to the proposal. The benefits are simply insufficient to 
mobilise the potential beneficiaries to push for the regulatory intervention. Hence, an 
intermediary or ‘policy entrepreneur’ is needed to sell the proposed policy, and often this 
actor has an agenda of its own. The EMEA ‘policy’ is a clear example of this
Both in the run-up to its creation and in its work, the EMEA reflects the clash between 
health and industrial interests in the sector. Because of this the proposals for a centralised 
medicines agency were pushed by the Commission despite, initially, widespread 
disinterest amongst the stakeholders including hostility from the industry. While this may 
seem paradoxical as the EMEA now manifests a pro-industry leaning, this only developed 
after the Commission made it clear that it would pursue an agency. That is, when the
149 Directives 92/25/EEC, 92/26/EEC, 92/27/EEC and 92/28/EEC.
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operational details of the new office were being finalised in consultation with the industry, 
and when the industry could therefore impress its views. Rather than dominating the policy 
network through the strategic use of information (as was the case during the SPC 
campaign), the industry was able to take advantage of the Commission (and member 
states’) single market priorities; its own (industrial policy) interests overlapped.
The member states and patient groups were agreed on the need for speedier access, but 
did not perceive sufficient gains from a Community agency to actively push for its creation 
-  an entrepreneur was needed to secure their support, and this role was adopted by the 
Commission. And here, recognising that all member states were keen on revising 
Community authorisation procedures in principle (even if not agreed on an agency), the 
Commission was able to take the lead. As noted by Robert Hankin of DGIII at the time, “... 
what is reassuring from the Commission’s point of view is that there are no alternative 
proposals on the table... it is more a case of being the job of the Commission... to try to 
win them over.” (as cited in HoL 1991b, 57) Thus, not just the impetus, but so too the 
campaign for an agency approach to medicines regulation in the Community, was the work 
of an entrepreneurial Commission interested in attaining a single market for 
pharmaceuticals. And despite the pro-patient rhetoric which came later, industrial policy 
goals within the single market had clearly been the prime concern.
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C h a p t e r  7
'M a jo r it a r ia n  Po l it ic s ’ : T he  Pr ic in g  a n d  r eim b u r s em e n t  o f
MEDICINES IN THE EU
Introduction
It has been mentioned several times to this stage that the major hurdle in the Community’s 
efforts to establish a single pharmaceuticals market is the question of (harmonising) pricing 
and reimbursement. This is not just because of subsidiarity but also given the formal 
stipulation of Article 152 of the Amsterdam Treaty confirming healthcare as the exclusive 
purview of the member states. The result is that each member state is free to set its own 
medicine prices and reimbursement levels for those products sold to national healthcare 
organisations. As drug expenditure in most EU countries is mainly reimbursed by social 
security systems, this has resulted in fifteen distinct systems with prices for the same 
preparations varying, at times wildly, between markets. Notwithstanding its exclusion from 
healthcare concerns, as differing prices are inconsistent with a single market, the 
Commission has made several ultimately unsuccessful attempts to introduce harmonising 
legislation. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine how and where it has done so.
The discussion is oriented around three initiatives. These are Directive 89/105/EEC, the 
so-called Transparency Directive’ of 1989; the Commission’s 1994 ‘Communication on the 
Outlines of an Industrial Policy for the Pharmaceutical Sector1; and the series of three 
‘roundtable’ meetings organised under the auspices of the DGIII in 1996, 1997 and 1998. 
These have been chosen for three reasons. First, they represent different Commission 
strategies to address the issue of price harmonisation. Second, because they show just to 
what extent the Commission is handcuffed in this area. And third, because each can be 
viewed as its own policy network. The initiatives are treated as a ‘mini’ case-studies of 
stakeholder involvement, but as the Transparency Directive represents the only formal 
Community policy in the area of pricing and reimbursement, it is given the most attention.
The chapter makes two contentions. First, that what has been undertaken vis-a-vis pricing 
and reimbursement, as with the wider Community regulatory framework itself, has been 
driven by industrial policy interests, neglecting or even excluding consumer interests. 
Second, that the Commission’s inability to develop a common EU policy (or policies) 
enables the application of the majoritarian politics characterisation of the policy-process. 
Recalling that this involves diffuse costs and diffuse benefits such that resolution takes 
place at the national rather than EU level (Majone 1996), this suggests that there is little 
incentive for any actor, either singly or in co-operation with another, to pursue such a
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policy. The discussion will show that while the Commission seeks Community policy in this 
area, the other stakeholders have consistently rejected this on the basis of perceived 
costs. Policy remains decided at the national level, as the supranational policy networks 
which emerge over specific initiatives are unable to reach consensual policy decisions.
Moreover, as the ECJ plays a role in the absence of policy and "... has been most effective 
when its rulings have altered the balance of power in the policy-making process so as to 
facilitate the passage of legislation which might otherwise have failed” (Wincott 1996, 183), 
it is also relevant to the discussion. For even if otherwise exerting only an indirect 
influence on the broader regulatory framework, by establishing that in principle national 
pricing and reimbursement systems are permissible under European law providing they do 
not conflict with the Treaty’s free movement goals (Hancher 1991), it is argued that the 
ECJ has essentially consolidated pricing and reimbursement as an area of majoritarian 
politicking. Several of the Court’s more important rulings are, therefore, looked at. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn with regard to outstanding issues and recent initiatives.
1 Pricing and Reimbursement -  defence of national competence
Before turning to the three initiatives, it should be asked why the member states are 
unwilling to forgo sovereignty over pricing and reimbursement. Despite general recognition 
that price liberalisation is necessary for a genuine single drugs market, governments are 
fiercely protective of their national systems and have consistently rebuffed what they 
regard as Commission interference. Considering the basis for this defence of their 
autonomy helps to put into context the positions expressed by the national governments 
(and the other stakeholders) in the policy discussions outlined in following.
1-1 Healthcare and industrial policy goals
The main reason for the member states’ unwillingness to devolve any regulatory role to the 
EU over pricing and reimbursement -  despite the host of legislation in other matters, 
including licensing -  is that it is in this area that the clash between healthcare and industrial 
policy objectives is most difficult to reconcile (Kanavos 1998). It is particularly acute in 
countries with a domestic pharmaceutical industry as governments’ interventions to contain 
healthcare costs may jeopardise the regulatory environment vis-d-vis the companies’ ability 
to recoup investment. Pricing controls are implemented by all member states, with 
individual drug prices set both to ensure the manageability of health expenditure and to 
promote industrial policy objectives such as the sustenance of local industry or job 
creation/preservation (recall from Chapter 2 the divergent strategies of price regulation). 
So while prices in the UK are based on a system of profit control on manufacturers aimed
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at promoting industry -  the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS)150 -  in 
Germany, medicine prices are ‘reference-priced’ against the lowest-price equivalent so as 
to enforce the prescribing of less expensive generic products151. Reimbursement controls 
are used in similar manner. Negative lists, for instance, are used to cut pharmaceutical 
expenditure, while policies such as linking reimbursement to a product’s origin can 
advance local industry by ‘discriminating’ against imported products.
Medicine prices are thus not based on market forces, but rather the type of product, the 
amount of innovation which went into its development, along with wider healthcare 
requirements and industrial aims. Further, they result from ‘pricing deals’ between 
governments and the industry. National authorities may be willing to accept companies’ 
price demands in return for guarantees on investment; whether in terms of research and 
development or simply with regard to the location of production facilities. This is especially 
the case in the higher-priced countries where the economic thinking behind several of the 
large multinationals maintaining costly research laboratories might otherwise seem 
questionable (Marsh 1989). Such arrangements help to explain the continuing over­
capacity in the EU pharmaceutical sector (Mossialos et al 1993), as well as why neither the 
member states nor the industry (nor indeed the Commission which is interested in 
promoting job creation) have raised the issue of (over-)employment in discussions about 
improving Europe’s industrial competitiveness. It should also be noted that in the member 
states different offices are responsible for price-setting. While this duty befalls the 
Department of Health (DoH) in the UK, it is the responsibility of the Bundesausschuss der 
Arzte und Krankenkassen (BAK, the Federal Standing Committee of Physicians and 
Sickness Funds) in Germany152. This too reflects differing objectives and regulatory 
systems, and poses a further obstacle for the Commission to overcome.
Because of differing healthcare priorities, national reimbursement methods are as varied 
as price controls. Cost-containment is the priority for most member states, even for 
countries such as the UK, France and Germany where, as three of the world’s biggest 
pharmaceutical exporters, national authorities are said to be ‘ambivalent’ compared to their 
other European counterparts (Burstall et al 1999). Along with Spain, Germany has used 
positive lists since 1993, the UK employs a series of limited lists, while France introduced a 
set of compulsory reimbursement guidelines for doctors in 1994 -  the Reference Medical
150 The PPRS regulates companies’ allowable profit, permitting higher profit margins for those with larger 
sales and research investment in the UK.
151 The German reference-price system has been reformed numerous times since its enactment in 1989. 
Although it has resulted in a reduction in patented drugs prices, this has been tempered by the number 
of prescribed medicines having increased over the same period (Giuliani et al 1998).
152 Charging the BAK with price-setting has allowed the sickness funds to make considerable cost savings 
(Busse 2001), but this has been queried under both German constitutional law and European law. The 
question is whether the system infringes on European competition law. The German Federal Supreme 
Court referred this to the ECJ on 3 July 2001. For a discussion see Kaesbach (2001).
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Opposables -  all to cut costs. Since 1996 Italy has guidelines restricting reimbursement to 
specific cases, and Dutch and Finnish authorities employ pharmacoeconomic studies in 
deciding reimbursement. Differing priorities have seen member state pricing and 
reimbursement systems moving further apart rather than converging (under the single 
market), and since the early 1990s a ‘North-South’ divide has emerged (Redwood 1992). 
The former have sought to implement controls on doctors, pushing them towards more 
economic prescribing (e.g. generics). This has contributed to higher prices for branded 
drugs as volume consumption has dropped. In the latter, volume consumption is higher as 
price controls on individual products (and hence lower prices) were implemented.
Detailing each of the national pricing and reimbursement regimes is not possible here. 
Suffice it that the majority of countries employ either or both direct price controls or 
reference pricing mechanisms -  the UK being an exception in operating a profit control 
system -  and most use negative or positive lists with reimbursement often correlated to 
disease type or frequency (Appendix 2-1). Although this generalisation belies a host of 
variables, the main issue is that medicines are delivered via national healthcare systems 
and, in some countries, are priced and reimbursed to pursue industrial and well as 
healthcare objectives. The member state governments are therefore not prepared to 
renounce any autonomy over such a sensitive area.
1 -2 Tilling the gaps’ -  the European Court of Justice
While such diverse national arrangements are on the face of it inconsistent with the free 
movement principles of the single market, not only does Article 152 give rise to them, but 
the ECJ has consistently sanctioned them. The Court has generally ruled that European 
law does not prevent governments from pursuing their own measures to contain health 
expenditures via price controls or reimbursement restrictions on medicines. The 
qualification being that such measures do not amount to ‘quantitative restrictions’ against 
imported products. This recognises the right of the member states to exercise healthcare 
policy as they see fit, and is in part based on the caveat of Article 30 (ex 36) which permits 
a derogation to the free movement of goods on the grounds of ‘public policy or public 
security’ and ‘the protection of health’ amongst others.
An example comes from the 1982 Roussel case153 involving a Dutch system of price 
controls which distinguished between local and imported drugs. The Court ruled in favour 
of the Dutch government on the grounds that such a policy was not a de facto impediment 
to the marketing of the imported medicines. This was subject to the proviso that:
Case C-181/82 Roussel Laboratoria BV & Others v. Netherlands (ECR 3849).
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... although such systems [national price controls] do not in themselves constitute 
measures having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction, they may have 
such an effect when the prices are fixed at a level such that the sale of imported 
products becomes either impossible or more difficult than domestic products.
The ruling clarified that only if “material discrimination or disadvantage” was demonstrable 
would such controls be in breach of Article 28 (ex 30). This line of interpretation has also 
been applied to reimbursement policies, as in the Duphar case154 two years later.
Here the Court’s ruling enabled member states to organise their healthcare and social 
security systems in a financially sustainable manner. The case again surrounded a Dutch 
law, one which excluded certain drugs from the compulsory healthcare scheme on the 
basis that cheaper medicines with the same therapeutic effect were available. Such 
restrictions were ruled to be permissible if they promoted the financial security of the health 
insurance scheme. Aware that this might be seen as an indirect restriction on imports, 
however, the Court stressed that the choice of which medicines to exclude from 
reimbursement had to meet certain criteria. These had to be applicable without any 
reference to the origin of the medicines, and verifiable by any importer. Where these were 
met, any medicine could be imported providing that it was cheaper in bringing the same 
therapeutic effect as one already available. An important by-product of the ruling was that 
controls on doctors’ prescribing behaviour -  in terms of only certain products being 
reimbursable -  was also deemed consistent with the Treaty. It thus set the legal basis for 
the national implementation of negative and positive lists, and the Duphar judgement has 
since been widely invoked to underline that Community law does not detract from the 
member states’ power to organise their social security systems (e.g. Palm et al 2000).
Irrespective of the Court’s free movement reasoning in such cases, permitting national 
pricing (and reimbursement) regimes causes difficulties within the context of the internal 
market, the most problematic of which is price variations between countries for the same 
product. This is unlike price differentials in other sectors which are more the result of 
market forces, and it has led to the controversial practice of parallel trade in medicines.
Parallel trade
In Chapter 3 it was stated that parallel trade is one of the most vexing issues in the pursuit 
of a single market, and brings not only the clash between the Community’s policy and legal 
frameworks to the fore, but also reveals the divisiveness of the pricing question where the 
stakeholders are concerned. Price differentials amongst the member states are the main 
reason for the development of parallel trade in prescription medicines. This does not occur
154 Case C-238/82 Duphar & Others v. Netherlands (ECR 523).
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to same extent in other sectors where the Commission has taken steps to harmonise 
prices. In the UK the retail price for the identical product often exceeds that in France or 
Spain by up to 100% (Kanavos 2000). Currency fluctuations have played a contributory 
part155, as have differing demand patterns and income differences between the member 
states. Distinct national regulatory systems have compounded the issue.
Medicine arbitrage can thus be seen as a natural product of an imperfect market. It has 
flourished in Europe in part because it is seen as an acceptable manner of ensuring 
relatively equal access to the same drugs throughout the EU. Commentators have sought 
to underline its public health value in enabling national healthcare systems to afford 
otherwise expensive innovative medicines156. Another reason is that it can, in theory, help 
check what many view as excessive industry profits157. By promoting competition in the 
market -  potentially leading to a greater range of choice for the purchaser -  parallel trade 
also has cost-saving implications for those medicines provided and reimbursed via 
healthcare systems. In the UK, indication of this comes from the fact that ‘parallel traded’ 
products are estimated to have an annual growth rate of 15-20% (ABPI 2001b).
Given their divergent interests in pharmaceutical regulation generally, the views of the 
stakeholders on parallel trade is suitably nuanced. Because it affects profits, the research 
industry argues that it undermines their ability to recoup the expenditure necessary for 
R&D158. The claim is that this discourages innovation and reduces competitiveness. So 
while the innovative industry views parallel trade as anti-competitive, generic 
manufacturers see it as the opposite (EGA 2000b). Consumer and patient groups are also 
supporters. Differing healthcare and industrial policy priorities mean that while the German 
and British governments share concerns about the negative affects on their domestic 
industry, Denmark and the Netherlands have actively encouraged it as a government 
regulated manner of reducing healthcare spending, and Spain is a net parallel exporter. In 
any event, manufacturers want the practice stopped and have adopted various tactics to 
prevent it159. One of the most egregious, and thus heavily criticised tactics, is that 
companies withdraw products on non-health-related grounds, as AstraZeneca did over its
This has been mitigated by the introduction of a single currency in the ‘Euro-zone’ countries.
156 For instance CECG (1993) or Macarthur (2001). Although parallel trade can be shown to have an 
effect on prices, any welfare gains are difficult to substantiate (Ganslandt & Maskus 2001). The only 
clear beneficiaries are the wholesalers who engage in the practice (Burstall et al 1999).
157 The wider availability of parallel-imported medicines might also, eventually, bring about some degree 
of price convergence. It is unclear whether this will mean higher or lower-priced drugs; industry fears 
the latter, but some commentators (e.g. Towse 1998) have suggested the former.
158 As with the intuitive welfare gains for consumers, to what extent parallel trade actually harms the 
research industry is also indeterminate.
159 Other industry ‘tactics’ include claiming safety and quality of the products suffer given attempts to 
repackage them; limiting availability via small batches; altering dosage by country (different licenses); 
supplying direct to pharmacies at reduced prices; and making different pack sizes or altogether 
different packaging.
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antiulcerant Losec in Finland last year (PharmaLaw 2001). For the most part, however, 
companies have turned to the courts.
Although European law prohibits restrictions on imports or measures ‘having equivalent 
effect’, Treaty Article 30 (ex 36) permits certain derogations, including where the protection 
of industrial and commercial property is concerned. This is permitted insofar as it does not 
constitute a ‘means of arbitrary discrimination or restriction on trade between Member 
States’, and has often been invoked by the innovative industry as grounds on which to 
prevent parallel trade. However, the ECJ has generally ruled that once the manufacturer 
makes a medicine available in two member states, it cannot then employ the intellectual 
property exception to prevent any resale of that product between them. Beyond this, the 
‘exhaustion of rights’ doctrine, the Court has also had to address other, overlapping issues, 
including the extent to which parallel trade is in keeping with internal market priorities, and 
questions relating to competition. Although the Court’s decisions have primarily been 
based of the free movement of goods principles (Kanavos & Mossialos 1999), wider social 
concerns have also featured in its judgements. Reviewing such cases is not the purpose 
here,. Suffice that the Court’s role has been complex though crucial160.
The Court’s decisions have made it clear that intellectual property rights cannot be used to 
prevent parallel trade in medicines. As well, the ECJ seems to have adopted the view that 
parallel trade in medicines is not only consistent with the SEM, but it could help bring about 
closer market integration. The most likely result is that parallel trade will continue for the 
foreseeable future. Ultimately, therefore, it is in the absence of Commission authority that 
the ECJ has been so involved. Moreover, the Court’s role in this regard gives additional 
indication of why there is no supranational regulation in this area, and why it is therefore 
presented here as a case of majoritarian politics. Nevertheless, the Commission has 
constantly stressed the need to overcome the distortions caused by price differentials. And 
although bound both by Article 152 and the ECJ’s rulings, it has tried to address the issue 
in reference to the free movement principles whenever possible. The most significant 
initiative in this direction was the so-called Transparency Directive of 1989.
2 The Transparency Directive -  the ‘one step at a time’ strategy
Directive 89/105/EEC represents the first explicit push for a European dimension to 
medicine pricing. The legislation, which came into force on 1 January 1990, was designed 
to ensure open and verifiable criteria in member state pricing and reimbursement 
decisions. This was to ensure that national policies on pricing, the range of products
160 For a discussion see Hancher (2000).
-190-
covered by the insurance system, and any controls on manufacturers’ profits did not inhibit 
the trade of medicines within the Community. It was also to limit the quid pro quo pricing 
deals between governments and industry. In addition, the Directive called for co-operation 
between the member states and the Commission towards developing future proposals to 
minimise the disruptive effects created by national controls. As Terry Venables, former 
Director of the European consumers group (BEUC), noted at a September 1987 
symposium: "... the extent of price differences throughout Europe for the same 
pharmaceutical product is unheard of in other industrial sectors.” (as cited in Clive 1989) In 
other words, it aimed to kick-start the process of bringing pharmaceuticals in line with other 
sectors as required by the 1985 White Paper.
2-1 Community pricing and reimbursement transparency: ‘take one’
There is much analysis of the Directive, most of which suggests that it has not worked as 
well as envisaged or that its effects are difficult to measure. Rather than assessing its 
impact, what is important here is that the final text was much thinner than the original -  
issued on 23 December 1986 -  wherein the Commission had actually proposed measures 
to promote price harmonisation (COM 1986a). Because of strong opposition (particularly 
from the member states) the Commission was forced to accept that price harmonisation 
was not realistic at the time, and the provisions were removed. The preamble to the final 
text refers simply to “further progress towards convergence”, and the Commission 
acknowledged the Directive as a first step.
Published on 23 June 1987, the proposed ‘Directive on the transparency of measures 
regulating the pricing of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion within the 
scope of the national health insurance system’ (CEC 1987) contained thirteen Articles 
aimed at ensuring that the member states’ pricing and reimbursement policies were not in 
breach of the internal market. Inter alia these involved:
• a time-limit for issuing decisions on pricing, reimbursement, any later price increases 
(with the need for written reasoning if this was not to be granted), and potential price 
freezes;
• the release of criteria relating to any controls on the profitability of manufacturers or 
importers161;
• publication of pricing and reimbursement criteria, and the reasons for rejection under 
the latter;
• the member states were to communicate to the Commission the ‘therapeutic 
classification’ used for reimbursement purposes, along with their criteria vis-a-vis 
transfer pricing (the Commission envisaged two later Directives aimed at 
approximating national provisions regarding the former and on the fairness of the 
latter);
161 This was aimed especially at the UK’s PPRS, given not just its opaqueness, but that it was generally 
recognised as a means of promoting local industry as much as it was to control costs.
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• the establishment of a ‘Consultative Committee on Pharmaceutical Pricing and 
Reimbursement’ to ensure implementation and adherence of the Directive -  each 
member state would contribute one member, though it would be chaired by a 
Commission official; and
• publication by the member states of a list of all products covered by insurance 
(subject to common guidelines laid down in the Directive), for communication to the 
Commission.
As if several of these were not already likely to draw criticism, even more controversial was 
Article 9 obliging the Commission ‘in the light of experience’ to submit to the Council a 
proposal containing appropriate measures leading towards the abolition of any remaining 
barriers to or distortions of the free movement of proprietary medicinal products.” 
(Eventual) price harmonisation was the message162, and the draft had been preceded by a 
communication pertaining to pricing and reimbursement specifically (COM 1986b).
The Communication set out what the member states were and were not able to do within 
the parameters established by the Roussel and Duphar judgements. More importantly, it 
provided the Commission’s own interpretations, including that pricing had to be ‘realistic’ 
and ‘transparent’, price controls specific to imported products were not permissible, nor 
could member states pursue measures to prevent or hinder wholesalers and retailers 
obtaining their supplies outside the national market. As for reimbursement controls, 
decisions had to be made on objective criteria which did not discriminate against imported 
products. In the UK for instance, reimbursement was often linked to the product licence, 
with the intent being to "... stop pharmacists dispensing medicines made in other 
countries.” (Marsh 1989, 935) And while financial grounds were not an acceptable basis 
for denying reimbursement, they could be applied where a cheaper product with equivalent 
therapeutic effect was already available.
According to Patrick Deboyser, then of DGIII/E/F and author of the Communication163, 
these views were “non negotiable” as the Commission was trying to prepare a later 
directive on price harmonisation (SCRIP 1153). As if to reinforce this, two cases were 
brought before the ECJ relating to aspects of the Italian and Belgian pricing systems which 
were said to be in breach of the guidelines164. The Court ruled against an element of Italy’s 
regime which employed different criteria for local and imported medicines, but the case 
against Belgium’s system of maximum prices was dismissed for an inability to show 
“material discrimination or disadvantage”. In both the ECJ reiterated its position on 
allowing national controls. In any event, the focus of the proposed Directive was on 
preventing national favouritism by making the process transparent to not just the
162The provision that this was to be based on twice-yearly Commission studies on pharmaceutical prices 
across the Community was dropped from the first draft.
163 Patrick Deboyser is currently head of Unit D4 (Food Law and Biotechnology) in DG Sanco.
164 Cases C-56/87 European Communities v Italy (ECR 2919) and C-249/88 Commission v. Belgium 
(ECR 1-125).
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Commission, but the other stakeholders as well. However, the member states, the industry 
and consumer interests all expressed concerns.
2-2 Community pricing and reimbursement transparency: ‘take two’
The initial responses of the member states were varied. The West German authorities 
were most opposed, though felt that transparency was to be sought in principle. Based on 
free pricing, drug prices in West Germany were at time the highest in the Community, and 
it was felt that other countries were therefore maintaining artificially lower prices -  greater 
transparency would reveal to what extent this was true or not. For this reason the idea of a 
consultative committee seemed particularly irrelevant i.e. why should a body be 
established to monitor price controls when Germany did not use them? Meanwhile the UK 
accepted the proposals (though wary of the effect on the PPRS), and the Department of 
Health and Social Security reported to a House of Commons Select Committee that 
implementation of the Directive would involve no significant financial implications.
The industry -  via its trade body EFPIA -  despite accepting the notion of increased 
transparency of national systems, was unhappy with the transfer pricing and consultative 
committee proposals. The former were seen as vague and a matter for the member states’ 
fiscal authorities rather than the Community. The group’s 1986 annual report expressed 
concerns over increased Europeanisation of the sector, with the latter seen as superfluous 
at best and intrusive at worst (EFPIA 1986). It thus lobbied the Commission for the 
abandonment of the committee, highlighting the lack of member state support. This 
continued even after the Directive had been implemented (EFPIA 1992a).
Given industry’s endorsement in principle, it is not surprising that the BEUC saw the draft 
as too industry-focused. And it had a point. According to the accompanying 
memorandum, the proposed Directive had a twofold aim:
... to ensure that the measures taken by Member States to control 
pharmaceutical expenditure do not pose a barrier to the creation of a genuine 
internal market for the pharmaceutical sector by 1992. However, the realisation 
of the internal market is not an end in itself but the means to the creation of a 
more favourable environment for stimulating enterprise, competition and trade. 
(COM 1986a, 7)
The Commission indicated its wider intentions vis-a-vis pricing and reimbursement as: 
encouraging “the future development of the innovatory pharmaceutical industry”; 
preventing companies from making “excessive profits in dealing with national health 
services”; and preventing European patients from becoming “dependent on research in 
third countries”. This was to be undertaken within Treaty competition rules, taking into
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account"... the needs of the Member States in ensuring the availability of an adequate 
supply of medicines at a reasonable cost for their citizens.” (8) The 3rd recital even 
asserts that reimbursement "... should also be intended to encourage research and 
development into new medicinal products, on which the maintenance of a high level of 
public health within the Community ultimately depends." The BEUC suggested that the 
result would be the eventual upwards convergence of prices.
Although not in favour of a European pricing regime, the group argued that the Community 
had to implement measures which balanced the legitimate requirements of the research 
companies against those of the generic industry (including permitting parallel imports). 
Promoting price competition was a key point, and it was felt that the proposals were more a 
response to industry complaints than a real attempt to address the more important issues, 
particularly the opaqueness surrounding (high) prices. Not just pricing, but the BEUC has 
also generally regarded the structure of the market and the volume of drugs available as a 
major barrier to the free movement of medicines (Anon 1988).
Based on the report prepared by the section for Industry, Commerce, Crafts and Services, 
the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) also noted the document’s pro-industry 
leaning. The ESC’s primary concern was the lack of competition in the market and that 
one of the aims of the Directive ought to be to help remedy this (ESC 1987). In its Opinion 
of 23 September 1987 it described the measures to increase the transparency of national 
systems as ‘useful’, but stated that:
... in order to achieve a clearer and more objective relationship between the 
pharmaceutical industry and the controlling authorities, the draft Directive must: 
(a) require firms to indicate the economic data and therapeutic properties of 
individual medicaments; (b) require the Member States to publish “transparency 
lists”; (c) urge the Commission to set up a data base covering the pharmaceutical 
market. (2)
Giving further indication of its more consumer-oriented focus, the ESC proposed that since 
national negative and positive lists can create ‘complications’, “In the interests of both 
manufacturers and of consumers it would be desirable to harmonise the systems of lists... 
the Committee, in the interests of clarity, would opt for a positive list. “(5) The Commission 
did not incorporate this in its revised proposal. It had no authority to pursue such a policy, 
but would in any event have been opposed by the member states and the industry.
On 15 December 1987 the report prepared by the Parliament’s Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and Industrial Policy Committee was released (EP 1988a). Controversially, and in 
order to allay some member states’ industrial policy fears, it deleted several of the 
provisions against which EFPIA was lobbying. These included that the Commission be
-194-
later able to a propose legislation on approximating national criteria on the fairness of 
transfer pricing policies, and harmonising national rules on classifying drugs by therapeutic 
category for reimbursement. Dutch MEP Alman Metten was unhappy with these 
suggestions and sought numerous amendments, including that: companies be required to 
provide more data in support of any arguments for price rises (governments would be 
allowed to reject these if the data proved insufficient); that a Community drugs price 
databank was required to help improve competition in the sector, and to promote the more 
efficient use of medicines; and that two years after implementation of the Directive, the 
Commission should submit a proposal towards ensuring that the ‘necessary supplies’ of 
medicinal products are ‘available at the lowest possible prices.’ In light of this Mr Sauer 
invited Mr Metten and Pierre Lataillade, rapporteur of the committee report, for discussions 
on achieving a compromise.
Ignoring Mr Metten’s amendments, the Council agreed an informal text in November, 
although it did include the vague stipulation that companies provide “sufficient information” 
to support any calls for price increases. With a Council text almost identical to its own, the 
economic and monetary affairs committee then adopted the report on 15 December165. At 
the Parliament’s 19 January 1988 plenary, however, the debate was stopped mid-session 
because of a growing number of proposals for changes (including several of those 
proposed by Mr Metten), and the document was referred back to the committee.
2-3 Community pricing and reimbursement transparency: ‘take three’
Only on 9 March did Parliament find sufficient time to resume its reading, approving the 
committee’s revised draft. The committee vote had again been an unconvincing 
endorsement (13 for, 1 against, and 8 abstentions, with Mr Metten the lone dissenter), but 
its new draft contained several amendments (EP 1988b). Most controversial was the 
reintroduction of the databank. This was to include the consumption, prices and daily costs 
of treatment of the top 2,500 medicines in each member state, and was to be made open 
to public scrutiny. Not only was EFPIA dead-set against such an initiative, but so too 
several member states -  notably France and Germany (Reich 1989). The industry’s fear 
was twofold: that it would result in lower prices as governments could make comparisons 
more easily, and that the provision of such detailed information on products would facilitate 
parallel trade. The member states feared that it would be later used as a mechanism for 
the Commission to pursue price harmonisation, even evolving into a European body to 
oversee pricing.
165 Mr Metten’s was one of the votes against in a 27-14 vote.
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With a view to achieving a compromise, in its Common Position of 22 June 1988 the 
Council agreed the databank as a Declaration, separate from but adjoined to the main text 
(SEC 1988). Not officially part of the legislation, the databank would nevertheless "... start 
becoming operational when the present Directive is implemented for medicinal products 
authorized in a majority of member states of the Community.” This acknowledged the 
strength of consumer pressures in the Parliament, and Fernand Sauer expressed the 
Commission’s satisfaction with this compromise noting that Parliament would reject any 
draft which failed to include the databank (SCRIP 1321 )166.
The economic and monetary affairs committee unanimously gave its support, noting that 
the Commission had incorporated all of the amendments from the first reading, and it 
recommended that Parliament accept the ‘slightly amended’ changes made by the Council 
(EP 1988c). It endorsed narrowing the brief of the consultative committee to (breaches in) 
the application of the Directive, and only noted the Council’s deletion of the databank from 
the main provisions asking how it would be set up. The consultative committee, however, 
remained a sore point for EFPIA, as it allowed only the Commission and the member 
states direct access. With the Parliament’s subsequent endorsement, the Internal Market 
Council finally (and unanimously) approved the draft legislation on 21 December 1988 with 
a view to member state adoption by 31 December the following year (CEC 1987).
This was not the end of the story. As envisaged under Article 9, the Commission’s next 
step was to attempt a follow-up pricing directive. But after several years of political 
wrangling this fell through. Detailing the intricacies of these deliberations is not possible 
here. But as it again involved all stakeholders, a brief summary of what was proposed and 
the reaction it elicited is necessary. For the failure of the Community to adopt a second 
version is further evidence that pricing and reimbursement is a majoritarian politics issue.
2-4 Transparency revisited?
In January 1991 the Commission circulated a discussion document and questionnaire 
(CEC 1991a) to the member states, industry, and professional associations, seeking 
feedback on how to reconcile three conflicting goals:
• doctors’ freedom to prescribe the ‘most appropriate’ medicine versus promotion of 
the ‘rational use’ of medicines i.e. limiting reimbursement to least expensive products 
in each therapeutic category;
• promoting increased competition between companies versus supporting them in 
developing innovative products; and
The elements to be listed for each drug in the databank included: the SPCs; the ex-factory price; the 
retail price; the estimated cost of treatment based on daily dosage; and the cost and manner of 
dispensing. Many of these were already available in the public domain, albeit not from one source. 
The content of the databank was limited to this information because of industry pressure.
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• short-term controls on medicine costs versus long-term support of the industry 
(adequate research and development investment for innovative drugs, and ensuring 
it remains competitive compared to the United States and Japan).
The document acknowledged the extent of the divergence between national controls and 
noted the north-south divide mentioned earlier. In the interests of promoting the single 
market, the Commission outlined its intent to pursue increased price transparency and 
harmonisation of packing and therapeutic classifications in a further document, which 
assessed application of the Transparency Directive (CEC 1991b).
There had been a flurry of national reforms after the Directive, as several member states 
sought to recast elements of their pricing and reimbursement systems to accommodate 
growing cost pressures167. This resulted in numerous queries (and Parliamentary 
questions) as to whether the new or reformed systems were in keeping with the Directive. 
While the member states accepted the Commission’s goals on price transparency, they 
were not so keen on the ensuing proposal for a Directive to tackle prices.
The proposed amendments -  based on the fact that national measures to control medicine 
prices had not really led to lower expenditure, but had actually made the market more rigid 
by neutralising competition (Hodges 1997) -  were gradually watered down over at least 
five drafts. At their most stark, they included: progressive dismantling of direct price 
controls towards promoting price competition; procedures for informing the Commission 
and other member states as to any planned changes to national systems; the need to 
clarify the concept of ‘interchangeability’ of medicines (towards establishing a system of 
objectively comparing medicines with different active ingredients but similar 
pharmacological effects); and measures to introduce co-payments, generic substitution 
and increased transparency of information in the event that prices were liberalised. The 
early drafts of the original Transparency Directive had been criticised for similar proposals, 
and this time was no different.
Via EFPIA, the industry continued to voice its concerns about member state price controls 
and any Europeanisation measures. In its comments on what was to become the final 
draft before the amendments were shelved, it highlighted what it saw as the inconsistency 
in the Commission’s position: "... whilst the Commission continues to advocate 
deregulation, it is also pursuing initiatives to manage competition [sic].” (EFPIA 1992a, 
2) EFPIA insisted that what it wanted to see in a potential recommendation to accompany 
the amended Directive was "... a suggestion that Member States eliminate any measures 
affecting competition [sic] on the market place (such as encouragement to prescribe, or
167 Burstall (1992), however, notes that the impact of the Transparency Directive is only one factor 
among many, and one that is difficult to separate from the rest... it would be difficult to prove that it 
was the major consideration.” (5)
-197-
incentives to substitute, generics).” (4) More importantly, however, the industry was 
disappointed with the extent to which the final draft had been cut back. There were no 
longer any proposals to inhibit member states’ ability to price and reimburse as they saw 
fit, and twelve separate, heavily-regulated markets would remain.
The position set out by the BEUC was equally unequivocal: “We do not believe that the 
harmonisation of price controls, or of prices or reimbursement systems would bring 
substantial benefits to consumers at this stage. There are many more important things to 
be done.” (as cited in Albedo 1991, 16) Their position reflects their focus on the patient, 
and follows on from their earlier arguments stressing the need for not only common 
European standards, but a uniform review procedure for the withdrawal of old or 
superfluous drugs from member state markets.
Finally, the member states -  at least those who responded to the Commission’s 
questionnaire168 -  again emphasised that they would not accept any Community 
infringement on their sovereignty in healthcare. The UK opposed any suggestion that 
member states be obliged to inform the Commission of potential pricing measures at the 
draft stage. It argued that as its pricing regime was a ‘negotiated agreement with no legal 
basis’, “The UK could not accept revealing its negotiating objectives to the Commission, 
Member States and other ‘physical or moral persons from the private sector1 in advance of 
concluding an agreement.” (DoH 1992, 5) France opposed any further formalisation of the 
prices databank, saying that it saw no need for the reintroduction of this provision which 
had been taken out with Directive 89/105/EEC (CEC 1992c). Ultimately then, the 
stakeholders remained unhappy with the Commission’s continued interest in price 
harmonisation. Member states’ objections in particular meant that the Commission’s 
‘technical amendments’ would not clear the Council, and they were dropped in December 
1992. Commission Vice President, Leon Brittan, put the decision to shelve the proposals 
down to the subsidiarity principle, which he saw as representing a formal limitation on the 
further development of Community pricing policy (Brittan 1992). Meanwhile, in the words 
of Fernand Sauer, while still head of DGIII/E/F:
If we were only to please industry, we would have proposed it [a revised Directive] 
a long time ago, but it would be stuck... because nobody would adopt it. We 
have to negotiate back and forth between industry and governments to get a 
consensus, (as cited in Koberstein 1993, 36)
This represents an acknowledgement of the policy network at the time, along with its 
tensions. One commentator summed it up best: "... no one outside Brussels wants a 
sequel... The overwhelming view of pricing and reimbursement is ‘Keep Brussels out!”’
168 Only Denmark, France, Greece, Netherlands, Spain and the UK responded.
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(Albedo 1991,16) As the Commission was to find out with regard to subsequent initiatives, 
this view would continue.
3 An EU Industrial Policy’ for Pharmaceuticals -  the ’shared interest’ or 
‘competitiveness’ strategy
In light of the disparities amongst the stakeholders seen during the transparency network, 
the Commission’s next step was to identify an area of common interest, one to which it 
could tie pricing and reimbursement. It attempted this on 2 March 1994 with its 
‘Communication on the Outlines of an Industrial Policy for the Pharmaceutical Sector in the 
European Community’ (COM 1993).
3-1 Co-operating with the industry?
Taking as its underlying assumption that a successful industry was in the interests of all 
stakeholders, the Communication set out measures to improve industrial performance. 
Asserting that the European pharmaceutical industry "... is not well enough prepared to 
brace itself against stiffening competition and with the relentless rise in the cost of 
pharmaceutical research, and that its industrial competitiveness could prove insufficient in 
regard to its main competitors” (4), the document focused on comparative industrial 
statistics and provided an assessment of competition policy and legislation in other major 
industries and markets (mainly the US and Japan). It acknowledged that the 1992 
programme had not ‘radically changed’ the industry and argued that the continued 
fragmentation of the market was harming European interests.
Areas of especial concern included the lack of European presence in biotechnology and 
the decline in employment in the sector. The Communication cited 65% of biotechnology 
patents being American compared to only 15% European and 13% Japanese by 1992. 
And in respect of employment, 1993 was identified as a turning-point, with the number of 
jobs in the industry having gone down for the first time in over ten years (by 1.3%). It 
suggested that some 27,000 jobs could be lost by 1995 through ‘delocalization’ or the 
closing of research and manufacturing sites, resulting in massive disinvestment169. The 
Commission argued that a more integrated market with freer competition and price 
deregulation was what the sector required, and in the Communication set out its case that 
European policies were the remedy170. Several of the more important proposals were:
169 Despite no legislative follow-up to the Communication, this predicted loss of 27,000 jobs did not 
happen. According to the industry’s (and Community’s) own data, employment in the sector has in fact 
gone up rather than down: from 439,572 in 1996 to an estimated 495,000 by 2000 (EUROSTAT 1998 
and EFPIA 2001).
170 It should be noted that the context to this was the SPC of 1992 and the EMEA of 1993 which, in the 
preceding chapters, were already shown to have been driven by the Commission’s industrial policy 
priorities.
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• consolidating and updating existing Community pharmaceutical legislation in a 
transparent manner (increasing accessibility for industry and health professionals, 
and to enable the member states to transpose and implement it easily);
• promoting the rational use of medicines by providing health professionals and 
consumers with sufficient information e.g. harmonising package labels and 
indications for use, and setting up the pharmaceutical prices database;
• quick introduction of the future marketing system (the EMEA) to achieve health(care) 
and industrial policy goals;
• enforcement and improvement of intellectual property protection for genuinely 
innovative drugs (to match that in other countries) and creating a favourable 
environment for biotechnology;
• increasing competition in the market via improved price transparency;
• monitoring the (distortive) effects of member states’ pricing and reimbursement 
controls and their implementation of Directive 89/105/EEC, with a view to adapting it 
“in the light of experience”; and
• contributing to global harmonisation efforts e.g. the ICH to reduce research and 
development overlaps and facilitate the opening of external markets to Community 
medicines.
After the failure to entrench pricing and reimbursement within the Community’s agenda 
following Directive 89/105/EEC, the Communication was clearly a trade-off. The premise 
was that through the development of measures to maintain the industry’s competitive 
position, it would be obvious to all stakeholders -  especially the member states -  that 
pricing needed to be addressed next.
3-2 Reaction (and rejection)
This industrial policy strategy, one without any immediate attached conditions/proposals 
relating to pricing, was heavily criticised. The AgV, the German consumer association, 
complained that: “In the communication, an industrial policy is drafted based on an analysis 
that it is oriented towards industry interests only. Thus the policy is disadvantageous to 
consumers.” (AgV 1994, 3) The BEUC dismissed several of the document’s conclusions, 
most notably that the industry was somehow in decline (BEUC 1994). It reproved the 
Commission for not giving enough attention to fostering competition in the sector, and for 
instead choosing to help industry to consolidate its position. In a speech to the 
Commission’s June 1994 hearing on the Communication, Jim Murray, Director of the 
BEUC, attacked the proposals for paying too much attention to improving industry’s 
competitiveness (Murray 1994). He argued that lifting price controls as a means of 
improving competition was unrealistic and disputed many of the conclusions drawn in the 
document. For example, accepting as "... clearly a matter of legitimate concern” that the 
number of new medicines originating in Europe was declining compared to an increase in 
Japan over the same period, he indicated that a closer look revealed the broader picture:
... the majority of the increased Japanese share has come almost entirely from 
medicines which represent very little therapeutic advance; for the most part they
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are “me too” medicines and the increasing Japanese strength in this area has 
parallels in Japanese industrial development in other areas also. (Murray 1994)
Indeed, part of Europe’s ‘decline’ could also be related to the European recession of the 
early 1990s, rather than better regulatory conditions in the US and Japan. And this need 
for a closer look was echoed by the Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public 
Health and Consumer Protection. Its draft opinion of 8 December 1994171 points out that 
“Progress in the pharmaceutical sector has produced savings largely in excess of the 
increase in its costs.” (EP 1994, 4) Further, the report called for the rationalisation of 
promotion and advertising given the opaqueness which surrounds them, and argued 
against abolishing price controls.
The reaction of the generics industry was predictably scathing, arguing that the SPC had 
already worsened its competitive position and the proposed Communication would only 
further harm generic interests. In a letter to the Social Affairs DG (DGV) for support, Greg 
Perry, Director of the European Generics Association172, complained about the existing 
restrictions on generic research and suggested that “... if the Commission’s objective is to 
encourage greater competition within the medicines market... then greater attention will 
have to be paid to those factors which affect both the demand and supply of generic 
medicines in the European market.” (Perry 1993a)
Anticipating member state opposition likely to stem from such criticism173, the Commission 
argued its case at a special session of the Parliament’s economic and monetary affairs 
committee (which had been assigned the Communication) on 27 September 1995. This 
was attended by MEPs along with representatives of both industry segments, consumer 
groups and member state officials. Mr Deboyser emphasised that the Communication was 
only about improving competition and industrial competitiveness, not public health or 
healthcare policy. He argued that the document should, therefore, only be examined in 
this light, lest it prove a wasted opportunity to keep Europe competitive. While this 
resonated with the research industry, the other stakeholders rejected this line of 
argumentation. It was said that several members of the parliamentary committee launched 
"... a string of largely hostile questions at the European Commission and the industry 
speakers, on jobs, on costs, on orphan drugs, and on the reliability of the data on which the 
Commission had based its policy document.” (Anon 1995, 6) Indeed, industrial and 
health(care) policy are not so easily separated as the Communication was suggesting. If
171 It was only an advisory committee, with the Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy 
Committee responsible for delivering the report on which the Parliament would base its reading.
172 Now the European Generic Medicines Association (EGA).
173 For instance, the reaction of the UK House of Commons Select Committee on European Legislation 
was: “We consider that the following [aspects of the Communication] raises questions of political 
importance, but make no recommendation for its further consideration.” (HoC 1994)
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not already clear that the proposals were in trouble, this showed just how far the 
Commission was from finding common ground.
The result was the tabling of some 66 amendments in Committee’s 19 March 1996 report, 
most of which related to restraints on industry (EP 1996a). These included: increasing the 
cost-effectiveness of research rather than using subsidies to promote industry; the need to 
monitor mergers in the sector; enabling generic research and regulatory preparedness 
prior to patent (or supplementary protection certificate) expiry; concentrating on research 
into therapies for as yet untreatable diseases; and ensuring that national measures to cut 
the costs of using medicines were promoted (with safeguards against the development of 
monopoly situations). It also called for transparent Community procedures for switching 
prescription drugs to over-the-counter. This had in fact been raised by Hubertus Kranz, 
Director-General of the Association Europeenne des Specialties Pharmaceutiques Grand 
Public (AESGP, or Association of the European Self-Medication Industry), at the 
September special session. The report was adopted by a narrow margin of 26 to 24, 
reflecting the difficulties inherent in the Commission’s new ‘competitiveness’ approach.
Following on from the autumn’s special committee meeting, Parliament attacked the 
proposals at its 16 April 1996 sitting. The Commission was accused of being “... out of 
touch with reality in claiming that normal market operation is feasible in the pharmaceutical 
industry and that it is merely necessary to cut back on government intervention schemes to 
achieve this.” (EP 1996b) Calling for a more overarching view of the sector, Parliament 
made numerous suggestions covering issues from increasing R&D into areas which may 
deliver therapeutically beneficial new medicines, to generic promotion. These suggestions 
also included several ‘outliers’ e.g. ethical queries regarding animal experiments and 
increasing the uptake of homeopathic medicines. Furthermore, Parliament suggested the 
Commission take a greater role in dissemination of the effects and risks of medicinal 
products. The Parliament may have been correct in its underlying critique -  that 
consumer/patient interests were not sufficiently served -  but by tying industrial policy to 
such a wide range of concerns, its Resolution could not offer a way forward. This was 
precisely what Mr Deboyser had feared when he addressed the special session.
The Council’s (Internal Market) views followed a week later, and its 23 April Resolution was 
equally general (CEC 1996). Passing reference was made to the peculiarities of the 
market and the need to balance health(care) interests against any industrial policy 
initiatives. Amongst the few workable suggestions, the Council called for measures to 
support small-to-medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the sector. This was because they 
have ‘local knowledge’ and ‘specialised know-how’ which would benefit competition as well 
as serving public health interests. However, given the perceived costs of its
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implementation, the Resolution was rebuked by all of the stakeholders (again, save the 
research industry). Having delivered little that could be enacted, there has been no policy 
follow-up on the Communication since the Council’s Resolution.
3-3 Policy network exclusions
As with the legislation to establish both the SPC and EMEA, consumer interests were of 
secondary importance i.e. it was implicit in the Communication that they would be served 
by measures to promote the industry. While this competitiveness approach had been a 
Commission initiative, the Communication was actually the product of the ‘Pharmaceutical 
Industry Policy Task Force’ -  a joint industry-Commission group established by 
Commissioner Bangemann in the wake of the aborted attempts to amend the 
Transparency Directive. According to the Parliament’s Intergroup on Community Affairs 
(ICA), the underlying purpose of the task force was
... to explore the broadest possible manner the whole range of factors which 
affect the international competitiveness of the European pharmaceutical 
industry... [and] to identify in concrete terms the needs of the industry, and what 
role the Community can play in meeting them. (ICA 1993,4)
ICA was concerned that consumer interests would not feature in any conclusions reached 
by the task force as their views had not been solicited. This fear proved justified, and not 
simply because of the document’s clear pro-industry leaning, but because prior to the 
Communication’s publication there had been a draft to which only the industry had been 
privy. In his response to the published version, Jim Murray of the BEUC said that:
It was apparently stated in a previous draft of the Communication, that 
pharmacists should be permitted to dispense the cheapest multi-source medicine 
when the prescription allows it but this positive sentiment seems to have been 
watered down in the current Communication. (Murray 1994)
Not only does this indicate that he had not seen the previous draft, but one can assume 
that the provision he refers to was removed because of pressure by the research-based 
industry. The reason being that in June 1992 EFPIA sent the Commission a 
‘Memorandum on an Industrial Policy for the European Pharmaceutical Industry’ which, in 
a section entitled ‘avoiding pitfalls’, argued that “Measures such as incentives or sanctions 
to prescribe or dispense the cheapest product... pose a considerable potential threat to the 
continued viability of the research-based pharmaceutical industry and... are anti­
competitive.” (EFPIA 1992b, 24). This suggests that EFPIA was already involved with the 
pharmaceutical policy taskforce. Moreover, the Memorandum made the dubious claim of a 
double victory: “The results will be measurable not only in terms of better healthcare -  a 
significant achievement in itself -  but also in economic terms.” (26)
-203-
Even clearer indication of the Commission’s intentions comes from the fact that the EGA 
had not been consulted about the Communication, although it was aware of its existence. 
In a letter to Commissioner Bangemann, Greg Perry claims not only to have received no 
reply from DGIII to two EGA submissions, but protests that:
Furthermore we were not even informed by your cabinet of the existence of the 
circulated version of the first draft Communication. When I phoned your cabinet 
to obtain a copy I was informed that the European generics industry was not 
entitled to receive one. I was subsequently given a copy by a source other than 
the Commission. (Perry 1993b)
The Commission’s commitment to "... intensify the dialogue already initiated in the 
pharmaceutical field”, as stated in the draft document, would seem to have meant 
excluding all but the research industry, else applied only post-publication when the 
document was a fait accompli™. Mr Perry went on to criticise the document for only vague 
references to promoting generic prescribing without addressing the real issue of market 
access as soon as possible after patent-expiry.
Beyond the lack of dialogue, what had proven even more controversial in the unpublished 
draft was that it was said to have included measures for the outright abolition of national 
price controls. It had recommended these be replaced by more indirect reimbursement 
mechanisms to contain national spending and that prices be actively converged (Anon 
1994). This was presented as necessary to ensure the industry’s further contribution to the 
Community economy (Hodges 1997). Dr Bangemann had often spoken of his wish to see 
pricing and reimbursement separated, particularly since the Transparency Directive, 
thereby endorsing industry’s campaign for free pricing175. In consulting with the member 
states, however, the Commission was unable to secure support for such proposals. More 
importantly, the price deregulation idea proved unpalatable to Social Affairs Commissioner 
P£draig Flynn (DGV). The fear was that free pricing equated to higher prices.
Of especial concern were so-called ‘break-through’ drugs. If these were to be subject to 
free pricing, could the member states simply be expected to pay the emergent ‘market 
price’ for these new, innovative products? For the companies would be expected to set 
high prices for such medicines which had little or no competition i.e. the superiority of a 
single product in a given therapeutic category, else a medicine which essentially creates its 
own category. This was not desirable from either the member states’ cost-containment 
perspective, nor DGV’s public health and consumer protection viewpoint. With both 
opposed to these price deregulation proposals, DGIII was forced to drop them from the 
subsequent draft. In the words of a newspaper editorial"... the purge was engineered by
This represents a clear exclusion of the consumer position.
175 For example Bangemann (1991).
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Social Affairs Commissioner P£draig Flynn, backed by President [of the European 
Commission] Jacques Delors and ‘half the commission’.” (WSJE 1994, 8) According to one 
source there had in fact been at least ten different drafts of the Communication (Mossialos 
& Abel-Smith 1997). As these appear only to have been shared with industry, comparing 
them is not possible. Nevertheless, the point to be made is that the final text -  like the 
transparency legislation -  was very different from the initial drafts. The stakeholders’ views 
were simply too disparate to be overcome in such a document, especially one which was 
about promoting industry first and addressing other issues second.
The Commission had tried to sell this new approach on the grounds that improving 
industry’s competitiveness would benefit all stakeholders. But it can perhaps better be 
seen as a trade-off to the research industry over the need to tackle other issues related to 
promoting the internal market, most notably liberalising prices. And its failure can be put 
down to the fact that the stated intent of the Communication “...to monitor the impact on 
the functioning of the internal market of national pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement 
measures... to assess the need to adapt [the Transparency] Directive in light of 
experience” did not assuage governments’ concerns over cost-containment (Furniss 1997). 
DGIII went on to claim that the Communication had been intended more as a means of 
facilitating dialogue than as a final policy statement (Deboyser 1995).
4 The Bangemann Roundtables -  the ‘dialogue’ strategy
Viewing the Communication as a minor setback, the Commission stuck with this 
competitiveness strategy in its next ‘big idea’. Accepting first that price harmonisation was 
unlikely -  at least not via a top-down approach -  and second that dialogue with all 
stakeholders, not just the research industry, was necessary, Commissioner Bangemann 
organised a series of ‘Roundtables’. Chaired by the Commissioner, they convened twice in 
Frankfurt (1996, 1997) and once in Paris (1998). Without detailing each gathering, on the 
basis of the positions voiced by the stakeholders, the main tensions can be teased out.
It should first be noted that the roundtables were essentially closed door affairs with 
restricted guest-lists, giving rise to accusations of secrecy and deal-making (Furniss 1998). 
Representatives of the Commission, the industry (trade organisations such as EFPIA and 
the EGA and individual company officials), national regulatory authorities and member 
state governments, professional and consumer groups, along with selected ‘independent’ 
experts were invited. Proceedings for all three meetings were published, but the media 
was barred entry to the 1997 and 1998 gatherings. Moreover, the initial roundtable was 
sponsored by EFPIA with a grant from the Pharmaceutical Partners for Better Healthcare
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group176. Although the next two were financed by Community grants, this may suggest 
that the agenda was already clear.
The underlying theme of all three meetings was liberalisation of the market generally, and 
the question of how to pursue a pricing regime which would meet the interests of industry, 
the member states and consumers in an equitable manner specifically. Amongst the topics 
discussed were how to overcome national price controls to relieve market fragmentation; 
the role of over-the-counter and generic medicines; developing Europe as a strong base 
for R&D; enhancing Europe’s position in biotechnology; taking advantage of advances in 
information systems and ‘e-commerce’; and what EU enlargement would mean177. 
Impacting on all of these, parallel trade was thus a hot topic.
4-1 What to do about parallel trade?
As noted earlier, the Court has traditionally ruled in favour of the parallel importation of 
drugs, and four days before the first Roundtable it did so again. In the joint Primecrown 
cases178, the manufacturer's (Merck) concern was that as patent rights did not apply to 
Spain and Portugal pre-accession, existing case-law allowed them to produce and export 
copies of original drugs (themselves becoming parallel importers). Merck asserted that 
exhaustion at the time of sale could not apply -  how could it exhaust rights it did not have? 
Thus it argued for a complete re-consideration of the existing case-law given both the 
increase in arbitrage since the Stephar ruling, and because the Supplementary Protection 
Certificate would lose its meaning if parallel imports from the Iberian countries were to be 
permitted; price differences between Spain and Portugal and the rest of the Community 
were argued to be much greater than at the time of the Stephar case.
Despite the Advocate General’s recommendation that the patent holder should be able to 
prevent parallel imports from the two countries, the Court stuck with its exhaustion line 
from the previous rulings (recall Table 7-1). Its decision that price distortions resulting from 
different member state legislation were to be remedied "... by measures taken by the 
Community authorities and not by the adoption by another member state of measures 
incompatible with the rules on free movement of goods” (ECJ 1996) nevertheless permitted 
the patent-holders to continue using their patents to prevent parallel importing for a limited 
period. These rulings ensured that parallel trade would continue to be a major discussion- 
point at subsequent roundtables.
The PPBH is a an industry-financed pharmaceutical think-tank which researches healthcare reform.
177 This latter point of especial concern to the industry, see EFPIA (2000). For a more general discussion 
regarding the impact of enlargement on the sector, see Forte & de Joncheere (1999).
178 Joint Cases C-276/95 and C-268/95 Merck v. Primecrown [1996] ECR I-6285
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On the one side were consumer representatives who stressed the importance of parallel 
trade as a manner of ensuring affordable medicines, along with some national 
representatives who argued that it promoted sustainable healthcare financing. On the 
other side, the research industry along with DGIII (and officials from other member states) 
pointed to the distortions it created. They were supported by the Groupement International 
de la Repartition Pharmaceutique Europdenne (GIRP, the European Association of 
Pharmaceutical Wholesalers). GIRP argued that, even if legal, parallel trade did not serve 
efficiency: “... whilst full line wholesalers do not encourage such trade, market forces are 
such that it cannot be ignored... the main cost savings in healthcare will come from the 
more efficient use of medicines rather than the restricting of their use.” (GIRP 1998, 2)
The Commission had nevertheless endorsed the ECJ’s position in its 1998 Communication 
on a single pharmaceuticals market, by stressing it as a "... driving force for market 
integration where there are significant differences in price”, despite the inefficiencies it 
creates (COM 1998). And though some effort was made to bridge the gap between 
member states’ and industry interests vis-a-vis parallel trade, these efforts have been 
described as more “metaphorical and rhetorical than concrete and tangible” (Albedo 1998).
4-2 What to do about price differentials and national controls?
Pricing and national controls was the most hotly debated issue at the roundtables. While 
the recurring theme in all of Commissioner Bangemann’s presentations was the abolition of 
strict price controls (as they were a disadvantage to Community industrial policy goals), the 
other stakeholders were equally adamant with regard to their own positions179.
The industrial policy Communication had earlier been watered down in part because of the 
intervention of DGV. Commissioner Flynn’s submission to the 1996 roundtable reiterated 
the reasons for this. Namely, that measures affecting price (de-)regulation could only be 
pursued within the broader context of public health policy and the development of member 
state health systems. Although Mr Flynn was not in attendance at the meeting, similar 
views were expressed by other parties in the open discussions which followed.
For instance, Michael Noonan, Irish health minister, acknowledged that while "... 
unrestricted free movement is not compatible with unrestricted governmental intervention 
in the domestic market”, he asserted that “... member states cannot [sic] give ground on 
the prerogative to set health policy within their own jurisdiction.” The result of this paradox, 
according to the Danish health minister, Yvone Anndersen, was that member states’ cost-
179 The citations in following can be found in the official proceedings of the 1996 roundtable (IMS Health 
1996).
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containment measures had pushed the industry into pricing its products at high levels. Jim 
Murray of the BEUC thus asserted "... the fundamental challenge is to develop and 
maintain the necessary price sensitivity in the market for medicines, in other words to keep 
pressure on prices.” Unsurprisingly this was challenged by industry representatives. 
Pierre Douaze of Novartis linked price controls to Europe’s declining position in the global 
sector, arguing that the benefits to industry brought by Commission policies such as the 
EMEA and SPC "... have been more than outweighed by the negative impact of the 
combined effort of national cost containment, currency erosion and the spillover effect of 
such actions into other markets.”
Claude Le Pen, a French academic and one of the ‘independent’ experts invited by the 
Commission, tried to guide the discussion to answer whether the goal was to eliminate 
price differentials between the member states or to reduce government intervention. The 
two, he suggested, were not the same thing. But his proposition to find "... a method which 
is a bit more reasonable and efficient for governments to fix prices [is] better than leaving 
everything to market forces” was vague. In any event, Professor Le Pen’s contribution 
(and presence), along with that of the other expert invited by the Commission, Patricia 
Danzon, can be seen as more decorative than useful. Both are economists, and a review 
of their publications would seem to show them both sympathetic to the industry.
Such divergence between the actors continued in the second meeting when two working 
groups set up after the first roundtable reported their findings. Group I had been charged 
with developing solutions to reconcile the free movement-national price controls clash from 
the member state perspective. Group II meanwhile, was to look at the pharmaceutical 
industry itself, considering the possibility for member state co-operation on pricing.
The report of the first group concentrated on balancing industrial and healthcare policy 
within the parameters of member state competence. One suggestion regarding pricing 
was to establish ‘broadly based’ contractual arrangements between member states’ health 
services and individual pharmaceutical company suppliers (WG I 1997). The idea being 
that prices could be agreed which served both their interests, with the company/ies trading- 
off lower prices for stability. The report also stressed improving the R&D element to 
promote investment and innovation. The more market-oriented perspective of the second 
group saw its report focused on competition. It concluded that so long as the member 
states are responsible for healthcare expenditure, there was no question that they should 
continue setting their own medicine prices (WG II 1997). A uniform pricing system applied 
centrally was deemed neither desirable nor practicable, and with regard to the future, the 
group offered three alternatives, claiming that each had its own merits:
-208-
i. continuing with the status quo on the basis that it was ‘inevitable’, and even 
‘desirable’ in public health terms -  although parallel trade had to be limited in this 
context
ii. actively seeking price convergence which would be desirable in an environment 
where all Member States are comfortable with the resulting balance between access 
and affordability on the one hand and innovation and industrial development on the 
other”
iii. neither of the former two ‘extremes’, though member states should work together on 
identifying and addressing those aspects of the market which were ‘suitable’ for price 
convergence
Discussing these options, Jim Attridge, rapporteur of Group II and executive-director of the 
British Pharma Group180, admitted that there had been disagreement on several issues. 
The most divisive had been over the relationship between the current European regulatory 
environment and declining innovation and investment in the sector. The industry argued a 
clear link made worse by ever-stricter national controls (recall Douaze quote above), while 
some member states had refuted this on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Both groups 
were comprised of a mixture of Commission staff (DGs III and V), industry and government 
officials -  no consumer representatives -  and thus delivered compromise conclusions.
Nevertheless, the results of the second meeting were described by Commissioner 
Bangemann as ‘encouraging’, with ‘excellent’ co-operation between the industry, 
Commission and member states (Bangemann 1997b). That translated into no conclusions, 
but agreement on the need for a third roundtable based again on ‘tripartite dialogue’ (i.e. 
minimal consumer representation). Dr Bangemann suggested that the Commission would 
work on an action plan or Communication in the meantime.
The final roundtable was possibly the least satisfying to each of the parties. On 25 
November 1998 the Commission released its ‘Communication on the Single Market in 
Pharmaceuticals’ (COM 1998). The Communication pleased no one, and much to the 
detriment of any substantive analysis regarding possibilities to address the pricing problem, 
it became the focal-point for much of the discussion. The Commission had intended it as 
an amalgamation or consensus-generating document to bring together the views 
expressed by the stakeholders over the past few years -  building especially on the work of 
the two working groups -  and one which highlighted the concerns of each stakeholder on 
an equal basis. But it was roundly attacked: by representatives of the research industry for 
not going far enough with regard to promoting research and development; by generic 
representatives for not paying enough attention to their requirements; and by member state 
officials and consumers for not showing sufficient appreciation for healthcare and public 
health requirements. With regard to the content, Herxheimer (1999) has summarised that:
180 The British Pharma Group then represented the interests of: Glaxo, Fisons, Boots, SmithKline 
Beecham, Zeneca and Wellcome.
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It is not clear whether any of the participants knew much about health issues, but the 
text of the Communication suggests that none did. References to health amount to 
no more than superficial generalities, whereas industrial and economic issues were 
discussed in detail. (25)
Ultimately, any potential for serious debate at the final roundtable was compromised by the 
Commission’s document.
4-3 Much ado, but nothing
Looking at the roundtables as a single initiative, while some degree of appreciation for 
each other’s stances was achieved within the policy network, there appears little to suggest 
that as a result of the meetings any actor changed its views on any of the topics discussed. 
The evolution of the meetings shows DGIII to have become less dogmatic about price 
deregulation as the sole way to achieve further harmonisation -  endorsing a more gradual 
approach -  but even this indirect manner to address pricing and reimbursement yielded no 
answers. No real policy decisions resulted.
Beyond the fact that the interests at stake are simply too sensitive to concede on, this was 
due to the parties having spent more time addressing each others positions than they did 
actually explaining their own. The merits of a dialogue-oriented approach notwithstanding, 
despite meeting as a group on three occasions, the stakeholders have been unable to 
agree on a way forward. Recalling the industrial policy Communication, this may in part 
due to the Commission’s seeming willingness to side with the industry -  indeed throughout 
the meetings Commissioner Bangemann harped on the need to improve Europe’s lot in the 
biotechnology field and made numerous references to electronic trade and free pricing -  
but it has more to do with the majoritarian politics nature of the issue. For even the 
conscious creation of the network represented by the roundtables failed to achieve 
progress. And, since Dr Bangemann’s departure in 1999 there have been no further 
meetings. However, on 26 March 2001 a new network, which again brings the 
stakeholders together, was set up by Erkki Liikananen, Dr Bangemann’s successor at the 
new DG Enterprise (see Section 5-1).
5 Conclusions
As the discussion has shown, despite three major initiatives (and policy networks), the 
pricing and reimbursement conundrum has still not been solved. There is doubt as to 
whether it can be given Article 152 and the cost-benefit implications for the stakeholders. 
But if the consequences of a spate of recent ECJ decisions on the compatibility of the free
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movement principles with national healthcare policy are anything to go by181, the member 
states are being pushed into accepting increased European intervention in healthcare 
matters (Mossialos & McKee 2001). Not only that, but as the European industry continues 
to exert pressure on national governments and the Commission with regard to loss of 
competitiveness vis-a-vis the US -  both of which appear to be listening to these complaints 
-  Hancher (2001a) suggests that:
The recent findings that institutional and regulatory factors might serve to protect and 
insulate the European industry from competition as opposed to forming barriers to 
the further expansion of what it usually viewed as one of Europe’s most competitive 
sectors may well offer the Commission a new point of departure from which to tackle 
the vexed issue of price regulation. (20)
Here, EFPIA has stated that: “We recognise, with the Commission, that competitiveness of 
the pharmaceutical market is an essential prerequisite for price deregulation.” (EFPIA 
1999, 2)
That said, is the Commission really seeking this ‘new point of departure’? The recent 
review of pharmaceutical legislation (COM 2001) -  called for under Article 71 of Directive 
2309/93 creating the EMEA -  and the establishment of the ‘High Level Group on 
Innovation and the Provision of Medicines’ (otherwise referred to as the ‘G10’), are very 
much in keeping with an industry-focused, competitiveness approach. Based on interviews 
with interested parities, the former assesses mainly how EU market authorisation is 
working, while the latter can be seen as a formalised mini-roundtable. A brief look at this 
new policy network is required, as pricing and reimbursement is a key discussion-point.
5-1 The ‘G10’ -  same wine, different bottle?
Enterprise Commissioner Liikanen’s establishment of the G10 on 26 March 2001 is the 
most recent example of the Commission’s continued strategy of trading with the industry 
i.e. seeking to develop measures to improve companies’ international competitiveness in 
exchange for more latitude on proposals to free up the market and address pricing. The 
product of a 22 December 2000 meeting organised by DG Enterprise to discuss the 
findings of a report it had commissioned to assess the competitiveness of Europe’s 
pharmaceutical industry, the G10 is to: “work on a new agenda to improve the framework 
for competitiveness in the pharmaceutical industry and to harness its power to deliver on 
Europe’s health care goals.” (CEC IP 2001) The report, ‘Global Competitiveness in 
Pharmaceuticals: A European Perspective’ (Gambardella et al 2000)182, published in 
November 2000, found that Europe is continuing to fall behind the US and argued that a
See footnote 88.
182 Often referred to as the ‘Pammolli Report’ after one of the authors.
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higher reliance on market-based competitive measures was central to remedying this183. 
The G10 joins together the Enterprise and Health and Consumer Protection DGs, and is 
comprised of what one assumes the Commissioner sees as the sector’s main interests. 
Table 7-1 presents the parties to the G10 broken down as stakeholders.
Table 7-1: Membership of the fG10’
(Erkki Liikanen) Commissioner for Enterprise and Information Society 
(David Byrne) Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection
(Alessandro Banchi) Board Member at Boehringer Ingelheim, and representative of the 
European Association of the European Self-Medication Industry (AESGP)
(Jean Francois Dehecq) President and Chief Executive Officer at Sanofi-Synthelabo, and 
President of the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry Associations (EFPIA) 
(Andrew Kay) Chief Executive Officer at APS Berk and Chairman of the European Generic 
Manufacturers Association (EGA)
(Chris Viehbacher) Chairman of Europe at GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceuticals
M e m b e r  St a t e s ______________________________________________________________________________________________
(Jose Miguel Boquinhas) Spanish Secretary of State for Health 
(Francisco Ramos) Portuguese Minister of Health 
(Philip Hunt) United Kingdom Health Minister 
(Bernard Kouchner) French Minister of Health
(Lars Rekke) Swedish Minister for Industry, Employment and Communications
(Ulla Schmidt) German Minister for Health______________________________________
C o n s u m e r s __________________________________________________________________________________________________
(Angela Coulter) Chief Executive of the Picker Institute
O t h e r  ( p u r c h a s e r  r e p r e s e n t a t io n )_______________________________________________________________________
(Ueli Muller) President of the Association Internationale de la Mutualite (AIM)
The table shows the group’s constitution as somewhat strange with only selected 
membership. Compared to the other parties (most notably industry), consumer interests 
are under-represented. The only representative with a clear consumer focus is the Picker 
Institute. However, its mission statement: “We specialise in measuring patients’ 
experiences of health care and using this information to improve the provision of health 
care”, suggests it as an odd choice if DG Enterprise was truly seeking a relevant consumer 
perspective. The involvement of the Association Internationale de la Mutualite (AIM), 
which represents European health insurance and social protection bodies, is also a strange 
choice. It has only a limited consumer focus -  more a purchaser perspective -  and is not a 
strong enough player in its own right to counterbalance the industry presence; AIM has 
also not been so directly involved by the Commission before. Moreover, only six member 
states are represented, and even then, only by their ministers with a health portfolio.
183 As an aside, it would be interesting, were it possible, to ascertain what sort of information and data the 
companies provided the researchers. For as this study has stressed several times, the strategic use of 
information by industry plays a considerable role in shaping EU policy. And this has had played a 
large part in ensuring a regulatory framework which favours industry interests.
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Discussions about pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement (and the competitiveness of 
industry) must surely involve finance ministries as well; employment is after ail such a key 
issue. This ‘narrowing of the field’ is clearly an attempt by the Commission to be seen to 
be doing something, and an attempt to convince the stakeholders of the apparently 
pressing industrial policy needs facing Europe; especially in light of the strength of the 
industry with the network. Unsurprisingly then, Per Haugaard, spokesperson for DG 
Enterprise, summarised the G10 as "... a good occasion to have industry in one place... 
the meeting will help to encourage innovation, and it’s generally accepted that we are 
lagging behind [the US] in innovation.” (as cited in Anon 2001)
The group first convened on 11 December 2001 to discuss the competitiveness report, and 
options for addressing pricing were raised. But on the basis of the consultative document 
which emerged on 26 February 2002 (G10 2002), the G10 appears unlikely to come up 
with anything new; least of all with regard to pricing and reimbursement. The document 
contains 14 recommendations, primarily aimed at promoting the industry. Those pertaining 
to complex issues such as pricing are sufficiently bland as to offer no real indication of a 
way forward. For instance, it proposes the Commission develop ‘a comprehensive set of 
indicators’ to measure the industry’s performance against its competitors. Moreover, that 
these indicators be tied to data on morbidity and mortality so that the performance of 
individual products can also be assessed. For pricing, it is simply suggested that:
Respecting national competence, member States should examine the scope for 
improving time taken between the granting of a marketing authorisation and 
pricing and reimbursement decisions in full consistency with Community 
legislation. (8)
That the Commission and the Member States should secure the principle that a 
Member State’s authority to regulate prices in the EU should extend only to those 
medicines purchased by, or reimbursed by, the State. Full competition should be 
allowed for medicines not reimbursed by State systems or medicines sold into 
private markets. (10)
In other words, it still befalls the Commission and the member states to find ways forward.
Admittedly, the G10 is a forum for dialogue rather than decision-making, and its somewhat 
prosaic recommendations reflect the stakeholders’ compromise views on a host of issues 
beyond pricing. The hope expressed by Paul Weissenberg of DG Enterprise that:
In this group we need to focus on issues where there is a reasonable prospect of 
clear recommendations on practical steps. The way forward must avoid the 
impasse in the debate ‘price control for state health services’ versus ‘single 
market free circulation of goods’, (as cited in AESGP 2001, 4)
-213-
seems to already have been dashed. The policy network represented by the G10 may be 
able to present a policy document, but the recommendations contained therein show that it 
cannot agree measures which will effect policy. This will prove a disappointment to the 
Commission, for it had expressed the hope that the G10 "... will be able to agree on policy 
approaches that do not necessarily require the Commission to take legislative action” (CEC 
IP 2001). But it reflects clearly the constraints the pricing and reimbursement issue carries.
Part of the reason for this rehashing of old arguments and delivery of bland 
recommendations is that the group’s initial consultation paper, issued by DG Enterprise 
(CEC 2001), sparked almost as many different views as there were respondents. At one 
pole was the BEUC, which felt that the document concentrated almost exclusively on how 
to promote the industry with little attention paid to consumer interests. The consultation’s 
aim was stated as: ‘to secure the development of a competitive (innovative-based, 
generics, non-prescription) industry’, and this has been continued in the 2002 paper. The 
BEUC concluded that: “The G10’s tentative suggestions need to be significantly improved 
in line with consumers’ and citizens’ needs.” (BEUC 2001, 2) Speaking about his 
participation in the December meeting, Ueli Muller -  president of AIM, and thus one of the 
few G10 members without a direct industrial policy interest -  shared this view:
I insisted that the proposals drafted within this group should strive to balance the 
interests of a truly innovative industry, the general interest of public health and fair 
access to medicines... the consultative document on which all interested parties 
were to give their opinion seems to make little reference to the public health and 
consumer protection dimensions on the issue... increasing the competitiveness of 
the pharmaceutical industry does not mean increasing consumption and raising 
prices. (Muller 2001,1-2)
This can be compared to EFPIA’s opinion at the other pole, which was that industrial policy 
considerations such as intellectual property rights were not given the necessary priority 
(EFPIA 2001c). Indeed, the Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller e.V. (VFA), the 
German Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies accuses the 
document of giving too much attention to issues which impede innovation, specifically 
generic promotion and the potential use of cost-effectiveness as a criterion of innovation 
assessment (VFA 2001). Although too lengthy for analysis here, the views of other parties 
reveal a host of positions between these poles. In any event, with such a mandate, and 
such a select membership, it should not come as a surprise that the G10 is unable to 
deliver any novel recommendations.
5-2 Costs versus benefits
What the disparate views and reactions of the stakeholders highlighted in this chapter 
indicate, is that all are affected by the prospect of harmonising pricing and reimbursement.
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Although something of a generalisation of the complex issues raised throughout the 
discussion, it can be concluded that each actor has something to gain and lose under a 
European pricing regime, such that both the benefits and costs of any ‘policy’ are widely 
dispersed. More specifically, each perceives the benefits to be insufficient to warrant 
bearing the costs (which may even be anticipated as high if the regulatory intervention 
proves unfavourable to their interests). The incentive for co-operation in pursuit of a 
common agenda are equally not there given the differences in interest.
Furthermore, there is also a considerable lack of clarity surrounding what manner a 
European price or pricing system might take, far less what it would bring. And a policy 
which benefits only one stakeholder is therefore likely to do so at the expense of one or 
more of the others. For the industry, as a Euro-regime essentially amounts to higher or 
lower drug prices and thus higher or lower profits, it is keen to assert its interests. Not just 
the industry, however, all stakeholders aim to defend their positions. The potential costs 
leads to a situation where there is no real motivation for any actor to ‘rock the boat’. All 
recognise that the issues are too complex and involved for a Community regime and, as 
things stand, the status quo of national price and reimbursement controls remains 
preferable to the unknown.
Nevertheless, the main cost-benefit calculation is perhaps that of the member states’. 
Despite their own national interests, they are unanimous in their opposition to Community 
‘interference’ in healthcare. The potential costs to be bome in terms of their control over 
healthcare expenditure, loss of jobs, and the income redistribution implications potentially 
raised by an EU pricing regime, all preclude any willingness on their part to rescind 
authority over medicine pricing. The Commission’s view, therefore, is that national cost- 
containment should be addressed only from a reimbursement point of view -  this is seen to 
be more consistent with a single market than price controls -  and that European policies 
are required for the other industrial policy issues. Again, this is not likely given that 
national interests span both healthcare and industrial policy matters, and there are fifteen 
different systems in place to address this. Hence, with the Commission only able to 
address the industrial policy side of the market, the competitiveness approach is not 
producing results; least of all where pricing and reimbursement are concerned. The 
problem is that it manifests itself in measures to promote the industry (mainly innovative 
companies) without generating workable proposals to take the pricing and reimbursement 
issue forward. By comparison, the interests of the other stakeholders, particularly 
consumers, are neglected. Thus, irrespective of any new policy network constellations 
such as the G10, the majoritarian politics character of the issue will remain.
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5-3 Final remarks
Two additional conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. First, the Commission’s 
‘competitiveness approach’ since the Transparency Directive has tended to fragment the 
stakeholders. Consensus-building has been made more difficult and more actors have 
been brought into play, in turn complicating the formation of effective policy networks. The 
majoritarian politics nature of the issue has thus brought severe constraints on the 
Commission’s ability to regulate. One reason for the numerous redrafts of the industrial 
policy Communication for example, was the split that emerged within the Commission, 
where DGIII and DGV disagreed over proposals for national price deregulation. The final 
Communication was in fact signed by both Martin Bangemann and Padraig Flynn -  a first 
where pharmaceutical policy was concerned. The member states too were divided. 
Despite shared concerns about cost-containment and the potential for loss of employment 
in the sector, differences in national industry, market, and drug consumption patterns saw 
them voice different requirements both in favour and against the proposals.
Issues such as generic promotion -  towards stimulating price competition -  are equally 
divisive from the stakeholders’ perspective. Indeed, this topic in particular has divided 
patients and doctors, two otherwise traditional allies in matters pertaining to European 
pharmaceutical regulation. For while patient groups such as the BEUC, Health Action 
International (HAI) and the UK Consumers’ Association favour generic substitution from a 
health(care) policy perspective, the Comite Permanent des Medians Europeens (CP or 
Standing Committee of European Doctors) is more circumspect, believing that the choice 
of medication should lie with the doctor (CP 2001). The question of what to do about 
parallel imports has also firmly entrenched otherwise secondary stakeholders into the fray. 
The GIRP and association of European parallel trading companies can, for example, 
expect to have their interests taken into account by national governments. This contributes 
to the member states’ differing positions on pricing and reimbursement more generally.
Another conclusion is that consumer interests, at least in terms of formal involvement in the 
policy-process, have been excluded. Jim Murray’s earlier-mentioned address to the 
special hearing showed that the BEUC had not been privy to the previous draft of the 
industrial policy Communication; he was not even aware that by that time there had 
actually been several versions. Even the roundtables, which ostensibly sought to bring the 
major stakeholders together, have been criticised for not taking account of consumer 
concerns: “To describe the occasion as a roundtable was perhaps misleading. The 
concept of a roundtable implies a meeting among equals, but that was not the impression 
created at this event.” (Furniss 1997, 28) Although this exclusion compromises the 
Commission’s ability to make any headway, according to Hancher (2001b):
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The debate on how to tackle pricing can no longer be safely confined to a 
privileged dialogue between industry and governments and European 
bureaucrats. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen to what extent the Commission 
can ensure broad stakeholder involvement in detailed issues... It is unlikely that 
consumers or health care providers could be closely involved in this assessment 
process. (24)
Indeed, the selective membership of the G10, as the latest major initiative in the 
pharmaceutical arena, appears to underline her point.
Two lines of argument were set out at the beginning of this chapter as the threads which 
would tie together the disparate elements of the discussion. The first was that despite 
limited Community competence over the pricing and reimbursement of medicines, what 
does exist of a supranational regulatory environment has been driven by industrial policy 
and industry interests, without equivalent attention paid to social policy or consumer 
considerations. The Commission’s inability to tackle the healthcare policy aspect of the 
market, has meant that it has been confined to the use of industrial policy measures -  in 
part as a trade-off approach -  which have inevitably involved promoting the industry.
The second contention was that pricing and reimbursement represents a majoritarian 
politics issue, where the prospects for supranational policy are highly constrained. This is 
both because of Article 152 and the actors’ divergent interests. Unlike the entrepreneurial 
politics scenario where there is widespread apathy amongst the actors because of the 
diffuse costs involved, in the case of majoritarian politics the regulator does not have the 
competence to address the issue. Opportunities for (compromise) policies to be reached 
via policy networks are therefore limited.
This is clearly the case over pricing and reimbursement policy, where the exclusion of 
healthcare from the Community remit means that the Commission lacks the competence to 
take the issue forward. Consequently, it has had to rely on Articles 28-30 (ex 30-36) on 
promoting the internal market in order to develop proposals. That the Transparency 
Directive remains the only formal policy and parallel trade continues are testament to this. 
As one commentator noted when discussing why the proposals for amending the 
Transparency Directive were shelved: "... it would not be fair to blame anything than the 
complexity of the problem itself.” (Faus 1997, 20) And as noted, particularly in respect of 
parallel trade, the ECJ has also helped to consolidate pricing and reimbursement as a 
national level competence, ensuring it as a case of majoritarian politics.
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Chapter  8  
Conclusions
Introduction
This study has been concerned with the making of supranational pharmaceutical policy in 
the European Union. It has considered the evolution and shape of the Community’s 
regulatory regime for medicines, one which does not amount to a harmonised market. 
More specifically, the study provided a political perspective on how and why certain policy 
outcomes have been achieved and others not, and did so via a theoretical approach which 
sought to take into account the regulatory constraints faced by European policy-makers. 
By way of conclusion it becomes necessary to return to the major lines of enquiry identified 
in the opening chapter. Recalling the study’s two main objectives then, the empirical 
element was to address the hypothesis that the industry is the main beneficiary of the 
current EU framework. Second was the development of a theoretical lens through which to 
understand how Community pharmaceutical policy is made. It is one which, although 
focusing primarily on actors, takes a broad and multi-layered view of the policy context in 
order to test the hypothesis. The discussion begins by reviewing the theoretical element of 
the study in order to reiterate its application and acknowledge its deficiencies. The case- 
studies are afforded another look within this discussion, towards drawing some empirical 
conclusions in a comparative format. Thereafter some final conclusions and remarks on 
current Commission proposals for the sector are offered. A quick look at possibilities for 
future research then closes the study.
1 Theoretical Considerations
Since the 1985 White Paper on the internal market (CEC 1985), the Community’s aim for 
the pharmaceutical sector has been the eventual harmonisation of member state markets. 
Although considerable progress has been made, the discussion has demonstrated that 
there is still a long way to go. In particular, it has shown that any further Europeanisation 
of the market is a difficult prospect for two main reasons. First, the interests of the 
European Commission, the member states, the industry and consumers, as the sector’s 
main stakeholders, are too disparate for agreement to be reached over the outstanding 
aspects -  most notably, pricing and reimbursement. Second, the clash between the EU’s 
legal and policy frameworks -  subsidiarity versus free movement -  means that the 
Commission is unable to force an agenda. In addition, Article 152 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty excludes the Community from direct competence in member state healthcare 
systems, and reflects a position over which national governments have been adamant.
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The implications of healthcare spending policies and income redistribution being made 
areas of Community authority are unacceptable to all member states.
The dilemma over supranational policy-making is clear. The EU is only able to legislate 
over the industrial policy dimension of the sector (i.e. within the remit accorded it by the 
SEM), while the healthcare aspects remain firmly in national hands. Despite this shared 
competence, as other EU policies, Treaty articles, and judgements by the European Court 
of Justice do impact on healthcare (and public health) concerns, the study endeavoured to 
ascertain how this came about. And it did so by looking at three examples in particular: the 
Supplementary Protection Certificate legislation, the creation and operation of the 
European Medicines Evaluation Agency, and the continued intractability of the pricing and 
reimbursement issue. It is the question of market harmonisation and the divergent views of 
the stakeholders that ties these otherwise separate elements of Community 
pharmaceutical policy-making together. And for all three, the study sought support for its 
main contention that the industry is the prime beneficiary.
To test its hypothesis of an industry-favouring regulatory framework -  one which results, 
primarily, from industry’s influence within the policy-process -  the study approached the 
EU sector from a political perspective and argued the need to adopt a broad theoretical 
lens. The case was made for a lens which takes the wider policy environment into account 
in order to understand the preferences and actions of specific actors in the policy-process 
-  this was then applied to the case-studies. In developing this, the discussion first showed 
the value of traditional European integration and policy-making theory, where the focus is 
often on the role of the member states and European institutions, or international 
organisations/influences within the international arena. At the same time, the discussion of 
Chapters 3 and 4 made clear why these perspectives were insufficient to test the 
underlying contention of the study. Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism were 
shown to account for the industrial policy leaning of the regulatory framework, but that they 
do not offer direct insight into how it came to serve industry interests. Thus, it was 
necessary to ask how policies were agreed, which stakeholders were involved in the 
policy-process, and in what capacity. To answer these questions, the discussion turned to 
the meso-level and focused on the main actors within the policy-process; thereby helping 
to develop a more complete perspective.
Policy networks were chosen for several reasons. First is that the process leading to EU 
regulatory policy outcomes is one which cannot be adequately captured by traditional 
pluralist or corporatist theories of interest mediation and bargaining. Variables such as the 
amount of resources, access to the policy arena, and the level of information which, while 
crucial to pluralist and corporatist analyses, have a comparatively smaller part to play here.
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In support of Heritier’s (1996) claim of a ‘sectoralisecT EU polity, consensual decision­
making is crucial at the supranational level, where the gains to be accrued through 
compromise often outweigh the price of holding to an individualistic (e.g. national) position. 
It is also at this level that the relative power/influence of individual actors may be less 
cogent given wider considerations, and where interests tend to be more aggregated than at 
national level. Here the study looked to multi-level governance. Accepting it as a 
descriptor of the dispersal of power within EU policy-process (and the dynamics which 
result), Chapter 3 showed its relevance in establishing the background to network activity. 
And other process-oriented views such as negative and positive integration, old versus 
new regulatory policy were tied into the discussion. Seen from this standpoint, multi-level 
governance offers insight into where and how policy networks can develop and operate 
(within the pharmaceutical sector).
Another rationale for employing networks is the argument that not enough empirical 
research has been done on transposing policy networks to the EU sectoral level (Josselin 
1994). This may have to do with the fact that the approach suffers from the lack of a 
singular theory and, as Rhodes (1990) has lamented, is therefore mainly used as a 
metaphor. Or it might be because the ‘elusive fluidity’ of the EU policy-process makes 
such application difficult, as Kassim (1994) has argued. Nevertheless, it remains one of 
the underlying contentions of this study that policy networks are a useful line of analysis in 
their own right, and that they are valuable in examining cases of consensual decision­
making at EU level. Support for his can be found amongst numerous scholars, including 
H6ritier et al (1996), Josselin (1996), and BSrzel (1997a,b). It is especially useful where 
groups of interests -  often with different or competing agenda -  come together in the 
making of policy which affects them all.
With the interests of the European Commission, the member states, the industry and 
consumers not always convergent given the three policy inputs and resulting health(care)- 
industrial policy clash, this is clearly the case over pharmaceutical policy. The interests are 
such that any policy will carry a winners and losers effect and the stakeholders’ behaviour 
thus conforms to Rhodes (1990) explanation of the internal dynamic of policy networks:
...[the actors] manoeuvre for advantage, deploying the resources they control to 
maximize their influence over outcomes and trying to avoid becoming dependent 
on the ‘other players’... [with] the relevant resources including constitutional, 
legal, organizational, political and informational. (42)
Moreover, as Rosamond (2000) argues that “Policy network analysis only works when the 
institutional dimensions of policy-making are weak” (124), the constrained role of the 
Commission within the sector appears to fit squarely within this view.
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Rather than joining the debate on the theoretical viability or policy networks, the study’s 
use of the concept was based on contemporary applications such as Rhodes’s, and 
accepted the view that"... their [policy networks] function is to develop new measures in 
European policy”. (H6ritier et al 1996, 7) Nevertheless, the discussion v\ent beyond simply 
applying the accepted (interest-intermediation) conceptualisation. For on its own the 
approach is somewhat uni-dimensional. It enables an understanding of actor relationships 
-  institutional or otherwise -  within narrowly-defined policy fields, thereby providing for a 
very focused level of analysis. This is particularly so at the sectoral level where actors and 
their interactions tend to be fairly fixed. However, this view does not accommodate that 
network behaviour can be affected, if not limited, by the external policy environment.
Ignoring this context may be a valuable exercise for the student seeking principally to map 
structural relationships between actors but it proves insufficient to understand why specific 
policy is made. Chapter 3 discussed how wider political factors necessarily influence 
networks in the pharmaceutical sector, and do affect whether policy is achieved or not; 
factors which impinge on the Commission’s role in particular. In order not to fall into this 
traditional mode of analysis, the study offered a further dimension in the use of the interest- 
intermediation approach. Bearing in mind the insights gleaned from the macro-theories, 
Wilson’s (1980) ‘politics of policy’ framework was employed to supplement the use of policy 
networks. By examining proposed regulatory interventions on the basis of actors’ 
perceived gains or losses, the framework suggests that the regulatory environment must 
also have an impact on the type of policy agreed. Use of the politics of policy was a means 
of integrating policy networks into a broader frame of analysis, thereby strengthening the 
theoretical value of the concept and, in turn, providing a more realistic and inclusive basis 
for understanding regulatory policy-making in the EU pharmaceutical sector.
2 Employing the ‘Politics of Policy’ in the Study of EU Pharmaceutical Policy- 
Making
Looking at the politics of policy itself, by establishing what type of politicking is required or 
results in instances of divergent views (amongst the policy network participants), Wilson’s 
framework goes some way to capturing why certain regulatory outcomes are successful 
and others not. Here, regulatory policy-making and the nature of outcomes is predicated 
on stakeholder preference and behaviour -  on the basis of perceived gains and losses 
from the intervention being considered -  resulting in four distinct types of politicking. 
Outlined in Chapter 4 these were: ‘client politics’, ‘entrepreneurial politics’, ‘majoritarian 
politics’ and ‘interest-group politics’. Recalling Figure 4-3, an application of the framework 
to selected elements from the Community’s regulatory competencies, including those 
looked at in the case-studies, gives rise to the matrix of Figure 8-1 (overleaf).
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Figure 8-1: The 'Politics of Policy’ as Applied to  Selected  E lem ents of th e  Community 
M edicines Fram ework
Costs  versus  Ben e f its
Diffuse-Diffuse Diffuse-
Concentrated
Concen t rated- Diffuse Concentrated-
Concentrated
• Pricing
• Reimbursement
. Patent protection
• European Agency 
^  ofMedicin
• Packaging, inserts 
and leaflets
for the Evaluation • 
al Products*
• A fully in te g ra te d  
single m ark e t fo r 
p h a rm aceu tica ls
Majoritarian Client Entrepreneurial Interest-group
T ype  o f  p o lit ic s
* The arrow from ’entrepreneurial’ to 'client’ regarding the EMEA reflects the point made 
in Chapter 6, that while initial proposals for an agency came the Commission, the specifics 
of its mandate resulted in large part from industry pressures.
2-1 Reviewing the case-studies: Comparative network evolution
In applying the politics of policy framework to the case-studies each was treated as an area 
of regulatory policy-making over which policy networks develop. They were chosen as 
major policy areas within the regulatory regime, ones which also showed the relevance of 
the study’s theoretical approach. Looking at the policy networks which developed around 
each case, their respective evolutions are represented in table format below (Tables 8-1, 8- 
2, 8-3). The issues at stake during each stage of the respective policy-processes are 
corresponded to which stakeholders where involved at the time. Although an abbreviated 
re-telling of the story, the tables are useful on three fronts. First they trace the 
development of the regulatory intervention in terms of ‘who did what’. Second they enable 
comparisons to be made between cases, in particular with regard to stakeholder 
involvement. And third, by showing that industry was the most stable actor within the 
networks in each case, they offer a graphic representation of how the policies favoured the 
industry. For it is this stability which has enabled the industry to influence the policy 
networks which emerge over individual regulatory policy issues.
The Supplementary Protection Certificate Network
The case of the Supplementary Protection Certificate legislation provides the clearest 
example of how, by dominating the policy network which developed, the (research-based) 
pharmaceutical industry has been able to influence EU policy outcomes towards serving its 
interests. Chapter 5 showed that from the outset it was the industry which set the agenda. 
Citing patent-term erosion as harmful to the industry, to healthcare interests (and public
- 2 2 2 -
health), and to European competitiveness, it was able to appeal both to member states’ 
industrial policy priorities and the Commission’s single market aims. Moreover, Table 8-1- 
shows the industry to have been present at every stage of the policy-process.
Table 8-1: Evolution of th e  Supplem entary Pro tection  C ertificate  Policy N etw ork
Phases Stakeholder INVOLVEMENT Issues
Pre-proposal 
(1) 1987
Research industry: EFPIA
Commission: Competition 
DG (IV); Industrial Affairs 
DG (III)
• Discussions begin about addressing p aten t-term  erosion 
(EFPIA members already lobbying national governments)
• EFPIA approaches DGIV, is rejected, and then  convinces 
DGIII to take on the case
Pre-proposal 
(2) 1988
Research industry: EFPIA 
Commission: DGIII
• EFPIA presents 'memorandum' and begins serious 
campaigning
• DGIII sets about 'selling' extended patent term s on 
medicines
Proposal and 
legislative 
process 
1989-1992
Commission: DGIII 
(Other European 
institutions:
European Parliament and 
committees; Economic 6t 
Social Committee) 
Member States 
Research industry: EFPIA 
Consumers: BEUC; CCC;
CECG 
Generic industry
• Commission presents COM document suggesting 10 year 
extension
• Member states express differences; France and Italy seek 
their own patent extension legislation
• EFPIA lobbying other European institutions, especially MEPs
• With Parliamentary review, consum er/patient groups stsrt 
to argue against the proposal
• The generic companies being to campaign against SPC, 
though no organised representation in the manner of EFPIA
• Consultation and review of proposal - 10 years extra  
protection watered down to 5
Adoption of 
Directive 
and post­
legislation 
1992-
Member states: Council of 
Ministers (Internal Market) 
Research industry: EFPIA 
Generic industry 
Consumers
• Legislation is approved in the Council - Spain, Portugal and 
Greece vote against
• EFPIA pressing for no subsequent legislation on improving 
conditions for generic producers
• Generic companies form European Generics Association 
(EGA)
• Consumers and generic companies call for mitigating 
measures e.g. generic substitution as quid pro quo (in view  
of public health needs and generic industry requirements), 
but Commission cannot/w ill not address them
Here EFPIA took advantage of the informational asymmetries, and was willing to provide
hitherto commercially sensitive data to selected parties in order to make its case. This 
strategic dissemination of material led to Shechter’s (1998) finding that after meeting with 
EFPIA, one MEP ”... was simply cut off... Either [he] was to settle for information provided 
by the industry, or he was to face the difficulties of collecting information using his own 
scarce resources.” (98) This was because he was known to be sceptical of industry’s 
position. Meanwhile, for those European policy-makers more sympathetic to its demands 
-  namely Fernand Sauer and DGIII -  EFPIA presented a detailed catalogue of industry 
and company-specific information. Although some of its claims were not as clear-cut as 
DGIII took them to be when delivering its initial proposal for a 10-year extension, the lack of 
opposition and access to information within the network ensured that only EFPIA 
information featured in the policy-process. Here the issue was that the generics industry 
had no formal representative body of its own, to counter EFPIA, and consumer interests 
were scattered without a real voice. They only had a formal say once the proposal had
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been sent to the Parliament and the (Internal Market) Council. The table shows the other 
stakeholders were involved in the policy-process only after the Commission had made up 
its mind. Opposition was thus weak and late in coming.
Even if opposing ‘evidence’ had been presented it is unlikely to have changed the 
Commission’s stance. (Indeed, data from the US where the generic industry had had a 
similar battle with its research-based competitors during the early 1980s was available, and 
generic companies did try to bring this to people’s attention). For there was also a natural 
convergence between the industry’s demands and DGIII’s concerns about European 
competitiveness. This pro-industry approach was only compounded by a Commission 
wanting to be seen to be doing something in the field of pharmaceutical policy more 
generally. DGIII was not difficult to convince. Further, Mr Sauer’s ‘deal’ with EFPIA over 
its opposition to the transparency legislation showed DGIII to be a receptive vehicle for 
industry’s demands. It is clear, therefore, that a client-politics scenario developed in the 
case of the SPC, with the research industry, via EFPIA, lobbying extensively and 
dominating the policy network primarily through the strategic use of information.
The European Medicines Evaluation Agency network
The EMEA legislation meanwhile was shown to have been a case of entrepreneurial 
politics, where the Commission forced the agenda. At the same time, it was again the 
industry which declared the terms. For having been involved in the policy-process from the 
start (Table 8-2, overleaf) -  its complaints about long registration struck a chord with the 
Commission’s single market goals -  the industry helped ensure an agency which works 
towards speeding market approval as an end in itself. Chapter 6 showed the degree to 
which the EMEA mandate was shaped to accommodate industry’s requirements -  
particularly a revised mutual recognition regime under the decentralised procedure, one in 
which the choice of rapporteur lies with the application. Along with healthcare policy, some 
public health issues remain beyond its remit.
EFPIA’s demands notwithstanding, the idea for an agency developed from the 
Commission’s concerns that with the 1992 deadline looming, current registration 
procedures were not serving single market priorities. On the basis of an initial consultation 
document, however, the Commission found its idea unpopular with the other stakeholders. 
Although all parties recognised the failings of the procedures, their respective cost-benefit 
calculations saw them express reservations. It was up to the Commission to overcome this 
initial opposition, and here it proved itself entrepreneurial. DGIII actively courted the views 
of the stakeholders, appealing to those elements of a potential new agency that each saw 
as beneficial to its own interests (recall Table 6-1). Quicker, more efficient and
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Community-wide approval with minimal member state interference would address 
industry’s priorities in getting drugs to market more rapidly, such that R&D costs could be 
recouped. Consumer interests would be served by quicker approval for important, 
innovative medicines. And faster registration could help governments to control healthcare 
costs, as well as support those with a local industry. In other words, all would benefit.
Table 8-2: Evolution of th e  European Medicines Evaluation Agency Policy Network
Phases Stakeholder involvement ISSUES
Pre-proposal 
(1) 1988
Research industry: national 
associations e.g. ABPI, 
SNIP; EFPIA
Commission: DGIII
• Industry calls for quicker Community registration 
procedures
• DGIII compiles report of CPMP outlining problems and need 
for binding authorisation (circulated to all stakeholders 
asking for views)
Pre-proposal 
(2) 1989
Commission: DGIII 
Research industry: EFPIA; 
national associations
Member states 
Consumers: BEUC
• DGIII publishes compilation of responses document
• All stakeholders recognise problems with registration 
procedures, though for d ifferent reasons (EFPIA opposed to 
any centralised agency)
• National governments with mixed responses - corresponding 
to consultation with national industry associations and cost- 
containment priorities
• BEUC calls for independent, quicker approval process with 
high standards of health protection in evaluation criteria
Proposal and 
legislative 
process 
1990-1993
Commission: DGIII 
Member states 
Research industry: national 
associations; EFPIA 
(Other European 
institutions: European 
Parliament and 
committees; Economic & 
Social Committee) 
Consumers: BEUC
• Official proposal document published
• Political wrangling between governments over legal basis to 
establish agency (Article 100a or Article 235)
• Member states consulting with national industry regarding 
pros/cons and divergent national responses to DGIII’s wider 
future systems proposals
• Parliament and ESC stress agency be based on public health 
protection grounds
• BEUC (consumer perspective no longer consulted by DGIII) 
issues response criticising lack of public health element in 
proposal
Adoption 
and post 
legislation 
1993-
Member States: Council of 
Ministers (Internal Market) 
Research industry: national 
associations; EFPIA
• Council approves revised legislation
• Bidding begins between member states to host agency 
(London agreed as site); only established in 1995
• APBI instrumental in bringing EMEA to UK
That said, the Commission’s first point of contact had been the industry, in order to 
ascertain its views and requirements. Moreover, after initial consultation with consumer 
groups (the BEUC in particular), they were then frozen out of the policy discussions proper. 
When talk turned to the mandate of the new agency, industry and member state industrial 
policy priorities were all DGIII appeared interested in hearing. In keeping national
regulatory agencies at the heart of the system, the Commission was able to secure
member state support by ensuring them that their authority would be preserved (and that 
medicines approved centrally would not simply flood their market at unbearable costs). 
The Commission’s aims, much like in the SPC case, were driven by how best to meet the 
requirements of the SEM -  again the proposal went to the Internal Market rather than 
Health Council for a decision. The end result is a pro-industry agency, despite the
Commission having pushed the agenda.
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Pricing and reimbursement- multiple strategies and networks
The main reason for the incomplete pharmaceutical market is the lack of pricing and 
reimbursement competence at EU level. Despite numerous and ongoing attempts to 
address this, it has not been possible to secure member state commitment on even 
gradual price deregulation in order to lessen the effects of price differentials between 
countries. The constraints on the Commission’s regulatory role are simply too substantial 
to overcome. This reflects a situation of majoritarian politics where the potential costs and 
benefits to the affected parties have to be reconciled if any policy is to be agreed, and is 
demonstrated by the different ‘strategies’ to address pricing and reimbursement proposed 
by the Commission. Table 8-3 (overleaf) compares the policy networks which formed 
around three initiatives in particular, only one of which resulted in a policy outcome.
It is clear that in each initiative and at each stage of the process, the research industry was 
present. Unlike in both the SPC and EMEA cases, however, it has not been able to 
impose itself. The views of the other stakeholders, in particular the unwillingness of the 
member states to give up their right to set their own medicine prices and reimbursement 
rates, has meant that the issue remains an unresolved in policy terms. The Transparency 
Directive notwithstanding, the member states have been unwilling to address the issue on 
the Commission’s terms. And even then, their interests in agreeing the legislation had 
more to do with wanting to keep a check on what each other was doing (i.e. transparency), 
than they did in devolving authority to the Commission. As the table reflects, the result has 
been the Commission trying numerous strategies, culminating in the on-going 
competitiveness’ approach, to address the pricing and reimbursement issue. This involves 
the Commission using industrial policy arguments (those elements of pharmaceutical 
regulation the member states are willing to countenance Community authority in) to sell a 
‘competition strategy’ as a trade-off (with industry as well) over some price harmonisation.
Table 8-3 also shows that in trying to take the pricing and reimbursement issue forward, 
the Commission has slowly narrowed the field. The different strategies reflect an 
acknowledgement that securing member state agreement could only be achieved gradually 
rather than from Brussels. The Commission’s aims, as reflected in the table, have 
therefore evolved from an initial call for price convergence and abolition of national price 
controls (under the original draft of the Transparency Directive) to now indirectly promoting 
price competition by advancing the competitiveness of the industry (the Roundtables and 
G10 group). This is more or less what the industry has been pushing for in its own calls for 
natural market forces to be introduced. The Commission has accepted that the member 
states must retain the authority to set their own medicine prices, as reflected in the report 
prepared by the second Working Group, and presented to third Bangemann Roundtable.
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Table 8-3: Evolution of Commission S trategies over Pricing and R eim bursem ent 
Policy (m ultiple netw orks)
Strategy Po l ic y  N e t w o r k s
T ra n s p a re n c y  D ir e c t iv e  (&  A m e n d m e n ts )
Phase Stakeholder involvement Issues
Pre-proposal
1986
Commission: DGIII • DGIII drafts COM document calling for member state pricing 
transparency and price harmonisation
Proposal and 
legislative 
process(1) 
1987-1988
Commission: DGIII 
Member States 
Research industry: EFPIA 
(Other European 
institutions: EP &
• 'Softer' official proposal presented (clause indicating 
eventual harmonisation remains a Commission priority)
• Varied responses from national governments e.g. West 
Germany uninterested; UK in favour so long as PPRS was 
left untouched
>
'one si 
at a tir
r
tep
ne’
committees; ESC) 
Consumers: BEUC
• EFPIA agreed on transparency, though adamantly against 
provisions which will impact on companies e.g. pricing 
databank
•  BEUC, although not consulted, begins campaigning to 
Parliament on the basis that the proposals missed the point
•  Parliament and ESC see the proposal as pro-industry; but 
Mr Metten’s amendments are opposed by industry and 
refused by Commission
Legislative 
process(2) 
and adoption 
1988
Member States: Council 
(Internal Market) 
Research industry: EFPIA 
Commission: DGIII
•  DGIII redraft proposal to incorporate some changes
•  Council agrees compromise with databank separate from 
main provisions
•  EFPIA gives its ok (suggestion of SPC deal with Mr Sauer)
> r
Post-
Directive
1989-1992
Commission: DGIII 
Member States 
Research industry: EFPIA 
Consumers: BEUC
•  All stakeholders reject Commission’s attempts at a revised 
draft; DGIII finally gives up in 1992
Industrial Policy Communication
> t
Pre-proposal
1992-1994
Commission: DGIII; DGV 
Research industry: EFPIA
•  Approximately 10 drafts of potential document drawn up 
behind the scenes - only industry is privy
•  Document the product of a joint Commission-industry task 
force
• Commission seeking abolition of national price controls and
'shared
convergence of prices 
• DGV intervenes and document has price provisions removed
intere
>
St’
f
Proposal and 
legislative 
process 
1994-1996
Commission: DGIII 
Research industry: EFPIA 
Member States 
(Other European 
institutions: EP &  
committees; ESC) 
Generics industry: EGA
•  Generics industry catches wind of discussion, though, like 
consumer groups, had been intentionally kept out
•  (Internal Market) Council resolution reflects disparity in 
member state priorities; nothing really implementable 
emerges
R o u n d ta b le s
Roundtable 1 
(1996)
All stakeholders plus: 
National regulatory 
officials; independent 
experts
•  Called for by Commissioner Bangemann
•  Industry-sponsored event
•  Parallel trade is the main discussion point, with divergent 
views expressed; corresponding to stakeholder priorities
•  2 working groups set up to provide the industry and 
member state perspectives
>
'dialog
r
ue’
Roundtable 2 
(1997)
All stakeholders plus: 
National regulatory 
officials; independent 
experts; other 
interested parties
• media banned
• this time, meeting is financed by Commission grant
• working groups report findings: WG1 suggests member 
states promote R&D climate while retaining control of 
pricing; WG2 offers 3 alternatives - price convergence, 
status quo, or increased member state-industry co­
operation - but endorses none
>r
Roundtable 3 
(1998)
All stakeholders plus: 
National regulatory 
officials; independent 
experts
• again financed by Commission grant
• discussion hijacked by Commission’s 'Communication on a 
Single Pharmaceutical Market’
• no proposals on moving forwards on the pricing issue; 
mainly accusation and counter-accusation regarding the 
industrial-orientation of the Communication
G10 (High L e v e l Group on Innovation and the Provision of Medicines)*
'Compet­
itiveness'
Set up by DG Enterprise in 2001 and involving selected membership (recall Table 7-2). Industry is again the 
strongest actor with EFPIA and individual companies represented. Consumer interests are comparatively 
neglected with no important policy actors present, and only some member states are involved. Having met 
once to-date, the group has been unable to deliver any implementable policy proposals in general, and vis- 
a-vis pricing in particular. It is, however, an example of the continued pro-industry agenda pursued by DG 
Enterprise, along with its attempt to narrow the actors in order to try to achieve some sort of policy.
* Not a case-study, but as shown in Chapter 7, a policy network in its own right.
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Despite the Commission’s best efforts to galvanise support on the issue, therefore, the 
assertion (after the industrial policy Communication) that: “The European Community’s 
foray into pricing could overall be characterised as having achieved a minimum of 
interference in pricing and reimbursement programs run by the Member States” (Hodges 
1997, 252) remains valid. Not only do the member states remain sceptical, but the industry 
and consumer interests remain for the most part happier with the current situation. This 
may in part be due to uncertainty over what harmonised prices might actually bring in 
practice (i.e. higher costs or lower costs; higher or lower prices), but as the costs to 
governments and industry could potentially be considerable (in the medium-term at least), 
neither has much interest in following the Commission’s lead. Ultimately, with pricing and 
reimbursement"... a political issue that touches the very heart of social policy” (Deloitte- 
Touche 1993) -  as acknowledged in a report prepared on behalf of the Commission -  the 
result is that all stakeholders pursue individualistic agendas, even within any policy 
networks which form, and majoritarian politics prevails.
2-2 Ad hoc development of competencies and interest-group politics
In Chapter 3 the Community’s history in the field of medicines policy was shown to be 
somewhat chequered. The (incomplete) regulatory framework is in large part an amalgam 
of competencies added when needed and where possible, rather than representing a 
concerted or integrated approach. And as the Commission has tried numerous strategies, 
this has resulted in a host of disparate powers most of which relate to the SEM:
The continuing influence of Brussels on drug affairs is refracted through a variety 
of prisms: at one extreme, the macro-considerations of the new European 
Medicines Agency on the discussions of the EU on balancing research strategies 
with health economics; at the other extreme, the micro-consideration of regulatory 
and legislative detail on medicines and their manufacture. (Albedo 1995a)
The result is an ad hoc framework which fails to address some important considerations 
i.e. health(care) aspects.
It has also been demonstrated that the Community’s framework has in large part been 
shaped by struggles between the main stakeholders, with the ECJ often involved e.g. over 
parallel trade. The Commission, the member states, the industry and consumer interests 
have all pushed certain agendas within particular policy networks, reflecting different types 
of policy outcomes and contributing to the ad hoc development of competencies. This 
relates to interest-group politicking in Wilson’s framework. It was mentioned in Chapter 4 
that in involving concentrated costs and benefits, regulatory policies subject to interest- 
group politics are the most challenging to implement. Only a small group derives the most 
benefit, with the majority losing out. Furthermore, the high costs of the proposed policy are
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also to be borne by a small group. The result is a host of potentially affected actors striving 
to have their interests met at the same time as they seek to protect what they already 
have; none are prepared to bear the costs. Regarding the primary stakeholders, there is, 
therefore, little incentive to support the policy, especially as it may not be clear who will 
benefit, far less at what cost. What is clear, however, is that most will be unhappy should 
the policy -  somehow -  be enacted. This is unmistakably the case over a ‘completed’ 
single pharmaceuticals market. Each stakeholder has a different vision as to what they 
want from a harmonised market and what it would bring in practice. At the same time, 
each is aware that they stand to lose a great deal if their interests are not met.
A single market is likely to result in increased prices (Towse 1998). This benefits only the 
industry, which has consistently called for market-based pricing. So long as the member 
states seek to retain control over healthcare policy, it is, however, unlikely. As one analyst 
noted at the time of the implementation of the SEM, “Total pricing freedom for 
pharmaceuticals throughout Europe will only come about if the national governments think 
it is in their best interest; no notice what so ever will be taken of the industry’s views.” 
(Burstall cited in MARKETLETTER 1992b, 11)
Full deregulation would, however, also result in a stronger European industry in output and 
export terms (vis-a-vis the US in particular), but will come at the price of heavy 
streamlining. It is worth noting that although the US has much less employment in the 
sector, its output is very similar (compare Appendices 2-3, 5-1 and 5-2). Rationalisation 
will favour the larger firms (and their ‘home’ countries), but ultimately means less 
employment in the sector generally. As Rovira (1996) argues:
The process of concentrating both production and employment in a limited 
number of countries will probably continue, especially in those countries that 
already have a strong presence of research-based, innovative, multinational 
companies. (12)
By extension, member states with weaker industries will bear the costs of this in terms of 
loss of employment and production, and are likely to pursue mitigating national measures 
which may impact negatively on other countries (or on the European industry’s 
competitiveness as a whole). This will also mean the closing of many SMEs, many of 
which are innovative companies engaged in very specific research, and their closure would 
also impact on the discovery of new medicines. As stressed several times, a loss of jobs is 
something the member states in particular do not want to see, and it helps to explain why 
the industry has traditionally lent its support to national governments in opposing any 
Community pricing policy. Although the industry favours free-pricing as would be the case 
in a deregulated market, because of the uncertainties over what exactly this would mean in
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practice, industry often sides with the member states, using the employment issue as a 
bargaining-chip when discussing national pricing of its products.
Beyond these few likelihoods, however, nothing about what a single market would bring is 
certain. There would clearly be winners and losers amongst the stakeholders, but 
uncertainty and a fear of the unknown (i.e. who ‘wins’, by how much, who ‘pays’, etc) 
means none is committed. The Commission may be convinced of the merits of a single 
medicines market, but is also aware of the healthcare and social policy implications. In any 
event, it is unable to engender support even for price deregulation, and it lacks the 
authority to force the issue. As Kanavos & Mossialos (1999) note:
Clearly the desire to complete a single market passes through national channels 
but is subject to pressures at the supranational level... the politics involved in 
national and supranational decision-making add a further dimension, which 
cannot be ignored. (53)
Completion of the single pharmaceutical market (Commission-driven) is thus unlikely in the 
short term -  achieving outcomes via interest group-politics is in any event a long-term 
undertaking when attainable. The peculiarity and sensitivity of the sector, as noted by 
Cecchini already in 1988, has ensured that harmonisation would not prove a 
straightforward process; thirteen years since publication of the report, ten since the 
inception of the SEM, and seven since the installation of the EMEA, and there is still no 
single pharmaceuticals market. Still, as this study has shown, a complex regulatory 
framework does exist.
In order to be more effective (and equitable), however, the multiple and varied 
competencies which make up this framework require consolidation under a comprehensive 
agenda which incorporates healthcare policy aspects as well. Entrusting pharmaceutical 
policy to the DG whose main duty is to promote European competitiveness, and an agency 
limited to an advisory role aimed primarily at speeding market approval times, does not 
amount to an integrated, far less appropriate, regulatory mandate. Here it has been asked 
why the EMEA is “... located in an industrial institution of the European Commission [DG 
Enterprise] despite the fact that its mission is ‘to promote the protection of human health... 
and of consumers of medicinal products’.” (Presc Int 2002, 9) Continuing to treat 
medicines as simply another ‘good’ or ‘service’ subject to free movement within Europe is 
not sufficient. However, redressing the framework would require not only a major alteration 
to the Treaty -  to overcome the subsidiarity-free movement clash -  it would also mean 
mitigating the costs and benefits to the stakeholders to ensure their support. Regulatory 
policy towards the full establishment of a single market is, in theory, achievable via 
interest-group politics, but the requisite widespread political will is not forthcoming.
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2-3 Acknowledging certain limitations
In Chapter 4 it was acknowledged that Wilson’s framework is not perfect. Not only is it 
something of a black and white view, and therefore quite rigid, but dividing policy outcomes 
into winners and losers scenarios is somewhat simplistic. Regulatory policy is admittedly 
more nuanced; particularly so for medicines. In addition, the politics of policy seems a 
view predicated on economic gain (or cost) being actors’ primary concern. Interests vis-a- 
vis pharmaceutical regulation clearly go beyond this in incorporating welfare and ethical 
concerns as well. These short-comings do not, however, detract from the approach’s 
wider value in establishing constraints on the regulator and the different types of politicking 
which can result from divergent interests (perceptions). It is towards this end that Wilson’s 
typology has been applied to the pharmaceuticals case. This was to help understand actor 
behaviour within the networks, and what effect (constraints) this would have on the type of 
regulatory policy-making necessary to achieve an outcome i.e. by showing how and where 
policy outcomes are likely within the free movement-subsidiarity dissonance given 
stakeholder preferences and influence.
Moreover, the framework was not employed in isolation. Nor was it held up as the 
definitive manner of conceiving of EU pharmaceutical policy-making. But as it does help to 
identify certain issues not captured by other theoretical approaches, it was used as one 
element in a wider perspective -  the configurations of actors’ perceived gains and losses 
were employed within the context of a policy network approach. The application of this 
view of regulatory policy-making helped to show where and to what extent European 
medicines policies have been achievable (by establishing certain constraints), and how the 
networks have behaved. The case-studies demonstrated that policy outcomes have been 
the result of at least three of the policy-making styles (with the fourth scenario 
corresponding to the wider question of what an integrated medicines market might mean). 
It seems that only over policy issues involving a clear concentrated gain or loss to one or 
more of the stakeholders has action been possible. And while this may be true of any 
industry and over any type of regulatory intervention, for pharmaceuticals it has major 
consequences given the ethical and welfare (and healthcare spending) issues at stake.
That different outcomes in the EU pharmaceutical sector fit different dimensions of the 
politics of policy is an important observation. Regulatory policy-making in other industries 
would likely correspond to one or perhaps two scenarios at the most. This is because the 
issues at stake are far less divisive, both on their own merits and with regard to the way in 
which policy is made. Moreover, the Commission’s hands are likely to be somewhat freer. 
Figure 8-1 thus reflected an industry in which the reaching of regulatory policy-decisions is 
especially complex. Indeed, when public health and healthcare concerns are coupled with
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the interests of a strong and profitable industry, the stakes involved are such that there are 
bound to be major winners and losers over each policy; the relative per capita gains or 
losses will also vary significantly. It is because of this that the regulatory intervention under 
consideration can result in different types of politicking and, ultimately, outcomes.
By employing networks in this manner, it was expected that the study would not only 
benefit from, but would also contribute to, the current public policy literature by 
demonstrating the value and applicability of the approach in a complex field. And as it has 
been shown how aspects of the EU framework correspond to different cells, the typology 
underlines the politics and complexity of the sector, helping to demonstrate that industry 
can (and does) come to dominate individual policy networks. What is especially 
noteworthy from the application of the politics of policy framework, therefore, is that it 
reveals the multi-dimensional nature of the sector from a policy-making perspective. This 
goes beyond the market/industry peculiarities and economics of the industry which receive 
so much attention in the literature. It helps to show what the proscribed Commission role 
has meant in practice, and what the other stakeholders have done in response. 
Importantly, as this establishes further constraints beyond the subsidiarity-free movement 
clash on the Commission’s ability to take the harmonisation process forward, it helps to 
explain the lack of a historically consistent strategy for pharmaceuticals in the Community. 
In turn, this provides support for the contention that, despite different politicking styles -  the 
regulatory framework is one which tends towards industry’s interests.
3 Closing Observations
The reasons for the regulatory framework favouring the industry are therefore clear. 
Foremost is the stability of industry within the policy-process. As set out in Chapter 1, 
these are because of: the natural alliance between the Commission’s single market 
priorities and the industry’s economic demands; the institutional leaning of the Commission 
where subsidiarity ensures that it only has competence over industrial policy matters; and 
the fragmented nature of the market in terms of industry being the only stable actor. All are 
contributing factors, and require summing up to bring home the arguments.
3-1 Continuing with an industry-oriented framework
Foremost of the three factors is the stability of industry within the policy-process when the 
other stakeholders were (are) fragmented. As Tables 8-1, 8-2 and 8-3 highlight, the 
research-based industry was shown to be present at every stage of the policy-process in 
all three of the case-studies; the policy networks invariably began with the Commission and 
EFPIA. Moreover, the industry (including generic companies) essentially voiced the same
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demands in each case. Indeed, their requirements and arguments about rising research 
and development costs, stricter national controls, patent-term extension and speed of 
access to market for new medicines have hardly changed over the 30-plus years since the 
original 1965 Directive. This institutional as well as agenda stability is in stark contrast to 
the situation amongst the other stakeholders.
Beginning with the member states, different countries had different priorities at different 
times. The German government for instance supported the SPC, but had opposed both 
the Transparency Directive and, initially, the EMEA. Different cost-containment priorities 
and changing national administrations (elections) has also meant an inconsistent approach 
to EU pharmaceutical policy. Inconsistency or a lack of stability in the Commission’s 
stance stems from the fact that policy has to be co-ordinated and agreed amongst multiple 
Directorate-Generals. The effect of this was most apparent over the industrial policy 
Communication when the social affairs Commissioner (DGV) disagreed with his industrial 
affairs counterpart (DGIII), forcing a compromise document which took the teeth out of the 
proposal. A major point of instability was of course the dissolution of the Commission in 
1999 -  all established lines of contact and process (path dependency) were dissolved -  
and in particular the resignation of Commissioner Bangemann. His departure was a major 
disappointment to industry, who praised his contribution to the pursuit of single market at a 
meeting held in the EMEA offices in April 1999, when he formally said his ‘goodbyes’ 
(Gopal 1999). That said, Enterprise Commissioner Liikanen does seem willing to don Dr 
Bangemann’s pro-industry hat. As for consumers, their lack of stability is manifest in being 
at the fringes of the formal policy-process. In each of the case-studies, consumer interests 
were not actively involved by the Commission, although some groups were very pro-active 
in presenting the other side of the story to Parliament. Even then, however, when their 
interests were picked up by the Parliament or Economic and Social Committee, the 
Commission was generally hesitant to incorporate them in its policy documents.
Second, the complimentarity between industry’s demands and priorities and the 
Commission’s industrial policy (competitiveness) aims, has meant that DGIII was always a 
likely ally to the industry; indeed, industry always featured in its initial consultations. In the 
case of the SPC the Commission showed just how keen it was. Here the information used 
by industry to make its case was uncritically adopted by the Commission, both on its own 
merits and towards bringing the sector more in line with a single market. This use of 
information by industry itself contributes to the industry’s stability. The same basic 
arguments, supported with data only it had access to, were reflected in all Commission 
proposals: the reasons for extending patent-times under the SPC; why medicine 
registration needed to be speeded via the EMEA; how to tackle price differentials within the 
context of loss of market position to the US and Japan in the industrial policy
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Communication, etc. And here it is again worth noting that the SPC, EMEA and 
transparency legislation was always debated by the Internal Market Council.
Finally, a pro-active Commission looking to expand its competencies in a field in which it 
was otherwise constrained has also contributed to a pro-industry framework. Its industrial 
policy authority stems from member states’ adamant over their retention of healthcare 
competence -  not to mention to ensure a contributing industry -  and is reinforced by Article 
152. The Commission has thus sought to make policy where and when it could; and it 
could only in matters related to the single market. The bottom-line is that the Commission 
is unable to legislate over the more social policy elements of pharmaceutical regulation. 
This is the major constraint it faces where pharmaceutical policy is concerned and, 
recalling the discussion in Chapter 2, it reiterates the question of regulatory capture.
The literature on economic theories of regulation suggests that one of the ways 
capture can be assessed -  insofar as it is measurable -  is through a gradual and 
creeping pro-industry bias in the work of the regulator. At the national level, the 
exceptional patent exhaustion rights offered the industry, along with ‘local content’ 
requirements and favourable tax arrangements, do perhaps raise questions; 
governments are thus often accused of complicity. At EU level, the SPC, the EMEA’s 
operations, and the Commission’s competitiveness approach seem prime examples. It 
also appears that companies often collaborate over Community policy as means of 
bypassing (stricter) national level regulatory policies (recall Chapters 5 and 6). And 
with a Commission seeking to "... meet the political objectives of a single European 
market and the commercial agendas of transnational pharmaceutical companies” 
(Lewis & Abraham 2001, 53), EU pharmaceutical policy may be an example of 
(supranational) regulatory capture184.
184 Further evidence comes from the Commission’s review of pharmaceutical legislation (COM 2001). 
Called for under Regulation 2309/93 establishing the EMEA, and based on a private consultants’ 
report into the agency’s work (Cameron McKenna 2000), the review contains several controversial 
proposals. Foremost is the introduction of a five-year pilot programme whereby companies will be able 
to provide information about their drugs (for AIDS, asthma and diabetes) via the Internet or in 
specialised publications on request from a patient or consumer group. This has met with criticism from 
those who see it as an endorsement of direct-to-consumer advertising of medicines. Although 
Commissioner Liikanen has stressed that “This is not direct-to-consumer advertising... I am against 
direct marketing” (as cited in Watson 2001,184), many medical associations and independent 
consumer groups are sceptical. On the basis of the US experience with DTC, they fear the effects on 
prices, healthcare funding, and doctors’ authority, especially as DTC has not been shown to bring a 
health benefit (e.g. HAI 2001, CA 2001). The review does contain proposals for a fast track 
registration for products of ‘major therapeutic interest’ (similar to that existing in the US) and the idea of 
a Europe-wide system of pre-authorisation availability for certain medicines on grounds of 
‘compassionate use’, but these are tempered by recommendations for industry representation on the 
EMEA management board and reform of the agency mandate to include a role in providing scientific 
advice to the manufacturers. While these proposals may, in the Commission’s words, aim to 
guarantee the highest possible level of health protection for European citizens via the safety, quality 
and efficacy criteria, they are clearly designed primarily to speed the authorisation process and 
improve the industry’s competitiveness.
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3-2 Broader theoretical considerations
In summary, the theoretical element of the study showed the broad-based relevance of EU 
integration theories to the development of EU pharmaceutical competencies and drew out 
some important insights to be gleaned from them. This was tied into the regulatory policy­
making (process-oriented) perspective to gain a more complete understanding of how the 
Commission behaves and how such policy is made. Here Wilson’s ‘politics of policy’ was 
employed as an important supplement in the use of policy networks. The objective having 
been to offer a more detailed understanding of the processes at work in shaping European 
pharmaceutical policy (a theoretical lens), as well as providing the means to test the 
study’s hypothesis185.
In so-saying, it is nevertheless recognised that the ‘macro’ and ‘meso’ address different 
things, or at least, different tiers. Indeed, Hix’s (1994) distinction between theories of 
European integration and the ‘politics of the EU policy-process’ was noted in Chapter 3. 
However, this distinction need not always be thought of so rigidly, especially not when the 
intent is to provide a more all-round perspective. For it is clear that with a sector as 
complex as medicines, outcomes (via policy networks) are not achieved in a vacuum. 
Policy is influenced by the macro-environment as well as by the regulatory environment; in 
this case, the subsidiarity-free market dissonance and the politics of policy.
This elucidation of a specific analytical framework to analyse EU pharmaceutical policy­
making runs the risk of remaining context-specific. As a proponent of new institutionalist 
theory, Bulmer (1997) has expressed the fear that:
We may end up with a bewildering set of policy cases explained by a further array 
of analytical frameworks... taken to an extreme, this situation could atomise 
empirical research on the EU, while failing to identify a common methodological 
strand for analysis of the different levels of research problem. (1)
Nevertheless, the continuing multiplicity of theoretical variations and illustrations suggests 
that European policy-making (and ultimately integration) remains a changing and exciting 
field of study. As one reason for the unique nature of EU governance is that it continues to 
evolve, it is one which would benefit from continuing research into individual policy cases, 
even if resulting in the elucidation of policy-specific frameworks -  this contributes to a 
better understanding of the wider process itself. This is not to suggest that Bulmer’s fear is 
unfounded. The call for a ‘common methodological strand’ to analyse the ‘different levels
185 This also offers some insight into the forces shaping the European polity itself; something which may 
prove particularly useful when assessing the effects that the next round of accessions may have on the 
industrial makeup of the EU.
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of research problem’ is a valuable one. But seeing it as a de facto case against the pursuit 
of frameworks specific to individual policy issues seems an unnecessary corollary.
Policy-making inter-dependencies and relationships which characterise national 
administrations do not feature (or at least are not yet fixed) at supranational level. 
Moreover, different policy fields generate their own policy-making dynamics, particularly 
where complex issues are at stake. Again pharmaceuticals have here been shown to be a 
very unique case. Understanding policy-making in this sector -  in particular the constraints 
involved and the Commission’s inhibited role -  necessitates the specific analytical 
framework provided. That said, the study has sought a more integrated perspective in 
order to grasp the wider development of Community medicine competencies within the 
context of the SEM.
In this vein, the study can be seen as having broadly conformed to a new-institutionalist 
frame of analysis, even if not representing a strict application. As mentioned in Chapters 3 
and 4, elements of the discussion, including how actors behave vis-a-vis pharmaceutical 
policy within the EU’s formal decision-making structures, how their preferences are shaped 
by past actions, and how the member states operate within Scharpfs (1988) ‘joint decision 
trap’ are in keeping with such a framework. However, the focus was on meso-level 
interactions over specific policy issues -  what the stakeholders’ interests were, how they 
pursued them, and in what manner this affected outcomes. The study thus employed 
theories germane to ‘different levels of the research problem’ towards showing how they 
can be used to better understand policy-making for pharmaceuticals in the SEM. 
Moreover, the discussion has sought to establish linkages between them. Admittedly, 
over-laying or using several approaches in tandem may not be what Bulmer is calling for. 
But the complexity of the pharmaceutical case seems best captured by such a lens.
3-3 Possibilities for future research
Despite the theoretical limitations outlined, both the nature of the study and the approach 
used suggest potential further areas of research. For instance, the discussion sought to 
employ the interest-intermediation conception of policy networks towards characterising 
policy-making in the sector. As such the governance aspect of the approach has 
necessarily been neglected. And though scholars such as Dowding (1995) are 
unconvinced about this perspective in particular, it is the author’s opinion that considering 
the network as a dynamic unto itself is indeed valid; especially within the EU as a sui 
generis policy-making system. Indeed, some scholars claim that “... the governance 
structure of a network shapes the incentives of the participants and induces the latter to act 
in a specific way”; such that"... policy network analysis explains the development of public
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policies in terms of complex exchange and transaction processes between network actors 
within given institutional restrictions.” (Windhoff-Heritier 1993, 44 & 149) Hence, using it as 
a theory for explaining governance at the supranational level, and relating this to 
pharmaceutical policy could be pursued as an area for future research. In particular, the 
interplay between national and subnational, the emergence of a transnational European 
pharmaceutical network, and the effect of comitology are all potentially interesting areas. 
Multi-level governance would seem the natural theoretical backbone to which such 
analysis could be fused.
Future research might also concentrate to a greater extent on the meso-level than was 
undertaken here. It would be interesting to break down the stakeholders further. Beyond 
citing the positions of different member states as this study has done, closer inspection is 
likely to reveal that different ministries (health, finance, competition, etc) were involved in 
different policy networks. Just as EFPIA first approached the Competition DG about 
patent-term extension before selling the idea to the Industrial Affairs DG, it would be 
interesting to compare which ministries took what decisions in each member state. This 
would further reveal the extent to which the countries have different priorities. A similar line 
could be adopted with regard to the Commission -  which DG was most involved in 
preparing the legislation and what sort of consultation took place -  as well as to the 
Council of Ministers -  which Council approved which piece of legislation, and how did the 
member states vote. Such differences have only been hinted at here. These lines of 
enquiry are also likely to strengthen this study’s contention that the industry has been able 
to dominate the policy networks by being the only stable actor throughout.
Ruled out for the purposes of this study, a quantitative approach could perhaps be adopted 
for future policy initiatives. It may be possible to quantify inter-network relationships on the 
basis of recorded interactions -  although the researcher would have to overcome the major 
obstacles posed by the lack of transparency. Indeed, the informational asymmetries which 
characterise the sector at both national and EU level could also be studied more closely; 
particularly the informational monopoly held by the companies. As Davis (1997) notes,"... 
the pharmaceutical arena is ‘data rich’, but access to these data is hedged about by 
restrictions imposed by law, by regulation, by commercial covenant and by financial ability.” 
(148) This too would underline the role of industry in the policy-process.
Finally, it may also be possible to apply the study’s theoretical lens elsewhere. This may 
reveal whether actors or stakeholders in other sectors have also been able to benefit from 
specific regulatory interventions by dominating policy networks to their advantage. That 
said, the politics of policy framework seems especially interesting in the case of
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pharmaceuticals because of the sector’s unique characteristics, including the different 
policy inputs and pressures which define it.
In the opening chapter it was stated that the pharmaceutical sector is an inherently political 
one in involving three often conflicting inputs: public health, healthcare and industrial 
policy. That the outcome is a clash between governments’ political and economic priorities 
is widely-recognised, especially as it contributes to distinguishing pharmaceuticals as 
peculiar in comparison to other industrial sectors. Yet, there are few political examinations 
of how supranational decisions are taken despite the fact that this clash is manifest in a 
tension between the healthcare autonomy of the member states and the imperatives of the 
single market; not to mention given the Commission’s limited competence. There has 
instead been an overwhelming focus on the economic and legal issues associated with 
what is an economically very important industry.
This represents something of an oversight. While economic determinants are central 
elements in the policy-process, and ought therefore to be widely examined, they do not on 
their own decide outcomes. ‘Politics’ in the sense of competition for influence, bargaining 
between actors and achieving compromise outcomes is, as the study has shown, at least 
an equally prominent consideration. Even at national level, the salience of political 
bargaining by groups of (aggregated) interests in the debates on cost-containment, pricing 
strategies and general healthcare reform vis-a-vis medicines, has yet to receive the notice 
it is due. The role of politics in explaining regulatory policy outcomes in the European 
pharmaceutical sector has generally been ignored. It is this gap in the literature which the 
present study has sought to address. In doing so -  by focusing mainly on stakeholder 
behaviour in policy networks -  the study has demonstrated the political struggle between 
health(care) and industrial interests in having led to the current framework. More 
importantly, it revealed a Community regulatory regime which ultimately favours producer 
interests before those of consumers.
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A p p e n d ix  2 -1 : EU M e m b e r S ta tes ’ P h a rm a c e u tic a l Supply and D em and R egu la tory  M easures (c o s t-c o n ta in m e n t m echan ism s)
Regulato ry  mechanism O bjective Na tio n a l  D ifferences Countries
Price-capping (average prices and/or 
maximum price agreements)
Formula to calculate prices based on other 
EU and international prices
Mechanism and methodology DAN, IRE, ITA, NETH, POR, SWE
Negotiated pricing Other EU and international prices may be 
taken into account
Countries used as comparators DAN, FRA, GRE, IRE, ITA, NETH, 
SPA, SWE
Compared prices Cost taken into consideration Products used as comparators BEL, SPA
Price cuts Control drug expenditure Degree and length BEL, DAN, IRE, UK
Price-to-volume arrangements Linking price to volume to control 
expenditure
Volume levels AUT, FRA, SPA, SWE
Supply-Side
Measures
Cost-effectiveness and 
'pharmacoeconomic’ pricing
Establish 'fa ir' price according to cost- 
benefit comparison
Methodology DAN, FIN, IRE, NETH, PORT, 
SWE, UK
Drug lists and formularies Control drug costs by improving prescribing 
patterns
Consumption patterns (national or 
regional)
Positive lists: AUT, BEL, DAN, 
FIN, FRA, IRE, ITA, NETH, POR, 
SPA, SWE
Negative lists: DEU, SPA, SWE, 
UK
Reference pricing or fixed 
reimbursement
Lower prescription costs Products included, and pricing 
formulae
BEL, DAN, DEU, ITA, NETH, SPA, 
SWE
Profit control Equilibrium between industry requirements 
and affordability of medicines
’ UK
Co-payments Cost reduction through patient charges Rate of co-payment AUT, FIN, POR, SPA, UK
Generic substitution Control demand-side expenditure by 
targeting pharmacists
- UK
Demand and 
Proxy- 
Demand- 
Side
Generic prescribing Reducing doctors choice of/preference for 
branded medicines in favour of generic 
preparations
UK
Prescription controls Limit unnecessary prescribing - BEL, DEU, FIN, UK
Measures Prescription budgets/targets for 
doctors
Limit drug expenditure by influencing 
volume or cost of drugs prescribed by 
doctors
Level of implementation, and type 
of incentives/penalties
GER, FRA, IRE, EUK
Drug utilisation reviews Checking doctors’ prescribing habits to 
identify unnecessary or over-prescribing
Targets, methodology and 
implementation (national or 
regional)
GER, UK
AUT: Austria DEU: Germany GRE: Greece LUX: Luxembourg SPA: Spain
BEL: Belgium FIN: Finland IRE: Ireland NETH: Netherlands SWE: Sweden
DAN: Denmark FRA: France ITA: Italy POR: Portugal UK: United Kingdom
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A p p e n d ix  2-2: EU Member State Pharmaceutical Production (million €), 1986-2000
M e m b e r  St a t e 1986 1990
......-..-..... ■■.........
1995 2000
A u s tr ia n.a. n.a. 1,848 1,548
Be l g iu m 805 1,133 2,400 4,203
D en m ar k 898 1,317 2,491 3,609
F in la n d 285 457 461 600
France 10,401 15,088 22,623 25,174
G er m an y 9,277 12,210 17,443 18,558
G reece 230 357 601 438
Irela nd 365 632 1,809 5,657
It a l y 7,621 12,133 13,821 14,668
LUXEMBOURG n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
N e th e r la n d s 1,290 1,772 3,051 5,013
Po r t u g a l 275 467 558 752
Spa in 2,514 4,624 6,272 7,283
Sw e d e n n.a. 1,518 3,076 5,295
U n it e d  K in g d o m 5,027 7,350 10,801 19,755
To t a l (EU 15) 41,139 60,383 86,955 113,125
Sources: EUROSTAT (1998), EFPIA (2002).
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A p p e n d ix  2-3: Em ploym ent in  th e  Pharm aceutical Industry (thousands), 1980-2000 
(EU, US & Japan)
550-i
□  Japan
1980 1986 1990 1995 2000
Sources: EUROSTAT (1998), EFPIA (2002), JPMA (2002), PhRMA (2002).
A p p e n d ix  2-4: EU M ember S tate Employment in th e  Pharm aceutical Industry, 2000
M em ber  St a t e N um b er  Em p lo y e d
A u s t r ia 9,200
Be l g iu m 22,713
De n m a r k 17,574
F in l a n d 6,544
Fr an c e 95,300
G er m a n y 114,581
G reece 11,500
Ir ela n d 16,000
It a l y 72,559
N e th e r la n d s 13,200
Po r t u g a l 938
Sp a in 38,700
Sw e d e n 18,700
U n it e d  K in g d o m 65,000
T o t a l 511,959
Source: EFPIA (2002).
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A p p e n d ix  2-5: EU Member States’ Total Expenditure on Health (% GDP), 2000
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Appendix 2-6: EU Member States’ Total Expenditure on Health (per capita US$), 2000
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A ppendix  2-7: Domestic Research & D evelopm ent Spending (US$ million, EU versus 
US), 1990-2000
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Appendix 2-8: European Legislation vis-a-v is  Medicinal Products for Human Use, 1965-2001
| Legislation  in Force -  Name a nd  T ype* OJ Reference*
Council Directive (65/65/EEC) of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products. L22 09.02.65 p. 369
Council Directive (75/318/EEC) of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to analytical, pharmacotoxicological and clinical standards and protocols in respect of the testing of medicinal products. L147 09.06.75 p. 1
Council Directive (75/319/EEC) of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to medicinal products. L147 09.06.75 p. 13
Council Decision (75/320/EEC) of 20 May 1975 setting up a Pharmaceutical Committee. L147 09.06.75 p. 23
Council Directive (78/25/EEC) of 12 December 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the colouring matters which may be added to medicinal products. L11 14.01.78 p.18
Council recommendation (83/571 /EEC) of 26 October 1983 concerning tests relating to the placing on the market of proprietary medicinal products. L332 28.11.83 p. 11
Council recommendation (87/176/EEC) of 9 February 1987 concerning tests relating to the placing on the market of proprietary medicinal products. L73 16.03.87 p. 1
Council Directive (89/105/EEC) of 21 December 1988 relating to the transparency of measures regulating the pricing of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion within the scope of national health insurance systems. L40 11.02.89 p .8
Council Directive (89/342/EEC) of 3 May 1989 extending the scope of Directives 65/65/EEC and 75/319/EEC and laying down additional provisions for immunological medicinal products consisting of vaccines, toxins or serums and 
allergens.
L142 25.05.89 p. 14
Council Directive (89/343/EEC) of 3 May 1989, extending the scope of Directives 65/65/EEC and 75/319/EEC and laying down additional provisions for radiopharmaceuticals. L142 25.05.89 p. 16
Council Directive (89/381/EEC) of 14 June 1989 extending the scope of Directives 65/65/EEC and 75/319/EEC on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal 
products and laying down special provisions for medicinal products derived from human blood or human plasma.
L181 28.06.89p .44
Commission Directive (91/356/EEC) of 13 June 1991 laying down the principles and guidelines of good manufacturing practice for medicinal products for human use. L193 17.07.91 p .30
Council Directive (92/25/EEC) of 31 March 1992 on the wholesale distribution of medicinal products for human use. L113 30.04.92 p.1
Council Directive (92/26/EEC) of 31 March 1992 concerning the classification for the supply of medicinal products for human use. L113 30.04.92 p .5
Council Directive (92/27/EEC) of 31 March 1992 on the labelling of medicinal products for human use and on package leaflets. L113 30.04.92 p .8
Council Directive (92/28/EEC) of 31 March 1992 on the advertising of medicinal products for human use. L113 30.04.92 p. 13
Council Regulation No (EEC) 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products. L182 02.07.92 p.1
Council Directive (92/73/EEC) of 22 September 1992 widening the scope of Directives 65/65/EEC and 75/319/EEC on the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to medicinal products 
and laying down additional provisions on homeopathic medicinal products.
L297 13.10.92 p .8
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93 of 22 July 1993 laying down Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of 
Medicinal Products.
L214 24.08.93 p.1
Council Regulation (EC) No 297/95 of 10 February 1995 on fees payable to the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products. L35 15.02.95p.1
Commission Regulation (EC) No 540/95 of 10 March 1995 laying down the arrangements for reporting suspected unexpected adverse reactions which are not serious, whether arising in the Community or in a third country, to medicinal 
products for human or veterinary use authorized in accordance with the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93.
L55 11.03.95 p.S
Commission Regulation (EC) No 541 /95 of 10 March 1995 concerning the examination of variations to the terms of a marketing authorization granted by a competent authority of a Member State. L55 11.03.95 p .7
Commission Regulation (EC) No 542/95 of 10 March 1995 concerning the examination of variations to the terms of a marketing authorization falling within the scope of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93. L55 11.03.95 p. 15
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1662/95 of 7 July 1995 laying down certain detailed arrangements for implementing the Community decision-making procedures in respect of marketing authorizations for products for human or veterinary 
use.
L158 08.07.95 p. 4
Council Resolution (96/C 136/04) of 23 April 1996 designed to implement the outlines of an industrial policy in the pharmaceutical sector in the European Union. C l36 08.05.96 p .4
Council Regulation (EC) No 1610/96 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for plant protection products. L198 08.08.96 p .30
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2141/96 of 7 November 1996 concerning the examination of an application for the transfer of a marketing authorization for a medicinal product falling within the scope of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2309/93.
L286 08.11.96 p. 6
Council Directive (1999/83/EC) of 8 September 1999 amending the Annex to Council Directive 75/318/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to analytical, pharmacotoxicological and clinical standards and 
protocols in respect of the testing of medicinal products
L243 15.09.99 p. 9
Commission Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of 16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal products L18 22.01.00 p.1
Directive 2001 /20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the implementation of good clinical 
practice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products for human use.
L121 01.05.01p.34
Commission Regulation (EC) No 847/2000 of 27 April 2000 laying down the provisions for implementation of the criteria for designation of a medicinal product as an orphan medicinal product and definitions of the concepts 'similar 
medicinal product’ and 'clinical superiority’
L130 28.04.00 p. 5
Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use. L311 28.11.01 p. 67
Convention on the elaboration of a European Pharmacopoeia. L158 25.06.94 p. 19
Protocol to the Convention on the elaboration of a European Pharmacopoeia. L1S8 25.06.94 p.22
*Listed under Sub-section 13.30.15 (Proprietary Medicinal products) of the Analytical Register of Community Legislation in Force. Section 13 is 'Industrial policy and
Internal Market’ ; Section 13.30 is 'Internal Market: approximation of laws’ . 
vOfficial Journal of the European Communities.
Source: adapted from EudraLex Volume 1: Medical Products for Human Use (h ttp ://dg3.eudra.o rg /F2/eudralex/vo l-1 /hom e.h tm , last accessed 01.08.02).
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A p p e n d ix  4 - 1 : Principal National Actors and Policy Objectives in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector
: •
St a t e
Regulation
Funding
Delivery
Economic
Ministries
health
finance
service
trade, industry
• adequate supply of safe, quality and effective 
medicines
• minimise tax-funded health expenditure
• maximise access to care for those most in need
• encourage local industry, employment, exports
I n d u s t r y
innovation
reproduction
Firms
research
generic
• maximise profits and safeguard research base
• improve competitive position
D is t r ib u t io n  & 
In s u r a n c e
distribution
insurers
Firms
wholesalers
companies
• improve margins
• segment market to best advantage
P r o f e s s io n s
prescribing
dispensing
Associations
medicine
pharmacy
• maximise autonomy and meet patient needs
• enlarge professional role and meet client needs
H e a l t h  S e r v ic e
primary
secondary
regional
Organisations 
practices 
hospitals 
health systems
: • maintain local visibility and community support 
j • maintain market share and organisational visibility 
| • meet requirements of key stakeholders
O t h e r
consumers
scientific
community
media
Various
associations/patient
groups
journals
firms
• ensure access to safe and effective drugs
• advance knowledge and academic freedom
• enhance or maintain market segment
Source: adapted from  Davis (1997), 21.
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A p p e n d ix  4-2: Selected Actors and Affected Interests in the EU Pharmaceutical Sector
Primary Stakeholder Actor Type Example
Consumers
Patient/Consumer groups 
National 
EU level
Consumers’ Association (UK)
BEUC (Bureau Europeen des Unions des Consommateurs)
Disease-specific patient 
organisations 
National 
EU level
Patientforenigen (SWE)
European Foundation for Osteoporosis
Industry
Manufacturers 
Proprietary medicines 
Generics
Companies e.g. Glaxo-Wellcome pic (UK) 
Companies e.g. PHC Pharmachemie (NED)
Industry groups (national): 
Ethical 
OTC
Generics
Industry Groups (EU): 
Ethical
OTC
Generics
BPI (Association of the German Pharmaceutical Industry) 
PAGB (Proprietary Association of Great Britain)
Aschimfarma (Italian Association of Bulk Pharmaceutical 
Chemicals Producers)
EFPIA (European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industry 
Associations)
AESGP (Association of the European Self-Medication Industry) 
EGA (European Generic medicines Association)
Member States
National governments Ministries of Health
Regulatory agencies MCA (Medicines Control Agency, UK)
BIRA (British Institute for Regulatory Affairs)
Medical Associations BMA (British Medical Association)
European Union
European Commission Working Parties
Council of Ministers COREPER (Comite des Representants Permanents)
(EMEA) (CPMP (Committee on Proprietary Medicinal Products))
Secondary Stakeholder Actor Type Example
European Union
European Parliament ENVI (Committee on the Environment, Public Health and 
Consumer Protection)
Committees Regulatory Committee 
Pharmaceutical Committee 
Transparency Committee
Health Professionals
Doctor Organisations Standing Committee of European Doctors
Pharmacist Groups PGEU (Pharmaceutical Group of the EU)
Nursing Organisations FINE (Federation of European Nurse Educators)
Other
National Pharmaceutical 
Associations
PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America) 
JPMA (Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association)
International
Pharmaceutical
Associations
IFPMA (International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association)
IGPA (International Generic Pharmaceutical Alliance)
International Trade or 
Industry Bodies
GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs)
TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement) 
ICH (International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human 
Use)
WTO (World Trade Organization)
International Organisations WHO (World Health Organization)
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A p p e n d ix  5-1: New Medicines Placed on the World Market (EU versus US), 1991 -1999
1991-1993 1994-1996 1997-1999
□  European Union ■  United S tates
Source: EFPIA (2001b)
A p p e n d ix  5-2: Breakdown of the World Pharmaceutical Market, 1990 & 2000
1990
31.2%
□  Europe M United S tates □  R est o f the W orld
2000
Sources: IMS Health data, EFPIA (2001b), EFPIA (2002).
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A p p e n d ix  6-1: Main Points of Comparison between the EU Agencies
Agency Based O perational Purpose Staff* Budget/Funding*
Community Plant Variety  
Office (CPVO)
Angers (Fr) 1994 Implements and applies the European system for protecting plant 
variety rights (intellectual property)
30 8,200,000  
90% from fees
European Agency for Safety 
and Health at Work (EASHW)
Bilbao (Sp) 1996 Works to support the EU institutions and the public with information 
on betters managing safety and health in workplace
40 6,900,000
97% Community subsidy
European Agency for the  
Evaluation of Medicinal 
Products (EMEA)
London (UK) 1995 Co-ordinate existing network of national experts regarding the  
supervision and authorisation of medicines (human and veterinary) 
in the Community
200 70,000,000  
70% from fees
European Centre for the  
Development of Vocational 
Training (CEDEFOP)
Thessaloniki
(Gr)
1975 Assist policy-makers, Commission, the member states and social 
partners across European in making informed choices about 
vocational training policy
100 14,00,000
97% Community subsidy
European Environment Agency 
(EEA)
Copenhagen
(Den)
1994 Management of a European observation and information 
dissemination network; helping to support sustainable development 
and to help achieve significant and measurable improvement in 
Europe’s environment
100 18,300,000
97% Community subsidy
European Foundation for the  
Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions (EFILWC)
Dublin (Ire) 1975 Contribute to the planning and establishment of better living and 
working conditions in the Community
90 15,000,000
97% Community subsidy
European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA)
Lisbon (Por) 1995 Co-ordination of a European observation network; provide the 
Community and member states with information concerning drugs 
and drug addiction and their consequences
50 10,000,000
90% Community subsidy
European Training Foundation 
(ETF)
Turin (It) 1995 Assist partner countries in reforming and modernising their 
vocational education and training and employment systems 
(including non-EU states)
130 16,800,000
97% Community subsidy
Office for Harmonisation of 
the Internal Market (Trade 
Marks and Designs) (OHIM)
Alicante (Sp) 1994 Co-ordinates and issues Community trademarks 700 113,600,000 
97% from fees
Translation Centre for Bodies 
of the European Union 
(TCBEU)
Luxembourg
(Lux)
1997 Serve translation needs of the Community agencies; working to 
promote collaboration and achieve economies of scale in the  
translation field
130 23,000,000  
90% from fees
* Approximate.
Sources: Mission statements of the agencies, and Reports of European Court of Auditors.
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Appendix 6-2: EMEA Centralised Procedure
Biotechnology Products Innovative Products
optional (applicant's 
discretion)
mandatory
4-6 months 
pre-submission 
assistance
CPMP evaluation, involving:
appointment of two 
assessment teams
generation of assessment 
report
validation of questions by 
CPMP
consideration of company 
responses
unfavourable maximum 60 days
Within 30 days, CPMP transmission to 
Commission, member states and applicant: 
\  •  Opinion 
/  • Assessment report
• Summary o f Product Characteristics
•  La bell ins & packagins insertmaximum 60 days
Second opinion
Company appeal
Day 70
Initial assessment considered
Day 180
Decision to hold hearing
Optional tim e before submission
Scientific advice
Day 120
List of questions fit first conclusions
Clock Stop
for answers by applicant
Day 210
Opinion adopted by CPMP
(Day 300) 
Commission Decision
Clock stop
Oral explanation hearing 
with the company
Day 15
Submission fit validation 
(application dossier to agency)
(Day 240)
Opinion (in all 11 EU languages) and 
assessment sent to Commission
Sources: adapted from Jeffreys (1995) fit COM (2001).
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A p p e n d ix  6-3: EMEA Decentralised Procedure
Application to first Member State
maximum 
210 days
Assessment report (including SPCs)
Parallel applications to other 
Member States
First authorisation
maximum  Applicant requests mutual recognition
90 days of the reference authorisation
may suspend evaluation and 
w ait fo r assessment report
Application & updated assessment 
report issued (to other Member 
States for recognition)
Certified identical dossier & 
identical SPCs
Mutual Recognition Process
O ther Mem ber States recognise licensing decision a fte r  
consultation w ith  first M em ber State and applicant
maximum 
55 days
No
Objections?
Yes
No (i.e. issues 
resolved)
Mutual recognition
Serious objections remain
Clarification & dialogue 
Point of view of applicant
-  Yes —
30 days
CPMP arbitration
maximum 90 days 
favourable
s
(Clock stop possible) 
Detailed statement of 
reasons; dossier provided 
by applicant
CPMP Opinion
Within 30 days, CPMP transmission to 
Commission, member states and applicant:
• Opinion
• Assessment report
• Summary of Product Characteristics (SPCs)
• Labelling & packaging insert
unfavourable maximum 60 days
Company appeal
Commission Decision
maximum 60 days
Second opinion (final)
Sources: adapted from Jeffreys (1995) & COM (2001).
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